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INTRODUCTION
Hon. Betty Weinberg Ellerin
Mothers who are victims of domestic violence and their en-
counters with our courts are the subjects of this conference, whose
proceedings are recorded in the Fordham Urban Law Journal. Un-
fortunately - and time and again participants of this conference
bear witness that this is the experience in New York - these wo-
men find the legal system is not always an ally in their quest for
safety, but yet another source of danger in their lives.
Conference speakers give a clear and disturbing picture of how
we ascribe a kind of omnipotence to mothers vis-a-vis their chil-
dren. If children are hurt, it is assumed that those at fault must be
the mothers, and they are likely to be blamed even when it is the
father who strikes the blows, lands the punches or terrifies the
child. Somehow, we imagine they should have been able to snatch
the children out of harm's way.
The implications of holding mothers strictly accountable for the
fates of their children are disastrous for the women whose lives are
dominated by the temper, rage or will to control of men in their
lives. Since they may be seen as the source of the very danger they
are trying to avert, women cannot count on the courts to help them
and may find the legal system ready to turn on them. As the pa-
pers in this volume detail, mothers seeking orders of protection in
New York City's Family Court frequently find themselves the sub-
ject of child neglect proceedings. So real is the danger of a child
protection agency stepping in (not just filing a petition but having
children placed in foster care), that some advocates for battered
mothers at the conference say they would do just about anything to
avoid evoking the power of the family court to help their clients
find safety.
At the same time the responsibilities of women are inflated, the
accountability of men for their own violence is lost. The focus on
the mother blurs the role of the fathers who created the danger.
Too often, still, the question asked is: "Why didn't she stop him or
get the children out of the way or leave?" instead of: "Why did he
threaten, hit or punch her?" And, as long as the wrong question is
asked, the incorrect answers will certainly be found. Sadly, instead
of searching for ways to use the agencies of the law to stop the
violent and abusive behavior of men, legal processes will be used to
sever children's ties to their mothers.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
The tendency of perceived solutions to backfire and the power of
backlash are other obstacles faced by abused mothers. Mandatory
arrest policies and statutes, put in place to assure that abusers are
subject to criminal law for their violence, have been turned against
women. Men have found ways, sometimes with the acquiescence
or tacit approval of the police, to have the women they have
abused arrested on invalid charges. At the same time, the research
on the dangers of domestic violence to children has strengthened
the hands of those who would convert a women's search for safety
into an attack on her as mother. Used against battered women is
the research that demonstrates the ways children are likely to be
abused themselves and the dangerous effects of domestic violence
on children within a household even if they are never subjected to
violence. Given the level of responsibility ascribed to mothers, the
research becomes an argument for taking the children from the
mother rather than yet another reason for removing the father
from the household.
Ultimately, the answers to these problems lie in making sure the
ways victims of domestic violence think about their lives and the
events that bring them into court are given voice, so that they have
a chance to supplant stereotypes. The advocates who participated
in this conference know full well how rarely women imagine their
search for safety in opposition to that of their children. More often,
these women place the welfare of their children above their own
and make their moves in the fraught atmosphere of family violence
in a way calculated to minimize the chances of harm to their chil-
dren. They usually understand instinctively how dangerous leaving
an abuser can be. They may be rightly convinced that no matter
how imperfect their efforts to find safety, no one, not a case
worker, foster parent or judge, will ever care nearly as much about
the well-being of their children as they themselves. Until courts
find ways to make sure victims' perceptions of abuse are heard,
credited and incorporated into legal processes, the legal system will
continue to falter in its efforts to do the right thing for domestic
violence victims who care for children.
As a judge who has devoted many years to New York State's
court system, I find the failures documented in this volume and the
need for the strategies to overcome them doubly troublesome. The
fate of women who still face an uncertain response from the court
system in itself is disturbing, but the fact that frequently it is the
courts that are failing them saddens me. The courts should do bet-
ter and are currently making great efforts to do so under the lead-
570
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ership of our chief judge. These efforts coupled with the
commitment and intelligence of those who have contributed to this
publication will, I have no doubt, ensure that the legal system will
become a dependable ally for women and children in their search
for safety from domestic violence.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
WELCOMING REMARKS,
APRIL 26, 1999
MS. HERMAN: On behalf of Dean John Feerick and Fordham
University School of Law, I want to welcome you to the third in a
series of conferences on domestic violence held at our school.
It is a privilege for our school to be a co-sponsor of this impor-
tant conference with the Appellate Division, First Department; the
Lawyers Committee Against Domestic Violence; the New York
State Judicial Committee on Women in the Courts; and other spon-
soring organizations.
I would like to extend a special welcome to the conference's fea-
tured speakers, the Honorable Roger Green, Assembly Member
and chair of the Standing Committee on Children and Families,
and the Honorable Ronnie Eldridge, who is a City Council Mem-
ber. I particularly want to thank all of the distinguished panelists
and moderators who come from the judiciary, private practice,
public service organizations and law enforcement, and whose par-
ticipation makes this such an outstanding conference.
In addition, I would like to recognize the Honorable Betty Wein-
berg Ellerin, Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division, First De-
partment, and Maria Imperial, executive director of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York Fund, Inc., both of
whom are being honored today with the first annual Lawyers Com-
mittee Against Domestic Violence "In the Trenches" Award.
I am proud to note that Fordham Law School participates in the
fight against domestic abuse through our Battered Women's Rights
Clinic, directed by Professor Leah Hill, who is one of the confer-
ence moderators, our Center for Family and Child Advocacy, co-
directed by Professor Ann Moynihan of Fordham Law School and
Dr. Virginia Strand of the Fordham Graduate School of Social
Services and our Public Interest Resource Center's Domestic Vio-
lence Advocacy Center, which this year made an extremely gener-
ous contribution to support this conference.
We would particularly like to extend special thanks to the mem-
bers of the Lawyers Committee Against Domestic Violence and its
co-chairs, Julie Domonkos, who is the director of Government Af-
fairs at Victim Services, and Catherine Douglass, who is the execu-
tive director of the Network for Women's Services, for doing an
extraordinary job of putting together today's program. Also, spe-
cial thanks to all the student board members of the Fordham Do-
mestic Violence Advocacy Center.
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This conference, entitled "Women, Children and Domestic Vio-
lence," examines one of the most agonizing, and also elusive, issues
affecting our nation today - the exploitation and abuse of some of
the most.vulnerable members of our community.
I know how much Dean Feerick values the commitment that all
of you are making in the campaign against domestic violence, and
on his behalf, I salute your outstanding efforts and wish you a very
successful conference.
I would now like to turn over the program to Julie Domonkos
and Catherine Douglass.
MS. DOUGLASS: I am Cathy Douglass, and I would like to
thank Helen Herman, who just preceded me. She has gone far be-
yond what one would expect from the lead person at a sponsoring
organization to ensure the success of this conference.
The Lawyers Committee Against Domestic Violence (the "Com-
mittee") is a co-sponsor and has really taken the lead role in put-
ting the substantive program together. The Committee is a
growing, vital organization that encourages all those interested to
participate by joining it. There are no dues other than hard work.
We meet every month. Every other month we have what we call
practice seminars, where we educate ourselves about legal issues,
bringing in outside people. Every other month we work through
committees that look at civil and criminal issues affecting families
that are experiencing domestic violence.
We have more than fifty members. The real criterion for mem-
bership is that you are willing to work on one of our committees.
You need not be a lawyer. Most of us are lawyers, hence the name,
but there are members who are not lawyers.
Now I would like to introduce my co-chair of the Committee,
Julie Domonkos.
MS. DOMONKOS: First, I want to thank our interpreters, Kelly
Shanahorn and Jennifer Kagan. Thank you for being with us today
and providing the interpreting services. We appreciate it.
Also, there is a Hypothetical1 in the materials handed out to all
participants. The panels :will be referring to and using this as an
interactive tool during the two days of the forum.
Now, it is my pleasure to introduce our keynote speaker, Assem-
bly Member Roger Green, who has represented the 57th Assembly
District of Downtown Brooklyn since 1981. The Committee in-
vited Assemblyman Green to speak here today because of his long
1. See Hypothetical, infra app. A.
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history of dedication to and concern for issues that affect New
York State's families. Assemblyman Green has been the chair of
the Assembly's Standing Committee on Children and Families
since 1993. In that role, he has legislative oversight for New York
State's laws pertaining to adoption, child protection, juvenile jus-
tice, day care and family preservation. In the area of juvenile jus-
tice, he has constantly reminded us that juvenile offenders are still
our children and that it is our obligation to ensure that they not
grow up surrounded by violence.
In his capacity as chair, Assemblyman Green initiated and con-
tributed to significant reforms in the child welfare system, includ-
ing the 1996 enactment of Elisa's Law,2 which increased the
capacity for oversight, monitoring, accountability and public disclo-
sure in the child protective system. This year, he worked to ensure
New York's compliance with the Federal Adoption and Safe Fami-
lies Act of 1997, 3 always keeping in focus that the primary perma-
nency plan for children is safe reunification with their families.
Assemblyman Green is the legislative creator of the New York
State Martin Luther King Institute on Nonviolence, which pro-
motes the study of civil rights, social history and nonviolence. He
also originated the Center for Law and Social Justice, which was
created in order for students of Medgar Evers College and the resi-
dents of central Brooklyn to address issues concerning the ongoing
struggle for social and economic justice.
These are but a few highlights from the career of a long-time
advocate for children and youth. In his remarks this morning, As-
semblyman Green will challenge us, as he always does, to confront
the issues of race, class and social and economic justice, which must
underlie any discussion of family violence.
Since we began planning this conference to challenge ourselves
and to address some of the toughest issues in the field of domestic
violence, I am very excited to introduce our keynote speaker, As-
semblyman Roger Green.
2. See N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 409-a (McKinney 1999).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 673b, 678, 679b (1999).
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS,
APRIL 26, 1999
ASSEMBLYMAN GREEN: Thank you very much. I am very
pleased to be here, and, as usual, would like to express my heartfelt
appreciation to the organizers of this extraordinary event. I would
like to thank Cathy Douglass and Julie Domonkos and the Com-
mittee for this event.
I come here today not to present a didactic lecture on the issue
of women, children and domestic violence, but instead as a student,
like many of the members of the State Legislature. This really rep-
resents a new paradigm in family law for us. As it is evolving, and
sometimes even moves in revolutionary spurts, we are all students
in this process.
I view Elisa's Law as critical to a number of different areas that I
am concerned about, especially the issue of child abuse and ne-
glect. Because this is National Child Abuse and Neglect Month, I
think it is very appropriate that this conference is called again to
look at the issue of women, children and domestic violence.
I would like to look at this through the eyes of an African Amer-
ican, who grew up in central Brooklyn and how questions of race,
class and gender impact on family law, and sometimes, how we en-
gage in acts of avoidance with respect to these issues. I will try to
do this the best way that I know how, which is to talk about my
own experiences growing up in central Brooklyn, my observations
of how things were and how our culture has changed. Although
the changes may not be great, we can observe how we are being
challenged in the state legislature, and in the courts and in other
segments of our society to address the issues of women, children
and domestic violence.
I grew up in the Bedford-Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn on
Madison Street between Sumner and Troop - an area they call
"the soul and the hole." I lived at 452 Madison Street, and there
was a park bench out in front of the house where all the women
would assemble from time to time. As a young man, I had the
opportunity to sit near the park bench and hear them discuss dif-
ferent issues.
I remember one of the things I often heard them say: "There is
nothing more dangerous to a home than an unemployed male." I
would sit back and try to figure that out.
When I was born, many men were returning from both World
War II and the Korean War, and that community was, at that time,
essentially still a working class and working poor community. As
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time went on, the surplus population of people coming up from the
South found that they would hit a brick wall of unemployment.
Increasingly, more men in that community were unemployed.
I was amazed at how the women in that community would go to
extraordinary lengths in order to organize themselves and their
lifestyles, and the extent to which they would go to ensure that
there would not, in fact, be unemployed men within their
household.
I remember my grandmother coming up from Wilmington,
North Carolina, and she would meet with my aunts who had mi-
grated from the South to New York before her. One of the first
things she would ask was, "How are you doing?" The second thing
is, "How is your love life?", The third thing is, "Does he have a
job?" She would hold her breath until they essentially said, "Yes,
he has a job." She still. would not believe it, but she would look
them in the eye and ask, "Does he have a job?" It went back to
those words I used to hear on the park bench, again: "The most
dangerous thing that you can put in a household is an unemployed
man."
In school, my colleagues and I would talk about what was going
on in the house. I remember stories of young men seeing the disso-
lution of their family before their own eyes. It would start with,
again, a loving father returning home, maybe from the Korean
War, and then, over a period of time, far too many of the house-
holds in Bedford-Stuyvesant would have walls that were peppered
by men who had punched holes into them. After a period of un-
employment, that behavior tends to happen. You come home and
the first thing that you strike is the wall. It always struck me how
many homes of my friends I would visit had fist marks in the walls.
Eventually, flesh replaced the fist marks in the wall. Men began
striking out - first at the woman in the household, and then, inevi-
tably at the children, because they would stand up to the abuse.
Many of my friends told me stories of how they jumped in between
their mothers and fathers and how they wrestled him to the
ground, followed by the father leaving, throwing his hands up, and
the son shouting out the door, "Never come back! Get out of here!
I do not want to see you again." Far too often, that is exactly what
would happen, but in some cases, the worst of situations would oc-
cur: the father would return and become even more abusive.
These are things that I thought about when I was elected to of-
fice. Thus, questions of race, class, gender and dynamics within a
family continue to come up in my mind. Eventually, what I under-
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stood was that this was something that was not isolated to Bedford-
Stuyvesant, but that perhaps white working poor and working class
women, including the trailer parks in Appalachia and in other sec-
tions of New York State, were enduring the same thing. There was
some commonality there, and perhaps even some common
language.
As I entered public life, one of the things that occurred was the
Lisa Steinberg case,4 which raised new questions of race, gender
and power, and the culture of violence within the household. For
the first time, I was challenged to think about the whole issue quite
differently - no longer simply looking at it in the context of class,
the relationship between unemployment and violence in the house-
hold. Then, I was looking at this in the context of pure power and
issues of culture: how our culture has set up certain autocratic
structures within our families and how that is played out - some-
times to terrible ends. That case really represented an extreme ex-
ample of human alienation, human disconnection, violence,
nihilism and sexism.
Years later, there was Elisa Escuerdo, a Latino sister who died at
the hands of her mother, and indeed of her mother's lover,
although in the press it was the mother who was primarily demon-
ized as crazy. And yes, she was crazy. The question was who drove
her crazy? I do not think we ever got there. What we simply saw
was this angelic child who had lost her life. We never went deeper
than that to see the dynamics that drove this mother to the brink of
engaging in one of the most horrendous acts of the human condi-
tion, which is for a mother to kill her own child.
Lurking in the background, every now and then in the articles -
and clearly I saw it when the information of the case came before
my desk - was the issue of the father, and how the father had
abused the mother and, in the process, had also abused these chil-
dren. I tried to contextualize all of this in the context of law and
public policy, and looking at it also in terms of how certain other
dynamics are happening within our community.
In another example from my personal experience: When I first
entered office, if I had a speaking engagement on a Monday morn-
ing, I would either take the train or the Greyhound bus to Albany.
I no longer take the Greyhound bus to Albany though.
Now, if I were to go to 42nd Street and jump on the Greyhound
bus to get to Albany, it would be filled with women, commonly
4. See People v. Steinberg, 573 N.Y.S.2d 965 (App. Div. 1991).
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defined in street parlance as "mules," who are carrying drugs from
New York City to Albany and other parts of the state. These wo-
men are essentially in the underground economy, where there is a
ruling class and "glass ceiling," similar to what we have in some of
the Fortune 500 corporations and in government. In the under-
ground economy, the drug lords push and force women, using their
power, to serve as mules, carrying drugs and drug products to other
parts of the state.
Increasingly, once the bus arrives in Albany, law enforcement
officials will be there to arrest these women. Then, as a result of
the Rockefeller drug laws,5 they will be sent away for many, many
years.
The consequences of that scenario are now faced by children and
family law. Today, we have two million children in this country
whose parents are incarcerated in state and federal prisons. Most
of them happen to be women, and far too many are women of
color. All of them are poor and working class women.
I repeat this to give you my perception of the challenges that we
are facing with respect to issues of women, children and domestic
violence.
This year we had to adopt a law called the Adoption and Safe
Families Act ("ASFA"),6 which promulgated new laws that would
ensure the safety of children in our child welfare system. Again,
there were issues that we had to confront that were part of the laws
we were developing.
One issue, for instance, was something as simple as mandating
fingerprinting of all foster parents in the child welfare system.
There had been cases in which many children had been abused and
neglected, not only by their natural parents, but also by foster
parents.
One of the things that occurred as we were deliberating this bill
and trying to enact it into law, was that we had called for finger-
printing not only for foster parents, as well as for adoptive children,
because my mind went back to Lisa Steinberg and Elisa Escuerdo.
However, the Senate and governor refused to enact a bill that
would call for fingerprinting of both foster parents and parents in
private adoptions. The major problem existed with foster parents,
who were primarily working poor parents, and children of color
5. See, e.g., Spiros A. Tsiurbiuos, Is It Time to Change the Rockefeller Drug
Laws?, 13 ST. JOHNS J. LEGAL COMMENT 613 (1999) (commenting on the Rockefeller
Drug Laws and describing current debate as to whether they should be changed).
6. N.Y. S.B. 2346, 222d Legis. (N.Y. 1999).
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and mostly women of color involved in foster care. Again, it
showed the challenges that we face in society, in which we continue
to develop public policy that is skewed based upon race and class.
There was also the issue of considering domestic violence when
the court issues a protective order. This was an issue that we won,
but that was a victory secured through a real struggle. We had to
struggle to educate members of the legislature that this was a pre-
scription in law that we needed. The issues of domestic violence
were not even being considered when we were developing this bill.
What I would like to do at this point is to go back and raise some
issues that had been highlighted in 1995, when my colleague, As-
semblywoman Helen Weinstein, had developed a roundtable on
Domestic Violence and Child Abuse. I really would like to place
this out there as issues of inquiry, because, again, I come here as a
student and not as someone who has a handle on all of these issues.
Below are some of the questions that were raised in 1995 that we
are still grappling with:
" Is there a common ground between domestic violence and
child protective advocates? The minutes of the roundtable
discussion indicate that there was general agreement that do-
mestic violence should be a factor in making child custody
decisions.
" Strict liability would be inappropriate in these hearings.
* We should strive to provide services to ensure the safety of
both mother and child.
" Most participants agreed that the aim should be to maintain
the mother and the child at home, although this is increasingly
difficult.
* A number of the participants highlighted creative approaches
in other jurisdictions. They particularly raised the example of
the Boston Children's Hospital Awake program.
" It was also pointed out that in New York, as is necessary, the
primary mission of Child Protective Services ("CPS") is to
protect the child, and that for CPS to work, the bottom line
requires the isolation of the child's needs from the needs of
other family members. This again raises serious issues, partic-
ularly with those policies that uplift the goal of family preser-
vation. Indeed, when we were dealing with ASFA, the reform
focuses on the issue of family preservation.
" There were other issues that dealt with questions of evidence
of domestic violence against respondents, and the question of
rebuttable presumption or affirmative defense against neglect.
While a number of participants opposed the laws that were
being proposed by Assemblywoman Weinstein at the time,
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they believed that these laws could, in fact, if not done very
carefully, exacerbate the number of mothers that would be
separated from their children.
" There was a call for coordinated services. One of the com-
mon themes was the need to take steps to prevent the cases
from occurring in the first place and from going to court.
Since then, there have been a number of different programs
that have been established to do just that.
" One of the major issues raised was that there were no shelters
at the time for the over 800 children who would be caught in
cases of domestic violence. Most of the sheltering programs
at that time were designed primarily for women, while none
created an integration with children, who were also affected
by either domestic violence or child abuse and neglect.
Let me close by essentially challenging you over the next two
days to look at these issues in the context of race, class and gender.
It is particularly important that any of you who practice law, those
of you who are jurists and those of us who are in the state legisla-
ture, continue to really challenge ourselves to understand that we
have not yet successfully grappled with the contradictions of race,
class and gender in our family law.
Laws that are intended to address the problem of domestic vio-
lence do, in fact, represent a new paradigm. They are being played
out, however, in the context of ongoing issues that are related to
race and class as well.
We need to double up our efforts so that we can develop new law
free from these contradictions. I have to honestly tell you that as
the author of AFSA, that we have many miles to travel before we
reach that reality.
This past year was a major challenge for us in the state legisla-
ture, acknowledging the fact that something as simple as finger-
printing for both foster care and private adoptions could not get
enacted into law, primarily because, quite honestly, the plutocrats
in Albany viewed that as a threat to their private practice, and also
because it would not be the type of political tool that they need in
some cases to continue the demonization of certain populations.
So it is my hope, in the final analysis, that the women of El Bar-
rio and the women of Bedford-Stuyvesant and, eventually, the wo-
men of the trailer parks in Appalachia, will not only find common
language, but common ground to struggle, and to create new law
that does justice to women who have been victimized by violence,
and also to ensure the survival, protection and development of all
children.
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With that I would like to thank you for allowing me to share a
few remarks with you. I regret that I must leave, but I want to
thank you for this extraordinary panel and conference that you
have put together for this morning and for tomorrow. I hope you
will send me all of the conference proceedings, in the hopes that
perhaps we can contextualize some of the insight that will be
learned into new law as we continue to reform the child welfare
system and children and family law. Thank you very much.
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WHEN ARE BATTERED WOMEN NEGLIGENT MOTHERS?
MS. DOMONKOS: I would like to introduce the moderator of
our first panel, Marlene Halpern. She is the Supervising Attorney
for the Volunteer Division of the Legal Aid Society. Prior to that,
for over ten years, she was the Family Law Coordinator of Legal
Services for New York City. The focus of that practice was to keep
children safely at home with their families and out of the foster
care system. Prior to that, she was with Bronx Legal Services. She
has taught at Hofstra University and has written for the Interdisci-
plinary Newsletter on Families and Children At Risk.
MS. HALPERN: I am honored to be here today and to follow
Assemblyman Green, who was far too modest in speaking about
his accomplishments and his integrity as New York State passed
the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 ("ASFA").7 In a time
of political pressure, to put in a rather draconian bill that would
hurt essentially low-income women and children in our state, he
worked to create the best bill possible under the political climate
for constituents here and elsewhere.
Before I introduce everyone, I should note that this is such a
timely topic. Unfortunately, we have not talked enough about do-
mestic violence and child neglect and the child welfare system.
There is such integration between the two, but we seem to have
always divided ourselves between people who work in the child
welfare arena and people who work in the domestic violence arena
and never really come together. This is very exciting, especially in
light of recent legal changes and changes in terms of practices that
are going on right now.
I want to quickly introduce all the panelists. First, we will allow
everyone to present her or his discussion, then we will discuss the
Hypothetical,8 lastly, time permitting, we will take questions or
present other questions to the panelists.
Susan Urban, who, since 1997, has been deputy director of the
Office of Interagency Affairs of the Administration for Children's
Services ("ACS") and also ACS's Domestic Violence Coordinator.
She has been responsible for the implementation of ACS's Domes-
tic Violence Initiative. Susan's work goes beyond 1997, and has
been dedicated to this area of practice and has diligently been try-
ing to assess the best programs to protect both children and
women.
7. N.Y. S.B. 2346, 222d Legis. (N.Y. 1999).
8. See Hypothetical, infra app. A.
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Catherine Hodes is the Social Work Supervisor at Park Slope
Safe Homes. I had the pleasure of meeting Catherine about two
years ago. Park Slope Safe Homes is a model program in terms of
how it counsels women and their families in these horrendous situ-
ations and how it tries to keep families together where possible.
Leah Hill, who I have had the pleasure of knowing many years
as a young attorney who practiced in Legal Services, started out in
East Brooklyn Legal Services, then went to Harlem Legal Aid.
She has always represented women who are trying to maintain
their families, keep their children in the community and raise
strong children. She then went to the academic setting and has
been teaching young students what advocacy is all about and what
the legal profession entails. We are happy to have her here. She
heads the Battered Women's Rights Clinic here at Fordham Uni-
versity School of Law, and she is affiliated with many various orga-
nizations in the city that focus on domestic violence.
Sitting to my immediate left is Charles Hollander, who is the
Deputy General Counsel to the Division of Legal Services for
ACS. I have known Charlie since 1976 when he worked at the Ju-
venile Rights Division and represented children. At that time, we
were colleagues, sometimes adversaries, and I would have to say he
always gave consideration to what would be best for children and
what kind of services could be put in the home so that children
could go home safely. He then went on to work for the Office of
Legal Affairs and now is presently with the Administration of Chil-
dren's Services, as I said. He has dedicated his professional life to
this area.
Sitting immediately to my right is Beth Harrow, who is the coor-
dinator of the Family Law Unit at Brooklyn Legal Services Corp.
Beth works in the Williamsburg office of that organization. She
has been in Legal Services for approximately thirteen years, focus-
ing on preserving families and communities. She was really the ini-
tiator of a demonstration project that was funded for a number of
years by the state legislature on preserving families and keeping
children at home safely. We are very happy to have Beth here.
She is, in my opinion, one of the foremost attorneys in the city on
representing women and men, who are faced with charges of child
abuse or neglect, where children are in danger of going to foster
care.
Immediately to Beth's right is the Honorable Lee Elkins, who is
a judge with the Brooklyn Family Court. Unfortunately, this is my
first experience meeting Judge Elkins, but I have heard much
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about him, all praiseworthy. He is sitting presently in the Perma-
nency Part of Brooklyn Family Court, which is the part that han-
dles abuse and neglect proceedings. He has also sat on criminal
court. He has co-authored a book, The New York Law of Domestic
Violence.9 Prior to that, he was a criminal defense attorney with
the Legal Aid Society and also Special Prosecutor for Police Cor-
ruption in the Attorney General's Office. We are very honored to
have him here today.
Sitting last, but not least, is Barbara Stock, who is Assistant At-
torney in charge of the Bronx Trial Office of the Juvenile Rights
Division in the Legal Aid Society. As many of you may know, the
Legal Aid Society's Juvenile Rights Division represents children.
We are happy to have Barbara here to talk about the role of the
law guardian and the insight that she brings, since the whole theme
of this conference is battered women and the emerging tensions
between them and their children and how to resolve them. We are
very honored to have you here.
MS. HODES: Thank you, Marlene. I am Catherine Hodes from
Park Slope Safe Homes Project, where we work with battered wo-
men, and have been for twenty-two years. In the past year, we
hired a children's program specialist and coordinator, and so we
really are, along with many of our colleagues, very seriously pursu-
ing appropriate kinds of services and intervention for children. We
are really thinking of the battered women that we work with as
mothers, and the impact that being a mother, who is also being
battered, has on their relationship with their children and their re-
lationship with the various systems they come into contact with.
We have a lot to talk about with this issue, but I want to highlight
four particular points.
First of all, when we are talking about charging battered mothers
with failing to protect their children because of the presence of do-
mestic violence in their lives, we are losing one of the key points
that domestic violence advocates and battered women have been
highlighting for twenty years, and that is the issue of accountability.
In the past decade, the domestic violence community has been
instrumental in trying to define the impact of domestic violence on
children. I think in the first decade of the movement we were fo-
cusing on very concrete safety issues and getting shelters off the
ground. The kids were there, tagging along, but we were not focus-
9. LEE ELKINS, THE NEW YORK LAW OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (1998).
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ing on their needs. That has really changed in the last five to ten
years.
In highlighting the ways that children are harmed by the expo-
sure to violence in their homes, we sought to influence outcomes
related to policy, legislation, intervention and prevention. It is with
a great deal of frustration that we now find ourselves increasingly
assisting battered mothers who are being charged with neglecting
their children for exposing them to domestic violence or for engag-
ing in acts of domestic violence. Those are descriptions that I find
particularly dismaying in their ability to erase accountability of the
abuser and place further blame upon the victim. I am sure we are
going to hear a lot more about accountability as this panel
progresses.
The second point that I want to speak about is that very often
battered mothers are offered options that do not address the very
complex realities of their lives. If they do not take those options,
they are punished. Battered mothers find themselves in particular
binds that are unique to being battered women who happen also to
be mothers. I want to illustrate that bind with three facts:
" First, battered mothers are told that leaving is the only appro-
priate option. As many of you in this room already know,
seventy-five percent of battered women visiting emergency
rooms have already left the relationship, and over a third of
women killed by a partner are killed at the time they are at-
tempting to leave the abusive partner. Leaving can be more
dangerous than staying. Often, when a woman leaves, the
batterer takes retaliatory action against the children. For ex-
ample, reporting the mother to ACS for child abuse or ne-
glect, threatening to harm the child during visits, or even
kidnapping the children.
" Second, battered mothers are told to locate shelter or alterna-
tive housing. There are approximately one thousand shelter
beds available in New York City, and on any given night these
beds are filled to ninety-eight percent capacity. On average, it
takes eighteen months before a battered woman can locate
affordable permanent housing. One battered woman that we
worked with at Park Slope Safe Homes Project lost her chil-
dren to foster care due to domestic violence, and even after
satisfying all the demands placed upon her with regards to do-
mestic violence, her children remained in care for an addi-
tional year while she attempted to secure an apartment.
" Third, battered mothers are told to obtain orders of protec-
tion. As many of you in this room already know, seeking a
family court order of protection can result in an escalation of
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the violence. It also frequently conflicts with visitation orders,
may generate an ACS investigation and is routinely ignored
by the batterer. Violations of these orders usually do not re-
sult in substantial penalties and rarely result in the battering
father being charged with neglect or endangerment.
The third point that I want to make is that battered mothers will
not reach out for help from the very systems that are designed to
help them if we proceed in the direction that we have been going as
far as charging them with a failure to protect their children. If dis-
closing the domestic violence can result in punitive action against
the victim, then the spirit of the advocacy and the legislation for
which we have all worked so hard is being violated. Battered
mothers are damned if they do not reach out for help, but ironi-
cally, they are damned if they do.
The chilling effect of charging battered mothers with failure to
protect their children is that they will be reluctant to call the police,
to speak to Social Service advocates, to speak up in court and to
obtain the help that they need, knowing that they will be investi-
gated by Child Protective Services, that they may be charged with
neglect or that they may lose their children to foster care. Further,
they know that the focus of accountability will be on their actions
rather than on the abuser's. In addition, knowing that any effort
they have made to protect their child will be ignored or dismissed
or minimized, mothers are more likely to remain in the abusive
homes, isolated, afraid, but at least together with their children.
The last point that I would like to make is that conceptualizing
battered mothers' safety needs as separate from the best interests
of her children leads to actions that re-victimize battered mothers
and their children. We need to begin to re-conceptualize the idea
of the best interests of the child in cases of domestic violence to
include an understanding that the child's interests can best be
served by providing protection, safety planning and services for the
battered mother.
Today's Hypothetical is a good case in point."' Here is a bat-
tered mother who has police and hospital records of abuse; she has
criminal and family court orders of protection; she has been
granted temporary custody by a judge; she has a safe place to stay;
and she has begun to develop a supportive advocacy network.
How is she failing to protect her child? How is this child's removal
in the child's best interest?
10. See Hypothetical, infra app. A.
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Thank you.
MS. HALPERN: Thank you, Catherine. We will now turn to
Susan to talk about the role that she would play in terms of these
two systems, trying to bring them together. We had Catherine start
off, obviously, as someone who would have a wide breadth of
knowledge about domestic violence and the dynamics and who
might first meet the woman coming into her office.
MS. URBAN: Thank you. Good morning.
I am Susan Urban. I serve two functions with ACS. I am the
Deputy director of the Office of Interagency Affairs, which is an
office created to help build collaborative efforts and break down
barriers between ACS and other city agencies that lead to children
not being served as well as they should be. I also serve as the ACS
Domestic Violence Coordinator.
I was very pleased and relieved, frankly, that Charlie Hollander
is on this panel, because I do not have the charge of describing and
defending Division of Legal Services and ACS policy on this issue.
I can leave that to him.
I would like to spend a little time telling you about various initia-
tives that are going on in ACS and how the agency is moving
forward.
Catherine Conroy at Columbia University School of Social
Work, who has also been working in this field a long time, talks
about domestic violence as being the prism through which every
child welfare case should be viewed. I think those of you in the
room who have worked in this area for many years understand that
domestic violence is prevalent in a large number of cases, that the
only sensible approach to a child welfare case is looking at domes-
tic violence first and having universal assessments on every case for
domestic violence and appropriate intervention if domestic vio-
lence is uncovered.
When I came to the agency a couple of years ago, it was with the
charge of focusing ACS attention on this issue.
That was an unrealistic hope. The agency is undertaking literally
dozens of reform initiatives that Commissioner Scapetta has
pledged to do and they are all very important initiatives. Domestic
violence really was not part of the reform plan. It takes a lot of
pushing to get the agency to address this in the way that this con-
ference will make clear it needs to be addressed, which is very
broadly as well as deeply. The agency has pledged to pay attention
to this matter, and I think its willingness to hire a domestic violence
coordinator was an indication of that.
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This issue has been fermenting at for least ten years, since the
Hedda Nussbaum/Lisa Steinberg case.' At that point, the Inter-
agency Task Force Against Domestic Violence started a Child Wel-
fare Committee in an attempt to bring child welfare and domestic
violence advocates to the same table. That committee continues to
this day, meets monthly and has been a vibrant committee, taking
on a role of both prodding ACS and doing advocacy.
That committee, which had several people from the child welfare
administration on it, pushed very hard to get the agency thinking
about this issue. Out of that came a pilot project in the Manhattan
Field Office in 1993, where workers were trained to assess for do-
mestic violence on every case. Columbia University School of So-
cial Work evaluated the works of that pilot and discovered that if
workers were trained to assess for domestic violence, they found it.
It is laughable on the one hand, but on the other hand, it is the kind
of thing where any researcher will tell you that you have to demon-
strate what everybody knows to be true, so you say "the data sup-
ports this conclusion." We could then say that the data supported
the conclusion.
Through Ruth Messinger's office, preventive services programs
were given extra money to begin to focus on family Violence. All
of this was done in close collaboration with the Urban Justice
Center, which has been working with the agency ever since 1993-
1994, mostly on a pro bono basis, in order to help ACS figure out
how to work with this.
At this point, we have twenty-seven preventive services pro-
grams that make up the Family Violence Prevention Program.
These are preventive programs in all five boroughs that have a
commitment to giving their workers expertise on domestic vio-
lence, both assessing for it in every new case and then knowing
how to do effective safety planning and effective intervention when
domestic violence is found - which it is, by the way, in a huge
proportion of cases coming to preventive services.
With the Urban Justice Center, we will increase over this year
those twenty-seven programs to add another thirty, so that fifty-
seven preventive programs will have this expertise to work with
families, with the hope being - and it already happens to some
extent - that the Child Protective Services offices will know that
there is an area with expertise where families can be referred, giv-
11. See People v. Steinberg, 573 N.Y.S.2d 965 (App. Div. 1991).
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ing them more options than just removal into foster care. I think
that is one important initiative that the agency is undertaking.
Additionally, trying to focus on the issue of abusive partner ac-
countability, these same preventive programs have been trained to
run groups for abusive partners, using the twenty-six week model
that is recommended by the state office for the Prevention of Do-
mestic Violence. John Aponti, who is familiar to many of you, has
taught the group that is learning how to do this work and is now
supervising the groups that are ongoing. Again, over the next year
we hope to at least double, if not more, the number of groups that
are underway for abusive partners within the child welfare system.
What we are trying to do is create a system so that child protective
workers, whose mission is to do a quick accounting and move the
case along, will have places to forward the case that they can feel
comfortable with and where the family will be getting the services
they need.
Also, in the Division of Child Protection, great headway was
made with the hiring in the Manhattan Field Office of a domestic
violence specialist, named Cheryl Ann Myers. She now has no
caseload. Her only mission in the Manhattan Field Office is to as-
sist workers on domestic violence cases.. So we are trying to move
with the Massachusetts model that is used by Child Protective
Services and bring it to our field offices here.
People should know that if they have problems with ACS, they
are welcome to call me, although it may not be the most effective
thing they can do because I am a one-person office. The ACS Of-
fice of Advocacy, the Parents' Rights Unit, will get involved in
these cases, and so I urge you to remember that, in terms of a place
you can tell your clients to call if they are having a problem with
their Child Protective Services case.
Also, ACS is working on an initiative with the domestic violence
police unit of the Police Department to form a joint response on a
pilot basis between ACS and the Police Department in the Man-
hattan Field Office. I believe that is something that we are going to
have to watch very carefully to make sure that it is done in a way
that does not further re-victimize the victim.
Thank you.
MS. HALPERN: Thank you, Susan. It was very exciting to hear
about the preventive services programs and the expansion. I won-
der if there has been any data accumulated or an evaluation done
at this time as to those cases that go through this preventive serv-
ices domestic violence program - is there a different outcome?
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Are they handled differently, and how many more children may
remain at home than in a case that does not go through this
process?
MS. URBAN: Because of a lack of funding, we do not have a
good thorough evaluation of this project, but Columbia University
School of Social Work had done some preliminary evaluations of
550 questionnaires filled out by the preventive programs. What
those questionnaires primarily showed was that cases coming to
Preventive Services, where they knew domestic violence was an is-
sue, were twenty percent of their caseload. With the use of the
questionnaire, that figure jumped to fifty percent of the caseload.
Furthermore, another interesting question was, "Are you afraid
of your partner," and "How afraid are you of your partner?" Some
sixty-five percent of the respondents were either very afraid or
somewhat afraid of their partner. That is an even more interesting
figure.
But we do not have a good outcome measure. Hopefully, that is
being developed with the recent funding of the Urban Justice
Center.
MS. HALPERN: Thank you. I open the discussion now to Leah
Hill, who teaches here at Fordham University School of Law, to
talk about the work that she does in this area.
MS. HILL: I wanted to begin with a little history of how I came
to this work because I think it is an important perspective that
many of you might share. As Marlene said, I started out doing
family law work in south Brooklyn, knew very little about family
law, but was convinced by Florence Roberts to come and give it a
shot.
I ended up working on primarily abuse and neglect cases, repre-
senting women who were mostly poor in Brooklyn Family Court,
and also representing women in matrimonial proceedings who
were also mostly poor. In most of the matrimonial actions, women
were claiming physical cruelty, and it was amazing to see that the
vast majority of those cases involved severe physical abuse.
What was similar about the two kinds of cases that we did was
what I "perceived" as the hostility towards these women in the
court system and from the service providers. I say perceived be-
cause at that time I think that a lot of what I was feeling was per-
ception, although a lot of it was real.
It seemed that everyone, particularly in abuse and neglect cases,
saw the clients as almost demonized. Case workers were hostile,
family court judges seemed hostile, law guardians were hostile.
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Nobody wanted to talk to me when I would come to court, and I
really believed that my clients shared the goals of everyone else in
terms of keeping the family together and helping their children.
In the proceeding, no one wanted to talk about the violence.
When cases were settled, I remember there was a judge in Brook-
lyn who would insist that we minimize the violence and say "Do
not give us all that stuff about he punched her in the eye and she
had a black eye - just say 'struck."' It was amazing to me that this
kind of quieting of violence was going on.
I would literally leave family court with a tremendous headache.
I thought everybody was evil. "Just let's bomb the place," I would
be thinking, because it felt so hostile.
After the first year, I realized that not everyone was hostile. I
made a number of contacts throughout the system. There were law
guardians who would talk to me. Charlie Hollander may not re-
member me, but I remember calling his office because I could
never get anything from the case workers, and I was able to get
results from him.
What struck me, as I stepped back from that experience, is that
what I saw as the biggest problem, and what probably influenced
my perception of hostility, was a lack of understanding about the
roles that people played in the system. I did not understand what
the social workers, who were evaluating my clients, were doing. I
would look at their notes and think, "Oh my God, this is so hostile,
this is so judgmental." Sometimes it really was, but other times I
did not understand what their roles were and I did not consider the
overwhelming caseloads at the family court and the pressures that
must have been on the judges to move cases along, nor the fact that
the system really did not allow us to have the kind of trials we
needed to have.
I think in some sense that is still the case. Particularly now when
we have more and more women coming forward and filing claims,
the system is really coming to a standstill in many ways.
I remember in some of the matrimonial actions where we had
women with immediate needs for orders of protection, we would
send them to 346 Broadway. I do not know what happened over
there, but again the system was so fragmented, no one was talking
to anyone, and it felt very hostile. I think that is less so today.
It is one of the reasons why I am doing the work that I am doing,
but I think that where we need to move is to a system where peo-
ple understand the different roles and where people talk to each
other and work together to bring about results for clients.
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When I think about the work that I am doing now in the Bat-
tered Women's Rights Clinic and in group called the Family and
Child Advocacy Center at Fordham University School of Law,
which is an interdisciplinary program between the School of Social
Work and the School of Law that is really dedicated to doing inter-
disciplinary research, I try to bring together different parts of the
system to work towards real results for clients.
What stands out for me about the program this year is that for
the first time, in addition to the Battered Women's Rights Clinic,
there is also the Family and Child Protection Clinic, which is a
clinic dedicated to representing women in abuse and neglect cases.
Students who take those classes have an opportunity to work in the
Battered Women's Clinic with clients who are victims of domestic
violence, and in the Family and Child Protection Clinic with clients
who are threatened with losing their families.
What we have begun to see is the overlap. For the first time this
year, we had students from both of those clinics working on one
case. This woman had more lawyers than anybody in the system.
But it was an interesting process. We were coming at it from so
many different ways, but we were able to see how to blend services
in a way that addressed all the client's needs, and I think it was an
interesting learning experience for students.
I have enjoyed seeing the students' reactions to the system, be-
cause a lot of them reacted in the same way that I did when I
started to do this work. We have talked about that and we have
tried to think about ways to break down that hostility and to bring
different sides together to garner results.
It has not been easy, but I think that is really where we need to
be looking. I have been to other parts of the country where I hear
about innovative programs that are bringing these systems to-
gether. The child abuse and neglect system and the domestic vio-
lence system are bringing about results, and there is not the
hostility that there is in New York, which to a large extent still does
exist.
Again, a lot of it was perception, but a lot of it was reality, and a
lot of it comes from a lack of understanding and a refusal to com-
municate. I see this center as 'one way for me to try and think
about ways to bridge that gap between all the different systems.
MS. HALPERN: Thank you, Leah. Leah, I just want to ask you
a question. At the center, I believe social work students work with
law students on these topics.
MS. HILL: Yes.
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MS. HALPERN: Have you found a tension between those two
disciplines as they face the same client; and, if so, what has been a
methodology or how have you thought about trying to resolve that
so the client gets represented but also the social work students un-
derstand - that there is a meeting between the students in the two
disciplines on how they are going to approach the issue?
MS. HILL: There are tensions, but I do not see that as a bad
thing. Because I think that since we are trying to bring about a
collaborative approach to these cases, the tensions get worked out.
We talk about them and try to get them to understand why, for
example, a social worker needs to do a psycho-social assessment
and why so much history has to come from the client, such as "Who
was your grandmother and what did she do?" We try to under-
stand what that process is about.
The social work students, on the other hand, try to understand
why lawyers are very protective about confidentiality, and why it is
a little troubling to have someone asking a client about whether or
not her mother was in a relationship that was abusive.
I think the tensions are good because we are learning. I am con-
stantly learning. I have been doing this work for thirteen years,
and I still feel very new. I believe it is working well.
MS. HALPERN: Now, I introduce someone who has one of the
harder jobs here, as Susan indicated - Charlie Hollander. He is
going to talk about ACS and, I presume, each person's approach to
the cases involving domestic violence, and how she or he addresses
that and how the courts become involved.
MR. HOLLANDER: Thank you, Marlene. It is a pleasure to
be here this morning.
Domestic violence obviously is a major issue and it is of great
concern to ACS. Although, as Susan said, it was not addressed
directly in the reform plan, I can assure you from my own personal
conversations with Commissioner Scapetta going back to the very
beginning of ACS, a little over three years ago, that this is a major
concern at ACS.
One of the questions that we have had to deal with is: How do
we address our primary mission of protecting children in a context
of domestic violence without in fact appearing to be victimizing the
victim again, which is not necessarily how I would describe it, but I
believe many others would? This is not always that easy, as is
obvious.
I want to say that, first of all, I have sat on the New York City
Child Fatality Review Panel for about seven years, and in that time
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there have been numerous child fatality cases where there has been
domestic violence. I do not think that should be surprising to any-
body here. It is a fact of life. This heightens ACS's concern that in
a household where there is domestic violence, there is an increased
risk of harm to a child.
Now, of course, there is clearly great risk of emotional harm to
the child, but there is also, unfortunately, great risk of physical
harm to a child. Our mission primarily is to protect children. We
do not see our mission as removing children wholesale. I expect
some of you may disagree with that, but that is not in fact what we
see ourselves as primarily doing, nor is it what we want to do or
like to do.
However, there are times when, in the judgment of the case
work people at ACS, a removal is necessary and appropriate. That
is always tested in court. The parent always has the right to go to
court, even if we are lax in fulfilling our obligation to get to court.
The fact is, however, that the parent's obligation, if she cannot or
will not - and I think many times it is cannot - protect herself is
nevertheless to make it safe for her child. That does lead to what
some people might certainly perceive as "victimizing the victim,"
which is removing the child. Removing the child in the psychologi-
cal sense may not be the best thing either. The child almost cer-
tainly would want to be at home with its parent.
I think that there is a question here of services, of advocacy, and
generally of an understanding of the problem that is really lacking
at this point in the development of our understanding of domestic
violence. It is easy for our case workers to remove a child. When I
say "easy," I do not mean in a literal sense. I think it is an ex-
tremely difficult decision and a difficult action to take. But in
terms of "What do you do to protect a child? Well, we'll remove
the child." It is much harder to have faith that the primary custo-
dial parent - and usually we are talking about a mother who is
usually the victim of the domestic violence - would be able to
enforce an order of protection. That is one of the real problems.
What should a court do, let alone ACS? Although the court has
tools available to keep the child at home or return the child by
issuing an order of protection or a temporary order of protection, it
will not use them if there is little faith or belief that the parent will
in fact enforce that? There is a real tension there. The children in
these cases are usually very young and unable to protect them-
selves. So how do we deal with that?
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I am not here to say that I have any magical answers. I will say
that I like what Leah said a few minutes ago, about the collabora-
tive effort that is required. Unfortunately, here in New York City
and in other parts of New York State, we are a very litigious soci-
ety. People stake out their positions and advocate them vigor-
ously. As some of you know, we get sued very often on all types of
things, policy matters, and it is sometimes difficult to even begin a
dialogue. I am particularly pleased that I am part of this group this
morning and that a dialogue, hopefully, can continue the process
that Susan mentioned is ongoing.
I do not believe children should be removed unless it is abso-
lutely necessary to protect the child. However, I am not a case
worker on the scene conducting the investigation. The judge in the
family court did not see the household or the conditions therein.
The judge only knows what is given to him or her as evidence.
I would also like to add one last thing before turning the
microphone back to Marlene. I am sorry that I missed Assembly-
man Green's keynote address. ASFA, both in terms of the con-
gressional and state mandate, is, first and foremost, the health and
safety of the child. That may sound easy, but we all know that is
extremely difficult. What is "health and safety of a child" except in
some of the more obvious circumstances? Is she really protected
better by removal from this household, or is it too wrenching for
her emotionally to be separated from her parent such that we
would be better off leaving her at home?
I cannot speak for ACS on that, but I will tell you personally that
I would much prefer to see the child at home, if I felt comfortable
that she would be safe.
We have had, unfortunately, too many cases where the parent
has had an order of protection and has failed to enforce it. We
have had even more difficult ones, where the parent has tried to
enforce the order of protection and there has been such violence
that the man has broken down the door, managed somehow to get
in the home and harmed the parent. Sometimes the child gets in
the middle of that struggle and is actually physically hurt.
We have the legislative requirement of putting the health and
safety of the child first and foremost. In determining what that is,
we would be aided by input from others who could provide us with
perhaps alternative concepts and viewpoints, assist in service provi-
sion and recommend resources.
We are going to a system of neighborhood-based services. We
are heading there rapidly. I think that this also holds great promise
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for addressing some of the domestic violence matters that we have
raised.
With that, I will turn this back to Marlene. Again, I am grateful
to be here and look forward to what emerges from the two-day
conference.
MS. HALPERN: One question: The topic of this workshop was
"When are battered women negligent mothers?" I am going to
presume that in every case where there is domestic violence the
intervention is to charge the woman with failure to protect and
bring that case to court. I am curious whether or not the Office of
Legal Affairs has standards in terms of how they evaluate a case
that comes before it on whether or not the case rises to the level of
the situation we are being faced with, where a petition has to be
filed. If there are standards, what are they and how are they uti-
lized? Specifically, how do you decide if this is a matter where
there is still domestic violence where you should file a neglect or an
abuse petition, or if this is one where there is domestic violence,
but no filing is required?"
MR. HOLLANDER: For the last ten months, I have not been
directly involved with the court units or cases. My responsibilities
have shifted at the Division of Legal Services. However, I can tell
you the approach I took when I was Deputy General Counsel for
Child Protection, and I believe this approach is still in place.
The issue should be viewed as: "Is there an imminent risk to the
child?" This inquiry is the only legal standard for removing the
child and for the court to continue that removal via a remand - at
least until there has been a finding of fact. The question, therefore,
"Is there an imminent risk to the child?"
Of course, that assumes that we have not only removed the child,
but now we have to file that petition or return the child promptly,
all within the first twenty-four hours.
The way that I have always analyzed it, and would advise my
staff when the question arose, was to determine whether the child
would be safe at home with various interventions and what level of
intervention was needed to keep the child safe in our opinion. Ini-
tially, it should be the minimal level of intervention that would
keep the child safe, not the maximum. You do not want to gamble,
as I said. The result of being wrong is much too serious, the conse-
quences are much too grave.
However, not every instance requires the ultimate intervention
of removing the child and filing the case.
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The standards I applied were: "What's the history? Has the par-
ent been cooperative in the past? Does the parent seem willing to
work with whatever services are appropriate? Is there a history of
abusive relationships? Will she start to work with somebody and
then go back to a pattern?" We have to assess these issues.
Currently, this assessment is extremely difficult. There is often
very little known about, the individual and her history, and we are
faced with a reality, assuming that the allegations in the report that
led to the investigation and the removal were true. But we have to
look at what we know, we have to look at what the history is in
terms of the actions of the parent; what kind of support groups are
available for the parent, such as her family, her friends, her neigh-
bors; and is she willing, if necessary, to leave her home and go into
a battered women's shelter, if admitted?
Sometimes the issue is, "Well, we'd like to do all these things,
and she's amenable, but there's no service available right now."
That is awful. But again, our concern has to be first and foremost
the interests of the child.
However, keeping the child in care, going to court, filing a peti-
tion and saying that the mother was neglectful, would be an esca-
lating series of responses to the presenting issue.
One other aspect of this issue is that we do not always have the
child in care when we file a petition, nor do we want the child in
care. On occasion, frankly, when we go into court without having
removed the child, the judge may remand the child to us neverthe-
less, but that is a different issue.
A lot of people confuse neglect in a case with removal - but
they are not synonymous. Sometimes we will go to court if we be-
lieve that the situation requires the intervention of a judge to pro-
vide that extra support or push that the parent needs in order to
protect the child. That often works. It is not a very large percent-
age of our cases, but it is not unknown at all. It is, I think, a pre-
ferred route many times.
One would have make this analysis of the history and services
available in making the judgment as to whether to remove, to file,
and or take any other-measures regarding the child.
MS. HALPERN: Thank you. I want to introduce Beth Harrow.
Beth represents both women and men who have been charged with
neglect or failure to protect.
MS. HARROW: Thank you. I think it is wonderful that we are
talking about many of the changes that we would like to see hap-
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pening, as well as the dialogue that we are attempting and the pol-
icy changes that we would like to see implemented.
From the perspective of a parents' rights attorney for the last
thirteen years, I do not see a whole lot that has changed for my
clients, which consist largely of poor women of color who are
brought before family court and charged with neglect and abuse. I
am here today specifically to deal with the issue of domestic vio-
lence in Article 10 proceedings. 12
Whenever I have spoken on this issue, and as long as I am doing
this work, I do not want to see children hurt at home. I believe
that children should be safe in their homes. So I am not someone
who thinks that every parent is able to parent their children.
As a Legal Services attorney, because we do have discretion in
the types of cases that we take, and are retained counsel and not
assigned counsel, and because our resources are very limited, we
take very few cases. We take cases where we really believe that the
parent can safely parent their child and that, without our help and
advocacy, that is not likely to happen.
Another thing that came to me in preparing for this and reading
the Hypothetical 13 is that I am glad that there is a coming together
of domestic violence and child protective advocates. I have to say
that I would be very careful as a domestic violence advocate about
advising a woman who is involved with domestic violence in her
home and young children to voluntarily go to family court for any-
thing. Considering the times in which we are living and the imple-
mentation of ASFA in New York, I would be very careful. I would
advise her. I would make sure that she understood exactly what
she might be letting herself in for.
It is bad enough when family court and ACS get into your life
involuntarily without subjecting yourself to them voluntarily when
I think there are other ways to get the protection and the services.
I was furious at the advocate in the Hypothetical who advised her
to go to family court.
I looked at a number of my cases over the last few years to see if
they stood out in some meaningful way. I decided to talk to you
briefly about cases that come in at the very beginning, when there
has just been a removal of the children, focusing on what should be
done, what I should do and what I should look at. These are cases
12. An Article 10 proceeding is an original child abuse proceeding brought under
Article 10 of the New York Family Court Act. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Ac-r §§ 1046, 1051
(McKinney 1999); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 385(b)(8) (McKinney 1999).
13. See Hypothetical, infra app. A.
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where the children have been out of the home for a period of time,
where there has been a finding, and now I am trying to get the
children home at an extension of placement possibly. Then, there
are cases where the children are home after a case involving do-
mestic violence and some of the problems that clients present us
and the kind of vigilance that we have to maintain.
One of the worst cases I had occurred in 1992. I was alerted to
this case from the Brooklyn District Attorney's office. The woman
was a Brooklyn resident. A child had been killed in the home. The
child had been drowned. There had been severe domestic violence
in the home. The woman's teeth had been knocked out, her eye
was swollen shut, and the six other children in the household had
been removed. Both parents had been arrested. The District At-
torney called us, saying that it looked like the case against the
mother was going to be dropped, that she appeared to be a com-
plete victim, absolutely powerless to defend against this man, and
they felt that she needed representation in family court.
I took the case and decided to go forward with a 1028 proceed-
ing." For the benefit of those who do not know, when a case is
initially filed in family court, the parent has a right to ask for an
immediate return of the child at a hearing that has to be granted
within three days of the request. The standard at that hearing is
imminent danger of the children. I decided to ask for that hearing,
feeling that he was out of the house, that she could parent the chil-
dren if services would be put into place. In retrospect, it was a
terrible mistake although not fatal to the case; this was clearly what
she wanted.
I should just back up slightly and say that when women come to
me in this situation, the thing that they want more than anything is
their children home. They do not want to know about the legal
theories of failure to protect. They do not want to know about
ASFA and the importance of safety in the home. They want their
children back. Before I do anything as an attorney, I try to explain
the proceeding, what we can do, the pros and cons of doing it, and
then she has to tell me, "Do you want to do this?"
So we went ahead with the Article 10 proceeding. In retrospect,
it was a mistake. She did not look like she could take care of a
house plant, let alone parent herself. She was a mess.
Very shortly after the case worker's testimony, we decided to
waive the rest of the 1028 and we put in a 722(c) motion,15 which is
14. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1028(a).
15. See N.Y. CTY. LAW, ch. 11, § 722(c).
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a request for the court to provide funds for a social worker and
funds for a battered women's expert- We also tried to get the chil-
dren immediately placed with a relative, and that was the best
thing we could do at the time. We did get the children to a relative
and we are able to move the woman out of the house and near the
relative so that she could at least see the children frequently.
With the money for a social worker, we were able to get some-
one who could get her into a heavy-duty counseling program and
begin putting the services together that she would need to safely
parent the children.
In terms of the battered women's expert, this came out almost
on the heels of Judge Schechter's decision in Glenn G.16 I knew
what we would be up against, but I felt that she wanted to fight this
and that the only way we could do it would be with an expert in
domestic violence. I got names from the domestic violence com-
munity, and the judge in that case granted us very liberal funding
for this expert. This was Dr. Julie Blackman, who had done much
of the Battered Women's Syndrome work and had testified in crim-
inal court cases. Dr. Blackman came, she met with our client, in-
terviewed her and wrote a report for the court. The report was
that she was a battered woman and that she was helpless to defend
against this man.
I had great reservations about going ahead with the fact finding
based on this report mostly because I did not think I was going to
get anywhere, that we would get the finding. This kind of
dovetailed with ACS coming up with a plan for us where she would
admit to improper supervision and the children would be returned
home very quickly.
That is a terrible thing to be faced with. As a Legal Services
attorney, I was trained that making an admission was the easy way
out, that most of the time it probably was good to go to trial. In
this case, after discussing it with my client, we made the admission.
The end result is that the children did come home quickly.
One of the broader points to make here is that in many of these
cases, as in any case where you are litigating, there are issues aris-
ing in court, in your client's life, in the social services arena that
you refer to in your conversations With the client., I always say that
I think being a good attorney is not only being able to do a good
cross-examination or draft a good motion, but also being able to
negotiate, to mediate, to talk with your adversaries and to be able
16. See In re Glenn G., 587 N.Y.S.2d 464 (Farn. Ct. 1992).
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to say, "Look, what do you need to do to send these children
home? What will make the ACS or JRD attorney feel safe? What
do we need to do to get these children home?"
Another case that also arises at the beginning stage is a case
where children had been home on supervision from a previous ne-
glect proceeding - three children: six-year-old twins and a thir-
teen-year-old girl. The twins began reporting to their therapist that
they were being hit at home by their father, and mommy and
daddy fought. ACS came back in on a new neglect action and re-
moved the twin children.
We went forward with a 1028 hearing because my client claimed
there was no domestic violence in the house, she was not a battered
woman and she could keep him under control. Again, it did not
work out very well.
At the end of the case worker's testimony, the judge took us into
chambers and said, "Counselor, I am not returning these children,
and unless you get your client and this thirteen-year-old at home
with her into shelter by the end of the day today, I am removing
that child from the household as well." I said, "Judge, you cannot
do that. You do not have jurisdiction over this child. She's not a
subject child." He replied, "Counselor, this is what I am doing."
At the lunch break I had to find her a place to stay although this
woman claimed that she was not a victim of domestic violence. Be-
cause we work closely with a number of community groups, we
were able to get her a bed in a safe house where she was able to
stay with this child. Then she did acknowledge the domestic vio-
lence and we sent her to the Emergency Assistance Unit, and she
and the child are now living in a Tier Two shelter.
The more problematic ones are cases where the children have
been out of the home for a period of time, and not only was domes-
tic violence an initiating factor, but perhaps there also was drug
abuse or emotional problems. Very often, the woman has dealt
with the latter issue. She has overcome the drug problem; she has
letters from her program; and she has been sober for one or two
years. What keeps coming up at every extension of placement,
year after year, is, "But is she really going to be able to protect the
children? Well, she was involved in a violent situation before.
How do we know she's going to be able to protect the children
now?"
The things that we do involve putting in motions for 722(c) funds
to get a social worker to work with us. Often, the mother is in a
follow-up rehab program, in counseling or in some sort of family
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program where we can get support. We look for witnesses or let-
ters to testify as to her growth, her insight into the problems, and
even going so far as asking for a plan that includes surprise visits by
the social worker or the ACS case worker.
In cases where we know where the man is when he is not in the
house, we document where he lives. I have brought in letters that
she has brought to Public Assistance asking to get him off the
budget, letters that she has written to the Housing Authority where
she has asked to get him off the lease.
In a case that I have been working on for a very long time, we
have two children at home and two others, who are the youngest,
coming home on weekend visitation with a plan for trial discharge
in the summer. The extension of placement was last week. ACS is
onboard with this plan and the children's attorney, who is not JRD,
because JRD has been conflicted off the case, says, "Well, I do not
know," and "I do not know what we are going to do. I mean, eve-
ryone is onboard. I imagine we will have a hearing. I think we will
prevail."
This is a follow up to what Leah said earlier, and I do not know if
it is because we come from the same background that we see this
the same way. It is incredible to me the difference between the
way a woman is perceived when she comes in filing for an order of
protection or for custody with domestic violence in the home and
how she is treated by all the players in the system, as compared to
when she comes in as a respondent in a child protective proceed-
ing. As Leah said, the disdain, this feeling that she will never be
able to parent, even acknowledging, "Yes, she has completed the
drug program and yes, she has dealt with all of the other issues,"
but this constant "How do we know, how do we really know?"
I would love to see some of this goodwill and input of services
and excessive monitoring put into place that would make everyone
feel safe. I would love to see a part similar to the model parts that
are now in the family court and the Drug Treatment Court in Man-
hattan where, with this heavy monitoring and heavy supervision,
children are coming home more quickly. My perception is that it is
because everyone is feeling a little bit safer. They are seeing the
mother every two weeks in court; she is really becoming a human
being to them. The services and the clinicians that are in place
working with her are talking to everybody. These are real human
beings.
When someone says, "Well, they removed the children," it is not
like just a phrase in the wind. Imagine someone coming into your
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home, knocking on your door, with the authority of the police, and
saying, "We are removing your children." Then you would have to
deal with it - deal with the system.
MS. HALPERN: As an attorney who represents parents in fam-
ily court, how would you approach a situation where a client came
into your door with a domestic violence issue? It was obvious that
she needed the assistance of the court, but you also know that by
having her go to court you would expose her in certain ways be-
cause now she is known? That is the problem. She is now known
and there might be some intervention more than she wants or you
want. So how would you advise her and what would you do in that
situation?
MS. HARROW: I have to say in all honesty I, as an attorney
doing this work, would almost always say, "Do not go to family
court. You can if you want to, though."
Again, I think that many of the things that she would be seeking,
in terms of an order of protection from criminal court, would be
possible. If she has the children and a safe place to be with the
child, such as a relative or access to community-based organiza-
tions that we would try to get her connected to, which would get
her into safe housing, if she did not have it, then we would work
with her.
MS. HODES: You cannot always get housing without an order
of protection.
MS. HILL: One of the things I was going to say, Beth, and I
think this is in part what you are saying, is that you try to fix the
case. You try to fix the case before the client goes into court to
answer all of those concerns that are going to come up. Can she
protect the child? One thing we realize as advocates is that the
order of protection, while it works in a lot of cases, really does not
make people safe necessarily.
MS. HARROW: Oh, yes. As one advocate said to me, it is not a
bulletproof vest. An order of protection is a piece of paper.
MS. HILL: Exactly. You could jump through a million hoops
before you send this client into court, and you still cannot guaran-
tee the safety of anybody in that situation. But I think we do what
we can to try, especially if clients insist on getting an order of pro-
tection or need it for other reasons. We do what we can to fix the
case before we end up going into court to see the family court
judge.
I think also, as advocates, we are so desperate to protect our
clients that we do sometimes push the order of protection, the in-
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tervention, as the answer, and often the realization is that it really
is not the solution.
MR. HOLLANDER: When I was speaking before I mentioned
how, in analyzing these cases, I would certainly look at the history
and what had happened in the past as I believe most case workers
would as well. One of the things that would be very important is
whether the mother made any attempts to take any action to pro-
tect herself and the child. And so, Beth, in this instance, if it
seemed that she should have sought an order of protection and had
not, if in fact there was ultimately a child protective investigation,
that would be a factor that would weigh, in a sense, against keeping
the children with her, at least at this point in time, or, even thinking
whether she would enforce an order of protection if she did not
seek one at an earlier point in time.
MS. HARROW: I know. But, Charlie, you and I both know
that while this investigation is ongoing, ACS has taken the child
out of the home. Before they file, they will do this investigation,
but the child is already removed.
MS. HALPERN: What we have illustrated here is a double-
edged sword or bind that many of our clients find themselves in
between these two systems.
At this point, as always happens before we go before the judge,
the law guardian gets to speak.
MS. STOCK: My experience has been that where there is do-
mestic violence there are also a number of other problems occur-
ring in the family, including child abuse, substance abuse, children
not receiving medical care, children not attending school or a lack
of permanent housing.
One particular case I had involved a family with six children
ranging in age from eight to fourteen years old. The petition al-
leged domestic violence, physical and sexual abuse against the chil-
dren, failure to protect, and educational and medical neglect.
There were two anonymous 2221S17 called in and investigated six
and eight months prior to the petition being filed. They were both
unfounded. The parents and children denied anything was wrong.
Months prior to the petition being filed, the three youngest chil-
dren were seen collecting empty soda cans from the garbage bins
around Columbia University. Undergraduate students living in the
dorms began noticing the children late at night. At first, there was
no communication between the students and the children. As sev-
17. A 2221 is a report from the Police Department to a case worker indicating
potential abuse.
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eral months passed, the students began speaking to them and es-
tablished a friendship. They would allow the children to come into
the fraternity house to take a break from collecting cans. The chil-
dren would watch television and talk.
They said their father used crack. He made them collect empty
cans so they could give him money at the end of the day. Each
child had a quota, and they were beaten or sent out again if they
did not meet it. Any possessions they had of any value were taken
by the father and sold. The children would go to sleep at night, and
in the morning the stove was gone, another time the refrigerator.
One night, two children went to sleep in their beds and woke up
the next morning on the floor - the father had sold their beds.
The students began feeding the children and giving them money
so that they would not have to collect the cans. The children ap-
peared thin, unkempt and never went to school. Not knowing what
to do, the students went. to Columbia School of Social Work and
asked a professor for advice. One of the students then called in a
report to the State Central Registry.
The police and ACS investigated. Their investigation revealed
all the children except the fourteen-year-old girl were beaten. One
was burned, and two had infections from cuts that went untreated.
The children would go for days without eating, and if the mother
was caught sneaking food to them, she was beaten. The father was
making two of the children watch porno movies, and the investiga-
tor believed that the father was prostituting the fourteen-year-old
and forcing her to steal for him.
The father was arrested and released pending his criminal trial.
Attempts to get the father out of the house or move the mother
and children into a shelter were unavailing. She was terrified of
him, emotionally dependent on him and would not leave him. She
would not get an order of protection nor cooperate with ACS. The
children were removed.
Attempts were made to normalize their lives. They were en-
rolled in school and participated in after-school programs, their
medical needs were met, and they received therapy to address their
abuse and the domestic violence. They had supervised visits with
their parents.
The mother eventually took a plea and there was an inquest
against the father. The judge made a finding and entered a final
order of protection against the father. The children were placed
for twelve months.
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As it turned out, the family was known to Massachusetts Depart-
ment of Social Services and there were pending criminal charges
and an outstanding warrant for the father. During the family court
case, the father vanished. He later turned up in the Massachusetts
prison.
At the first extension of placement, the mother's situation
greatly improved. She had entered therapy to address the domes-
tic violence, she completed parenting skills courses, obtained hous-
ing, cooperated with ACS and was visiting her children on a
regular basis. The children were discharged to her with ACS su-
pervision for twelve months. That was in 1995, and they are doing
well.
The factors I considered in determining whether to return the
children were: my clients' desires to return home; the mother's
participation in domestic violence counseling and other services;
her willingness to enforce the order of protection; her cooperation
with ACS; her willingness to cooperate with services for her chil-
dren; and, whether she had a source of income and suitable
housing.
If the father had been in the picture, I would have considered
whether he was willing to enter into and complete domestic coun-
seling, and whether he would abide by the conditions of an order of
protection. If he refused to cooperate, I would have insisted that
he be excluded from the home.
Many battered women lack the resources to escape violent fam-
ily situations and adequately feed, clothe and house themselves
and their children on their own. Most of the families we see in
family court are poor, and poor women are less able to relocate;
hire lawyers; obtain access to health care; obtain skills and training
to become employable; or obtain affordable day care, counseling
and other services or access support systems.
If we are to protect children, we must also protect their mothers
from domestic violence. That means providing them with the re-
sources to assist them in planning and implementing a safe exit for
themselves and their children.
Domestic violence experts agree that the most dangerous time
for a woman is at the point of separation or at the time when the
decision is made. The news media recently reported that a Man-
hattan investment manager was hospitalized with a broken nose
and jaw, receiving more than one hundred stitches after she was
attacked by her husband with a barbell while she slept. Three of
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her six children were home at the time. It was reported that her
husband became enraged when she asked him for a divorce.
Domestic violence has a profound effect on the physical and
emotional well-being of children. Every lawyer, social worker and
paralegal in my office who interviews a child that has witnessed his
father pummeling his mother, sustained broken bones at the hands
of a parent or been the victim of sexual abuse can attest to that
fact.
We see that children's relationships with their abusive parent is
conflicted. Sometimes, children will tell you they still love their
parent, while also expressing feelings of anger, disappointment, re-
sentment, fear and pain.
Children who witness domestic violence experience a great deal
of stress, which manifests itself in a variety of ways, including in-
somnia, bed wetting, headaches, stomach aches, eating disorders,
asthma, substance abuse, depression, suicidal notions, truancy, low
self-esteem and antisocial behavior. One of the most direct conse-
quences of witnessing domestic violence may be the attitude a child
develops concerning the use of violence in conflict resolution.
Studies suggest that children's exposure to violence may generate
attitudes justifying their own violence. Education, training and
community outreach are critical. Recently, city funding was made
available for a pilot project in five New York City public schools to
create a comprehensive program addressing domestic violence. A
domestic violence coordinator was at each of the five sites every
day to oversee the program. There was a counseling component
dealing with domestic violence, which included crisis intervention,
outreach to the community and training for school personnel.
Two weeks ago, I was in Washington, D.C. at the American Bar
Association's Ninth Annual Conference on Children and the Law.
One of the featured speakers was Dr. David Satcher, the Surgeon
General. He told a story about a star NCAA college basketball
player who was drafted by the Chicago Bulls. This young man
could not believe that he would be playing basketball with the
great Michael Jordan. The first night of his professional career, the
coach put him into the game with about twenty seconds remaining.
He was fouled, went to the line and scored one point. Michael
Jordan scored sixty points that night. After the game, a reporter
interviewed the rookie and asked him what he would remember
about that night. He looked the reporter in the eye and said he
would remember that on this night he and Michael Jordan com-
bined to score sixty-one points.
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Domestic violence is a major problem in our society. Manage-
ment of this problem requires a collaborative effort. Regardless of
the degree of contribution of the members of the team, all are ex-
tremely important.
MS. HALPERN: Barbara, I know the Juvenile Rights Division
has social workers on staff, and they are actually quite fortunate in
having that multidisciplinary model. Are these the types of cases
you utilize social workers on, and, if you do, what type of assess-
ment do they do in this situation? Particularly, do they consider
assisting the mother and making the mother safe as part and parcel
of making the child safe?
MS. STOCK: Yes, we do. We do have social workers. In fact, I
left out part of the story in my case because it actually was more
involved. The respondent father and mother lived in Massachu-
setts. This man and woman lived with another woman in the same
household, and the respondent father and this other woman had a
child. Of the six children, one of them was the son of the woman in
Massachusetts. When we found out about it, we contacted Massa-
chusetts and we had the records sent here. A social worker worked
with me on this case. Together, we went up to Massachusetts and
spoke to the Department of Social Services. We assessed the
mother's situation up there, and eventually we were able to return
that child to the mother in Massachusetts.
We look at the safety factors for the child. There is an assess-
ment. Sometimes there is a conflict between the social worker and
the lawyer as to what should happen in the case. But for the most
part, we work together and we assess the criteria that I set out
before as to what we look for. Those are the criteria that we use.
MS. HALPERN: Thank you. Finally, we have Judge Elkins,
who is hopefully going to address the viewpoint from the judiciary
on this issue, which is eventually what it all comes down to
sometimes.
JUDGE ELKINS: I have the easy role of reconciling all these
different points of view.
If you do not come away with anything else about the law in this
area, I think it is important to know that there is no per se rule. I
think that is what Lonell J. stands for.1 8 Lonell J. was a case that
was appealed from the Bronx Family Court, where the judge had
said that, absent expert testimony, you could not find that there
18. See In re Lonell J., 673 N.Y.S.2d 116 (App. Div. 1998).
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was neglect as a result of domestic violence because you could not
determine the impact on the children.
The Appellate Division disagreed. In that particular case, the
child was seven months of age and obviously could not be inter-
viewed. There was a case worker who did testify that the child had
psychosomatic illnesses, vomiting, and was dirty and disheveled
and essentially not cared for. The Appellate Court was prepared
to attribute the child's condition in part to the domestic violence as
a causal matter, relying on the findings of the legislature in amend-
ing section 240 of the Domestic Relations Law, which states that
domestic violence must be considered as a factor in custody cases,
if not a presumption, in favor of granting custody to the non-abu-
sive parent.19
I do think it would be helpful for those of you who are perhaps
not as familiar with the literature as some of the panelists, to look
at the legislative findings in the Amendment to section 240 of the
Domestic Relations Law, which became effective as of May 1996
and may be found in the Laws of 1996, Chapter 85.20 The legisla-
tive findings are also cited by the Appellate Division in the Lonell
J. case.21
But Lonell J. does not stand, in my opinion, for the proposition
that victims of domestic violence, are as a matter of law, neglectful.
It does not stand for that proposition.
I am a little concerned about a subsequent case in the First De-
partment that said severe domestic violence is neglect as a matter
of common sense.22 That is true, but I think you need a little more
analysis.
That is why I say there are no per se rules. You have to look at
the facts of every case. As Charlie Hollander has said, among the
things that you have to consider are: Has there been domestic vio-
lence in the family for a long time? What efforts, if any, has the
mother made - usually, of course, it is the mother who is the vic-
tim - to get help or to protect the children?
As a form of benchmark case, I refer to a Third Department
case, In re Melissa U.23 I think it is illustrative of how the family
court approaches these cases.
19. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney 1999).
20. See N.Y. Pub. L. 1996, ch. 85, § 2.
21. See Lonell J., 673 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
22. See In re Athena M., 678 N.Y.S.2d 11 (App. Div. 1998).
23. 538 N.Y.S.2d 958 (App. Div. 1989).
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Melissa U. was a case where the appellate court had reversed the
family court's dismissal of a neglect petition against the respondent
mother. After her paramour broke into her home in the middle of
the night and severely beat and terrorized her in front of her two
daughters, whom he threatened repeatedly throughout this ordeal,
the respondent mother escaped to a neighbor with her daughters
and called the police. The paramour was arrested and charged.24
Now, if that were as far as it went, I think that the mother did
everything that she could be expected to do under the statute,
which measures objectively whether a reasonable and prudent par-
ent would have taken those same steps to protect the child from
harm or from the imminent danger of harm.25 What else could she
have done? She acted appropriately. The appellate court agreed
with that. The appellate court found that the respondent acted ap-
propriately under the circumstances and could not be faulted for
failing to anticipate her paramour's violent assault, even though
she knew of his violent tendencies. 26 The Appellate Court also ob-
served that the respondent had separated from her assailant, did
not have warning of his assault and obtained help as soon as
possible.27
So why did they reverse the trial court? Because they found that
the respondent mother had neglected her daughters when she al-
lowed her paramour to move into her home upon his release from
jail three months later, despite her knowledge that her daughters
were terrified of him and still emotionally traumatized by the as-
sault.28 The children were temporarily removed from her custody.
This did not occur in the City of New York.
The respondent subsequently married her assailant and peti-
tioned the family court for custody of the children.29 The facts es-
tablished, according to the family court, that the respondent was
unwilling to protect her children from the threat presented by her
paramour and that she neglected the children by allowing him to
return to the home, concluding that, viewed objectively, a reason-
24. See id. at 959.
25. See, e.g., In re Carrie R., 549 N.Y.S.2d 230, 231 (App. Div. 1989) (applying
"reasonable and prudent" parent standard to evaluate whether parent allowed child
to be abused within the meaning of section 1012(e)(i) of the New York Family Court
Act).
26. See Melissa U., 538 N.Y.S.2d at 959.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 959-60.
29. See id. at 959.
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able and prudent parent would not have so acted under the circum-
stances then existing.30
I do not have a problem with that result, but these cases are
among the most difficult because, as in every child protective case,
there are twin evils. On the one hand, there is the problem of the
neglect, whatever it may be - in this particular instance, the abuse
of the mother and the impact on the children. Everybody here has
already said, and the legislative findings support, that the impact is
negative and the association between domestic violence and child
abuse is very high, physical abuse of children, as well as of course
the harmful emotional impact on the children of witnessing the
abuse, and the developmental problems in a home that is disrupted
by domestic violence, even if the children are not necessarily
witnesses.
On the other hand, there is the separation of the mother and the
child. It seems to me that in that second step of the analysis that
we could take better care.
Assemblyman Green referred to the Awake program in the Chil-
dren's Hospital in Boston. When children are brought in on abuse
investigations, their mothers are interviewed to determine if there
is domestic violence in the home. Then, a program is put in place
that addresses the abuse of the children and the mother together,
leaving the child with the mother and working with them together
in counseling, provided of course that they are protected from the
batterer.
I do not think that anyone would dispute that if you could
achieve that result, that the removal and the separation of the
mother and child is not necessary. It seems to me the question is
where do you get the services.
Let me suggest that if anything comes out of this conference, it
could be that the needs of the child and the mother need not be in
conflict, that advocates for battered women could work together
with child protective agencies to allow the mother and the child to
remain together by providing more shelter, counseling, monitoring
the home itself to make sure that the children are protected and by
providing the battered partner access to resources in the commu-
nity so that she can reach out in the event that the order of protec-
tion is not immediately seen to work. Even the police department,
if they have an initiative, can work on the precinct level with the
domestic violence officers, in conjunction with ACS or Child Pro-
30. See id. at 960.
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tective Services. Perhaps they should coordinate their efforts so
that a mother of children who herself has been abused could have
an immediate means of reaching out to the police department in
the event that the abuser threatened her again.
I know that the criminal courts have a program where there is a
bracelet, containing a button that you can push to get an immedi-
ate response. Let me suggest that there are ways in which advo-
cates on both sides can work together to allow the children to
remain in the home.
Finally, at every step of a child protective proceeding, the statute
clearly states that if the children can remain in the home under an
order of protection the court is obligated to issue that order of pro-
tection. Generally, the question devolves down to whether the vic-
tim of the abuse will enforce the order of protection. That is often
what it comes down to. That is the distinction that was relied upon
by the appellate court in the Melissa U. case.
I would also like to see more consistency between the law of
child protection and custody. When a woman is brought to court
under an Article 10 petition, often we treat her differently than we
would if she were a respondent, or even a petitioner, in a custody
case. Invariably, in the custody cases, and as the legislation that I
pointed out to you makes clear, we prefer the non-abusive parent
as the custodian. Although there is not a presumption, the abusers
have the burden of demonstrating, in light of their abusiveness,
that it is in the child's best interest to be in their care.
I do not know why we should not at an agency level - and in
the course of a child protective proceeding - take the same ap-
proach. Of course, we should leave the child in the care and the
custody of the non-abusive parent, if at all possible.
Also, I think that child protection should not be a disincentive to
getting help in domestic violence cases. On the other hand, domes-
tic violence should not be an excuse for failure to protect, which is
what I think Glenn G. is about. I question those people who would
bring the Battered Women's Syndrome, which was developed
under the law of justification in criminal cases, wholesale into child
protective cases. It applies the People v. Goetz31 standard of justifi-
cation and says that in addition to the objective component, you
look at whether the person acted reasonably through the spectrum
of what their perceptions were.
31. 506 N.Y.S.2d 18 (App. Div. 1986).
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Of course, if you were subject to a history of severe violence and
you know that when you place a cup on the edge of a table just a
certain way you subject yourself to a beating, you may act preemp-
tively to protect yourself. That, in effect, is the Battered Women's
Syndrome in the criminal context. Obviously, that person should,
if they are justified, be relieved of criminal liability.
I also want to point out to you that in the recent amendment to
section 240 of the Domestic Relations Law, which prevents placing
custody in or providing visitation to one parent who has murdered
the other, there is an affirmative defense for a victim of domestic
violence. If you fall within the justification definition, there is an
exception to the statute.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that the defense is going
to serve to protect the child. I had the privilege of clerking for
Harold Rothwax when he presided over the case of Joel Stein-
berg,32 and I saw Hedda Nussbaum, who was not able to care for
the surviving child. She simply was not able. She looked like a
prisoner of war who had been tortured and she was psychologically
destroyed. She was in no shape, however sympathetic, to care for a
child. Necessarily, someone had to intervene to protect the surviv-
ing child in her custody.
Having said that, of course, the objective is to return the child to
the parent by giving services and counseling. Obviously, we do not
intend to separate the child from the parent any longer than neces-
sary. But the reality is that in the most severe cases, the victims of
domestic violence are not capable of caring for the children.
However, let me go back to where I began, there is no per se
rule. That does not mean that in every case where there is domes-
tic violence in the home that the mother should be deemed to be a
neglectful parent, and if the mother has taken the steps that,
viewed objectively, a reasonable and prudent person who was the
victim of such violence would have taken, then in my opinion we
should work with the mother to continue caring for her children. I
would imagine that the Child Protective Services would view it the
same way, and if they did not, I would try to correct that when it
came into my courtroom.
MS. HALPERN: I have two questions. I know you are now
sitting in the Permanency Part, but when you were sitting in a regu-
lar intake part in family court and petitioners would come before
you on orders of protection, were there certain fact patterns or
32. See People v. Steinberg, 573 N.Y.S.2d 965 (App. Div. 1991).
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types of cases that came before you that you felt should be referred
for a child protective investigation, and what were those facts?
As a follow-up, could you address one of the things that has
bothered me over the last few years, which is the apparent equali-
zation of blame between the batterer and the victim? When I read
Lonell J., one of my concerns was the fact that this was a child who
was exposed to domestic violence. It was the exposure to the vio-
lence, not a physically abusive act on the child.
What I start to think concerning the exposure to domestic vio-
lence - or, perhaps, the exposure to an unhealthy home environ-
ment that might cause damage - is where do we draw the line
where state intervention comes into those situations? From my
perspective, that is very troubling, knowing that children must be
protected, but also wondering when does the state come into indi-
vidual's home, evaluates the situation and decides whether or not
the child is being harmed in some way?
JUDGE ELKINS: First of all, I think there is no question that
violence in the home is harmful to children generally, whatever the
level of violence. But that does not necessarily mean that in every
case where you have pushing, emotional or verbal abuse that Child
Protective Services should intervene. Obviously, in many divorce
cases you have similar situations and the matters are referred for
counseling. There is a spectrum.
If I. see a person who comes into my courtroom and seeks an
order of protection and I issue an order of exclusion, generally I
will not order a Child Protective investigation because the woman
is there doing what she needs to be doing; she is seeking protec-
tion. So generally, I will not do that.
Sometimes, however, I do order an investigation if I have the
sense that there is someone there, usually a man, who is trying
preemptively to get an order of protection in a situation where it
appears that that person may be perpetrating the abuse. One way I
might know that is checking the domestic violence registry and see-
ing whether that person is a defendant in a criminal case. I will
probably order a Child Protective investigation then.
Or sometimes, if I have a person, generally a woman, in front of
me who seeks a limited order on facts that appear to present really
serious allegations and a history of violence, then I may order a
Child Protective investigation because I question whether the wo-
man, under the circumstances, is able or willing to protect the
child, even though I understand that the most dangerous point is
separation, and that maybe she wants to remain in the home to
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protect the children. There is no guarantee, unfortunately, that she
will be effective in that regard, and it may be that if she is not able
to reach out, then perhaps we have to intervene. So in those cir-
cumstances I would probably also order an investigation.
MS. HALPERN: Thank you. Before we move on to the Hypo-
thetical,33 I think maybe we should have a little discussion for the
audience.
AUDIENCE: Listening this morning, it has become quite clear
that it is not only a complicated problem, but it raises complexities
in New York City's - or any city, but New York in particular -
delivery of services, in that a large number of different systems are
involved in one way or another, or should be involved, in the issue.
You have ACS, some Public Assistance aspect, perhaps the City
Housing Authority or another city agency involved in Section 8
housing or other housing, the Department of Homeless Services,
the Emergency Assistance Unit, the New York City Police Depart-
ment, the Legal Aid Society and Legal Services, all the social serv-
ices agencies that may or may not be involved in providing
preventive or other kinds of services and, finally, the courts, such
as family court and criminal court.
The question is whether any model in a smaller place could be
examined? Is there any model anywhere where somebody has put
together a project that pulls together, where there is some coordi-
nation of all of these units, so that there is a design for how you
bring them all to bear in cases involving abuse and domestic
violence?
MS. STOCK: When I was in Washington, D.C. at the conference
two weeks ago, I actually got a book. I have not had time to really
go through it, but I think it is a wonderful resource. It is called
Family Violence: Emerging Programs for Battered Mothers and
Their Children.34 It looks at model programs throughout the coun-
try, like the Massachusetts program and the NDA Gold Models,
which seem to be working well. I cannot talk right now about the
programs with you, but I can tell you that you can get the book
from the National Council of Juvenile and family court Judges.35
MS. HALPERN: Barbara, I am not aware of a court model that
brings the two together. I was curious if you knew of one. I know
33. See Hypothetical, infra app. A.
34. See FAMILY VIOLENCE DEP'T OF THE NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT.
JUDGES, FAMILY VIOLENCE: EMERGING PROGRAMS (1998).
35. To order the book, please write to P.O. Box 8970, Reno, Nevada 89507; phone
number (775) 784-6012. The initial copy is free; each additional copy is $15.
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there are certain models of investigation and assessment where
child protective workers work alongside battered women's
advocates.
MS. STOCK: I think Massachusetts has something in their hos-
pital where they work together called the Awake program.
MS. HODES: There is also a program in Quincy, Massachusetts
that does a great deal of coordination between law enforcement
and courts, as well as various types of social service responses.
MS. URBAN: The Edna McConnaugh Clark Foundation is
working in, I believe, five or six sites across the country on specifi-
cally the child protective issue as it concerns domestic violence.
There are a few things beginning to happen across the country that
attempt to combine all of these factors. But we are still at the be-
ginning of those collaborations.
MS. HODES: Also, in the Failure to Protect Working Group's
paper, which Susan mentioned earlier, we do talk about model pro-
grams in Massachusetts; Jacksonville, Florida; and Orange, Warren
and Washington counties here in New York that have coordinated
child protective and domestic violence responses.
MS. HALPERN: Beth reminded me that in New York City we
have the Drug Treatment Court, which is a model of how the fam-
ily court approaches a specific issue. I know Monica Drinane from
Juvenile Rights and I have spoken about how it would be wonder-
ful if we started thinking about a way the court could be structured
in a multidisciplinary way that could address these issues as well.
Of course, everyone is looking for funding.
AUDIENCE: What I think distresses me most about the model
that we have is that nothing encourages batterers more than seeing
their victims lose. Whether she loses by losing custody to him -
and I will say the system has improved and is correcting this, by
and large - or to the state. What I see is that we have shifted from
one model to the other model in a way that makes the batterers
think they have an even stronger trump card they can use to keep
her oppressed and downtrodden. This is what really, really upsets
me. Does anyone have any thoughts on this?
MS. HILL: What stood out for me after all of us gave our
presentations was the absence of any discussion, except that Cathe-
rine raised this issue, of not only holding men accountable but
dealing with the issues that they face as batterers. We heard com-
ments about one case where the man dropped out of the picture,
but we kept hearing about what the respondent mother needed to
do and what kind of services would address her needs. As a do-
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mestic violence advocate, my instinct is to say, "Well, we can send
them to jail." But we all know that sending the batterer to jail is
not necessarily an answer. I have a lot of clients who have had
their partner arrested. None of them have gone to jail, and I do
not know if they had gone to jail that it would have addressed any
needs that they may have had or would have addressed the vio-
lence that they were perpetrating.
I do not think we even have a dialogue about what to do about
the men. They are not in family court. They walk away. Some-
times they are there, generally, we have not been able to figure out
a way to bring them into the system in a way that really addresses
the issues of violence - why men are violent and how to stop them
from being violent - other than the criminal justice system. But I
think now we have to think about what to do since we cannot fill
the jails with all these men.
We are not talking about severe violence in all the cases. That is
the other problem, as I see it, that we look at the absolute.
Although we talked about the lack of a per se rule, we look at
severe violence and then define the strategies for addressing ser-
vice needs by looking at that as the only way that these cases come
to us. They come in many different ways. There are many differ-
ent patterns of violence. A lot of it is emotional abuse. We do not
have a way of addressing what to do with men. We have batterers'
treatment, but that is just the beginning.
MS. HARROW: In response to what you said, it is true, and
there are situations where we have to address the men. For exam-
ple, there was a situation where an ACD had been worked out, the
woman had the children at home, and one of the conditions of the
ACD is to enforce an order of protection against the perpetrator of
sexual abuse against one of her other children. He stalked her in
her neighborhood, the neighborhood of the office and, recently, at
a doctor's appointment with the kids. She said, "Get away from
me, get away from me." He says, "Do not call the police because if
you do, I will see that these kids are taken from you and you will
never see them." She says, "Get away from me, get away from
me." She runs to our office in the neighborhood. He follows her.
We get him out, get her calmed, down, then I ask her, "What do
you want to do?" She responded, "I do not want to go to the po-
lice. I do not want you to tell the ACS attorney. I do not want you
to tell the JRD attorney. I do not want to go in on a violation of
the order of protection." I said, "Well, what do you want to do?"
She said, "Please just leave it alone."
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We ended up agreeing that I would contact his attorney from a
sex abuse case still continuing in family court. She hoped the attor-
ney would contact his client and at least talk to him. But she was
petrified to do anything that would bring her back to the attention
of the system again.
On the other hand, your point is well taken, and I find this diffi-
cult to acknowledge, but it is true. Not all of these men are batter-
ers forever, and they are the fathers of the children in these
women's lives. There are so many complex situations in the com-
munities in which we work. Very often, we have had situations
where the children are coming home to the mother on a visit from
foster care with a plan for return and the father knows it, and even
though he has been ordered away from them, he will be around the
neighborhood just to see his kids.
What is she supposed to do? Unfortunately, she is damned if she
does and damned if she does not. We have had a situation where
she did nothing - she did not allow him in or allow him to have
contact, but she did not report him as being in the neighborhood.
And she has gotten into trouble for that.
They are very difficult issues, and I do not know that they are
being addressed.
MS. HODES: I am glad that Beth said that these are the fathers.
We are not just talking about batterers. We are talking about bat-
terers who are the fathers of children or who are father figures for
children. Before we can do anything about fathers who are abus-
ers, we need to challenge the language that we are using when we
talk about this issue.
I would like to do that a little bit, with all due respect, by chal-
lenging some of the phrases and sentences I have heard here to
describe the issue. It is not a matter of semantics, it is a matter of
analysis and developing a deeper analysis about what we mean.
I think some of that is going to force us to look at our expecta-
tions of mothers and fathers in our culture and society. We have
unrealistically high expectations of mothers. We have devastat-
ingly low expectations of fathers. We hear that it is the mother's
obligation to make the environment safe for children. We never
hear that it is the abuser's or the father's obligation to ensure a safe
environment for children.
We hear that it is up to the mother to enforce the order of pro-
tection. I thought that mothers obtained orders of protection, that
abusers violate them, and that courts and law enforcers enforce or-
ders of protection.
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I am not trying to nit-pick. I become very confused about how
to communicate with the women I work with about what they are
facing out there when I am not speaking the same language as the
other people in the system that they are going to encounter. I
think that we do have to talk about language.
One of the other things that confuses me is related to mother's
attempts to protect. Well, what are we talking about? I look at a
mother who has done an enormous list of things that I consider
protective, but they do not involve leaving; or getting an order of
protection; or even going into a shelter, for a whole host of reasons.
I think that we need to look at some of our cultural meanings -
our cultural expectations, our definitions - so that as we talk
about what to do, we see it from a perspective that has a deeper
analysis.
I believe that ACS is deeply earnest and sincere about their mis-
sion of protecting children, and I have worked closely with ACS
providers, from line workers to supervisors up through commis-
sioners. I have never felt that they did not take that mission seri-
ously. But I think their analysis is shallow and it needs to be
deepened.
One other point raised today concerned the mother's history,
her psychology, her patterns and her actions. I did not hear about
the abuser's history, psychology, patterns and actions. Why is it
that these aspects of her life fall under scrutiny and not his, or not
both of them, at the very least?
JUDGE ELKINS: The reason I did not address that issue is be-
cause of the way in which the question we were called upon to
address here today was framed, which is: "When are battered wo-
men negligent mothers?" Obviously, I do not know how the bat-
terer can take any solace when I am making a finding against him
of neglecting his children, ordering him into programs, and in-
structing him to stay away from the family until he completes the
programs, or else I will put him in jail, especially in severe cases
where actual physical violence is occurring. How he can view that
as a victory escapes me.
I do believe that we need more effective programs to try to cur-
tail the violence, but I do not know that we have any answers to the
truly abusive, violent person in the home, other than to keep him
away from his victims, including the mother and the child.
MS. STOCK: I think the legislature has to step up to the plate
and criminalize stalking and make it more extensive. If someone
breaks the law, the penalties should be harsher. I think in many
620 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
cases when the father violates an order of protection, he might get
out of jail too soon. The legislature can do something about it by
making the determination that these kinds of crimes require
stricter penalties for the batterer.
JUDGE ELKINS: Let me add another comment. As someone
said, these men are still also the fathers of these children. The
point is to coerce them into dealing with their own problem be-
cause they are not going to do it voluntarily. Ultimately, you can
help them come to terms with their violent impulses. I do not
know that anyone has an effective program for doing that.
MS. URBAN: The Abusive Partner Intervention Program, with
the acronym APIP, is what ACS is doing with the Urban Justice
Center to try to address making batterers more accountable on
child protective and child welfare cases. I mentioned it briefly
before. There are currently groups co-led by male and female co-
facilitators running in Queens, Staten Island and Manhattan. We
are training new people to do this work so we will get groups run-
ning in the other boroughs, as well as a Spanish-speaking group,
possibly an Arabic-speaking group and at least one group running
for teens.
What is different about this model than some of the other alter-
natives to violence programs or batterers programs is that each
family is known to the preventive agency. So that while the abuser
is going to the twenty-six-week psycho-educational course, there is
somebody working with the mom and with the children, monitor-
ing whether or not the violence is decreasing.
What we are hoping is that once these groups are really devel-
oped and running as a firm part of the child welfare system, the
child protective workers, who are already referring men to these
groups, will do that more, and that possibly our lawyers can even
stand before the family court and ask that the judge order the man
into this child welfare abusive partner initiative.
MR. HOLLANDER: I would like to address a couple of things
Catherine said.
First of all, in terms of an order of protection, by "enforcement"
I mean the female, who is usually the victim obtaining an order of
protection, must take the steps to put some teeth into it, to call the
police, then go back to court and allege any violations. Obviously,
the ultimate enforcement of the order is in the hands of the court
and the police. That is what I meant when I said "enforcement."
I also am disturbed by the somewhat Orwellian idea of "let us
change the language we have been using, and now we can see that
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she did all these things, that she has tried to protect the child and
that should be sufficient." I think that there are not many women
who want to see their children unsafe and unprotected. They may
not be able to provide a sufficient measure of protection in a cer-
tain situation. That is when it is necessary for the children to be
protected through other means, and we have developed, in this so-
ciety primarily, government intervention through Child Protective
Services.
You mentioned earlier that there was a list of things that the
mother has tried in protecting her children. I assume that the point
you were making is that whatever the mother has tried was not
terribly effective, or at least not completely effective under the
circumstances.
Finally, in terms of the role of the man vis-A-vis the children,
while they may be the biological fathers, very often they are not
necessarily the legal father. That makes a'tremendous difference in
terms of how they are viewed through the legal system. They have
no rights until they are declared the legal father. They also have no
rights to custody and no rights that would have to be terminated.
In fact, the most effective solution was an order of protection,
which can last until the child is eighteen, assuming of course that it
would be enforced, if necessary.
We do not have to remove custody from this person when he is
not the legal father. In fact, if he tried to establish paternity, with a
history of domestic violence, I doubt that he would get custody,
and I would certainly hope that he would not. The law now re-
quires the courts to look at his history of abuse as well.
The focus has been primarily on the mother, because it is the
title of this morning's panel. That is not to say that the batterer
does not exist and should not be examined, but that is not necessar-
ily what the goal should be. Our goal and my goal is the safety of
the children, hopefully with the parent in a safe place.
AUDIENCE: I have a couple of points for the Judge. Is it not
true that these men do not consider loss of custody or even loss of
their parenting? Many of the things that we view as punishments,
fathers do not necessarily agree with them. Often for them, cus-
tody is an issue of power and control over the woman - she does
not have the children and he does. Yes, if you put them in jail, I
think that is another issue, but that is a rarity, and that is only pos-
sible in pretty severe cases. Incarceration is just not an option.
In addition, we tend to dehumanize a lot of these family mem-
bers. We talk about "the children," "the mother," "the father,"
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"the victim," "the abuser." I think we need to remember to hu-
manize people and talk about them in terms of real people. When
we are talking about individual families, talk about them with
names, because I think it is easier for us to remove "the children"
than to take Johnny and Maria away from Mrs. Jones.
I also have a question for Mr. Hollander. You talked about the
state of imminent danger and risk in terms of removing children,
and the considerations weighed in determining whether they
should be reunited with their families. Having worked in preven-
tive services and foster care services for a number of years, I do not
think that is a capturable standard. It may be the regarded stan-
dard, however, the line is of imminent risk or danger changes based
on the politics of the moment. We know it changes. What actually
constitutes enough imminent risk or danger to remove the child?
Periodically that answer changes. We know that level changed
three years ago.
I also would like you to respond to your feelings regarding re-
uniting families with their children. I have a strong belief that the
level that is required to remove a child is significantly different
than the level of danger or risk that will be tolerated in order to
reunite a family. I have seen this in many cases. We place a family
where we feel the risk level is fairly low - not gone, but fairly low
- yet we feel we are not able to return them. The mother has the
batterer out of the home, but there are still concerns. We do not
know for certain that she is not going to get involved with another
batterer. She has not proven to us what kind of relationships she
will have in the future. These are just realities.
If you could perhaps talk about your feelings regarding the
reunification risk, and possibly the law guardian theory that you
have espoused, because that seems to us to be a large difficulty in
getting children returned to their families.
MR. HOLLANDER: First of all, you said that often you have
worked with families and you have gotten the situation to where
you feel there is a low level of risk. Perhaps it has not disappeared
completely, but it is a low level?
AUDIENCE: I have never had a case where there was no risk.
There is always some risk.
MR. HOLLANDER: If you have a case like that and there is an
existing court case, which I assume there would be if the children
are in foster care, then the parent has every right to go back to
court. Even if we did agree that the children should be returned,
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sometimes we are constrained by the specific point we are at in a
case and whatever court orders may exist.
Clearly, the parent should never be constrained, or almost never,
in terms of going back to court and requesting a hearing to have
the children returned. It depends again upon the stage of the case
as to what form this would take and what the standards in the
terms of proof are, such as imminent risk, best interest of the chil-
dren and so forth. The parent is not without a remedy.
In my own view, it may seem that it is easier to have children
removed than it is to have them returned. What I can tell you, in
terms of what we are doing, is that with certain exceptions, we re-
ally hope that a permanency decision would be made internally no
later than the point in time that ASFA requires it, which, generally
speaking, we are looking at approximately a year after the child
comes into care. That time frame will be tested in court in what is
now called a permanency hearing. Regardless of the type of case
that we are involved with - Article 10, voluntary, PINs or delin-
quency petitions - are covered by ASFA.
My point is that the issue of reunification has moved to the fore-
front. It should happen, or the groundwork should be laid, much
more quickly if it is more appropriate than it has been in the past.
But again, when you use the word "risk" and there is a low level
- and I agree with you that there is probably nothing that is to-
tally without risk, and I would not presume to say that - the ques-
tion of risk has to be assessed in a context. Children are not the
personal property of the parent; they are not some inanimate ob-
ject or even an animal. You do not take risks, and should not take
risks, with the welfare of children other than what would be rea-
sonable under the circumstances.
I really do not like to use the word "risk," as in "Well, I'll take a
risk in sending the kid home." In fact, the Second Department,
about twenty or so years ago, strongly berated a family court judge
and a law guardian for using language like that. A child's welfare
is not something that is gambled with, and that has to be kept in
mind as well.
What constitutes an acceptable level will differ between you and
me, perhaps, and between ourselves and the judge, but there is
some analysis that has to be given to determine the acceptable
level.
MS. STOCK: As a law guardian, my primary concern, obvi-
ously, is for the safety of my children and their emotional and phys-
ical well-being. I know, being a mother and a law guardian, that it
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is best for children to be home with their mothers and families, if
they can be safe. When we are assessing the risk where I have
clients who are being beaten and clients who are exhibiting psycho-
somatic symptoms, we review whether they are capable of func-
tioning; whether they are not going to school; and whether they are
in a bad emotional state. It is these factors that pose a risk to the
child's safety at home.
JUDGE ELKINS: I understand the problem of empowerment
and the purpose of the order of protection given to the mother on
behalf of the children. Actually, it would be given to the children
and the mother would be expected to enforce it on behalf of the
children by reporting a violation of it.
The purpose would be to change the balance of power by en-
abling her to call upon the police, or whomever, to assist her. If
there is a violation, I would incarcerate if that were the only alter-
native available to me and the purpose of the order would include
a program to assist the batterer, if he is the parent, to come to
terms with his anger management and violence. I am not con-
vinced that imprisonment is a useless instrument. I consider it is
very useful if enforced correctly, and I think "enforcement" is the
proper word.
MS. HILL: I wanted to comment on something that Catherine
said earlier, which digresses slightly from what we are discussing,
concerning the whole cultural expectations for mothers and fa-
thers. What I recalled is what I view as the incredible world of
family court, in terms of the expectations for the women who come
before it, knowing that those women are more often than not poor.
Those women come from communities that we are not familiar
with. They struggle with issues of housing and income. These are
things that, when you talk about jumping through the number of
hoops that we put in front of them, we do not seem to take into
consideration.
We have almost this lily white - and I say "white" because I
think about the color of people who are mainly in family court -
expectation for parents that, in fact, if some of us thought about
our own lives, we would not be able to live up to those expecta-
tions. Of course, we would not find ourselves in family court fight-
ing for custody of our children either. When you add that as the
other dynamic in the picture, you think about the clients who sur-
vive that system, the Herculean efforts that they must make, that
none of us could honestly say that we would be able to sustain,
given the circumstances under which they come to us.
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I think when you have the axe of removal and you have all this
danger in the air, the risk to the children, you really cut away an
opportunity for dialogue. Women do not necessarily want to talk
about what is really going on in their homes because the thought of
removal is hanging over their heads.
I do not think that is the case in every child protective system
throughout the country. I think we want to take a step back from
that and try to think about ways to talk about keeping children in
the home and how to accomplish that without threatening women
and without being punitive or ignoring them. While the men may
not be the legal fathers, they are around and they come back. We
need to address ways to get around that kind of barrier, which re-
ally becomes an excuse for why we do not address the needs of
these people as families.
AUDIENCE: My name is Martha Raymond, and I am with the
Women's Prison Association.
First of all, Judge Elkins, it is so wonderful what I hear about
your courtroom. It makes me feel very positive about the future of
family court. However, I know that this per se notion is alive and
well in the family court, and certainly at ACS, the per se notion of
neglect exists when there is domestic violence. I would like the
panel to talk about what they consider a legislative approach to the
issue. When you think about section 240 of the Domestic Rela-
tions Law, it took a long time for domestic violence to be a factor
in custody determination. I am wondering whether something
should be explicit in the Article 10 proceedings, such as a form of
presumption in favor of the woman who has been battered. I am
wondering what the panel thinks.
MS. HILL: I actually think the law is not that terrible because
what we are talking about is factual information. What the Judge
said is very important. Many of the stories that I hear are so com-
pelling, but to get them before a court is often impossible. If any-
one has ever tried to have a trial from beginning to end on any
given day in family court, then you know what that is like. The
Battered Women's Rights Clinic has tremendous resources, and we
hear compelling stories from our clients that, if we were given the
opportunity to present them, we would probably prevail.
That is why I believe that the idea of having a dialogue about
viewing severe domestic violence as a warning signal and limiting
the removal axe would allow us to have a discussion before we
even get to court.
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Case workers, however, are fearful, women are fearful and
judges are fearful. How do you talk when you have that kind of
dialogue?
AUDIENCE: My point is that the presumption would sort of
alter the attitude, not just in the family court but in society. It
would not only affect how the case workers view their cases, it
would also affect how things are viewed in court.
JUDGE ELKINS: I think there is something that is happening,
though not legislatively, that would be helpful. That is alternative
dispute resolution before the filing of petitions, where you bring in
the child protective agency and the battered women's advocacy sys-
tem, sit them down together, and see if you can find a way to pro-
tect the children before a petition is filed. Perhaps, if that system
were required routinely, not only in these cases but in all child pro-
tective cases, we would see fewer filings. Also, we could access the
resources in the community, which may make filings unnecessary.
MR. HOLLANDER: While I agree with the principle very
much and would love to see something like that occur, the way
New York State law is at the moment, once a removal occurs, if it
occurs, we are required to file the petition on the next court day.
Based on the quality and quantity of the information available to
the case worker and the chain of command for that case worker at
a particular moment, there may or may not be a sense that there is
enough time to engage in some sort of mediation or some other
outreach on the part of Child Protective Services before making
the decision to remove a child.
There is one mechanism that currently exists under New York
law although it is very rarely used. If the emergency removal oc-
curred with consent, we would have what amounts to an extra
forty-eight hours to file a petition. That time, hopefully, could be
used very productively, perhaps to obviate the need to file the peti-
tion and to keep the children in care. But that provision is not used
very often. It is under section 1021 of the Family Court Act.36
Other than that provision, it is difficult, especially if you are a
case worker and you have a report that you are investigating where
you look at the situation and have a concern about the children,
not to act at the moment. Maybe it is the right thing not to act in
terms of removing, but it also has to be viewed through that prism.
JUDGE ELKINS: What about some pre-removal services? For
example, advising the woman to go to court and getting an order of
36. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 1021 (McKinney 1999).
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protection; advising the local precinct of the situation to put the
batterer out of the home; having somebody monitor the home to
make sure the order is in effect; assisting the woman in obtaining
services, counseling, as a prophylactic measure?
MR. HOLLANDER: Those things certainly have been done in
individual cases. What can be done depends - as it does in any
system like this - on the quality of the individual case worker and
that case worker's chain of command, in terms of how they assess a
case. There are no absolutes, one way or the other.
Certainly, those attempts should be tried if in fact the overarch-
ing presenting problem is some domestic violence in the home
where the children themselves have not necessarily been physically
harmed. Obviously, things escalate rapidly.
Also, one other point is that domestic violence may be the over-
arching issue in the home, but very frequently, as in the Melissa U.
case and even in, I believe, Lonell J., there are other issues going
on. They may stem from the domestic violence, but there are other
factors to be considered as well, in terms of what services are
needed right now for these children.
MS. HALPERN: For clarification, what Martha referred to con-
cerned some legislation the Assembly introduced, attempting to set
up what was called an affirmative defense for battered women, or a
qualifier in the child neglect definition, which would say that a wo-
man who was under apprehension or fear for herself or her child
might be treated somewhat differently in the definitional sense of
failure to protect.
What struck me the most here is that clearly what is occurring in
New York, like many other things unfortunately, underscores sys-
tems not working well and not addressing the needs of both women
and children. What we need to do and, hopefully, this is at the
beginning of a dialogue, is move forward and think of creative, new
and different solutions that might work, and not be stuck in our
litigious mode as an advocate or in a counseling mode as an advo-
cate, but bring these two efforts together.
My wish would be that very few of these cases get to court, that
there are cases that could be resolved in the community, in a social
work setting or in an advocacy setting, where people can network
with services and where the solutions can be found.
I remember a couple of years ago during a roundtable discus-
sion, Joan Zorza crystallized the issue for me. She said, "Here, we
are unable to protect victims - usually women - from domestic
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violence. We do not put our money into that; we do not put our
minds into that; and we do not have the system set up to do that."
What we do know how to do in New York - although not very
well all the time - is remove their children. We know that we can
go to court and that there is a vehicle to use, which is funded by the
federal government basically. Unfortunately, that is where we look
most of the times.
Hopefully, as we move forward, we will go out there, as advo-
cates and as speakers from various disciplines to say, "What the
women and children and men need from our state and our society
are resources and programs that diminish violence in the family,
that diminish violence in the community and that only those cases
that we cannot resolve in the former way go to court."
I am sure, as Judge Elkins knows, the over-burdened court sys-
tem is not the best place to resolve these issues. Also, this is proba-
bly one of those areas where what would be in the best interests of
the children would be in the best interests of the victim as well, to
have a safe, stable home where both can thrive.
I want to thank everyone for being here and for giving their in-
sight to these complex issues. Thank you.
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PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS: MANDATORY ARREST AND
DECREASING THE THRESHOLD FOR ASSAULT
MS. DOUGLASS: It is my pleasure to make the introductions
of this afternoon's panel. This morning began a very lively discus-
sion of people's thoughts on issues involving abuse and neglect.
This afternoon we focus on the criminal issues that have arisen as
we have been thinking about where women, children and domestic
violence converge. The title of this afternoon's panel is "Paved
with Good Intentions: Mandatory Arrest and Decreasing the
Threshold for Assault."
I would like to introduce Dorchen Leidholdt, who will moderate
this panel. She is the director of the Center for Battered Women's
Legal Services at Sanctuary for Families in New York City. The
Center provides legal representation for battered women in family
law, criminal and immigration matters, and advocates for policy
and legislative changes that further the rights of battered women.
Ms. Leidholdt also serves as the co-executive director of the Coali-
tion Against Trafficking in Women and has been an activist and a
leader in the feminist movement against violence towards women
for over twenty years. She also teaches law as an adjunct professor
at both City University of New York Law School and Columbia
University School of Law.
I hope you will join me in welcoming Dorchen this afternoon.
MS. LEIDHOLDT: Thank you, Cathy. The subject of this af-
ternoon's panel is "Mandatory Arrest: A Re-evaluation," with a
focus on the relationship between mandatory arrest and dual
arrest, as well as the potential impact on the mandatory arrest pol-
icy of a lowered threshold of physical injury as an element in as-
sault statutes.
The need for mandatory arrest policies and laws was graphically
demonstrated by the landmark case of Bruno v. Codd37 in 1977. In
Bruno, domestic violence victims sued New York City's criminal
justice system for abandoning battered women to the mercy of
their abusive husbands. Judge Gelinoff's decision quotes the affi-
davits submitted by dozens of victims who documented the shock-
ing failure of the system to provide even a modicum of protection.
I would like to read from that decision and those affidavits.
In one of the affidavits, a woman asserts that the police arrived
after her husband "grabbed me by the throat and beat me and
brandished a straight razor and threatened me with it and tore my
37. 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1977).
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blouse off my body and gauged my face, neck, shoulders, and
hands with his nails in full public view. '"38 The police, she avers,
advised her that "since this was a family matter, there was nothing
they could do and I would have to go to family court.
39
Another battered woman's call to the police station elicited the
following advice:
There is nothing we can do. Our hands are tied. The police
cannot act without an order of protection. Even if you had an
order of protection, if your husband harassed you and you called
the police, he would be arrested and released the next day. This
would probably provoke your husband and put you in more
danger.4n
Another woman, going to a police station after just being treated
at a hospital emergency room, said she "was advised that the police
would take no action, and I was advised to go to family court on
Monday morning. They said that because I was married, they
could do nothing. The police officer could see my bruised and
swollen face."4 1
Yet another says that she was told by a police officer
that I would have to go to family court and that the police could
not help me. I asked if that meant that my husband would not
be breaking the law by beating me. The police officer said that
that was not exactly what he meant, and explained that what he
meant was that I had to get an order of protection from family
court before the police could help me.42
Even more disturbing are incidents alleged in the affidavits in
which the responding officers are quoted as giving support to the
assaulting husband. Thus, one woman whose arm had just been
sprained by her husband's attack, requested his arrest and says she
was informed by a police officer that "there is nothing wrong with a
husband hitting his wife if he does not use a weapon. '43
Another wife, who was slapped and struck with a knife by her
husband, says she heard the officer, who refused to arrest her hus-
band, say to her husband, "Maybe if I beat my wife she'd act right
too."
4 4
38. Id. at 976.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 977.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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Bruno resulted in a consent decree that the police must make
arrests in certain domestic violence cases. Those cases, it turns out,
were few and far between. Calls to 911 after Bruno generally re-
sulted in police mediation of dispute resolution - that is, "Take a
walk around the block and cool down."
In 1994, the New York City Police Department ("NYCPD")
adopted a modified mandatory arrest policy. A few months later,
it was succeeded by New York State's mandatory arrest law, a key
provision of the Family Protection Domestic Violence Intervention
Act.45 Even before the New York State law went into effect on
July 1, 1995, there was trepidation on the part of advocates.
Mandatory arrest had always been controversial, even in the do-
mestic violence advocacy community. There also were concerns
that it would be wielded in a discriminatory fashion, especially in
communities of color. There were concerns that batterers, adept at
manipulating the system, would turn it into another weapon
against victims.
In 1995, Urban Justice Center developed its Criminal Justice
Help Line, and quickly began to hear from women who identified
themselves as domestic violence victims and contended that they
had been wrongfully arrested. Other agencies reported similar
misuse of mandatory arrest.
In one case I handled, an immigrant battered woman, who spoke
little English, was arrested along with her abusive husband, who
spoke English fluidly. She was visibly injured; however, he was
not. Seven months pregnant, she went into labor while in police
custody and gave birth to a baby girl who was born with underde-
veloped lungs. While she was in the hospital, her husband went to
family court and obtained temporary custody of their two young
sons. Two years later, he still has temporary custody.
At the same time, many advocates have acknowledged an im-
proved police response when victims reported domestic violence
crime. Police mediation of domestic violence incidents, for the
most part, is a thing of the past.
In 1997, after years of lobbying by domestic violence victim ad-
vocates, New York State passed a law requiring police officers to
make primary physical aggressor determinations for family offense
misdemeanors ("PPA law").46 Perhaps because the law's success
depends upon intensive police training, dual arrests, wrongful ar-
45. N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 812 (McKinney 1999).
46. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10 (McKinney 1999).
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rests and retaliatory arrests of victims continued apparently
unabated.
On October 1, 1998, at a speak-out on police response to domes-
tic violence spearheaded by Jill Zakardy, who was then at Network
for Women's Services, fifteen women spoke out in front of City
Hall about their experiences of dual, wrongful and retaliatory ar-
rests. Some were arrested after their abusers falsified child abuse
charges.
Can mandatory arrest further justice for domestic violence vic-
tims or is it inherently flawed? Is police officer training about pri-
mary physical aggressor a way to make mandatory arrest work,
and, if so, what form should that training take? What effect will
lowering the threshold of physical injury - something many advo-
cates have been lobbying for years - have on this situation?
We are at a critical moment to reach some resolution on
mandatory arrest. In a little over a year and a half, New York
State's mandatory arrest provision expires.
Today, we have an exceptionally distinguished panel to address
these critical and complex issues. Lisa Smith is the director of
Brooklyn Law School's Criminal Clinical Program, which includes
the Family Violence Project. In 1996, she was appointed the Dep-
uty District Attorney for Domestic Violence, Sexual Assault and
Child Abuse in the Brooklyn District Attorney's Office, where she
is responsible for its legislative agenda, community partnerships,
policy analysis and project development. During her twenty-one-
year career with this office, Ms. Smith has served as the Acting
Bureau Chief and Deputy Bureau Chief for the Criminal Court
Bureau, Senior Supervising Assistant District Attorney for the Sex
Crimes Bureau and as a trial assistant.
Mary Haviland is the co-director of the Family Violence Project
at the Urban Justice Center. Ms. Haviland has been involved in
the issue of domestic violence since 1977, and is also the founder
and former director of the Coalition for Criminal Justice Reform.
From 1980 to 1987, she was the director and then the Advocacy
Coordinator for Park Slope Safe Homes Project. She is the recipi-
ent of both the Susan B. Anthony Award and the Revson Fellow-
ship on the Future of New York, and she has taken a leadership
role in work on mandatory arrest and dual arrest in her capacity at
Urban Justice Center.
Michelle Maxian is the Attorney-in-Charge of the Criminal De-
fense Division of the Legal Aid Society of New York and has been
a criminal and civil rights attorney for over twenty years. She has
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also supervised the Legal Aid Society's Affirmative Litigation
Unit, which brings test cases and class actions on behalf of criminal
defendants. In recent years, her office has successfully challenged
the constitutionality of New York's Sex Offender. Registration
Act, 47 secured the right to a twenty-fou r-hour arraignment in New
York County, required that probationers be afforded interpreters
and that sentenced inmates be transferred promptly to state facili-
ties, and overturned the loitering statutes. Ms. Maxian presently
serves on the Criminal Court Committee on Domestic Violence.
Tasha Hightower is a sophomore at Brooklyn College; pursuing
a career in the field of journalism and communications. She is cur-
rently a resident of Sarah Burke House, a residential facility that is
part of Sanctuary for Families. A dynamic advocate for the rights
of battered women, she has spoken publicly at numerous confer-
ences on domestic violence and has participated in lobbying efforts
to reform legislation and policy to further the rights of battered
women and their children.
The Honorable Laura Drager was appointed to the New York
City Criminal Court bench in 1987 and was designated an Acting
Justice of the New York State Supreme Court in 1995. Prior to her
judicial appointment, Judge Drager was the Chief of the Rackets
Bureau in the Kings County District Attorney's Office. She has
chaired the New York City Criminal Court Committee on Domes-
tic Violence since its creation in 1992. Judge Drager was the princi-
pal author of the article, The Paper Shield: Orders of Protection in
the New York City, Criminal Court. She has lectured on domestic
violence issues to judges, doctors and bar associations. Judge
Drager is also a director of the New York Women's Bar
Association.
Inspector Ed Young joined the NYCPD in 1969 and has held
various positions with the NYCPD over the past thirty years. In
1998, Inspector Young was appointed as the Commanding Officer
of the Domestic Violence Unit, which provides citywide oversight
to seventy-six patrol precincts and nine police service areas to en-
sure that the NYCPD's policies, as they relate to domestic vio-
lence, are being properly implemented on the operational level.
These policies include such items as compliance with the Domestic
Violence Intervention Act of 1994 mandatory arrest provision,48
and the subsequent requirement of the police to make an assess-
47. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW ch. 43, art. 6-C (McKinney,1999).
48. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812.
634 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
ment to identify the primary physical aggressor.49 Inspector Young
also has been teaching police administration at John Jay College
since 1991.
Carol Stokinger is chief of the Family Violence and Child Abuse
Bureau of the New York County District Attorney's Office, where
she has worked for over twenty years. In 1984, she was appointed
the head of the Domestic Violence Unit, and later became Chief of
the Child Abuse Bureau. She is also a member of numerous task
forces and organizations involving domestic violence and is a fre-
quent speaker on issues involving family violence and children.
Our first speaker is Tasha Hightower.
MS. HIGHTOWER: Good afternoon, everyone. My name is
Tasha Hightower and I am twenty-six years old. I live with my
daughter, Naisha, who is nine years old. We reside in a battered
women's shelter, Sanctuary for Families.
I have been in the system following a series of incidents caused
by my former boyfriend of almost two years. I met Edward when I
was fifteen years old and in the ninth grade. He seemed like a
dream come true. I guess I should tell you that my mother was also
a victim of domestic violence, and that my family was really there
for me. Edward seemed like everything other boys were not -
affectionate, loving and fun to be with. He was someone I thought
would always be there for me. I got pregnant, had my daughter at
age seventeen, and moved in with Edward when I was nineteen.
Everything was fine that first year, but after that I decided to go
back to work and to school. He did not like that at all. I joined the
City Volunteer Corps ("CVC"), which made him angry. At first, it
was anger and name-calling. If I came in five minutes late, he
would say that I was cheating on him, then came pushing, shoving,
and then a slap in the face. Then he decided that since he slapped
me once, he could just keep on hitting me. There are so many
incidents I could tell you about, but I will just tell you about the
first and the last.
CVC selected a few of the volunteers to go on an exchange pro-
gram to the Soviet Union. I had never flown in a plane before or
traveled out of the country. Going half-way around the world was
the most exciting thing that had ever happened to me. At first,
Edward seemed excited, but as I was getting ready to go, he be-
came more and more upset. He said I was a bad mother for leav-
49. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10.
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ing my daughter and I was not a good girlfriend. He thought, as
usual, that I was going to cheat on him.
The night before I was supposed to leave, he tried to talk me out
of going. When that did not work, he started grabbing me and hit-
ting me and choking me. He threw me against the wall. Again and
again, he wanted to hurt me so that I could not get on the plane. I
told him that he was going to have to kill me if he wanted to stop
me from getting on that plane. He kept me up all night long beat-
ing and punching me. Finally, he stopped and laid down. I drag-
ged my suitcase to the front door and I slept there. When the
alarm went off, I got up and got dressed and I left. My body was
covered with bruises and scratches, but I was happy to be on a
plane and going to Russia.
When I got back from Russia, I found that he had filled our
apartment with roses, cards, gifts and plaques. He got down on his
knees and he told me that he would never hit me again. He said he
just did not like being without me.
The violence started up again. For the next three years, it was
beatings and apologies, and then just beatings. I left him at one
point and went into a battered women's shelter, but he talked me
into coming back. More than anything, I wanted to keep my family
together and I wanted my daughter to have a father. In spite of the
violence, we became engaged.
The last incident was in June of 1997. I found out that my fiancd
was engaged to another woman. When I confronted him, he de-
nied it. He told me I was jealous and that I was insane. I told him
that he had to leave so that I could get my life together. He pushed
me against the wall. He pushed the ironing board against my stom-
ach. He told me that I was not taking his daughter anywhere. I
turned away from him. He grabbed me and began choking me and
banging my head against the floor. He started punching me on my
chest. He sat on me so that I could not breathe. As I tried to get
away, he grabbed my hands and twisted my nails until he pulled
two of them out. He broke all of my things. He would get tired, sit
down and rest, and then get up and continue his rampage.
I ran to Naisha's room, vomiting. I grabbed her and tried to get
out with her. He grabbed me. He pulled us back and I started to
fall. I grabbed him to keep from falling and accidentally broke his
gold chain. He said, "You popped my chain, you black bitch." He
started to whip me with his chain. He lifted me up by my neck and
put me in a choke hold. I started to black out. Naisha started
screaming, "Stop it, stop it, you are killing Mommy." He let me go
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and I fell in a daze to the ground. Naisha said, "Oh my gosh,
Mommy's dead. You killed her." I woke up and I started vomit-
ing. I crawled into the dining room and I lay on the floor in my
vomit. I woke up hours later. I was in so much pain I could not
believe it - scratches and bruises. The apartment was torn up, and
the walls were splattered with blood.
The buzzer rang and it was my mother, sister and niece. They
had come for my daughter's graduation. They looked at me and
the apartment and began to cry. Finally, Edward left. Edward had
broken my telephone cord, but a friend from downstairs brought
up her cord and attached it to my phone. I tried to call the police. I
had to call 911 three times.
Half an hour after the call, the police finally came. They parked
downstairs, they came upstairs, walked a few feet into the apart-
ment and looked at me. Nonchalantly, they asked me, "Who did
this to you?" I answered, "My fianc6." They said, "it is hot in
here; can we wait in the hallway?" They did not come in, so they
never saw the blood all over my apartment. They kept asking,
"Who did this to you?" They said, "You need to call this number
to get an order of protection." It was the number for family court.
They handed me a domestic incident report. Their parting words
were, "If he comes back, we'll try to get back here faster again."
Then they left. My mother and sister took me to the hospital.
A friend told me about Sanctuary for Families and I called. I
talked with a law school student named Meredith, who was nice
and sensitive. I was on the phone with her for almost two hours.
Then I had a meeting at Sanctuary with another law student named
Jennifer. I told Jennifer my story and Jennifer told me that I could
press charges if I wanted to. I said, "Yes."
Meredith accompanied me to the Forty-Fourth Precinct and I
met with a domestic violence prevention officer. She was very up-
set about the way the first pair of officers responded to my case
and she arranged for me to meet with a detective. Meredith and I
met with the detective. I told him my story. Then he said, "I need
you to tell it again." When I told it again, he said, "You had a
slight discrepancy." I was very intimidated. I felt like I was on the
witness stand. After that, he said, "Okay, I am going to arrest him,
but I do not do re-arrests." He made me feel nervous and scared,
but at least Meredith was there with me.
A few weeks later, Meredith and I went to family court, for the
return date on my order of protection case. I waited in Victim
Services. A few minutes later, Meredith came back and told me
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that the detective had come into court and arrested him. I was glad
that he had been arrested, but I was scared for myself and Naisha.
I was also afraid that he might be hurt in jail. In spite of every-
thing, I still had feelings for him.
That night, I broke out in hives. He stayed in jail for a week
before being bailed out by his family. I was contacted by the Assis-
tant District Attorney ("ADA"), and was told that his family was
talking viciously about me and that she was worried about my
safety.
His charges had been reduced from a felony to a misdemeanor.
When I asked why, the ADA told me that my bruises were not
visible enough to charge him with a felony. I was upset. I knew
that I had been beaten badly, I had been bruised all over my head,
neck, arms and torso. I felt the pain from the contusions for weeks.
But because my skin is dark, the bruises were not as visible as they
would have been on a light-skinned person. It did not seem like
equal justice.
It will be two years in June from the day that Edward beat me up
for the last time. The criminal case has been adjourned almost
twenty times. I have had three different prosecutors. I am worn
out from the waiting and anxiety, and I feel I cannot get on with
my life. I need closure, but the criminal justice system keeps the
trauma alive for both me and Naisha.
I support mandatory arrest because it is safer for women and
children, but it is clear to me that many police officers are not fol-
lowing the mandatory arrest law. In my case, they did not even
come into my apartment to see if there was enough evidence to
make an arrest. They did not ask about my daughter, Naisha. As
the domestic violence prevention officer later told me, the two po-
lice officers who responded to my 911 call should have turned my
case over to the detectives. Instead, they closed my case and just
sent me to family court.
I have heard from other women at Sanctuary for Families that
sometimes the police officers arrest the victims along with the
abusers. This is a big danger because batterers are often manipula-
tive. They are actors and liars. To prevent this, the police depart-
ment needs to educate, train and sensitize all police officers about
the dynamics of domestic violence, the tactics of batterers, and how
to investigate a domestic violence case. From my experience, the
detectives need just as much training as regular police officers do.
Right now, the only charges Edward is facing are harassment
and unlawful imprisonment, despite the fact that he beat me almost
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
to death, tore out two of my fingernails, and left me vomiting,
bruised, bleeding and in extreme pain. When I saw myself in the
mirror the next morning, it looked as if a gang had jumped me. I
could not recognize myself. But the system decided that Edward
had not injured me enough to be charged with even a misdemeanor
assault. The system has to change.
I also think that the requirements for assault are racist. It is as
though black women have to be injured twice as badly as white
women to get justice.
In conclusion, I believe that everyone needs to be more in-
formed about domestic violence and how it affects women and chil-
dren of all races and classes. Domestic violence is everyone's
problem, and if we ignore it, it is only going to get worse. The
police, judges and District Attorneys are on the front lines of the
fight against domestic violence. If they do not respond swiftly, ac-
curately and sensitively, women will stay in abusive relationships
and avoid pressing charges, and the rate of domestic violence
murders will continue to climb.
Thank you.
MS. LEIDHOLDT: Our next speaker is Judge Laura Drager.
JUDGE DRAGER: I am an advocate of the mandatory arrest
policy. I would like to consider the issue from a systemic approach
and the ultimate purpose of the criminal justice system. I know we
have a number of other members of the panel who are connected
to specific agencies and will be in a better position to discuss this
issue from their agencies' perspective.
I am sure that many of you will remember from some high
school or college course the philosophical concept of the social
contract. Theoretically, by that concept we all agree to give up
some of our freedom to gain the benefits of living together in a
society and what a society enables us to have. For example, each of
us has the power to kill someone. We could all go out tomorrow
and kill someone. Physically, we are capable of doing it, but we
have agreed not to do so because we know that we will gain the
benefits of living in a society if we not only do not kill someone,
but know that no one is going to kill us. Thus, we agree that we
will give up some of these freedoms throughout our lives to enable
us to live together.
When we as a society reach an agreement on an individual free-
dom that we are willing to give up to gain a societal benefit, we
enact a law that prohibits that conduct, and we call that prohibited
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conduct a crime. The law warns us that if we all engage in that
prohibited conduct, we will face prosecution.
Now, these laws evolve over time as we as a society evolve. Cer-
tain conduct that we once found criminal we no longer consider a
vice. On the other hand, we as a society have awakened to the
serious consequences of domestic violence. It is no longer consid-
ered a matter hidden away behind the closed doors of a family. We
have concluded that domestic violence is serious, not only as it af-
fects the individual victim or the family, but for society as a whole.
We have concluded that when domestic violence occurs, the victim
is harmed, children are harmed, education is disrupted, time is lost
at work and medical costs are incurred. The recognition of all of
these serious consequences brought on by domestic violence led us
to conclude as a society that we will not tolerate domestic violence,
and we have taken steps to enact criminal laws to enforce this
conclusion.
Prosecutors are the officials who are charged with bringing viola-
tions of the domestic violence laws to court. It is their duty to
bring a case to trial to protect the interests of society. Since the
prosecution is protecting the interests of society, the prosecution
brings the case in the name of the people, "The People of the State
of New York," or in a federal case, the United States Government.
The prosecutor performs this job by presenting witnesses at a
trial. The prosecutor may call police officers who responded to the
scene and saw certain things at the scene. The prosecutor may of-
fer the defendant's own inculpatory statements. The prosecution
may present physical evidence, such as broken plates or blood sam-
ples. The prosecutor also may call civilian witnesses, such as a
neighbor who may have overhead or saw something. And, of
course, the prosecutor may call as a witness the victim of the do-
mestic violence. However, in this action, the victim is just one
more witness. The purpose of a criminal action is not to directly
help the victim, as might be the case in a civil action where the
victim would be suing for damages, or in a family court action
where the victim might be seeking child support. Nor is it the vic-
tim's right to decide if the case should proceed, because what the
prosecutor is doing is protecting the overall interests of our society.
Frequently, I have a defendant before me who is alleged to have
violated an order of protection, and his defense attorney says to
me, "But, Judge, the complainant in this case does not want the
case to go forward." I ask the defense attorney, "Have you spoken
to both complainants?" The defense attorney usually looks at me
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like "what is she talking about now?" I say, "Well, did you talk to
the judge who issued the order of protection, who is as much a
victim in this proceeding as is the complainant, because this is a
case that is brought on behalf of our entire society, not brought by
the individual victim?"
This does not mean that prosecutors, police or the criminal
courts are unsympathetic to the needs of victims. Each of the pros-
ecutor's offices in the city has gone to great lengths to try to ad-
dress the needs of victims to the extent that they can. They work
with agencies that provide counseling services; help victims get
their locks changed; and, in some cases, help to relocate victims.
They also evaluate cases to determine whether it is necessary for a
witness to testify, or even whether a case should be transferred to
family court.
The courts, too, provide assistance in providing counseling serv-
ices and connections to victim advocates, and, through our new en-
forcement parts, which monitor sentences of defendants, also help
ensure the safety of victims. And, of course, we issue orders of
protection.
Ultimately, the criminal court and prosecutors must be primarily
concerned with the criminal action that is before the court. The
prosecutor does not represent the victim; the prosecutor represents
the people. The prosecutor is a public official who represents the
interests of society, so if an abuser is found guilty, he must be pun-
ished for two reasons: (1) because the individual defendant chose
to assert his individual freedom over society's duly enacted law;
and (2) because society, as a whole, must be reminded that this
type of conduct, domestic violence, is prohibited. In effect, the
prosecutor is charged with protecting our social contract.
It is my belief that we are at a very delicate point in the develop-
ment of societal awareness regarding domestic violence. We have
overcome the initial resistance to the concept that domestic vio-
lence even exists. Victims and advocates convinced legislators and
the courts that we needed to address the issue in a way we had not
before.
We must now move to the ultimate goal of ending domestic vio-
lence, and we must use the tools that are now available to us. We
must treat domestic violence as a crime and prosecute violations to
the fullest extent possible. This approach will not always be easy
for the individual victim of the violence.
I strongly support the view that the needs and desires of the vic-
tim should always be considered during the course of a prosecu-
640
2000] WOMEN, CHILDREN AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 641
tion. Plea bargaining to avoid a trial in many cases may be
appropriate. However, I am willing to sacrifice the individual vic-
tim's needs to bring an abuser within the jurisdiction of the court. I
understand it is not a perfect system. Mistakes are made. The
wrong person is arrested at times. Sometimes there are dual ar-
rests. It is not an easy system. We are talking about thousands
upon thousands of arrests.
Certainly, Ms. Hightower's concerns are very valid and always
need to be addressed. I realize that the approach I suggest sounds
harsh and may have serious consequences in any particular case.
But the ultimate benefit to society as a whole is simply too great.
The arrest and prosecution reinforces society's interest by making
abusers, individually, and the public at large, aware that domestic
violence will not be tolerated.
I have often said in speeches that by the time a domestic vio-
lence case appears in criminal court, we as a society have failed
because the violence has already occurred. In my opinion, the real
front line at this point in the battle against domestic violence
should now be in the field of education, both within the schools
and in the media. We need to educate the public about domestic
violence so that it will not occur in the first place.
However, to support this educational effort, the public must
know that the criminal justice system will take action against abus-
ers. In my opinion, any effort to undermine the mandatory arrest
policy would remove one of our most powerful tools in the war
against domestic violence.
Moreover, even if the law were to change, my guess is that the
NYCPD would continue the policy of mandatory arrest. I believe
it is a policy that, on the whole, has been more successful for them
than what existed beforehand.
The issue has been raised that the definition of what constitutes
an assault should be modified. I do not think changing the defini-
tion of assault, that is "what constitutes physical injury," is the real
issue. A few weeks ago at a training program for judges - each
year judges undergo training on the issue of domestic violence
throughout the state - Dr. Stark raised the interesting issue that,
at present, our criminal law does not address most domestic vio-
lence conduct because most domestic violence is emotional abuse,
not really physical abuse.
I do not know whether we will ever be able to satisfactorily de-
fine domestic violence in the context of penal law language. Dr.
Stark seems to feel that within the next decade we will have better
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studies on this issue that may help us to do so. Certainly, the stalk-
ing law is an effort in that direction.
Ultimately, I do not think a change in the law on physical injury
will answer the problem. We need to address the overall emotional
issue of abuse, and I think we need to understand that there are
limitations on what type of conduct the criminal justice system can
reach.
Thank you.
MS. LEIDHOLDT: Thank you, Judge Drager. Our next
speaker is Inspector Ed Young.
MR. YOUNG: Good afternoon. I would like to approach this
issue by doing an overview of what the New York City response to
domestic violence has been over the past thirty years. From the
police officer's perspective, you are looking at three aspects: 1) the
structure of the NYCPD and how that has changed; 2) the goals of
the NYCPD and how they have changed; and 3) how they have
impacted on the operation and response. I will then talk about
some current developments that have taken place, the results of
the mandatory arrest policy, some issues and challenges surround-
ing the primary physical aggressor aspect to the mandatory arrest,
as well as some thoughts on the thresholds for assault.
From a cop's perspective, going back to the 1990s, the structure
and the policy of the NYCPD - actually, the policy was about two
pages on how to respond to domestic violence - was strictly to
react to the 911 call for service. From the late 1960s and 1970s,
there was a limited number of radio cars. The policy, in terms of
the goals, was to separate and mediate. Actually, the policy stated
to assist them in reaching some kind of a decision, which is even
contrary to separate.
It also sets the framework for a culture within the NYCPD - a
culture that says, "Go into a particular situation involving domestic
violence, and quickly resolve the problem. Get in, problem solve,
get out. There is another call for service coming your way any min-
ute." Right now, we probably have four million calls for service
coming into the NYCPD on a yearly basis, and that response time
raises some issues as we move forward in history.
The operational response was that every call about a dispute was
treated as an "old family domestic violence dispute." The disposi-
tion given back relatively quickly was that the man was sent on his
way. The occupants would state they did not call 911, and there
would be no historical requirement or documentation that the
event had taken place. If there was any historical reference, it
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would be the fact that the officers responded. Given that there
were only a smaller number of units then, they responded to calls
for service where perhaps they had been there several times
before. Nevertheless, given the current structure and the need to
get in and get out, they attempted to resolve the matter as quickly
as possible.
From the late 1970s to the 1990s, the NYCPD started, given the
legislation, to look at the family offenses. Training focused on fam-
ily offenses that related to domestic violence, certainly enforcing
the Family Court Act, but in addition to that, expanded the defini-
tion of what were domestic violence situations, such as common
law, same-sex couples, was included in the training.
The NYCPD also started putting on a political face. Certain in-
dividuals, by their very office, would be the front executive to go to
various meetings, perhaps chaired by advocates or other agencies.
Perhaps patrol would send a representative or a liaison, and he or
she would be considered the NYCPD's expert on domestic vio-
lence. Detectives perhaps would do the same thing.
There was virtually no real operational oversight from that per-
spective. The goal of the NYCPD was a proactive arrest strategy,
utilizing the concept of probable cause. This is very important
from an objective standard for law enforcement as we start looking
at the issues of primary aggressor later on. Probable cause cer-
tainly plays a significant role, locking up for felonies as related to
family offenses, violations of the orders of protection, misdemean-
ors if the victim wanted that particular individual arrested, and/or a
violation taking place in front of a police officer and the victim
wanted the arrest. That was the process.
The operational response during this period was a recognition on
the part of the responding cops that there were elements of crimi-
nality going on, that it was developing a greater awareness. The
people were being arrested if they were at the location. But there
were still discretionary aspects in the arrest based upon the police
interaction with the victim, which leaves a lot to be desired.
There were very limited preliminary investigation requirements,
given the culture of response time constraints - get in, get out -
that you did not really see the gathering of evidence, building a
case or having that focus in mind. The attitude was make an arrest
and throw it over the wall to the district attorney who will be han-
dling the prosecution.
Those cases that were referred to the detectives - and now we
are talking about the 1980s - were not considered high priority. If
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we recall back to the 1980s with all the crack wars and the shoot-
em-ups that were taking place, as well as the increasing number of
homicides that were going on, there was a sense that domestic vio-
lence had low priority with a limited investigatory response.
As we approached 1994, there were a number of police strate-
gies. Certainly, there has been a focus on crime in this city. The
first three strategies addressed guns, drugs and youth crime. But
strategy number four had to do with breaking the cycle of domestic
violence, and there was a look at the previous history, what the
NYCPD had been doing as it related to domestic violence and
what it was going to do differently.
From this strategy came about the creation of the Domestic Vio-
lence Unit. The person in charge of the Domestic Violence Unit,
Lucia Davis Raiford, was a civilian director, an advocate, who re-
mains in that position to this day.
The goals of the Domestic Violence Unit were to look at and
develop new programs, do policy analysis, training oversight on the
issues of domestic violence, operational oversight, and liaison with
our partners in the domestic violence field, including criminal jus-
tice agencies, the District Attorney's office, governmental agencies,
the Administration for Children's Services ("ACS"), Department
of the Aging and numerous other partners on these issues, as well
as advocate groups.
Also, within the structure of the NYCPD, the strategy created
two new roles that are very significant as we move forward. These
are the role of the Domestic Violence Prevention Officer in the
precinct and the role of the Domestic Violence Investigators spe-
cializing in domestic violence.
It mandated the development of the Domestic Incident Report,
which ultimately became the prototype for the New York State-
mandated Domestic Incident Report. Also, the strategy called for
a Domestic Violence Database to maintain a history and to look
and discover patterns of domestic violence in the individual
precincts.
The goals were enhanced once again. The policy called for
mandatory arrest, prior to the legislation, of all felonies - not just
family offense felonies, but all felonies occurring in the family con-
text. It was seeking, and ultimately it brought about, the criminal
contempt charge of violations of the order of protection, and there
was a greater emphasis or greater focus on the misdemeanor stat-
utes relating to domestic violence.
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Also, as is dictated in the title of the Domestic Violence "Pre-
vention" Officer, we began to look at what was being done to pre-
vent domestic violence. Again, still within that context is the
overall culture of a quick fix, the "get in, get out," that still lingers
on. For a unit responding to a call for domestic violence, there are
response time considerations, operational costs as it relates to
overtime, and even as we are required to make arrests, preventing
domestic violence addresses some operational concerns of the or-
ganization that have an impact on the operational response.
The operational response has been a greater focus on the part of
the investigation process. Given the role development of the Do-
mestic Violence Investigator, you now have a specialist in the
squad interested in closing out that case with an arrest. From an
oversight perspective, we still monitor that.
Historically, when a call was dispatched to a car, it was not iden-
tified as a domestic violence call, but now there has been a proce-
dural change. Domestic violence calls for service are identified
with subsequent prepared domestic incident reports and informa-
tion and entered into a database.
Looking at the mandatory arrest, has it had an impact? From
1993, felony arrests have increased thirty-three percent. Under the
misdemeanor aspect, misdemeanor arrests are up 114 percent since
the mandatory arrest policy. Violations of orders of protection ar-
rests are up seventy-six percent.
With the issues surrounding the primary physical aggressor law,
there are problems as a police response looks for an objective as-
sessment to make the right decision. That is where there are still
problems lingering in predetermining who is the primary physical
aggressor in this current incident. A lot of our training focus is on
the historical perspective of the incident - what is the history.
That is all well and good, but it does not take us to exactly what
happened on this particular night, at this particular point in time.
This is where we have some difficulty in determining who is the
primary physical aggressor.
The culture of "get in, get out, quick response time," and the
time that is required for an investigation in determining the pri-
mary physical aggressor, is the challenge for law enforcement right
now.
MS. LEIDHOLDT: Thank you, Inspector Young. The next
speaker is Assistant District Attorney Carol Stokinger.
MS. STOKINGER: I began working in the Manhattan District
Attorney's Office ("DAO") in 1977. Until 1977, family violence
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was generally handled in family court. The change that year had
nothing to do with my arrival in the DAO, but had a lot to do with
the fact that criminal court was given concurrent jurisdiction over
domestic violence cases. Concurrent jurisdiction, as many of you
remember, did not mean that both the family court and the crimi-
nal court could handle cases at the same time; it was just that one
court or the other could handle the same incident. Victims had to
make a choice within seventy-two hours, frequently a time period
in which they did not even know they had a right of election. So,
many times they were stuck in one court or the other at the end of
those seventy-two hours. Despite the changes in the law that gave
criminal court jurisdiction over family violence cases, police, prose-
cutors and judges still believed that those cases belonged in family
court.
Shortly after 1997, my boss, Mr. Morgenthau, recognized the
special needs of domestic violence victims and felt that we should
be handling those cases in our office and in the courts. He set up a
Domestic Violence Unit in the office. Still, we had to struggle with
the realities of what the NYCPD did, what the courts did, and even
what people in our office did with the cases.
At that time, almost no cases that we see today were actually
handled in criminal court. The numbers were few yet the injuries
were severe. The cases that we actually saw were generally treated
in supreme court rather than in criminal court.
In 1984, I was appointed head of the Domestic Violence Unit. It
happened to be the year that the Minneapolis Domestic Violence
Experiment Study50 was released. As many of you know, that
study indicated that mandatory arrest was a great thing. Arrest,
rather than separation or mediation, reduced recidivism rate in
their study by fifty percent over a six-month period.
However, later studies, sponsored by the Department of Justice,
failed to replicate their success. Nevertheless, the Minneapolis ex-
periment became the rallying cry for many people in the domestic
violence world.
We pushed for mandatory arrest, and we finally got it. Last year,
we had some 6000 domestic violence arrests in Manhattan, a city in
which there were 250,000 domestic incident reports. Our numbers
are similar to those in the Bronx and Queens while Brooklyn had
double our numbers. Despite the number of arrests, you can see
that there were many domestic incidents reported to the police that
50. Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Minneapolis Domestic Vio-
lence Experiment, POLICE FOUND. REP., Apr. 1984, at 1.
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never resulted in arrest. Probably in excess of 200,000 cases failed
to make it into the criminal justice system.
The question that we have to ask is: What happened to those
cases? Why were there no arrests? Was it that the police did not
want to make arrests? Was it that the police did not have jurisdic-
tion to make arrests?
In many of those cases, the incidents fell within the definition of
harassment, rather than assault. Unless they witnessed the inci-
dents, the police could not make an arrest, even if they wanted to.
Those statistics tell us that we have to do something about chang-
ing the definition of physical injury, changing the assault laws, as
well as enacting new stalking legislation.
Some of the most terrifying cases of domestic violence actually
never make it into the criminal justice system. Of our numbers,
approximately one-sixth to one-fifth of our cases were felonies,
many of which were contempt cases. Nearly four-fifths of our
cases were misdemeanors, the majority of which never would have
resulted in an arrest in 1977. In fact, many of the felony cases
would not have resulted in arrest in 1977, or even in 1984.
Those cases that did come to the attention of the police would
have been mediated. At worst, the officers would tell the parties to
cool down, the perpetrator to walk around the block; and, at best,
to tell the victim to take her or himself to 346 Broadway. Now
those cases are here and we are forced by the potential expiration
of the law to ask ourselves: Is this a good thing or a bad thing?
Along with the general decrease in crime, reductions in cases in-
volving serious injury have occurred, although it is not the same
dramatic way that general crime has decreased.
I am convinced that mandatory arrest is an excellent idea. I had
questions about it before, but I now think that it has brought about
important changes to the system and to society. It has changed the
attitudes of police, prosecutors and judges, and, more importantly,
it has changed the attitudes of victims, defendants and society as a
whole. Along with the changes, it has brought real protection to
countless victims and demonstrated to all of us that domestic vio-
lence is simply unacceptable.
Mandatory arrest can be used as an opportunity to bring victims
into the mainstream and to attain the help that mainstream can
provide. We can provide services to those people and help protect
them and their families.
I am wholly in support of mandatory arrest where there is physi-
cal violence, but I am less certain about it for those cases in which
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there have been only violations of family court orders of protection
and where there has never been any physical violence. In other
words, where there was no underlying physical violence and the
violation does not involve physical violence, I am concerned. I
think those cases need to be treated seriously, because, as Judge
Drager said, those cases represent not only a violation against the
victim who originally brought a case, but also against the court and
against the entire criminal justice system. However, I think those
cases need to be brought before the judges that issued those or-
ders, and then they can be brought to the criminal justice system on
referral by the family court judges who know them best.
I am in favor of prosecuting many of the cases that we see, even
where victims do not want to prosecute. I think that has become a
very important thing. One of the reasons is that many offenders re-
offend, not only with the original victim, but they go on to re-of-
fend with multiple victims. Frequently, there are other unintended
victims, including children, other family members, friends and
neighbors, as well as responding police officers.
To set the tone that society will not accept domestic violence,
police and prosecutors have to be able to go forward with or with-
out the victim, and I think that we cannot say that mandatory
arrest should be eliminated. We have to go forward.
MS. LEIDHOLDT: The next speaker is Michelle Maxian.
MS. MAXIAN: The Legal Aid Society has attorneys in the Ju-
venile Rights Division where we represent children in neglect and
child abuse proceedings, many of whom are the victims, or at least
the witnesses, of abusive relationships among the adults who live in
their home. We also have a Civil Division where we represent wo-
men who are battered and who are involved in divorce cases.
I am the head of the Criminal Defense Division, where we repre-
sent women who are accused of drug use or prostitution, many of
whom are the victims of domestic violence throughout their lives.
We also represent batterers, which is the reason I am here. We
represent mostly men, the people who batter women.
As lawyers, we see the whole cycle of violence. The children we
represent in family court grow up to become our clients in criminal
court. It is the result of the very dangers that were discussed this
morning when they talked about removing children from those
homes. Every day, I see those dangers come to fruition in criminal
court.
I also started in 1977 in Manhattan Criminal Court. Bruno had
also been decided in that year. Where we have reached in domes-
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tic violence has paralleled our careers here in the criminal justice
system.
When I started, even though people were being arrested at that
point, it was enough to say, "Your Honor, this is a domestic vio-
lence case," to have the case dismissed or ACD'ed. There was vir-
tually no factual distinction made between cases. It was simply
enough for me as a defense lawyer to point out that the victim and
the accused were known to each other or lived together, and that
was a victory for me.
In 1999, as someone said earlier, police mediation is a thing of
the past, so all of these cases are coming here. We have Domestic
Violence Court, where a judge has the obligation to decide individ-
ual cases, but also, as we can see by panels like this and by the
presence of judges on domestic violence cases, has a perceived ob-
ligation imposed to stop domestic violence.
To a certain extent, I think we all evaluate the success of how our
judges and our courts and our prosecutors do by the prevalence of
domestic violence. As a defense attorney, that scares me. It scares
me for a couple of reasons. First of all, I think that the criminal
court is a very blunt instrument. Many things that we say, that peo-
ple here have talked about and Tasha in particular, is the failure of
the system, or the limitations of that system.
We have a social contract, but we still require individualized
proof. That means that there are going to be lawyers there, and
there are going to be lawyers like me there, who have as their pri-
mary purpose to get someone off, to get the batterer off. It means
that we are going to confront witnesses; it means the woman is go-
ing to be confronted about her story; and it means that at least
there should be an unbiased fact finder. That means that the wo-
men who come into that system, who are still in many instances
operating within the relationship that is an abusive one and have
shifting feelings, are going to result in feeling like the system is
battering them again. They are going to come up against me. They
are going to have a court continue protective orders that say the
batterer cannot come home again, even though they would wish
that to happen, even though they are experiencing economic
problems, even though the children in the family might want the
batterer home, even though they might in their shifting feelings
and in their difficulty dealing with this issue, want the batterer
home, and now all of a sudden they are told that cannot happen, no
matter how much they want that.
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Also, I have heard stories that I believe to be true that a prose-
cutor will tell them that if they wish to drop charges, the prosecutor
will refer their case to ACS and that they will be in danger of losing
their children, and they will be subject to that kind of pressure to
continue the case.
It concerns me because I know the significance of the social con-
cern for abusive relationships, because almost all my clients are its
victims. It is not that I do not understand how significant the issue
is. It is probably because I do understand that I worry that it will
eradicate constitutional concerns that exist in the court and that I
hold equally dear as a defense attorney.
I sometimes wonder: Does the presumption of innocence even
exist in Domestic Violence Court? It is a real question. Certainly,
everything we've said here today should give all of us pause about
whether that is still true. When you walk in to that court, what
assumptions do you make about the woman standing on one side
of the table and the man standing at the other table, and does that
have anything to do with how you were brought up about the
Constitution?
The other thing that worries me is that each of us knows in our
own lives that it is best if government does not treat you individu-
ally. From any experience we have had as mature adults in society,
we know that if we run up against the IRS, the Social Security or
the Motor Vehicles Department, we are in trouble, our life is going
to be miserable. You should not expect the family court or the
criminal justice system to be any more effective or efficient in deal-
ing with individuals. People who get involved in this system often
regret it. It is our only alternative in cases of real violence, but it is,
as I say again, a very blunt instrument. It destroys people's lives as
well as saves them.
We go there because that is where the money is, and that is really
the truth. Since Reagan, the social supports that have existed
outside the criminal justice system have totally disappeared. If you
want treatment for drugs, you better get arrested, because that is
where the money is. In youth violence, the money is going into the
courts. In domestic violence, the money is going into the courts.
So yes, arrest brings victims into the mainstream as Carol said, and
that is true because that is where the money is; that is where we
have to bring people because that is where government is now put-
ting money, into the criminal justice system. Money outside that
system is drying up - well, gone, I guess, and blowing away as I
speak.
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I do not know what my recommendations are. I think as far as
mandatory arrest we should either revoke it or apply it across the
board. I think it is very difficult to set vague standards, such as
primary aggressor. Our standards would have to be much more
specific for officers to enact.
I think the problem that you spoke about is when we really think
primary aggressor, we are thinking what is the history; that is what
we really mean. We do not mean you are going into a home and
deciding who is hurt more in this instance. We are really thinking:
What is the history here? But that is very difficult for the police to
enforce, because does it mean that, once battered, you now have a
license? If you make the rush to the courthouse first and you get
that first order of protection, what does that mean if the police
come in on a second incident? Are they still permitted to make an
individualized determination? Is that not difficult for police? And
maybe, if we are going to have mandatory arrest, at that point we
should just say, "Arrest them all and let Judge Drager figure it out
somewhere down the road."
The other thing I think we need is a treatment module for batter-
ers. I do not mean that you should turn your attention from the
very serious problems facing women. Nor do I mean to say that we
should turn away from the real issues of women and their social
needs and take that money and give it to batterers. What I am
saying is if you want to break the cycle of violence, then you need
to address those issues, that no one will be jailed long enough to
never come out again.
There will continue to be children, as long as we have a situation
where people continue to fall in love not so well; choose not so
wisely; and find themselves in relationships from children with peo-
ple that were themselves perhaps victims of battering or have just
continually been so closed out of the social contract they are not
making good decisions. Unless we address issues like violence,
drugs and mental illness, and how they are all involved in this bat-
tering, then we will be here for the next twenty years and we will
not be any step further along than we are today.
I also think that, to the extent that many of the women that we
do represent, and even some of the men who were battered as chil-
dren or were abused as children, this group of advocates should
also turn some attention to the effects of domestic violence for
other defendants and should ask prosecutors and courts to look at
that when they evaluate women who are accused of selling drugs,
or who are prostitutes or are charged with drug possession. A lot
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of that is self-medication. We all know that. I think it should be
part of your job as prosecutors and courts to talk about that, so, at
least as to them, the system could be more ameliorative rather than
punitive.
Thank you.
MS. LEIDHOLDT: Thank you. Our next speaker is Mary
Haviland.
MS. HAVILAND: I am going to try to give a quick indication of
a small study that we did on our criminal justice help line at the
Urban Justice Center, and I am going to try not to give too many
opinions in my talk, although I will make some recommendations
at the end.
The Family Violence Project of the Urban Justice Center set up a
help line in 1995 to assist victims of domestic violence in the wake
of the passage of the Family Protection Domestic Violence Inter-
vention Act. 1 I was well aware from my activities before that time
of the effects of mandatory arrest in other jurisdictions. I was
aware of the possibility of victims' arrests, the influx of victims of
domestic violence into the criminal justice system who may not
necessarily want to be there, and the possibility that more arrests
are made in communities of color rather than other communities. I
wanted New York City to have the capacity to deal with some of
these potential problems in the aftermath of the implementation of
mandatory arrest.
In 1997, we received funding from the Center on Crime Commu-
nities and Culture to computerize our help line and to study the
incoming phone calls. We teamed up with epidemiologist Dr. Su-
san Wilt at the Department of Health and Victoria Fry to look at
some of our incoming calls. I want to give a brief summary of this
study, and I am going to talk mainly about victims who were ar-
rested by police because I think that is my little niche here on the
panel. I also think that real hard information and data about the
numbers of women who are getting arrested or the kinds of exper-
iences they have are few and far between, so I am going to dedicate
my talk to that.
We receive almost 500 phone calls a year on our hotline. In
1998, we received 468 calls, 274 of which were new clients and 103
were presenting problems regarding the police response to their
household. We received a lot of calls about other problems, such
51. 1999 N.Y. Laws ch. 222.
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as family court, criminal court, ACS, parole and probation -
though I will not go into any of those details.
Before I describe the arrest of victims that we experienced on
our hotline, I want to clarify that over the years we have developed
definitions or seen patterns in the kinds of arrests that have taken
place in New York City of domestic violence victims, and I want to
be clear about what our definitions are and how many cases fit into
that definition and how many did not.
First of all, we saw quite a few dual arrests. We call "dual ar-
rests" those which occur on the scene or shortly thereafter that em-
anate from the same incident of violence. Both the victim and the
perpetrator are arrested in this event.
The second group of arrests that we have been seeing increas-
ingly on our hotline are victim arrests, usually in the wake of an
exaggerated or false complaint by an abuser. Often, these arrests
follow some measure the victim has taken to protect herself. We
call these retaliatory arrests.
Some of our cases involve the threat of arrest and the arrest has
not been executed. I have lumped those cases together, and you
will see as I present some of the statistics what happens to them.
We only had one call that really fell outside of this categorization
of arrest, and that was a woman who had seriously inflicted injuries
on her boyfriend and was looking to turn herself into a precinct
and needed representation. She had used a knife. Other than that,
the rest of our arrested victims fell into these two classifications.
Now, I realize that the language that I am using becomes difficult
here, because I am using the language of victim and perpetrator,
and sometimes it is difficult to say exactly what is going on in the
household at any given time. I hope that by the end of my talk you
will be convinced that I am using the right language, but I will
leave that to you.
I am not going to have time to discuss other kinds of problems,
which I think are really important in this kind of discussion on
mandatory arrest, one of the major ones being: What is happening
to women who do not want to go through the criminal justice sys-
tem and what do they think of that intervention two, three or four
years down the road? I would love to have a further conversation
about that.
The police issues that we encountered on our help line were: 1)
non-arrest when the police policy indicated that an arrest probably
should have been made; 2) arrests that were made when the victim
did not want such an arrest made; 3) dual arrests; 4) retaliatory
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arrests; 5) lack of information about police policy; 6) police refus-
ing to assist a victim recover belongings; 7) no response after call-
ing; and 8) service of order of protection problems. That is a
snapshot of the kinds of problems that were coming into the
hotline.
In our dual arrest cases, we had seventeen callers, three who
were threatened with dual arrest and fourteen who were actually
arrested. The seventeen cases were quite evenly distributed
throughout the city, with seven in Manhattan, six in Brooklyn,
three in the Bronx and one in Queens.
We looked at five different variables and had information on
those variables for thirteen cases. We looked at whether there was
a prior history of domestic violence and whether it was docu-
mented, whether there were extant orders of protection at the time
of the incident, whether the situation fell under the primary physi-
cal aggressor law, what the injuries of the parties were and what
the outcome of the cases were.
In our dual arrest cases, twelve out of thirteen cases that we had
information on had a prior history of domestic violence, though
four of these cases were undocumented histories. Only four, or
thirty percent, of our dual arrest callers possessed orders of protec-
tion at the time of the incidents, and none of the perpetrators did.
Eleven out of the thirteen cases fell under the rubric of the PPA
law; in other words, I combed through them to see whether they
were felonies, whether they were family offenses, whether they
were family members, and only two were knocked out of the box
by the requirements of the PPA law.
Of the thirteen, nine of our callers were injured by the incident,
and, in five of the thirteen cases, the perpetrators claimed injuries.
With one exception, all of the injuries were scratches and one was a
bite. In four out of five of these injuries, our caller admitted to
having scratched or bit in self-defense. The fifth injury on the per-
petrator side was a self-inflicted wound, according to our caller.
The outcome of these cases was as follows: in eleven cases, the
charges were dismissed or the arrest was not made against our
caller; in six cases, we were missing that information. The charges
against the perpetrator were dismissed in five cases; the arrest or
charges were pursued in another four cases; a parole officer took
action in one case; and in seven cases, we had no information.
Based on the facts of these cases, I want to just make a couple of
recommendations that I think come out of this.
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First, I think in dual arrest cases, police officers really have to
separate the parties to talk to each person at the scene. What I
mean by "really" is out of earshot and out of eyeshot.
In eleven of the thirteen cases, our caller satisfied at least one of
the PPA factors enumerated by the PPA law as described to us
over the phone. If the parties are separated, you can get at these
factors more effectively. For example, responding officers are
often instructed by the statute to assess comparative injuries, which
are not always evident at the scene but can be described; whether
threats were made; whether the injuries were defensive or not; and
whether a party has a history of domestic violence.
Second, police training should address the issue of undocu-
mented versus documented history of domestic violence. Four of
our cases were undocumented histories. I think that police training
could address this issue so that police officers could be more effec-
tive in soliciting that information.
I also think that the police officers could be trained to communi-
cate between precincts. One of our cases involved a precinct that
would not arrest at the scene, and then the perpetrator went to
another precinct and that precinct made the arrest.
Another issue, which is related, is one of timing, which a couple
of people have mentioned. The first person to the precinct is not
necessarily the victim. In one of our cases, the victim was at the
hospital when the perpetrator was at the precinct filing the
complaint.
Next, I would urge some changes to the PPA law. I would urge
the adoption of an expanded definition of domestic violence so
that it is clear that it applies to same-sex couples and couples who
have formerly resided together. I would not limit the primary
physical aggressor determination to only family offenses, as long as
the definition of family was met. There were a couple of cases in
which family offenses were not committed.
I would broaden the primary physical aggressor to apply to situa-
tions where victims grab weapons to defend themselves and the
injuries are minor. Often, an Assault Two charge results from a
situation like this.
Finally, we had twenty-one callers who were arrested on com-
plaints filed at the precinct in this same time period in 1998 (with a
total of thirty-eight victims of domestic violence arrested and call-
ing our hotline). As with the dual arrest cases, these cases were
pretty evenly distributed throughout the city, with five from Man-
hattan, nine from the Bronx, four from Queens, two from Staten
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Island and one from Westchester. Interestingly, three callers were
wives of police officers.
In nineteen cases, we had complete information on eight differ-
ent variables. All nineteen callers reported a prior history of do-
mestic violence. Sixteen of these callers had a documented history.
In three cases, the perpetrator had a documented history as well.
Twelve of our callers, or sixty-three percent, had orders of protec-
tion at the time the complaint was filed. We were quite astounded
actually at the number of orders of protection that our callers held
when they were calling about an arrest, as opposed to our callers
who were calling about a dual arrest.
In twelve cases, the primary aggressor law would have applied if
it had been a dual arrest situation. There were five claims of inju-
ries by perpetrators out of twenty-one cases. In two of these cases,
our callers claimed they used the violence in self-defense. The
other injuries claimed were scratches.
Eight of the nineteen complaints filed were allegations of harass-
ing phone calls or personal threats. There were no tapes obtained
of these allegations in any of the cases.
In thirteen of the nineteen cases, the caller mentioned an event
that led to the allegations. Service of an order of protection telling
him that she was ending the relationship or a violation of an order
of protection in family court were some examples of the events that
led to these arrests.
The outcomes on the cases were that eight of these cases were
dismissed or acquitted, two arrests were voided, and two cases
were ACD'ed with an order of protection against her, and on seven
cases we have no information. Subsequent to this arrest, however,
three perpetrators were able to get orders of protection.
Also, of these twenty-one, thirteen of these women were held in
pens, several for more than eight hours. One woman was eight and
a half months pregnant and was held in a pen for ten hours. Three
women were given Desk Appearance Tickets ("DAT"), which I
think is a very interesting sort of solution on the police officer's
part, since DATs are not allowed in domestic violence situations.
The issuance of a DAT indicates a feeling of sympathy on the part
of the police officers for the arrested victim since a DAT gives no-
tice of the first court date without detaining the arrestee for book-
ing or arraignment. Despite current policies, DATs were issued in
three cases. In two cases, the arrest was voided, and in one case
the arrest was never executed.
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I want to draw your attention for a moment to the fact that we
had actually more retaliatory arrests being called into our hotline
than we did dual arrests, which suggests, I think, that we should try
to come up with a legislative solution to retaliatory arrests. I think
that many of the issues are the same and that primary physical ag-
gressor rubric or analysis could be applied to these cases.
I also think it is extremely important that this time around when
we look at this legislative session, we fund services to help women
who are arrested as a result of the mandatory arrest law. Several
other states have done this, Connecticut included, and I think it
behooves us to do that in order to make the mandatory arrest legis-
lation fair.
I also think that we should be keeping track of how many dual
arrests there are and of arrests by gender so that we can tell what is
going on in New York State with regard to dual arrests and retalia-
tory arrests.
I ultimately think that mandatory arrest probably does help pro-
tect battered women, but I think there are enough problems with it
that we should rethink the reenactment and include things that will
help diminish the negative side effects of mandatory arrest.
Thank you.
MS. LEIDHOLDT: Thank you, Mary. Our last speaker is As-
sistant District Attorney Lisa Smith.
MS. SMITH: I would like to relate a story that happens to be a
case on which I worked in my clinic this morning. Basically, I think
it sums up the problems that we all have.
The woman and the defendant in this particular case have a child
in common and have been together on and off for about eleven
years. There has been a dispute recently. He thinks she is dating
other people, she is not sure she wants to be with him anymore,
and he is very jealous. On the night in question, he came to her
apartment. I think he got in via the window. When he came in, she
was in the bathroom and she was wearing sweatpants, the type with
the elastic waistband. He grabbed her, dragged her by the sweat
pants - she is a very slight woman - into the kitchen, took a jar
of jalapefio peppers from the refrigerator, opened them and stuffed
the peppers in her vagina.
She went to the hospital a few hours later, after she tried flushing
it out herself, which actually made the situation worse, because it
made the insertion worse. She went to the hospital. The hospital
records clearly say that the doctors and the nurses fortunately ex-
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tracted all of the jalapeflo peppers, in pieces primarily, but they
basically got everything out.
She does not want to press charges. We have spent many hours
trying to reach out to her, but not only through the District Attor-
ney's office. In my mind, the best thing I think I have done in
Brooklyn happens to be the Brooklyn Domestic Violence Task
Force, which meets on the second Tuesday of every month and has
at least forty organizations as members. We try to reach out to
some of our advocates and our community people, hoping that she
might feel more comfortable with them and that they would be
more successful.
This case can clearly be tried without her. But, of course, the
question we wrestle with all the time is: What is the right thing to
do here? She has her own concerns, and her concern is that he
does provide very well for her and her child. I raise this not for the
answer, but just for the complexity of the problem.
My feeling about mandatory arrest is when we all go out there
and advocate for mandatory arrest, we should advocate for the re-
sources we need to put the teeth in mandatory arrest. The system is
set up so that the police at least in Brooklyn, took 7500 cases that
were prosecuted in 1996; 12,000 in 1997; and 12,500 in 1998. The
police take all these cases. They have to work on them. But you
know what we expect of the police? We expect them - and I am
sure Ed would agree with me - to work on these as quickly as is
humanly possible. We do not say to them, "Take your time and
really investigate." We say, "The goal here is speed."
We really say the same thing to prosecutors who are in-taking
200 and 250 cases a week. We want them to concentrate on the
cases. But how hard can you concentrate when you are taking in
250 cases a week?
Believe me, we say the same things to the courts. My heart goes
out to the judges who are sitting here. I have been to countless
meetings where they have one hundred cases on their calendar.
This applies to the felony judges, to the misdemeanor judges, in the
domestic violence parts and in other parts, and where they are con-
stantly told, "Speed the cases along. You have to work more
quickly."
People will say to you, "it is better for the case," but the reality is
that speed is not good for most of these cases because they are very
complicated and they require hours and hours of work. I cannot
even begin to describe the amount of time we have spent on the
case that we are talking about this morning. We must have the
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resources attached to the mandatory arrest law. Everybody has to
come to realize that these cases are very difficult and very time-
consuming and they are labor-intensive. You will not attain what
you want, you will not accomplish your goals, whatever those are in
the individual cases, if you do not accord them with the resources
and the time that they really need.
My one suggestion on mandatory arrest is we get together and
really talk about that as an issue. Although mandatory arrest has
increased the arrests dramatically - and you can see from my sta-
tistics that they have - I cannot say the same thing about convic-
tions in the criminal court, because arrest does not equal
convictions.
Now, I want to step back and say that I do not necessarily think
that a conviction is the goal in all of these cases. Sometimes your
priority is just the process, that the process was appropriate; and
sometimes your priority is just the safety of the victim; and some-
times your priority is one particular type of outcome. But there are
some cases where the conviction is your priority. In those cases, the
problem is that physical injury, as defined currently in New York
by the case law, does not include for A misdemeanor assault pur-
poses most of the injuries our victims of domestic violence suffer.
It does not include the slaps, the kicks, the bruises, the bloody
noses and the swollen eyes.
If you think it does not matter, you are wrong. It matters a lot
when you get to the very first stage of the plea bargaining process,
where all defendants know that they may have come in charged
with that "A" misdemeanor of assault, but that the most they are
really looking at is a violation or harassment. So the point is that if
you go in there as the prosecutor and you say, "I want this, this and
this," they know that that is just what is going to happen to them,
and the ball is clearly in their court.
So I think redefining physical injury in some way will make a
difference for those cases where conviction of a misdemeanor is the
outcome that you would like to see. There are three possible ways
of doing that:
The first possibility is a general redefinition of physical injury in
the penal law. Some people are not in favor of that because it
would mean that bar fights are also redefined, and people fear it
would bring many more defendants into the system at a higher
level of charge. So that is one problem, although redefining physi-
cal injury would cover everybody.
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The second possibility is to simply include a domestic assault in
the penal law, where the definition of physical injury is altered for
victims of domestic violence. So it would mean that in a domestic
violence case, the penal law would specifically say that physical in-
jury means bleeding and bruises and bloody noses and all of those
things.
What is the problem with that? What is a domestic assault? Who
is domestic? I do not have to begin to say here what kinds of
problems the legislature is going to have around the definition of
who would be protected if we had domestic assault. And if we
went with domestic assault instead of just a redefinition of physical
injury, do we not want to protect the people that the legislature
might not want to protect?
The last possibility is elevating sentences for repeat offenders in
domestic violence. But the problem with that, and something I
would also like to see us concentrate on, is that unfortunately,
many defendants in domestic violence cases end up with dismissals,
ACDs, and violations, and those do not appear on their rap sheets
a year later when they are rearrested.
It is very hard for prosecutors and judges to have any kind of
realistic view of the defendant as a recidivist in domestic violence.
In fact, it is impossible unless the victim of domestic violence can
give you a very accurate portrayal of prior arrests. I have seen
numerous cases where a defendant has had six and seven dockets
that have ended up as dismissals and come into you with an abso-
lutely blank arrest record. So I think that is an issue that we ought
to really talk about also. Thank you.
MS. LEIDHOLDT: Thank you, Lisa. Please join me in thank-
ing all of our panelists. It has been fantastic.
We have time now for questions, answers, comments and discus-
sion for our panelists. Who would like to speak?
AUDIENCE: Hi. My name is Sarah Bennett. I am an attorney
at the Legal Aid Society. My question is really for the District
Attorneys.
I represent a lot of battered women who have killed their abus-
ers, where the District Attorney's offices tend to prosecute those
cases to the utmost. What I do not tend to see is a cross-over of
understanding. In arresting the abuser, there is a lot of under-
standing about what the victim has gone through, but when it gets
turned around and the woman kills her abuser - and clearly she
would have been dead had she not fought back - there does not
seem to be any kind of understanding or negotiation. I should not
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say across the board, but in my experience, and I have represented
about fifteen battered women at the appellate level, and I have not
seen that much movement in the District Attorney's office in terms
of understanding what led the woman to take the action she did.
The cases tend to be indicted as murder cases, and when they are
prosecuted as murder cases, the woman is convicted of murder.
When she has an advocate or a battered women's expert come in
and testify that being a battered woman and caused her to act in
this way, the District Attorneys that try the cases when talking
about sentencing say, "Oh, she says she was a battered woman, but
she was not a battered woman." Then, even though she has no
criminal background and has led an upstanding life for the forty or
fifty or sixty years before she killed this abuser, she ends up getting
sentenced often for more than the maximum sentence. And when
she is in the criminal justice system in that way she is basically be-
ing battered over and over again - first by her abuser, then by the
District Attorney's office, then by the court, and ultimately by the
cruel system.
MS. LEIDHOLDT: Who would like to take that? Lisa?
MS. SMITH: It is a little hard to answer that question. I do not
see that many cases in a year. There are cases where even though
there is a death they can be dismissed at the arrest stage by quickly
looking through some prior arrests and cases. Then after investiga-
tion, the case is either presented or not presented.
I think most of the District Attorneys' offices now, at least in
1999, are very conscious of this issue, and thus tend to do a lot of
investigation in these cases before they are actually prosecuted. In
all honesty, on an individual basis, there might be cases in which
they do not think that the defense is the truth.
But you are saying you see it as a systemic problem and I do not
see that many of them, so it is hard for me to agree or disagree.
MS. STOKINGER: I think my response also is that we have not
seen very many of them. They certainly have not come across my
desk, so I cannot speak to those specific cases.
JUDGE DRAGER: I do not deal with this at all, but apparently
you have become an expert on this. You are probably seeing a
great number of those cases because that is where they get sent to
relative to the number. I mean, that may be the most that are in
the system, or almost as many as there are in the system at this
point.
That is not to say that those should not be considered, but I think
the offices are now aware of the issue. And, of course, if you are
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dealing with them at the Appellate level, you are probably seeing
them.
AUDIENCE: Within the last year I was having a negotiation
with the Brooklyn District Attorney's office, and I felt like the peo-
ple I was dealing with, who are on a very high level, just believed it
was nothing. "So she had an order of protection, so he dangled her
out the window." They just dismiss it. And, I understand that of-
fice is supposed to be good on domestic violence.
MS. SMITH: Afterwards you can tell me about the case and I
will look at it.
AUDIENCE: But we still do read in the paper often about a
battered woman going on trial for killing her abuser. I know there
is one going on in Kings County right now. I do not know the facts
of the case, just what I read in the newspaper. I do see though, that
an expert is going to testify that the person was battered, and I
know that experts in general do not testify that a woman is bat-
tered if she is not - or at least this expert, Julie Brackman, with
whom I have dealt on many occasions. Sometimes she finds that
somebody has been battered and sometimes not.
You still see those prosecutions going on though. It just makes
me wonder, are we failing battered women who are in the criminal
justice system? They are the ones who are really victimized. They
are coming in at the point at which they have killed their abuser.
The violence they may have experienced is just unbelievable, and
usually the kind of bruising that they are coming in with the night
of that incident is just incredible. And yet, once they have killed
their abuser, it seems to me that the system has really let them
down.
MS. LEIDHOLDT: Yes, Kim?
AUDIENCE: I think maybe it would help - and I certainly
want to follow up on her point - to just switch the analogy
around, and maybe talk about the violations. Women have been
arrested when there are cross cases, and it might be easier in terms
of the numbers to talk about those kinds of cases because those are
happening more frequently, where women may be prosecuted if
there are cross cases on violations. There is a similar sort of a lack
of understanding about what it was that she had gone through as a
victim, but in a less severe case.
And then also, as a follow-up to what was mentioned earlier this
morning, about not prosecuting or not having mandatory arrest on
violations where there was no physical injury, much of the litera-
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ture says that those cases - the pushing, the shoving, just a viola-
tion that does not -
MS. STOKINGER: I consider that physical violence. A case
where there was no physical violence, for instance -
AUDIENCE: Well, even if there were a threat or something,
that could be seen as an escalation. So if you prosecuted or ar-
rested on a violation, even if there was no physical violence, some
would argue that would be preventative.
MS. STOKINGER: I would like to address that point first.
What I am saying is that we should have mandatory arrest. I think
there are cases in which there should be an arrest and there should
be a prosecution, even where victims come to us and say, "I do not
want this." However, there are cases in which someone has gone
to family court and gotten an order for protection where there has
not been any physical violence whatsoever. There may have been
a harassing telephone call - not necessarily a threat - just a
harassing telephone call. There is an order of protection and then
there is another telephone call.
My feeling is that once there is an arrest, the criminal justice
system is a very blunt instrument. Michelle is right. Once one
party has been arrested by the other, I think the repair of any rela-
tionship is almost impossible. I think there are cases in which we
should be looking at those cases and saying, "Do we want to dam-
age that; to break into that relationship and damage it, even when
we have not been asked to?" But there is mandatory arrest for
violations of orders of protection.
It seems to me that, even when the victim may say, "Please do
not arrest," in those instances we need to be looking at it. And
maybe the family court judge says, "You know something? This is
deserving of a criminal punishment." Maybe it should go to the
criminal justice system.
But we are stepping in and making an arrest when someone has
asked us not to and where there has been no physical violence. As
I said, I do not consider pushing, kicking and slapping not to be
physical violence. That is physical violence. It is physical contact.
I am talking about something that is just not physical, something
that is not in our traditional sense violence. Those are the cases I
am concerned about, and I think those are the cases that are now
coming into the criminal justice system. Those cases tend not to be
prosecuted, and yet we are stepping in and interfering with rela-
tionships that we may irreparably damage when there might have
been some hope over in family court for them.
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AUDIENCE: I am Lisa Frisch. I am with the New York State
Office for the Prevention of Domestic Violence.
I think we have to continue to be aware that it is the person who
is being controlling and abusive that is damaging the relationship.
I do not think it is the criminal justice system that is doing it. If
somebody has an order of protection issued, they should know
clearly that if you violate it, these are the consequences, and we
have to be really clear and consistent with those consequences.
MS. STOKINGER: But sometimes people have gotten orders
of protection and asked for them and they did not understand what
the consequences were. I think we do not make clear to people
what the consequences are.
AUDIENCE: That is a problem.
MS. STOKINGER: I think that the judges, the courts, the pros-
ecutors and whoever else is dealing with them have to say, "No
contact means you cannot pick up the phone. That means no con-
tact." You do not just write it on an order. There has to be a lec-
ture given. And then, if someone violates it, I do not feel bad for
them.
AUDIENCE: I agree with you. I think we need to provide that
information. Just one other quick comment about the question of
lowering the threshold of physical injury. What is the relationship,
from your perspectives, on the problem of dual arrest? Do you
think that could potentially contribute to that problem, and what
suggestions would you have about crafting language? Lisa gave
some suggestions as to possible ways of doing that, but what about
crafting language that may avert contributing to that problem?
MS. HAVILAND: I do think that lowering the threshold of
physical injury in New York State will cofitribute to more arrests
being made of victims of domestic violence. I do not have any im-
mediate solutions off the top of my head, but I do think that we
have to take the law that we have now and make a bigger effort to
train and to educate women in the community about what their
rights are with regard to the primary physical aggressor.
One of the things on our hotline that I did not talk about at all is
that probably a quarter of the calls that we get around police
problems are just merely women asking, "Oh, I got a DRI last
night; what does that mean? I got a DRI but no complaint; what
does that mean? I got a DRI and a complaint; what does that
mean?" I think there is a tremendous lack of information out
there about what women can or cannot do and expect in terms of
police response.
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I also think the NYCPD policy on primary physical aggressor is
not very well written so that it is unclear how the officers are sup-
posed to intervene. It says that you have to evaluate these factors,
but then it says two or three times over that you can make an arrest
of both parties anyway basically. It does very little to flesh out how
the factors should be interpreted. It does nothing to flesh out how
the factors can be ascertained, for example, whether a history of
domestic violence has to be documented or not documented. For
instance, in looking at defensive wounds, we had callers to our hot-
line where the differential in size was amazing. We had a caller
who was 5'5" and weighed 120 pounds and he was 6'3" and
weighed 210 pounds. Well, that kind of thing has to be looked at
when you are looking at whether an injury is defensive.
I think there is room for a lot of fleshing out of the primary phys-
ical aggressor law. We do entrust our police officers to make deci-
sions about probable cause. I do not think -that the primary
physical aggressor is a lot more complex than that. I think we have
to do a better job of getting the police officers educated about that
law.
JUDGE DRAGER: I think the difficulty with how to expand on
the language of physical injury is because it would be very difficult
to do that. That is kind of what I was alluding to in my comments.
If we think about moving away from the stalking statute, we are
going more in the direction of what is really happening in domestic
violence cases. It is the emotional abuse that is much more telling,
that we have not quite come up with the right language, if you will,
or to turn that into a criminal statute. That kind of abuse is much
more prevalent, and I think that somehow or another we have to
begin to grasp onto how we address that kind of activity.
I also just wanted to comment on the issues of orders of protec-
tion just to give you an example of some of the difficulties that are
created. I must tell you, I love getting contempt cases because they
are easy. I do not have to worry about whether she wants to prose-
cute or not. I mean, I have the order of protection, and it has been
violated. It is an easy case. And of course, now that it is a felony
level prosecution, there are real substantial penalties that are
involved.
To give you an example of some of the difficulties we face in the
criminal justice system, somebody is arrested on a violation of an
order of protection and the defense attorney says, "But, Judge, she
moved back in with him," or "She asked him to come and live with
her." While we all know that is not what the order says, we all
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know that he is still violating the order, it does make the case a
more difficult prosecution.
I think it is very important to remember that when we talk about
a prosecution, ultimately what we are talking about is presenting a
case to a jury that is going to hear the evidence and where the
standard of proof is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This is a
very high standard, it should be a high standard, and it is a jury
decision. There is no telling what ultimately happens at a trial, as
everyone knows.
AUDIENCE: I do a lot of criminal defense, and a lot of times
what I see is the woman - usually it is a woman - using the order
as something to try to keep her husband or boyfriend in line.
Many times I have seen it being totally abused by the woman.
I tell my clients when they are in jail, "I do not care if your girl-
friend comes to you through the front door of your home naked,
you are not to have any contact with her." Yet, usually, the girl-
friend will call and they will go. I had one case where they went to
a tanning salon together for lunch, the boyfriend got up to leave,
and she called the police and had him arrested because she said, "I
do not want you to go." It happens quite often that way, quite
often.
MS. LEIDHOLDT: Yes?
AUDIENCE: I am from Sanctuary for Families, Center for Bat-
tered Women's Legal Services. In the early 1990s, it used to be
that my primary assistance to my clients was helping them convince
the police to arrest the men who had abused them. I find myself
now in the position of spending most of my time helping my clients
not get arrested on retaliatory charges made by their abuser. I find
that the mandatory arrest law is being used as a tool by abusers
against women.
Inspector Young noted that mandatory arrests are up 144 per-
cent. I asked him during the break if he had a breakdown by gen-
der, but he did not have that information available. I have been
trying to get that information from the NYCPD for some time and
I have not been able to. I do not think he has it. The Office of
Public Information has not given it out.
Anecdotally, I know that arrests of women on these retaliatory
charges are increasing. I wonder if anecdotally anyone on the
panel had comments about this misuse of mandatory arrest as a
tool for an abuser, and I would ask the panel how they approach
these cases and how assessments are made when women are ar-
rested, whether there is even assessment, whether she is previously
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a complainant in a domestic violence case, whether or not the
arrest complaint is a valid complaint, and how assessments are
made?
MS. SMITH: Actually, one of the great things about this confer-
ence is that a lot of the conversation from last year prompted some
of the work that has been done in the interim in this area. The
NYCPD has been doing special training in Brooklyn on primary
aggressor with the police officers. I am actually seeing a drop in
cross-complaints in the courts, so much so that the judges actually
independently mentioned to me one day that they had noticed that
the cross-complaints were dropping dramatically.
The cross-complaints or the dual arrest numbers are so much
smaller than our overall arrest numbers. We have set up a system
in our complaint room where we have one person who looks at
them as they come in. I think they are the perfect example of cases
that actually have to be treated on an individual basis and should
have if we cannot get an advocate involved in the intake stage,
which I guess is problematic because we do not know if the woman
who is arrested has an advocate, at least as soon as the advocate is
involved, they should reach out to the District Attorney.
We have been trying to address it at the intake stage so it does
not go any further. We have been having actually quite a bit of
success, just judging from the numbers that are actually pending in
the Brooklyn Criminal Court.
So I think maybe on a training and then really an aggressive
complaint room approach, you can actually make a dent in it. That
is at least what our criminal court judges are telling us.
MS. STOKINGER: What we are seeing with dual arrests is, I
think, that they are down since the primary aggressor law. We
have had a policy since before last year when there is a dual arrest
to bring both parties into the complaint room, if the police have
not already straightened it out. If we can, we straighten it out then
and there, so we know whether or not to draft a complaint against
both, one, or none. It is important to do that.
However, I think one of the big impediments to the police doing
their job and to the District Attorney's office doing their job is just
the dynamics of a situation. Sometimes it is hard to find out, even
after weeks, that we have a problem. But there is an agreement,
there is actually another consent decree, that there is twenty-four
hours from arrest to arraignment time. The police have two hours
of that twenty-four hours to process an arrest. What happens in
dual arrest cases is they just cannot apply the primary aggressor
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law in that two hours; it is almost impossible. So that is a huge
impediment.
If we could somehow get an exception for domestic violence
cases to that two-hour rule, it would be wonderful.
AUDIENCE: I am not just talking about primary aggressor. I
am actually talking about cases where the woman is the only one
arrested.
MS. STOKINGER: The retaliatory cases I think are actually
even more difficult. It is, frankly, in intense relationships where
there are retaliatory complaints made in many different contexts.
We see it in child abuse cases and domestic violence cases; we see it
in the situation where one person has had the other one arrested
and then that person has the other one arrested; we see it where
there is a matrimonial action going on and all of a sudden there is
an allegation of child sex abuse. We see it a lot.
But even when we see it a lot, it is still not uncommon. We do
see it too much. It is the misuse of the system. But it is a small
number compared to the 'overall numbers that we see.
They are very difficult cases to flesh out, and the retaliatory ar-
rests are very difficult because it does not obviously present itself
to either the police officer or to the District Attorney's office at
that moment that there is a situation where we have got to sort out
which one it was. But that is something where I cannot insist that a
defendant speak to me. So if a woman gets arrested, I cannot say,
"You must talk to me and tell me what happened and I can figure it
out." I am dependent upon her lawyer to come to me and say,
"Please look into this situation."
I would be very unhappy to hear if there was a case in which a
lawyer brought a case to us and said, "Please investigate this," but
someone did not do it in my office.
AUDIENCE: I want to ask Mary if you know of any other stud-
ies that have been done in other states looking at similar kinds of
issues, or whether other states which have lower definitions of
physical injury have greater rates of dual arrest or retaliatory
arrests?
MS. HAVILAND: No. It is a fascinating question. I have never
really studied it systematically. There are some states that have
much lower thresholds - California is one of them - in domestic
violence crimes, and there are others that have adopted primary
physical aggressor law, Wisconsin and Connecticut being two that I
know of. But I do not know about the interaction between the
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two. I would love to look at it at some point and see what the
interaction is.
It becomes very hard. I looked at other jurisdiction stuff when I
was director of the Coalition for Criminal Justice Reform for Bat-
tered Women. It becomes very difficult to compare because there
are so many different possible intervening characteristics of a
jurisdiction.
But I do know that the mandatory arrest statute that we all have
emulated, which comes from Duluth, Minnesota, is a statute that is
based on visible injuries - not anything less than that, just visible
injuries. They have been able to keep their dual arrest and their
retaliatory arrests low. But that is because it is a small town. For
each household where there is an arrest made, an advocate is sent
out to that household. It is a very intensive and different model
than we can replicate in an urban environment.
So that is a very good question that I think people do not really
have the answer to.
MR. YOUNG: If I could respond from the police perspective, I
guess what has been mentioned is just in terms of the training on
primary physical aggressor. Without going through the whole
training, one of the points that we are trying to get out as a result
of the training is that we want the officers not to jump to conclu-
sions, but to conduct an investigation to learn the facts. We do
encourage that the parties be interviewed separately and privately
to learn the nature and cause of the incident; check both parties for
injuries and determine if they are consistent with the stories that
they are telling; distinguish between offensive and defensive
wounds; consider the threats of future harm and past incidents of
domestic violence; and consider if one person acted in self-defense.
Having said all those things, independent of comparing probable
cause versus primary physical aggressor, I do, from an operational
perspective, see a significant difference in probable cause and pri-
mary physical aggressor for the officer on the scene being asked to
make a decision in a quick period of time.
But the structures in the Department, with the creation of the
Domestic Violence Prevention Officer, allows other aspects of the
system to interview, go back to the Domestic Violence Officer and
ask for documentation on previous histories to assist in the quality
assessment of the case as it moves through the system, to allow
justice to ultimately prevail. It is just very difficult in that snapshot,
very focused period of time to make a decision with the outcome
that you may desire.
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AUDIENCE: I would like to address the blunt instruments is-
sue. I work a lot in family court. I also do a lot of divorces. Often,
I think about what one of my law school professors said to me,
"You will never be a client," and this issue of depending on bu-
reaucracies or large organizations to necessarily come to the cor-
rect conclusion in a particular case. My experience in family court
is basically that there is the presumption that you are guilty when
you come in, and it is up to you to prove that you are innocent.
Because they are used to dealing with neglect and abuse, they are
used to dealing with certain types of things, and they assume that it
is up to you to establish that you are not the norm. That is your
attorney's job - to establish that it was not you.
Doing a lot of divorces, I also find that orders of protection are
often used as a ploy. They are used to get a man out of the house
because otherwise they will have to live together for a long time
uncomfortably.
I find in family court that you get a fair number of people who
manipulate the orders of protection. Sometimes it is the man,
sometimes it is the woman. These are the realities of practicing in
any court, that you get a gamut of motivations - which is not to
say that there are not more women abused than men, but I have
also dealt with cases where there have been men who were physi-
cally abused by women. After awhile I get a little tired of hearing
that it is only the woman who is the victim, because that is not
necessarily the case. What I am trying to say is I do not know what
kind of training judges are getting, because we get some judges
who will always put a man in jail, and some judges who will say,
"Well, she married him."
MS. LEIDHOLDT: I would like to let just one more person ask
a question or make a comment.
AUDIENCE: I would just like to applaud Ms. Tasha Hightower
for sharing her personal story.
There are other areas in the law in which it is being said that
pigment is not addressed and people get a different form of justice
or it manifests itself in different ways. Perhaps another day, an-
other time, we can delve into that, but thank you for sharing your
story.
MS. LEIDHOLDT: I think before we close, Tasha has just one
or two comments that she would like to make.
MS. HIGHTOWER: Yes. I just wanted to say quickly that the
system has not just been a foe to me, it has also been a friend, but I
had to stick to the topic at hand. I would like to address two peo-
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pie very quickly. One is my attorney, Mr. Ronald Fischer, from
Victim Services, who helped me in family court. I was really skep-
tical at first because he was a male and I had just finished dealing
with a male, but, Mr. Fischer, thank you.
And then, the biggest surprise is my Assistant District Attorney
is here, Sashay Taylor. She has been incredible. She has been so
supportive to my daughter and I. She is just incredible. And this is
great, because when we talk on the phone about the updates of the
case, we rarely get to talk, and for me to actually see her - I just
feel so loved from everybody in the room. Assistant District At-
torney Taylor, you are great.
MS. LEIDHOLDT: Thank you very much, everybody.
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IN THE TRENCHES AWARDS:
FIRST ANNUAL PRESENTATION To AN OUTSTANDING JUDGE
AND EXCEPTIONAL ADVOCATE
MS. LEIDHOLDT: We are now going to start the award cere-
mony. Could the awardees please come to the front of the room?
MS. DOUGLASS: It is my great pleasure to begin the remarks.
In planning for this year's annual forum, the Planning Committee
got together and discussed what the content of the panel discus-
sions should be and just generally where this conference would be
going.
One of the conference planners, Rose Pierre Louis, from Net-
work for Women's Services, said, "You know, it is about time that
we gave out awards to some people that have done tremendous
work. We should really institutionalize an awards ceremony, since
we have institutionalized this conference here at Fordham, and no-
tice those people that perhaps deserve special mention specifically
for their work around domestic violence issues."
We did not want to have formal awards or formal titles or formal
anything be the basis for these awards. We wanted it to be really
those people who had devoted themselves, their real thought pro-
cess, to trying to make a difference in the arena of domestic vio-
lence. Those people, starting this year and going forward, who
have had the courage to take unpopular positions within the sys-
tem that they actually operate in, to speak out in places where the
subject of domestic violence might not have been welcome at the
time that they spoke out, to be a thorn in people's sides and, to try
to make change where change is worth making.
Without further comment about the awards themselves, I would
like to introduce you to the first judge who is going to be receiving
the "In the Trenches Award" from the Lawyers Committee
Against Domestic Violence, Judge Betty Weinberg Ellerin, on my
right.
Many of you probably have seen Judge Ellerin introduced as a
woman of firsts. Perhaps the most recent of these is that she is the
first woman to be the presiding judge of the Appellate Division,
First Department, which came about earlier this year. I think we
should all applaud that.
Without dwelling on all of those firsts, some are the first woman
to be appointed to the Appellate Division, First Department in
1985, the first woman to be the Deputy Chief Administrative Judge
of the State of New York, the first woman to win the Harlan Fiske
Stone Award presented by the Association of Trial Lawyers of the
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City of New York, which are all major achievements. If you look at
Judge Ellerin's record, you can see that for a long time she has also
been concerned with what is happening with women.
Judge Ellerin is now the chair of the New York State Judicial
Committee on Women in the Courts. She is the Past President of
the National Association of Women Judges; the past chair of the
National Task Force on Gender Bias in the Courts; the past presi-
dent of the New York Women's Bar Association; and, a founder
and director since its inception of the Women's Bar of the State of
New York. She has received awards from the ABA Commission
on Women in the Profession, the very prestigious Margaret Brent
Women Lawyers of Achievement Award, as possibly the shining
achievement among those many awards that she has gotten for
work on behalf of women.
There was no one else who came to mind .when we decided to
award a judge. It was Judge Ellerin who should get this award.
What makes her tick? Well, we found her to be a woman of
empathy and understanding. She really seems to connect with peo-
ple, one on one. But she is also a woman who loves the court and
loves the law and does not want them to do anything but be a force
for good. So she brings these two interests together in a very
unique way.
She also sees herself as a problem solver. She rolls up her
sleeves, listens to all. the good ideas in the room, and then says,
"Let's get started, let's do something about this." She is sociable
and warm. She is a mentor to everyone who comes along. There
are three examples I want to tell you about, and then I want to give
her what we hope will be an award that she can remember along
with the other important ones of her life.
First example: A little less than two years ago, after thinking
about the forum that was coming up last year, we thought we
would have Judge Ellerin, who chaired the New York State Judicial
Committee on Women in the Courts and who was going to be co-
sponsoring that event, come and talk to us about what she thought
should happen with that event and, in general, what issues were
important to bring up at the conference. We invited her to come to
one of the regular meetings of the Lawyers Committee Against
Domestic Violence. No important people were planning to be
there, no press, nothing. It was just another event that she needed
to fit into her schedule, which is packed every single minute.
Not only did she come and spend an enormous amount of time
with us talking and listening, but before that, she said, "Cathy, I
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want to meet you out in the hall. I have something I need to talk
over with you. Come out before I come into that meeting." So I
came out ten minutes early. What I found was a very difficult case
for a battered woman that had come to the Appellate Division.
The woman had no lawyer, and was never going to receive a hear-
ing on her case that merited consideration without a lawyer. Judge
Ellerin would simply not let this person go without figuring out
collectively with the people who were in that room some way to
find counsel for that woman. And you know that this is happening
day in and day out behind the scenes.
Second example: Last year at our conference, we decided for
the first time to have a judges' panel. We wanted to attract people
on the bench to talk to advocates and establish a dialogue. We
asked Judge Ellerin if she would be willing to moderate that panel.
Not only did she welcome the opportunity, but she welcomed the
opportunity to ask the hard questions and to admit to problems not
yet being solved, and to work all the people on the panel very hard
to acknowledge where the failures still were and where we had yet
to go. This is not an easy thing to do, and it was a very good start
to our judges' panel precedent. We are actually hoping to follow
the awards ceremony with the second of those.
Third example: In her role as the chair of the New York State
Judicial Committee on Women in the Courts, she linked that or-
ganization up with the City Bar's Task Force on Domestic Violence
because there was such a natural link between the concerns that
were being raised in that Task Force and by her commission. Be-
cause of that link, there is a movement to try to solve problems in a
very systemic way that will perhaps make a real difference to those
victims that may not have gotten representation before.
These examples are just the ones that I know of. All of you who
have been dealing with Judge Ellerin in many contexts could come
up with your own examples.
At this point it is my great pleasure to show you the award and
to read it to you. It says: "The Lawyers Committee Against Do-
mestic Violence presents the 'In The Trenches Award' to the Hon-
orable Betty Weinberg Ellerin for bringing indomitable courage,
vision, and dedication to ending violence against women. April 26,
1999."
JUDGE ELLERIN: Thank you so much, Cathy. That was such
a beautiful introduction.
I must tell you this award means more to me than I can say,
because I think it says that maybe I have made some small contri-
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butions to effecting a scourge that has been with us since, unfortu-
nately, time immemorial.
I am not sure that I really am the one who deserves it because
there are so many out there, judges and others, not the least of
whom is Cathy Douglass, who happens to be my own sort of favor-
ite saint in waiting, but who really do work day-by-day to try to
make things better.
I will be honest and say that for the first thirty of the fifty years
that I have been aggressively involved in seeking to make things
better for women, it was primarily in seeking to help women ad-
vance within the professions and within society generally. We
sometimes would talk about domestic violence - but remember,
that it was an issue that was in the closet for a long time.
And then, when I became a judge and I sat in the criminal court,
a little over twenty years ago, I had first-hand experience with do-
mestic violence cases and I got a taste of (1) what a difficult prob-
lem it is, and (2) that it was not being taken very seriously by those
who should have been taking it seriously, whether it was judges or
court personnel or what have you.
While things have really improved markedly in many areas, the
one area where we have not really made much progress at all, I
hate to say, is in domestic violence. The one way that we have
forged ahead is that at least it is now out of the closet, it is recog-
nized as a wrong and as a problem that we must address. Hope-
fully, all people of goodwill and right thinking feel that way. Just
listening to some of your speakers here has been very inspiring to
me.
But there is still so much more to do. It is still very prevalent. It
still is not being addressed in a very effective way in many areas.
Cathy made some mention about my new position. Well, I have
been working with the Council of the Association of the Bar on
Domestic Violence. The chair of that Council, Judge Michael
Nadel, is here today. He happens to be a member of my commit-
tee, the New York Committee on Women in the Courts. He
brought to us the report of the committee that it is essential in a
case where a domestic violence victim is bringing a case in the fam-
ily court that counsel be assigned immediately. Of course, our
committee also adopted that position. I thought "Oh, this is easy.
After all, the law says that counsel is supposed to be assigned,
right? We are going to be able to do this in a snap." Well, that was
two and a half years ago, and it still has not happened.
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As things would have it, I am now in a little different position,
and that is the one thing I am committed to doing. I want to make
sure that when the victim of domestic violence comes into court to
file that petition, she has counsel. And yes, there are occasionally
men victims, but, to be honest, the overwhelming number are wo-
men victims. Having counsel assigned at that stage permits that
victim to know all of the options that are available and to be able
to proceed with the case in an appropriate fashion. Statistics have
demonstrated that when counsel is early assigned, the return rate
to prosecute to conclusion is thirty to forty percent higher than
when that is not the case.
I am committed to that, and I want to tell you, they are going to
hear from me between now and the end of the year. If I can ac-
complish that, I really will feel (1) that I deserve the award that
you have given me, and (2) that I really have accomplished some-
thing in this new position.
I want to thank you all again very, very much. I admire all of
you so very much because you really are in the trenches day by day
fighting the good fight.
MS. DOMONKOS: Now it is my pleasure to give the Advocates
In the Trenches Award.
When the Lawyers Committee Against Domestic Violence de-
cided to give one of its first In the Trenches awards to Maria Impe-
rial, I grabbed the chance to be the one to present it to her today.
For over ten years, Maria Imperial has been a leader and an in-
novator in the effort to find legal approaches to address the epi-
demic of domestic violence. In her ten years as General Counsel
and Associate director of Victim Services, where she learned from
the experiences of the 75,000 domestic violence victims who came
to the organization for help each year, Maria looked beyond the
conventional wisdom of the domestic violence movement and the
stereotyping assumptions of the justice system to get to the heart of
the true needs of these very real and very diverse women and their
children.
Early on, Maria identified the dearth of specialized legal services
for domestic violence victims and knew that this was an issue of
essential justice, personal safety and integrity, and economic free-
dom for women and their children. With Legal Services' money
scant and getting scantier, she found a way to establish, and then to
grow, Victim Services Domestic Violence Law Project.
Maria has always focused on the issue of economic dependency
and how it creates a trap for women with abusive partners. The
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implications of welfare reform for battered women were immedi-
ately obvious to her, and she set out to make sure that the Family
Violence Option, which would exempt battered women from many
of the new rules and restrictions regarding the now-tattered "safety
net," would not apply to them. Maria worked tirelessly in New
York City and in Albany and was instrumental in getting the Fam-
ily Violence Option5" passed in New York State.
She now serves on the New York State Task Force to Implement
the Family Violence Option. She also developed and chaired the
Women Welfare and Abuse Task Force, which, among other things,
has sought to ensure appropriate and fair application of the Family
Violence Option in New York City.
She has written a number of articles, including "Self-sufficiency
and Safety: Welfare Reform for Victims of Domestic Violence,"
published in the Georgetown Journal on Fighting Poverty.53
Maria was also in the forefront of the examination of domestic
violence in the workplace. In 1995, she was invited by the Office of
the President of the United States to talk on the topic of "Domes-
tic Violence as a Workplace Issue" at a conference celebrating the
Women's Bureau.
She has helped develop policies and training materials for em-
ployers. She is also a member of the New York State Task Force
on Domestic Violence Workplace Issues, which has developed a
model policy on domestic violence for all New York State counties
to apply to their employees and which is being adapted to serve as
a model policy for private employers.
Maria's work is never just theory. At Victim Services, she devel-
oped Project Rise, a job-training program for domestic violence
victims.
Maria now serves as executive director of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York Fund, Inc. The City Bar Fund, the
501(c)(3) affiliate of the Association, provides legal services to
those who cannot afford such assistance through direct representa-
tion, advice and referral, and self-help clinics.
I know that Maria will continue her dedication to helping do-
mestic violence victims at the City Bar Fund. She had barely got-
ten on the payroll over there when she called to tell me about her
idea for a new legal clinic for battered women who need advocacy
to access benefits.
52. See N.Y. A. Bill 507, 222d Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999).
53. See Maria L. Imperial, Self-Sufficiency and Safety: Welfare Reform for Victims
of Domestic Violence, 5 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3 (1997).
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A few final and more personal words about Maria before I give
her the award. I had the joy of working for her for almost six
years, and I learned from her everyday. I learned about how to
treat clients with dignity, respect and the utmost professionalism. I
learned about how to try always to remember that our own per-
spective cannot substitute for that of the client, who may come
from a different ethnic, cultural, racial, socio-economic or philo-
sophical viewpoint.
Maria embodies one of the truest characteristics of someone who
really cares about women's issues, and that is a heartfelt desire to
support, encourage and mentor the women professionals who work
for her. In my book, that makes her a feminist in the very best
sense and she will always be a mentor, role model and friend to me.
So it is with great gratitude and delight that I present the Law-
yers Committee Against Domestic Violence In the Trenches
Award to Maria Imperial, who lives her professional life in the
trenches, shoulder-to-shoulder with domestic violence victims and
with her colleagues.
MS. IMPERIAL: Thank you so much for the In the Trenches
Award, although I feel, like Judge Ellerin, that I am not as deserv-
ing of this award as much as other people in the audience are as
well.
It is especially gratifying for me to receive this award from Julie
Domonkos, who is a colleague that I respect so much and admire.
I also would like to thank all of my new friends at the City Bar
Fund and also friends from Victim Services for coming here today
to see me receive this award.
Some years back, Donna Shallaleigh commented that "in this
country domestic violence is just about as common as giving birth,
about four million instances of each." Think about that - hope-
lessness and hope equally weighted in our society, and all too often
intermingled in the same woman's life.
I often use that quote when I talk about domestic violence be-
cause I actually saw my role as an advocate on domestic violence
issues as giving women hope. Although there are many legal
things that I needed to do, I also felt that I needed to create pro-
grams or develop policies to give people hope.
Over the past ten years, I have seen a number of changes -
there has been the Violence Against Women Act and on the state
level there has been criminal and family justice reform - but there
still is so much that needs to be done. I actually was sitting at the
conference with a friend who taught me about domestic violence
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on a plane over ten years ago, and we both commented that
although a lot of things have changed, a lot of things still stay the
same as well.
I find it somewhat ironic to be honored as an advocate because I
went to. law school knowing that I did not want to be a litigator.
Being an advocate, if you know my personality, is not the first
word that would come to your mind. But the reason I share that
with you is because I would like to give the law students in the
audience hope that although you might not aspire to be a litigator,
that there are ways that you can definitely make a difference in
other people's lives.
I feel extremely privileged to have worked with domestic vio-
lence victims over the years. I also feel privileged to have worked
with the colleagues that are in this room over the past years. I have
learned so much from the women. I have learned so much from
Tasha today.
My final remark is that I just would like to thank all of you so
much. Thank you very much.
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JUDGES PANEL: How EFFECTIVELY Do THE COURTS AND
ADVOCATES ADDRESS THE SAFETY OF WOMEN
AND CHILDREN?
MS. DOUGLASS: It is now my privilege and pleasure to intro-
duce the moderator of the Judges' Panel. He will introduce the
rest of the panel and begin the discussion.
The Honorable Michael Nadel is Judge of the New York State
Court of Claims; but for the purpose of this panel, his important
position is that he is the chair of the Domestic Violence Task Force
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. He was a
criminal court Judge, and from 1981 to 1985 he served as the Dep-
uty Chief Administrator of the New York State court system. He is
also, as Judge Ellerin said earlier, a member of the New York State
Judicial Committee on Women in the Courts.
It is with great pleasure that I turn over the Judges' Panel to
Judge Nadel.
JUDGE NADEL: I want to introduce our panel.
Judge Esther Morgenstern was elected to the Civil Court of the
City of New York in 1995 and was assigned to the Criminal Court
of Kings County in April of 1996. In March of 1997, Judge Mor-
genstern was appointed to preside over the newly created Kings
County Domestic Violence Part that handles domestic violence
misdemeanors from the first date after arraignment through the fi-
nal disposition or trial. Prior to taking the bench, Judge Morgen-
stern was law secretary to Justice Herbert Kramer of the Kings
County Supreme Court, and before that she practiced law at a firm
specializing in international commercial litigation. Judge Morgen-
stern sits on numerous committees and task forces addressing the
issue of domestic violence. She received her Juris Doctor from
Cardozo School of Law in 1984.
Judge William Rigler was a practicing attorney from 1951 to
1970, when he was appointed to the civil court, and to the family
court in 1971, where he served until December, 1977. At that time,
he was elected to the Supreme Court of Kings County, where he
presently serves. Judge Rigler has been a lecturer at judicial semi-
nars and various bar associations on matrimonial law.
Judge Gayle Roberts was appointed to the bench in 1997. Since
that time, she has been presiding over the Bronx Family Court.
Prior to her appointment to the bench, Judge Roberts was an As-
sistant District Attorney in Bronx County. She is involved in nu-
merous professional and civic organizations. She is the co-chair of
the Bronx County Bar Association's Pro Bono Committee and a
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member of the New York State Bar Association's President's Com-
mittee on Access to Justice. Judge Roberts graduated from Tulane
University School of Law and the University of Pittsburgh.
Judge Joseph Lauria has been practicing law since 1972, when he
was appointed Assistant District Attorney in Kings County. He
served in that capacity and attained status as senior homicide trial
attorney. Later, as an Assistant District Attorney in Queens
County, he was Chief of the criminal court and family court bu-
reaus. He was also in charge of training for that office. Thereafter,
Judge Lauria practiced family and criminal law in the private sector
from 1980 until 1989, when he was appointed to the family court
bench. He presided in Queens County for nine years over some
notorious cases. Since July, 1998, he has been a Supervising Judge
of the Family Court of Kings and Richmond Counties. 4 He has
been a lecturer and panelist at various bar associations and govern-
mental and law enforcement agencies.
Judge Judith Gische is an Acting Supreme Court Justice pres-
ently presiding in the dedicated Matrimonial Part in the Bronx.
She is a member of the Peace Advisory Board and of the Matrimo-
nial Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York. Judge Gische previously served in the Civil Court of the
City of New York and in housing court. She was also a practitioner
in private practice for many years.
To begin, the court system in New York does not deal with the
issues presented by the Hypothetical 55 that you have been dealing
with during the day in a coherent fashion. We know that thrbe
separate courts are regularly called upon to address the circum-
stance of domestic violence and the well-being of a child. We see
in the Hypothetical matters pending in family court and criminal
court. The same facts could be presented to a supreme court jus-
tice presiding over a matrimonial action.
We have assembled a group of judges from each of the three
courts to explain from their perspective what happens when situa-
tions of domestic violence involving the well-being of a child are
presented to them, and to explore whether the issues of custody,
visitation, support, violent behavior and the issuance of orders of
protection are handled differently depending upon which court it
is.
54. Judge Lauria was appointed Administrative Judge of New York City Family
Court in October, 1999.
55. See Hypothetical, infra app. A.
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How do the responsibilities of the three courts differ? Is infor-
mation upon which decisions are made different depending upon
the court; and, if so, is that because different information is neces-
sary, or is it because of a difference as to what is available?
When more than one court is involved with the same people at
the same time, how much does each court know about what the
other is doing? Do they need to know? Should they try to find out
more?
What we hope will emerge from this discussion and from your
questions is a sense of whether the overlapping jurisdiction of
courts inhibits or enhances the effectiveness of how the courts ad-
dress the problem.
To begin our presentation, one judge from each of the three
courts will examine the issues presented by the Hypothetical from
the perspective of her court. We will start with Judge Morgenstern
of Brooklyn Criminal Court. As you look at the Hypothetical,
what are the issues that you have to decide, what do you need to
know to decide them, and how much do you consider what is or
should be going on in family court?
JUDGE MORGENSTERN: Thank you.
Domestic violence is the only crime where most often the victim
and the batterer do not believe that the acts committed are actually
crimes. The creation of the Domestic Violence Court sends the
message and makes it clear that we as a society will have zero toler-
ance for domestic violence.
In Brooklyn Criminal Court, we arraign over 100,000 cases every
year. One out of every five cases is a domestic violence case. Four
million women are physically abused by their male partners each
year in the United States. Again, there is domestic violence against
men, but it is very different from cases where women are the
victims.
In New York City, in 1997, there were over 250,000 Domestic
Incident Reports ("DIR") filed. In 1998, we had almost 300,000
DIRs. Not all of these resulted in arrest and prosecution.
In Brooklyn Criminal Court, we have two designated domestic
violence parts. Each of us is an Individual Assignment Part - han-
dling cases from arraignments to final dispositions. We carry over
1200 cases apiece. The Brooklyn District Attorney's office has des-
ignated domestic violence district attorneys, as well as social work-
ers, that deal with the special victims.
Most determinations that are made in criminal court occur
before there is a determination of guilt. There are very important
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constitutional issues raised when I arraign a defendant and issue a
full stay-away order of protection. Based upon an uncorroborated
complaint, the District Attorney has very little information within
those first twenty-four hours, and we are depriving defendants of
their liberty if bail is set, and of their property if we issue full stay
away orders of protection. However, the court's first concern is the
alleged victim's safety and the safety of the family.
Now, in our Hypothetical, Juliette had several things working
against her, which is what makes it a very interesting Hypothetical
for our panel today. She entered into an arranged marriage and
was clearly being controlled by Neil from the outset. He would not
give her money for anything but food, he insisted on going every-
where with her, he would not allow her to attend classes or job
training and verbally abused her, telling her that she would never
hold a job. He also held her immigration status over her head.
These are classic domestic violence control warning signals.
When the verbal abuse escalated and Neil punched Juliette in
the face and knocked out her tooth, had she called the police to-
day, a domestic violence officer assigned to each precinct would
have arrived at the home, Neil would have been arrested and
charged with felony assault,56 menacing57 and harassment; 58 if
Amy, the child, was present, they would have charged him with
endangering the welfare of a child. 9
Now, it is very likely that had this been the first incident of this
magnitude, Juliette would have declined to testify in the Grand
Jury and the case would have been reduced to a misdemeanor as-
sault. It is also likely that Juliette would not have signed the sup-
porting deposition against Neil, and the result would have been an
ACD (adjournment contemplating dismissal) with a limited order
of protection or an outright CPL § 30.30 dismissal.60
In 1997, we compiled the following statistics: 82.7 percent of all
the domestic violence cases filed in the domestic violence parts in
Brooklyn were disposed of without a criminal conviction. In thirty-
five to forty percent of the felonies where the victim testified in the
Grand Jury, she later recanted and testified for the defendant.
56. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.05, 120.10 (McKinney 1999).
57. See id. §§ 120.13-120.15.
58. See id. § 240.25.
59. See id. § 260.10.
60. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30 (McKinney 1999).
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Juliette could also have opted to file a summons in the criminal
court against Neil pursuant to CPL § 130.10.61 She would then
avoid having Neil arrested, Juliette would obtain an order of pro-
tection, an officer would have served the order on Neil, and he
would have been summoned to appear in criminal court for ar-
raignment. Pursuant to CPL § 530.11, Juliette could have also
elected to proceed in the family court, where the courts now have
concurrent jurisdiction.62
Back to our Hypothetical, when the violence escalated and Neil
punched Juliette in the stomach while pregnant and threatened her
with a knife, Juliette could have called the police. If this occurred
today, a domestic violence officer would have appeared at the
home, would have taken photos to preserve the evidence, and the
officer would have interviewed the neighbors and made a further
investigation. Once arrested, Neil would have been processed
through the criminal court and at the arraignment charged with
felony assault,63 menacing with a knife,64 harassment 65 and endan-
gering the welfare of a child.66 And, certainly, a full stay-away or-
der of protection would have been issued requiring Neil to find a
place to live during the case.
Had Juliette come to court for the arraignment and spoken with
the Victim Services representative or with the District Attorney's
office and indicated she wanted him home, a limited order of pro-
tection probably would have been granted by the court and the
case would have proceeded requiring the defendant to appear
before a judge and his behavior would be monitored.
Had Juliette gone forward with each case and prosecuted them, a
Domestic Violence Registry entry would have been created and
the courts at arraignment would see that, although it may appear
that Neil had never been arrested before and no criminal history
existed, the Registry evidenced that prior orders of protection
against Neil did exist in Juliette's favor - from family, criminal or
supreme court. Judges now receive, in addition to the defendants'
rap sheets, the Domestic Violence Registry on every defendant at
the arraignment on the criminal court complaint. And, with the
new legislation passed, states are giving full faith and credit to all
61. See id. § 130.10.
62. See id. § 530.11.
63. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.05, 120.10 (McKinney 1999).
64. See id. § 120.13-120.15.
65. See id. § 240.25.
66. See id. § 260.10.
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orders of protection from other states,67 and we are now starting to
see orders of protection from other states at the time of arraign-
ment as well.
Had Juliette kept records of the abuse - the hospital records,
the police reports, the photos - these could later have been used
to prosecute Neil. Studies have shown that the best predictor of
more violence is violence.68 So often after the victim has refused to
go forward the first or second time the violence escalates. The vio-
lence further escalated in our case - Neil pushed Juliette to the
ground while holding the baby, broke her nose and bruised the
child.
When the domestic violence officers would show up at that
point, they would now have to make an assessment as to who was
the primary initial aggressor in the situation. This could avoid the
horrific outcomes that we talked about earlier today requiring the
Administration for Children's Services ("ACS") to get involved,
possibly remove the children and arrest the victim.
When cross-complaints are filed in court, the District Attorney's
hands are tied because both parties want to end the matter in
court, albeit for very different reasons. The District Attorneys can-
not communicate with either party without their attorneys and the
cases are labeled "ACD" (adjourned in contemplation of dismis-
sal) with limited orders or dismissed outright.
Since the passage of the primary aggressor legislation,69 the
cross-complaints in Brooklyn have gone down significantly. Of my
1200 cases pending and the total 2400 pending in Brooklyn, about
five percent are cross-complaints, and that is two and a half years
into the domestic violence parts existence. So the numbers have
gone down significantly.
In every case in my Domestic Violence Part, if the victim is in
the courtroom, I will second call the case and send the victim down
to speak with Victim Services. Victim Services is not an arm of the
court or of the District Attorney's office. Victim Services is there to
speak with the victims and they have a better chance of reaching
the victims.
67. See 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (1999).
68. See, e.g., J. MONAHAN, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE
CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 80 (1981); Ron Langevin & R.J. Wat-
son, Major Factors in the Assessment of Paraphilics and Sex Offenders, in SEX OF-
FENDER TREATMENT 39, 58 (Eli Coleman et al. eds., 1996); D. Klassen & W.A.
O'Connor, A Prospective Study of Prediction of Violence in Adult Male Mental Health
Admissions, 12 L. & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 143 (1988).
69. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(4)(c) (McKinney 1999).
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Once a victim has decided to go forward, the court has more
options in dealing with the case. The court can move the case to
trial, get a defendant who is guilty to plead guilty, mandate pro-
grams such as Alternative to Violence to help behavior modifica-
tion and mandate alcohol and drug treatment through probation or
through further monitoring by the courts.
The concept of "one family, one judge," which Judge Lauria will
address later, is an innovative concept because domestic violence
cases, like our Hypothetical, cry out for one judge to address the
family's problems.
JUDGE NADEL: Thank you, Judge.
We will now turn to Judge Roberts of Bronx Family Court for
her view on the Hypothetical and the extent to which any of it
differs from criminal court, as Judge Morgenstern has just de-
scribed it.
JUDGE ROBERTS: It seems to me that there are two main
objectives as an advocate that you would have with this Hypotheti-
cal. First, you need to get the father charged as a respondent in the
neglect case also. You need to do a detailed investigation so you
can try to persuade ACS that they were incorrect in only charging
the mother and that the father, Neil, should be a respondent too.
It is a tricky situation, because if you do too good of a job, you
might be just strengthening ACS's case against the mother. So,
while working to prove to ACS that a neglect should be filed, you
also need to have the mother working with the ACS; have the
mother speaking to the case worker regularly, and getting involved
with a domestic violence program. Whatever referrals ACS is ask-
ing the mother to do, you need to make sure that she is doing it
and she is showing ACS that she is cooperating, so maybe down the
road you can get an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal or
an outright dismissal against the mother.
In addition, you need to be preparing for a 1028 hearing7 ° be-
cause you are going to be asking a judge to return this child to the
mother in three days. Have enough information ready to persuade
a judge that there definitely was domestic violence in the home,
that Juliette stayed in the home for awhile and that she can really
protect herself and this child if the judge decides to give the child
back to her.
You need to be talking to everybody possible. For example, you
need to try to reach out to the neighbor who is a witness to some of
70. See N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 1028 (McKinney 1999).
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the domestic violence, at the very least, the incident when the po-
lice were called. That neighbor may be able to give you more in-
formation. Who knows what kinds of things she heard that may
persuade a judge or ACS that the father should be charged with
neglect?
In addition, you need to go to the hospital where she went after
she was arrested, get those hospital records, and see what state-
ments were made. You also need to go and speak to the special job
training program that she is in. Maybe the people there know
something; maybe they had interactions with Neil, and maybe they
can corroborate that he was dominating or that domestic violence
occurred at that location.
In addition, you need to try to get all of the police reports that
are involved with this case. If you are unable to persuade ACS that
Neil should be charged with neglect, you need to be able to go to
court and ask the judge to order ACS to file a neglect action
against Neil. In order to do that, you have to investigate and be
able to give the judge a coherent, persuasive set of facts so a ne-
glect petition will be filed.
The balance of power between Neil and Juliette is really off-kil-
ter, especially if you cannot convince the judge that Neil needs to
be charged with the neglect also. As Neil could conceivably be a
resource for the child to be discharged to him, if you do not con-
vince a judge that he is involved in and initiating domestic violence,
then you really have a problem. Juliette will just be defending her-
self against the neglect case; she will have no chance of her getting
the child.
In addition, speak to the child's doctor to try to find out if he or
she has had interactions with Neil and Juliette. The doctor might
be another person that can provide more information about what
has been going on with the family and convince either ACS or a
judge that Neil should definitely be charged with neglect.
At the 1028 hearing, try to show that ACS did not really provide
this family with any services - that Juliette was a victim of domes-
tic violence. Had ACS been involved in terms of providing her
with a domestic violence program, or other services, perhaps this
neglect would not have been filed against her, or certainly the child
would not have been removed from the home.
The Hypothetical addresses asking for temporary support, which
could be important. But before you can get support, you have to
get the child back in Juliette's custody because no judge is going to
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give a temporary order of support if she is in foster care or in non-
kinship, or even with a relative.
JUDGE NADEL: Now Judge Gische from Bronx Supreme
Court, from your perspective, including the extent to which your
responsibilities may differ from the two courts that we have heard
from so far.
JUDGE GISCHE: In most of these types of cases the supreme
court is the last court that the litigants will go to. The supreme
court is the only place where Juliette can get a divorce. Although
she may be a victim of domestic violence and she may have seen
the need to get orders of protection, it is a very different thing for
her to come to terms with the fact that she wants some kind of
permanent resolution and that she really wants to divorce Neil and
go on with her life separately.
I think one of the interesting things about this Hypothetical is
the undercurrent of cultural and financial problems that Juliette
faces in terms of making a decision to divorce Neil. Let us assume
in this Hypothetical that, at the end, she has made the decision to
divorce Neil. After all the events in the Hypothetical have oc-
curred, she will have her first initiation with the supreme court, and
will have her advocate file a divorce proceeding, probably based on
cruel and inhumane treatment.
One of the things an advocate has to do at the beginning of the
case is to strategize. The advocate needs to consider: what Juliette
needs in the short term to live; what she needs to do to make per-
manent arrangements to live a life apart from Neil; and whether
Juliette would be best served if all of the separately commenced
proceedings were coordinated in one court. More than the other
courts, many issues can be coordinated in the supreme court.
One of the things that should be apparent in domestic violence
cases is the extensive history that exists by the time they get to the
supreme court. The court needs to learn about this history to make
its own adjudication on the issues in front of it.
The first step that advocates need to take is to bring a pendente
lite motion,7' which may be brought simultaneously with starting
the divorce action. There is certainly some evidence to suggest that
in households where there is a history of domestic violence, bring-
ing a divorce action can itself be a triggering event for additional
71. A pendente lite motion is one made "during the actual profess of the suit."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 590 (5th ed. 1983).
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domestic violence.72 Oftentimes in these hard-core domestic vio-
lence cases, I will see an order to show cause brought simultane-
ously with the commencement of the action. The advocate is going
to be looking for an order of protection, even if there already are
orders of protection from other courts. They are going to be seek-
ing temporary exclusive possession of the marital residence; cus-
tody, although, as Judge Roberts pointed out, this particular
Hypothetical presents some custody problems that are not always
present in every other case; and, usually temporary child support.
After you determine which parts of the dispute should be re-
solved at the same time as the divorce proceeding, you are also
going to ask for removal of those proceedings from the court in
which they are pending to the supreme court.
In this case, I would envision that the custody dispute might be
something that you would want to bring up to the supreme court so
that it can be determined at the same time as the divorce and the
support issues. The complicating factor here is that there is the ne-
glect and the child protective proceeding. That is not typically
brought up to the supreme court; the supreme court has jurisdic-
tion over it but it is just not done. It would also be hard convincing
ACS to come to the supreme court. Therefore, the neglect and
child protective proceeding would have to be dealt with first, and
then you would be looking for a resolution of the custody proceed-
ing into the divorce proceeding.
Whether you are entitled to this relief that I say you should ask
for is really based on the particular facts of the case. I will give you
an idea of the kinds of things that I look for when I make decisions
on the types of issues raised in the Hypothetical.
Because this case is a hard-core domestic violence case, on initial
presentation of the Order to Show Cause, when I am only hearing
one side, I will issue an order of protection. There are two reasons:
(1) I probably will not know at that time the full extent of the or-
ders of protection that have been issued by other courts, and I will
be concerned about whether in the short haul there is protection;
and (2) I will be concerned about whether the pending orders of
protection - many of which are in their infancy, and have not
72. See Jean Louise Carriere, It is Ddjd Vu All Over Again: The Covenant Mar-
riage Act in Popular Cultural Perception and- Legal Reality, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1701,
1714-16 (1998); Lynne R. Kurtz, Protecting New York's Children: An Argument
Against Awarding a Spouse Abuser Custody of a Child, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1345 n.21
(1997); cf. J. King, Burdening Access to Justice: The Cost of Divorce Mediation on the
Cheap, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 375, 445 (1999).
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been adjudicated - should be removed to the supreme court and
adjudicated in the context of the divorce action, because so many
of the facts and issues are overlapping.
Again, a complicating factor in this particular case is that there is
a criminal court component, and I am not going to typically re-
move the criminal court case.
If, however, there is a pending family court order of protection
and a permanent adjudication has not been made, nor does it look
like there will be an imminent adjudication, I will likely remove
that family court proceeding into the supreme court and adjudicate
it with the divorce action.
With respect to seeking temporary exclusive possession of the
marital residence during the divorce action, there is a lesser show-
ing necessary for the relief than there is for getting an order of
protection. The standard is domestic strife. That is very important
to know and to keep in mind when you are seeking that in the
divorce action.
Here I would note that in the Hypothetical, even though there is
this history of violence, the parties are still living together. That
raises a lot of red lights for me that this is a really dangerous
situation.
Money is important for Juliette to maintain a life apart from
Neil. Until she gets child custody, she is not going to get temporary
child support. Maintenance might be a viable option in this case.
There are no numbers in the Hypothetical, but clearly one of the
underlying factors that is really important is the extent to which her
financial dependency on him may play into her decision to leave
him. It is important for advocates to see what can be done to make
her financially viable by herself. It becomes hard if she cannot get
child support. So, temporary maintenance might be appropriate in
this case for many reasons: her immigration status, her financial
dependence on him, her lack of job skills and his responsibility in
her having no job skills. Before awarding maintenance, even on a
temporary basis, I would need to look at whether or not the num-
bers make any sense, that is whether or not he can afford to give
her some maintenance, so that she can be supported in a separate
household from him.
One of the ultimate issues that you really ought to consider also
is in terms of permanent relief: What are you looking for? You are
going to be seeking permanent custody for her, and possibly a per-
manent maintenance award. With the latter, I do not mean that
she gets it forever. Instead, this case is a good example of the need
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for rehabilitative maintenance, some kind of money to get her
skills so that she can support herself. Otherwise she may have a
real problem in divorcing or separating from him.
If she ultimately gets the child, she would absolutely be entitled
to child support, though. Also, she may or may not want to con-
tinue in the marital residence as an exclusive resident until the chil-
dren are older.
JUDGE NADEL: Before we get back to criminal and family
courts, I would just like to ask Judge Rigler perhaps to comment on
some of what Judge Gische just said. If you were confronted with
this kind of a situation, with proceedings having taken place and
some still pending in family and criminal court, what effect does
that have on what you have to do and the desirability of trying to
bring those matters before you?
JUDGE RIGLER: I could go along with most of the answers
already given on the Hypothetical. As the last judge indicated,
though, it really does not impact too much on what we do in matri-
monial except for those issues that she stretched a little bit to make
them fit into this Hypothetical.
First of all, you never get as much information as in the Hypo-
thetical. You often have nothing about anything that he has done
to her and the reports will probably only indicate what she has
done. You would not have the hospital records of any of those
other things that are necessary for you to make an intelligent
decision.
In terms of orders of protection during my seven years in the
family court, I became very familiar with the process. It is a lot
easier to get an order of protection in family court than it is in
supreme court.
When I was in family court, you did not know anything. People
would come in front of you and tell a story. Attorneys give me
papers on a pendente lite motion which indicate that they want an
order of protection along with the laundry list of everything else
that Judge Gische mentioned. I look very closely at what they
want in an order of protection, and what the background is. We
make a check to see if there are any family court orders of
protection.
The problem is it is a tool that is used in the matrimonial, more
so than in the family court. In the family court, usually if they go
in, there is some sort of a basis for it. Sometimes they wait too long
to go into the family court. But in the matrimonial, some lawyer is
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going to say, "You want to get this guy out of the house? This is
what we will do."
It is very strange that all of these things happened and they
never went into family court, that they have to come before me
maybe three or four months after the incidents happened.
Very recently, I had a matter where they made five different ap-
plications for an order of protection and I did not give it. They
wanted to get this man out of the house. He was a prominent doc-
tor with a prominent lawyer. I will not mention his name, but he is
on the television all the time. They kept complaining that this man
has done this and that, and then they did an end-run and went into
the family court and got some sort of an order of protection, but
not an exclusion order.
Then they came back to me again, but this time they made a
mistake. They indicated that this was a case before Judge Duffman
and things of that nature. They wanted me to look at the situation
and think, "Do I need my name on the front page of the News or
the Post?" Assuming my answer would be no, they thought I would
just grant it. I did not grant it though. I said, "You do not want to
do this here? Fine. I am going to hold a hearing on it on Monday
morning." This was the middle of the week before.
Monday morning they came in, and wanted an adjournment. But
I wanted to hear it. We heard testimony from both sides, and again
I did not grant the order of protection.
Not only that, but I took back the $5000 fee that I had given to
this prominent lawyer because it had not been paid yet. I felt ag-
grieved because they were using the court system to push the judge
into a position where he is going to go ahead and do something
that he should not be doing. If I am making a decision, I want to
know it is an intelligent decision and that I am doing it from what I
have in front of me, not from somebody pushing me into it.
I look at orders of protection very loosely because I know that
the first thing the victims do is go running home. Then the guy
comes home from work and says, "Here I am, darling," and the
police are there, and they are going to take him away, and he will
have to spend time in jail. I have that in mind, too.
I think it is a good tool to have. I have used it. I have thrown
people in jail for disobeying it, but I do not think that it should be
handed out like confetti just because somebody comes in and re-
quests it.
Judge Lauria, Judge Morgenstern and myself are on a committee
in Brooklyn where we are trying to get all of these things in one
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court. I know that there are probably a whole bunch of statutes
that we will have to step on to do it, but we are trying to get it so
that people will not do an end-run like the case I just mentioned
and run into the family court to get an order of protection. They
would have to do it all in front of me. I think that is probably the
direction we are heading.
Not only that, even what Judge Morgenstern is doing, they want
to refer it all, if it has an underlying matrimonial attached to it, to
put it into one court. I think in that particular way, there are not
that many.
JUDGE MORGENSTERN: We did a study. There are eleven
out of the 2400 matrimonial cases pending in criminal court.
JUDGE RIGLER: So it is not a great deal. But there are a lot
of different areas that we have to overcome, like the CPLR and the
domestic relations law and things like that.
It happens, but it is not that prevalent. It is mostly used as a tool
in some particular case to get an advantage for the wife's sake.
JUDGE NADEL: That is not the way it is in family court, cor-
rect, Judge Lauria?
JUDGE LAURIA: No.
JUDGE NADEL: Did you ever have a hearing on an order of
protection?
JUDGE LAURIA: Yes, of course, we have lots of them.
Each of the family court judges handles about 6000 individual
cases a year. In Brooklyn, we had about 8000 original family of-
fense petitions filed and almost 4000 supplemental petitions. It is
truly in this area that I recognize so many of your faces, as well as
having committed your telephone numbers, faxes and e-mails to
my memory. It is a very intimate group and it is a very important
give-and-take on these issues.
Clearly, the area of domestic violence is the most inspiring be-
cause of the wide ramifications that these issues have, and I think
the family court certainly is sensitive to those issues because we all
know that it cuts across the board. Issues of domestic violence im-
pact on custody, visitation and support.
The difficulty with the family court judges is that on any given
day you may do forty to fifty of these cases, and they have to be
very careful not to prejudge a party before them. Judges learn by
experience how to get what they need in a very brief, even ex
parte, appearance - again, without prejudging it - but really
what we do is based upon relevant and competent information. In
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family court, there are many self-represented parties. We get infor-
mation from the lawyers and from the support agencies too.
The only point that I disagree with Judge Rigler on is that con-
current cases pose difficulties. Certainly we know what goes on in
other courts what the other judges do and what their jurisdiction is,
but we cannot know what is happening in a particular case with a
particular family unless we communicate with one another. That is
what we have begun to do.
In Brooklyn, we found that while the courts are literally across
the street from each other, there was no consistent communication
between the Brooklyn Family Court and the Brooklyn Treatment
Court, the Brooklyn Family Court and the Criminal Court, the
Brooklyn Family Court and Supreme Court or Criminal Court or
Surrogates Court. It was such a simple process to develop court-
to-court. We do not really have the difficulties with confidentiality
or ex parte communications. The judges now do not have to issue
an order saying, "Subject to whatever the order is somewhere
else."
We can say to the parties that are in front of us - because I
think they look to us to make sound decisions with respect to their
families - that we are knowledgeable about what is going on in
their families. For judges to ask questions about what is going onin
their lives must be astounding to them, especially of self-repre-
sented litigants.
Now we have started to solve that problem. When you come
before any of our judges - family, criminal, supreme; or juvenile
offender judges in the Supreme in Brooklyn - he or she should
have a copy of the corresponding or concurrent court's order, and
should therefore know what the status is and whether there is an
order of visitation, or any violations, or simply know when the next
adjourn date is in family or criminal court.
This is a much more informed and positive way to get involved
with these families, and I think it gives a little confidence back to
the parties that they are not in this huge void that is called the
court system or shuttling back and forth across the street where the
judges do not even pick up the phone or use a fax machine to get
each other's orders.
That is where we are in Brooklyn now. It is the initial stages of
it, but I think it is a much more informed approach. I see a certain
confidence building in the self-represented litigants that appear
before us that they are not the only source of our information, that
we have concrete copies and provide them with copies of orders
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from other courts that they still may not even have. So I am
pleased with it so far.
JUDGE NADEL: How does that affect what you do in the case
that you have. In addition to having the information, is there any
way to" affect the other case that is pending?
JUDGE LAURIA: In particular, with respect to violations, it
has now been mandated for the Police Department, I believe since
October, to make arrests on violations of any order of protection,
temporary or final. And, whether it is criminal, family, or supreme
- particularly in the Brooklyn Family Court - all of those cases
where a complaint has been made to the Police Department, there
is a summary arrest. That is what triggers the communication be-
tween criminal and family court.
We get it now from the District Attorneys in the ECABs (Early
Case Assessment Bureaus) as well as each of the two judges sitting
in criminal court in the dedicated Domestic Violence parts, Judge
Morgenstern and Judge Nunez. We get the violation from a com-
plaint charging contempt or aggravated harassment or other
charges. It is faxed to me directly and I distribute it to the judge
that is presiding over that particular case. If it is a closed case, they
will pull the case and see whether or not there is any action the
court should initiate, although that is a little difficult sua sponte for
a court to resurrect the case and initiate an action.
More importantly, on the temporary orders of protection, it is
essential for a family court judge to know that there is an interven-
ing prosecution in criminal court that we would not know about
unless we either ask the self-represented litigant. A situation where
the only information we have is that a person was arrested and
taken down to the police station, but then released.
So it does impact, because now when the judge receives a copy
of this fax from the criminal court, the judge has an adjourn date
on the case and can do many things - advance the case, if it is a
serious enough violation to issue a warrant on the case that is
before that particular judge; or at least, when the parties do ap-
pear, hoping it is not a very long date, ask the parties about the
pending case in criminal court. I think this really shows that the
court is involved.
Again, we are supposed to be neutral and objective arbiters of
the parties, but in order to be responsive, we need this kind of in-
formation to show how involved we are in this area.
JUDGE NADEL: Judge Morgenstern, when there is a violation
of a family court order of protection that is being prosecuted, what
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happens in criminal court and how does that relate to what is still
going on in family court?
JUDGE MORGENSTERN: These cases are now being
processed as contempt cases. They are basically reduced to misde-
meanor contempt. Defendants face a year in jail. In every one of
my 1200 cases, there is an order of protection. I can maybe think
of five cases where I did not order it out of all those cases before
me. In criminal court, there are orders of protection in every case,
and we take them seriously.
The contempt charges are no different from our other cases.
Somebody mentioned earlier that you need corroboration to go
forward on the criminal case. In the contempt charge, you need
the underlying order and proof of service of that underlying order
in order to have that misdemeanor go forward. Very often, our
contempt cases go the same way the regular domestic violence
cases go; they get 30.30'ed73 out because they cannot bring in proof
of service; the underlying family court order was never served, and
so there really is no provable contempt charge. If we do have the
underlying order and proof of service we can try to get the defend-
ant to plead guilty and mandate that he enter a program so we can
monitor behavior.
We also have that very important tool - the Domestic Violence
Registry. I use it every day. I can tell if someone has had five
orders of protection from family court, whether there were differ-
ent complaining witnesses, whether this is a new relationship. All
this goes into trying to put the defendant into some kind of pro-
gram that we can monitor.
But again, with the realistic numbers that we have in Brooklyn
Criminal Court, in eighty-seven percent of our cases the complain-
ants do not want to go forward, so the cases get disposed of by
either ACDs or conditional discharges. That is the reality.
In every case I ask the question, "Is there a Matrimonial pend-
ing? Is there a family court action pending?" And if there are chil-
dren in common, I instruct every defendant to go to the family
court to arrange for visitation. So the defendants see that we are
monitoring, and that we are noticing when there are family court
cases pending. We look at the dates, and see the family court case
is not on again for another three months, so we will bring a defend-
ant before the criminal court more frequently and ask the District
Attorney to investigate and see if additional violence has occurred.
73. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30 (McKinney 1999).
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In that respect, I believe this exchange of information is very
beneficial. The outcome of the criminal court case is not necessar-
ily going to be a conviction, but I think looking at these cases and
focusing on them is making a difference.
JUDGE RIGLER: Judge Lauria mentioned the fact that most
of the times they bring on a motion, they are getting ready in the
family court to make a determination, and they will suddenly ask
me to take it up to the supreme court at that particular time.
JUDGE MORGENSTERN: When it is not going their way.
JUDGE RIGLER: When it is not going their way, and they fig-
ure they will get another bite of the apple. Many times we have
called up to find out what the status is. If we find out that three-
quarters of the case is already completed we will ask them if they
want us to take it over to let them finish, and usually they want to
finish whatever they have had on it. If it is something just starting
though, then I think it all should be under one roof.
JUDGE NADEL: Judge Roberts, is your experience in the
Bronx different in terms of the information that is exchanged be-
tween criminal and family court?
JUDGE ROBERTS: It is a little different. I do not think we
have an organized mechanism of exchanging the contempt orders
with the criminal court, so I do not routinely get copies of the con-
tempt orders. When I have a violation of an order of protection, I
have to try to contact the judge and find out what is going on or
have my court attorney look into it.
We do not get very many violations of the orders of protection
because people come before me on the pending underlying family
offense case, saying, "He got arrested last week and there is a case
in criminal court." So I know it is pending but, unfortunately I do
not really know the details of the case.
The only time I really get involved with the criminal court judges
is when an order says that the defendant is supposed to stay away
from the woman and the children but there is nothing on the order
saying "except for modification by the family court." That means
that I do not know if something really, really horrible happened in
criminal court with respect to the children and the judge intention-
ally did not put anything in the order .allowing the family court to
modify the order. That means I actually have to speak to the crimi-
nal court judge because I want to -know details before I take a
chance of allowing someone to visit with the child.
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So my experience is, on a case-by-case basis, I really have to call
the judge. This sounds like a really good idea and I hope it is mov-
ing to the Bronx.
JUDGE NADEL: What is "it" that needs to move from.Brook-
lyn to the Bronx?
JUDGE MORGENSTERN: It is the program that Brooklyn is
starting.
JUDGE NADEL: But this is not your "one family, one judge?"
JUDGE MORGENSTERN: Yes.
JUDGE LAURIA: Well, it is partly that. It should be clear that
it is the exchange of information. I get a copy of a criminal con-
tempt or other case where there is a family court order that is re-
flected in the body of the criminal court complaint, from either
Judge Morgenstern or Judge Nunez, or I get the list of arraign-
ments on a weekly basis from the two supreme court dedicated
parts - Judge D'Emic's part and Judge Levanthal's part in Brook-
lyn. Then, I have the files pulled and fax them any current family
court orders - custody, visitation - so that they have that before
them. It is just a simple exchange of information.
I think we realized, at least when we started doing the numbers,
fortunately for all concerned, that it amounts to two or three cases
a day, sometimes less; sometimes a day goes by with none. It is
really not just an onerous procedure to fax it over, get it to the
right judge and have the family court orders copied and faxed back
to the judge who is presiding.
JUDGE NADEL: And this is above and beyond the Domestic
Violence Registry?
JUDGE LAURIA: Yes. This is our own Domestic Violence
Registry.
JUDGE MORGENSTERN: And we are doing it the first time
the case is on in the criminal court part. I will look at the Registry
and see that there is an order of protection issued by a family court
judge, so if I am not getting the information from the attorneys, I
can see as well there is a family court case pending and I will fax
those cases over.
JUDGE ROBERTS: I guess the lesson to be learned for people
who are representing women is that you, as their representative,
need to get as much information to give the court as possible, be-
cause you cannot assume that everything is working in Brooklyn,
where everyone is getting orders. With me, if you do not tell me, I
often do not know. Therefore, it is very important when you are
representing people to make that extra effort to tell them to make
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sure that they bring all the paperwork, all the police reports they
have, all the orders of protection from whatever court they have
been to, and not to just assume that the courts already have the
information.
JUDGE NADEL: I think that is critical. Obviously, the respon-
sibility, as Judge Lauria indicated, should be with the court, and the
courts look terrible when they do not know or appear not to know
what is going on with respect to the same people or persons. But if
you are representing somebody, it is critical to make sure that
whatever judge you are before knows everything you want that
judge to know, and do not assume that judge knows what has gone
on before.
I think we are probably at the point where we should give the
judges from Brooklyn an opportunity to explain this "one family,
one judge."
JUDGE NADEL: Juliette's plight in this Hypothetical is a mon-
ument to why you need "one family, one judge." It is a mini-ver-
sion of Chief Judge Kaye's Family Division contained in her Family
Court Initiatives and Family Justice Plan. 4 It really slices across
the tier section. Every single one of the issues raised in that Hypo-
thetical can be heard before one judge, either a supreme court
judge, a family court judge or a criminal court judge, acting
supreme.
Many of these issues would have been heard in at least two, if
not three, different courts. It really is not necessary.
The vision right now, in terms of "one family, one judge," is
probably under the umbrella of the matrimonial case - again,
either presided over by the justice that is presiding over the matri-
monial or by an acting supreme. Within that matrimonial case in-
cludes family offense, custody and visitation, and support. At least
in Brooklyn, almost a full ten percent of our calendar are cases
where there are concurrent cases pending in criminal, family and
supreme court. It really is not necessary, it is confusing to the par-
ties, certainly to the self-representing litigants. It is duplication of
effort, and a waste of judicial efforts.
We see "one person - one judge" as a way to open the door to
avoid parties jockeying for position before different judges, using
different proceedings as an abuse of process to wear someone
down in one court or another or using it as a tactical advantage to
74. THE B. ASS'N OF ERIE CTY., The Bulletin (visited Nov. 18, 1999) <http://
www.eriebar.org/bulletin/may-97/family-justice-program.html> (presenting highlights
of Judge Kaye's plan as well as ordering information for a copy of the plan).
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raising an issue in another forum, in another set of facts and issues,
when someone is losing on another set of facts, such as going in on
a visitation petition that really has no merit when it is a father who
has a family offense case or a support case now pending against
him.
We see it as the starting ground. Now we are just in the initial
stages of examining the jurisdictional and resource problems, and
whether there has to be interdisciplinary training of the lawyers
and the parties involved. We do not see any real obstacle, though.
There seems to be a lot of cooperation, and there is no reason if
that goes well not to extend it into areas like the misdemeanor
criminal cases, enveloping them under the supreme court or acting
supreme court judge's authority, since most of those cases are ad-
journed for a while. With the continuing orders, they could be car-
ried with the consent of the parties until all of the issues are
resolved, and then into Article 10 proceedings. Where abuse and
neglect raise their ugly head in parties that have matrimonial cases,
either truthful or false accusations concerning abuse and neglect,
they would also be heard before the same judge, this "super
judge," whoever it is that we are going to pick.
There is a lot of interest in it, there is a lot of excitement about it,
and we are in the initial stages of it.
JUDGE NADEL: Are there any questions?
AUDIENCE: I am very much in favor of the court restructuring
plan, but I do worry in the situation that you are describing that
litigants who would be eligible for appointed counsel in family
court are not going to receive counsel in this super-judge's supreme
court, and there are many litigants who cannot afford counsel who
need it. Is that an issue you are going to address?
JUDGE LAURIA: I do not think that would be the case. And
also, I think in any of the work that begins with domestic violence
analysis and dealing with parties you realize the ramifications of all
those issues. I think we are sensitive to that. It has been brought to
our attention in all the workshops that we have and all the meet-
ings that we have, that coercive efforts are undertaken in so many
different areas, once there is a domestic violence case. The parties
come back at each other in different ways - they withhold support
and financially and emotionally intimidate.
Certainly a party who would be represented by assigned counsel
in family court would be represented before this judge. I do not
think anybody is going to be deprived of counsel. What will be
removed is the blindness between different judges presiding over
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the important issues in that family. You would now have it before
one judge, which will eliminate a lot of the jockeying.
JUDGE RIGLER: You could have different attorneys, too, in
different courts.
JUDGE MORGENSTERN: We are going to try to cross-train.
JUDGE LAURIA: That is another thing, interdisciplinary
counseling.
JUDGE NADEL: Let me ask you a question. At what point
would this begin? At what point in the process would a case go to
this "super-court"?
JUDGE LAURIA: I think what we are really planning on is
upon filing - maybe there is an immediate appearance before an-
other judge. We have not really gotten into that. It would be cru-
cial if we could get the parties to appear before this one judge
immediately so that judge is aware of what the issues are with the
family, what the history is, or any other pending cases.
Of course, right now we have such an accumulation of those
cases - as I say, some ten percent of the calendar cases could be
transferred to one judge and there would be now custody, visita-
tion and support. What we are pushing for is not only newly filed
or pending cases, but post-judgment cases because we get many of
the cases in family court that arrive are before the ink is dry on the
divorce judgment. We have someone coming in trying to have us
define for them what "reasonable" or "liberal" means. I have done
it enough already. I would like to not have to do that anymore.
And issues of support - our hearing examiners are overloaded
with cases that are modifications of judgments of divorce that
could properly be heard back before a justice of the supreme court
to modify.
AUDIENCE: I have a number of problems with that. I repre-
sent private clients. When a client comes to me and there is an
issue of domestic violence, but she clearly also wants a divorce, my
hands are tied to a certain extent. If I say to them, "I will go into
the supreme court because you are coming to me for a divorce ac-
tion," I have to worry about whether my order of protection may
or may not be granted - and I am talking about a valid reason for
an order of protection. So the first thing that I tell them is, "Go
into the family court on your own and take out a petition for an
order of protection." If I am also dealing with a person who needs
an immediate support situation, I know that they can at the same
time take out a petition in family court for support.
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But really, what she is coming to me for is a divorce, and my
hands are tied to a certain extent if I am really concerned about her
protection. I have got to get her into family court for that order of
protection, but then now I am playing around with the two forums.
I really do not want to be there. I really want to be in the matrimo-
nial court.
JUDGE GISCHE: Why do you think you cannot get an order
of protection in the supreme court? I can understand it if what
happened is that, before she came to you, your client had an emer-
gency situation, and the family court certainly is more user-friendly
to people who do not have advocates. On the other hand, once
your client has an advocate, I am a little bewildered why you would
not bring an order to show cause before the supreme court judge.
You can get a hearing there on an order of protection, you can
commence it simultaneously, as I have discussed.
So I think part of the problem that you are articulating - and I
do not deny that that is what people do - is that a culture has
grown up around the courts where it is, by habit or practice, that
people will go to the family court in the first instance to get an
order of protection, even when they know that they are going' to
file a divorce action.
JUDGE RIGLER: I can see if it is an emergency and something
has happened, that you may want to go into the family court that
day and get an order immediately, rather than to have to file a
motion in front of me, which even if I put it down as the shortest
possible time, is going to take three or four days, and usually they
come in on a Friday or something like that. So if she can go into
the family court, she can get that order immediately.
JUDGE GISCHE: But it is the same TRO whether they get it in
front of you or not.
JUDGE RIGLER: But they have to make an application in
front of me. There they can walk in, go into intake and be upstairs.
JUDGE MORGENSTERN: It is cheaper.
JUDGE GISCHE: But that is a different issue in terms of it
being more user-friendly for people who do not have advocates.
There is no reason really why we cannot have those kinds of peti-
tions in the supreme court. There really is no reason.
JUDGE LAURIA: However, if it is filed in a family court, that
is precisely the type of case that the temporary relief could be
given in family court and adjourned to the justice for the
matrimonial.
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JUDGE RIGLER: That is exactly what you should be doing.
We are trying now to initiate something in the Brooklyn Supreme
Court where we are going to have some special clerk there to fill
out papers for a pro se type of an application. But you still have to
serve the other party and things of that nature, where here you can
get it immediately.
JUDGE GISCHE: But it is the same thing.
AUDIENCE: I just want to point out that as an advocate, I get
cases where the exact same thing happens. I imagine in the private
context there are huge financial and time considerations to prepare
that type of immediate application for an order to show cause for a
TRO or support, to commence the divorce, get an index number,
you have got to buy the RJI, you have got to send someone over to
do it. There are a lot of considerations. So there is that resources
question.
But Judge Rigler said in his comments - and this has been my
experience - that when you commence a divorce action, part of it
asking for an immediate order of protection, it tends to get lost in
the shuffle. There is a laundry list of things. I find when I go to
court on something like that that all of a sudden we are talking
about, "She wants custody, that's why she's asking for the order of
protection, and she wants this." All of a sudden the issue of domes-
tic violence is viewed as a bargaining chip in the divorce. I think
that there is that piece also.
My preference is always to have the order of protection case
alone in family court, being viewed totally separate, because it is
violence.
JUDGE GISCHE: But that is a strategic decision that you make
as an advocate and not really an access to court problem.
AUDIENCE: You said there is no excuse when you are an ad-
vocate for not just starting it in supreme court with everything.
JUDGE GISCHE: I said you could do it.
AUDIENCE: You could do it, and your likelihood of getting
the attention to the domestic violence, which is generally your pri-
mary concern, is decreased much more because of all the issues.
JUDGE LAURIA: But it is never really isolated. The issue of
family violence, even if it is handled in family court, is not isolated
from the issues that you are describing in supreme court.
AUDIENCE: They may well be. If she wants his pension and
she is getting beaten up, I guarantee you they are going to be
talked about in the same conversation.
JUDGE LAURIA: You would think so.
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AUDIENCE: "I'll consent to the order of protection if she gives
up my pension."
JUDGE GISCHE: You do not have to agree. You should be
able to get a hearing in the supreme court. You can make a strate-
gic decision as an attorney, and I think I said that at the beginning.
You have to strategize your case. But in terms of the relief that is
available, there is no question that the same relief is available in
the supreme court.
In terms of access to the court, we can make it easier in terms of
the petitioning and the cost, there is no question about that. The
obstacles that you raise are not insurmountable.
AUDIENCE: I want to just make one other point, which is the
point of the form - and I think this is getting better, and I know it,
at least in Brooklyn it is. When you get a temporary order of pro-
tection in supreme court, it looks different, and it is much harder to
get the police to serve it, if it is contained within the relief and the
order to show cause.
JUDGE GISCHE: You can use the same form for orders of pro-
tection in each court.
AUDIENCE: And there is the supreme court form, which the
police are not quite familiar with yet, and so there are a lot of is-
sues along those lines also. It sounds like Brooklyn is on its way
towards adjusting it and has identified a lot of them, but even with
an advocate going into supreme court at the first instance raises a
lot of problems.
JUDGE NADEL: Yes?
AUDIENCE: I just wanted to mention that what you are talk-
ing about, throwing everything into the supreme court, would be
wonderful, except that so many things would have to be changed.
The bottom line with all of my clients, middle class on down, is they
cannot afford to have me do everything in supreme court. It is ab-
solutely impossible.
And, in addition to that, if this gets started, there is going to have
to be a major revolution, as somebody already mentioned, in as-
signing counsel in supreme court cases. I have represented a
couple of supreme court litigants pro bono. But then, for example,
I took a case where I should have gotten a fee, the judge told both
parties that the husband was going to have to pay the fee, at the
end of the case my fee was denied. It was $20,000 worth of work. I
will never take another case of that sort without getting specifically
assigned and without getting previous authorization, a previous or-
der to the husband to pay my fees, because you are just not going
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to get women represented. Women do not have the money. That
is the bottom line.
JUDGE RIGLER: One of the things that my committee is
looking at is the services and the extra monies that we would need
to implement such a plan. I think that is a very important aspect of
it, because there are a lot of other things that you are going to need
other than just in a matrimonial, especially when you have a lot of
people who cannot afford that particular end of it. So that is some-
thing we are looking into. We realize that it is going to take a lot of
extra monies.
AUDIENCE: I just want to say that I only represent low-in-
come people, mostly women, on a sliding scale according to in-
come, and the scale is very low usually, always at the bottom
somehow. But I think litigants are served best and most cost-effi-
ciently, as Judge Gische suggested, if there is a divorce. Obviously,
if the parties are not married, that is a whole other situation. I have
found that I serve my litigants best, my clients best, by bringing
everything - orders of protection, support, custody - into
supreme court. It is the most expeditious, relief possible, and gen-
erally brings a resolution to their cases very swiftly at very little
money, as opposed to an action here in the family court for an
order of protection, which hamstrings the matrimonial judge in
terms somewhat of custody and visitation, and then if further there
is an action in the family court for child support, you have now got
three judges, or two judges and a hearing examiner, for one family.
That cannot save these litigants money. It costs them money, if
only in time.
And I have found the supreme court justices, when they give the
TRO on an ex parte application, usually make the return date
swift, within three days, and then they order the advocate to be
back within that week. So if a mistake was made, the other side has
a very quick response to be able to come back into the court and
say, "Hey, I never did any of this."
I strongly support bringing for the benefit of the client, if you
can, all of this before one judge, one court.
AUDIENCE: I would just like to get the judges' views on some-
thing I see .more and more, which was discussed a little bit this
morning, especially the idea of bringing things in one court. It is
where my clients, who are most often women, are more and more
being charged criminally as well as with an Article 10 proceeding,75
75. See supra note 12 (discussing Article 10 proceedings).
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an abuse or neglect proceeding, in family court, because they are
victims of domestic violence and in family court we have something
called "failure to protect." There are not many people who are
married, but obviously they are in relationships or getting out of
relationships with abusers.
How might that affect things where a divorce is not needed but
just support or protection is? How might things look from the
bench, when a woman is coming into court as a defendant in a
criminal action? Her alleged abuser is saying, "Hold it, I should
get custody of the kids, I am the father, I am the resource." There
is no money generally on either side. How, from a judicial perspec-
tive, would you be dealing with those cases, if any of you were
super-judge, or whether you see getting rid of those questionable
criminal charges against the women?
JUDGE LAURIA: It is a very delicate issue that requires a re-
ally careful analysis. It is very difficult in dealing with someone
who has finally had the courage, through support or whatever, to
come forward to family court and then have to submit to an ACS
investigation because the court does not know anything about the
family yet, except the action that has been brought, to see what has
been going on.
But it is not, I can assure you, a callused determination by the
court. I think the cases are somewhat viewed together. If there is a
family offense case, usually it is initiated and then there is an Arti-
cle 10 case. You look very carefully at what those charges are.
I think in many of the cases involving women that have unfortu-
nately also had family offense cases pending who were then
charged with Article 10 proceedings, there are many, more allega-
tions other than just the fact that there may have been domestic
violence in the home.
I think what we have found in many of those cases is substance
abuse. The point you raise is interesting because again, in terms of
communication, when we for the first time coordinated with the
Brooklyn Treatment Court, the first batch they sent us was all of
the pending defendants that were undergoing treatment. They
gave us approximately 150 names that we had to run through our
computer. We found that about thirty of those were mothers
whose cases had been done by inquest, where our information was
that they could not be located, yet they were attending regularly
across the street, involved in a program, doing well, and we took
the initiative to involve them in the family court proceeding.
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So I do not think it is punitive. I think it just requires a very
careful analysis and dissection of what the family dynamics are, and
if there is a culprit, who that culprit is, and for the protection of the
children. It is not one answer for all these cases.
And to the judges' credit, they do look at them that way. We
now have specialization, which for the most part is a very good idea
in family court because it brings all of the cases regarding that fam-
ily before one judge. Whichever case is commenced, whether it is
the Article 10 case or whether it is the custody and visitation case
or whether it is the family offense case, all of the other cases will be
before one judge, so we will have our own mini-version of "one
family, one judge" in family court already.
I think it helps to avoid penalizing someone that has had the
courage to come forward to confront domestic violence. That is
what we do in family court.
JUDGE ROBERTS: I want to add that I think it is very impor-
tant to understand that, as the judge, a lot of times I do not feel like
I have a lot of information. So you, as the advocate, have to give
me whatever information you have to affect the fact that she
should not be charged with an Article 10, but she was a victim of
domestic violence. I find I am operating in the dark because I just
have a case worker who spoke with the woman for fifteen minutes
and really did not understand what was going on; in my mind the
case worker did not ask the relevant questions.
If I had someone representing the woman who was able to give
me more documentation of what is going on with this family, it
would be very helpful. I find that I do not often get that.
JUDGE NADEL: On behalf of the organizers of the event, I
extend their thanks to the judges.
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WELCOMING REMARKS,
APRIL 27, 1999
MS. DOUGLASS: I would like to welcome everyone to the sec-
ond day of "Women, Children and Domestic Violence." So far, we
have had an incredible array of speakers, discussions, and informal
meetings in the Atrium, and we expect fully for this to continue
today.
Now, Leah.
MS. HILL: Thank you. I am especially delighted to welcome
you here to Fordham, which is my home. I have been asked to
make welcoming remarks. My theme today is looking at the pro-
gress we have made.
Yesterday, I reflected a little bit about my experiences as a do-
mestic violence advocate when I started out about ten years ago. I
want to reflect a little bit more, and take another look at the world
as it existed when I started doing this work in 1987, because it was
a very different world than what we see today. I think that is im-
portant for us to reflect upon.
I began my career in 1987 as an advocate for women and their
families. There was no public discourse on the issue of domestic
violence at that time. There were many, many advocates out there
working tirelessly, but they were basically working without a public
discourse, at least as far as I could tell. I had graduated from law
school in 1985, and I had never heard the term "domestic violence"
in my three years at law school. I had taken women and law, I had
taken family law, but did not hear it in criminal law. It was not
discussed.
So when I came out of law school, I was clearly aware of the
issue. As an African-American woman, I was aware of the issue of
violence, but as I said, there was no discussion about it. The legal
world was just beginning to contend with this issue of domestic vio-
lence, and that was only because of the tireless efforts of advocates
for many, many years in forcing people to take a look at this issue.
Here is a glimpse of what the world looked like when I started to
do this work. The policy of the New York City Police Department
was mandatory arrest. As I said, it was a policy, it was not the law,
which, as many of you can imagine, and it was discussed yesterday,
it is hard to conceive of why you would need a policy to arrest
people for crimes. But that in fact was the policy of the New York
City Police Department, and that policy came about only as the
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result of a lawsuit by the name of Bruno v. Codd,76 a case that was
started by battered women who had contended that they were not
being treated the same as other victims of crime when they claimed
that the perpetrators were their husbands and boyfriends. As a
result of that lawsuit, a settlement was reached under which the
New York City Police Department agreed to have a policy of
mandatory arrest.
When women decided to seek protection from their perpetrators
in courts, they had to choose whether or not they would go to fam-
ily court or criminal court, and they had seventy-two hours to make
that choice. Imagine what that must have been like for a woman
who was a victim of domestic violence and had to gain the strength
to come to court, only to be told that she had to decide within three
days whether or no she would pursue her remedies in family court
or criminal court.
As a practical matter, it was difficult, at best, to obtain an exclu-
sion order. For pro se clients, it was almost impossible. I remem-
ber in my days at South Brooklyn Legal Services, when we had a
client who was living with her batterer, we would practically have
to spend days preparing the facts of her case before going into
court if we wanted to get an exclusion order. They just were not
granted.
And it was not unusual for battered women to lose custody of
their children in family court. There was no discussion of the im-
pact of domestic violence on children, and there certainly was no
requirement that courts consider domestic violence as a factor in
custody proceedings.
I also talked yesterday about the hostility that was felt towards
women in the court system, hostility from the Police Department,
just to name an example.
While there was no public discourse on domestic violence, I re-
member connecting with advocates throughout the city for help on
my cases. But I also remember knowing these advocates by name.
I cannot say that that is the case today, but just a few names that
come to my mind, Ellen Yaroshevsky was someone I talked to in
those days; Maria Arias, Marjorie Fields. I do not think that any of
us can call out the names of the advocates throughout this city in
that way today.
I also remember attending my first Lawyers Committee meeting.
There were five of us in the room. We were in a cramped room. I
76. 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
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do not even remember where the office was, but I remember it was
hard to get to. It was Cathy Douglass, Julie Domonkos, myself,
Rose Pierre Louis, and Florence Roberts. Most of those meetings
had about four or five people in them. Now those- meetings are
being held in one of the top law firms in New York City, they are
often filled to capacity. Judges, Assistant District Attorneys and
criminal defense attorneys all attend those meetings on a regular
basis.
Law schools across the country now have domestic violence clin-
ics, one of which is here at Fordham, educating our future lawyers
on the issue of domestic violence and how to provide quality repre-
sentation on cases. Law students have organized countless stu-
dent-run domestic violence advocacy centers, like the one here at
Fordham. Here at Fordham, the student-run domestic violence ad-
vocacy center is responsible for my job. Students demanded a
clinic that would address the issue of representation of battered
women.
Battered women no longer have to choose between family court
and criminal court. They can pursue their remedies in both courts.
Mandatory arrest is the law,. as it should be. We also have primary
aggressor legislation, as you heard yesterday a lively discussion on
that issue.
The New York City Police Department has a Domestic Violence
Unit at One Police Plaza, and there are domestic violence offices in
every precinct. Domestic violence parts have been created in Fam-
ily and criminal court and in supreme court.
I will not go through all of the things that have changed and that
are different today, but I wanted to point out the progress we have
made. It is so hard to do this work on a daily basis and to hear the
stories of women and not feel a sense of hopelessness. Those of us
and those of you who have laid the groundwork - I am no fool, I
know that this progress did not happen in the ten years that I have
been doing this. I know that there are people before me who
fought tirelessly. In a way, I feel like this is my way of saying thank
you to those people.
But, of course, my story does not end there. We have a long way
to go. As we saw yesterday, there was a very lively discussion on
the issue of failure to protect. This is really the beginning of that
kind of discussion, and we need to have more of those.
Far too many women continue to be battered and killed. My
clients get younger and younger, and I do not know if that is be-
cause I am getting older, but I do not think so. I look at this phe-
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nomenon in two ways. On the one hand, because there is a public
discourse on this issue of domestic violence - and that is because
of the work that we have done - I think women feel more free to
come forward with their stories, and that is why we see so many
young women coming forward. But I also think that the batterers
are getting younger and younger, and that is scary, and the violence
is more and more severe in these younger men.
Yes, the Police Department has gotten better, and the domestic
violence officers that I have dealt with have mostly been helpful.
But I still hear too many stories of women being met with indiffer-
ence by the Police Department and failure to act, and make arrests
on contempt cases, and that is just not acceptable.
The courts remain overburdened, and in fact seem more
overburdened now than they were when I started out, and they are
unable to adequately hear the cases involving battered women.
Delay is the order of the day. What this means for battered women
is many of them end up giving up; they just do not have the
strength to continue to come back and forth to court. Some of
them have jobs and they cannot keep taking days off.
Another problem is that the New York system continues to be
fragmented. You have domestic violence advocates over here, you
have criminal defense attorneys over here, you have Assistant Dis-
trict Attorney's, criminal court, family court. No one seems to
know what the other side is doing. And then you have the child
protective system. Again, there is not a lot of communication
across these systems, and battered women and their children end
up being hurt as a result.
There is a lot of work to be done. I have not gone through all of
it. I am sure many of you are thinking of more and more things
that need to change in this system.
But I see this conference as a unique opportunity to inspire those
of us who do this work and to sign on some new recruits. Also, I
see it as an opportunity to build bridges with those with whom we
have fought in the past. Yesterday we saw an example of people
from all different sides coming together to talk about issues that
impact on the lives of battered women and their families. That is
what we need, and we need that conversation to continue.
I was happy to hear Cathy this morning say that someone had
suggested that we start an Interagency Task Force to look at this
issue of failure to protect and to continue this discussion. That is
the kind of thing that we need to continue to do.
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Hopefully, these discussions will not end here and we will take
these discussions back to our work places and continue to reflect.
As I said, as a clinical teacher, that is what I am best at. But I also
think that it is an important way of moving forward, and that is
exactly what we need to do.
Thanks again, all of you, and I hope today's discussion will be
inspiring.
MS. DOUGLASS: Thank you, Professor Leah Hill.
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS,
APRIL 27, 1999
MS. DOUGLASS: It is my privilege to welcome and give an
introduction to City Council Member Ronnie Eldridge, who will be
our keynote speaker this morning. Ms. Eldridge has been on the
City Council since 1989, and in that time she has been a leader in
efforts to improve protections for victims of domestic violence.
My first personal exposure to that leadership was in 1993, the
very first year of Network for Women's Services. Ms. Eldridge and
Ruth Messinger were the co-sponsors of a two-day conference at
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. It was not a
lecture setting, but rather it was working group sessions on issues
of housing for battered women, on issues of shelter, welfare, health
care, and a whole array of topics. From that conference came a
book, which many of you probably have seen. The title of the con-
ference and the title of the book was Behind Closed Doors.77 You
can still see some recommendations there that need implementa-
tion, as well as others that have come about as a result of the last
six years of work.
Ronnie Eldridge also took leadership in requiring the police to
keep records of domestic violence incidents, the DIR that we all
know of now. She has been the prime sponsor of other significant
action, including the Automatic Teller Safety bill,78 the All-Civilian
Complaint Review Board legislation, 79 and she has been the prime
sponsor of the Clinic Access Law,80 requiring safety for women
who are trying to access reproductive health care and safety for
those people who are the health care providers. She currently
serves as the chair of the Women's Issues Committee of the City
Council.
Before I turn the speaker over to her, I would like to mention
some past achievements in Ms. Eldridge's life before she joined the
City Council because I think they provide a window to view where
she has spent her efforts. She served as a Special Assistant to
77. See RUTH W. MESSINGER & RONNIE M. ELDRIDGE, N.Y. TASK FORCE ON
FAMILY VIOLENCE, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: THE CITY'S RESPONSE TO FAMILY VIO-
LENCE: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE (1993).
78. See N.Y. S. Bill 4596, 222d Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999) ("An act to amend the
general business law and the penal law, in relation to theft or criminal possession of
automatic teller machine cards.").
79. See N.Y. S. Bill 2208, 222d Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999) ("An act to create a tempo-
rary state commission to examine and assess the use of excessive force.").
80. See N.Y. S. Bill 6146, 222d Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999) ("An act to enact the clinic
access and anti-stalking act of 1999.").
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Mayor John Lindsay in the early 1970s. She was the director of
Community and Government Affairs at the Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey. She served on Governor Cuomo's Cabinet
as the director of the Division for Women, where she proposed
programs and legislation and acted as an advocate for women's
needs. She also was the director of Special Projects at Ms. maga-
zine, and was the executive director of the Ms. Foundation for Wo-
men. And finally, she was the executive Producer of a feminist
series on Network Public Television.
With all this as background, I am delighted to welcome Ronnie
Eldridge to speak to us this morning.
MS. ELDRIDGE: Thank you. I encourage everybody to join in
politics and political life of the city. During these years I have been
privileged to witness and participate in many activities that were
part of the campaign against violence, and I have a few stories to
tell and some observations to make.
I will tell from my perspective a little bit about the struggle. It
has been a long and hard struggle to place domestic violence on the
public agenda. It was not easy to convince public officials that it
should be an issue of concern to them. We were sometimes happy
to just get a proclamation issued mentioning it.
But women's groups and advocates in New York persisted and,
sometime in the 1970s, Governor Carey appointed a Task Force on
Domestic Violence. Governor Cuomo elevated the Task Force to a
Commission, but even with a Commission, most public officials
continued to view domestic violence as a women's issue and
treated it as such. No male Commissioner discussed it as part of an
agency program. No units of appropriations appeared in agency
budgets. The only times we heard domestic violence seriously dis-
cussed were when women convened meetings or when candidates
wanted our votes.
We realized we needed dramatic examples to further our cause,
and so in 1985 we turned to the area of criminal justice to demon-
strate a truly awful result of violence in the home. One day in the
summer of 1985, some of us met with members of the Inmate Liai-
son Committee at Bedford Hills Correctional Facility, a maximum
security prison for women. The women were hoping to find a pro-
ject that would bring them into contact with the outside world. We
discussed life suspension when in prison, missing children, wanting
visitors, looking for something meaningful to do.
One of the women suggested running a hotline for the prison for
battered women. That seemed complicated, but we continued the
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discussion, and the tone of the meeting changed immediately. The
women became more animated, then excited, as they realized that
many of them had similar stories of abuse to tell.
We realized we had our project. These women and their abusers
were extreme victims of domestic violence. Their abusers were
dead and the women, many of them separated from their children,
were incarcerated.
The State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, the Governor's
Commission, lawyers from Prisoners' Legal Services and the Divi-
sion's Counsel met together to plan this project. We decided first
to survey the inmates by questionnaire. Out of 540 inmates, 320
responded and revealed that an overwhelming number of them had
been abused as children and then later as adults.
Next came a public hearing sponsored by the Division for Wo-
men and the Governor's Commission on Domestic Violence,
whose chairs at the time were Karen Burstein and Marjorie Fields.
The hearing panel included the Governor's Criminal Justice Coor-
dinator, Commissioners from the Departments of Social Services,
Corrections and Youth Probation, as well as some key state
legislators.
It was a stunning event, held in the gymnasium at Bedford Hills,
and attended by interested inmates, people who ran battered wo-
men's programs, women who had been battered, lawyers, social
workers, public officials and the press. Twelve women told their
stories, reciting circumstances that are so familiar: They grew up in
homes that were violent and they thought that abuse was part of
life. They depended on their abusers for support. Many of the bat-
terers were substance abusers. Many of the women thought they
were responsible for the attacks because they did something
wrong. They were isolated from their families and friends, or their
families did not want to hear about their troubles. Some of them
called the police and the police talked to their abusers and did no
more. They lay in emergency rooms out of fear. They suffered,
and finally they killed.
Some of them had never heard the term "domestic violence" or
"battered women" or "Battered Women's Syndrome," nor, unfor-
tunately, had their lawyers. Some of the women pled to man-
slaughter and were serving sentences of eight to fifteen years, while
others were convicted and sentenced to longer terms.
The hearing did not bring any miracles - though actually one of
the women was granted clemency and another later won her appeal
- but it did raise the state of consciousness of many officials and it
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forced them to see there is no line between domestic violence and
criminal violence. It added a few dollars to the Department of
Corrections' budget, and they were able to add. new programming
at Bedford Hills.
It also encouraged another group to form a Committee on Do-
mestic Violence and Incarcerated Women. Although three excel-
lent reports had been issued in the previous two years that
addressed causes and manifestations of domestic violence, as well
as the treatment of victims by the policy, family and criminal
courts, this group addressed new issues raised at the hearing. They
issued a report called Battered Women and Criminal Justice,81 in
June of 1987. It made recommendations for changes to law en-
forcement agencies, the courts, bar associations, and correctional
facilities. Some of the recommendations were implemented soon
after, but others languished.
One of the things we wanted very much was to have all the cases
involving domestic violence reviewed for clemency. They did that
in Ohio and several other states and released many women from
prison, but each year that goal seems to be more and more
impossible.
Meanwhile, we continued to watch for other opportunities to
dramatize our issues. One came right after the report was issued,
when a young woman named Karen Straw went on trial for second-
degree murder. Karen Straw was a battered young woman who
had followed every step that the system said she should. She
moved away from her husband, out of their apartment, with her
two children; she got an order of protection from the courts; she
even called the police to her home six times before she killed. We
knew about her because the Victim Services Agency had started a
pilot program that year that placed domestic violence counselors in
a few police precincts, and one of those counselors was a friend
who worked in a precinct in Queens and who called me just before
Christmas of 1986 to tell me that this young woman, who had
called her six times for help, had finally killed her batterer. Even
with the order of protection, her husband of course had still come
to her apartment, high on crack, raped her in front of her children,
and continued his attack when she picked up a knife in self-defense
and stabbed him.
81. See COMMITTEE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND INCARCERATED WOMEN, BAT-
TERED WOMEN AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1987) (unpublished), cited in, 15 WOMEN'S
RTS. L. REV. 101 n.13 (1987).
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We quickly formed another committee, the Battered Women's
Defense Committee. We worked with her lawyer, Mike Dowd, to
raise money, and attended her hearings and her trial. By this time,
Karen was living with her two children in a welfare hotel, the Lin-
coln Motor Inn, on the Van Wyck Expressway as you go to Ken-
nedy Airport. Ten to twenty of us were present per day in the
courtroom and in the media.
One day during her trial - mind you, this was a trial for second-
degree murder - she told me she could not come the next day
because she had to go to the welfare office to pick up her rent
check to pay the welfare hotel. She was quickly acquitted. Sadly,
though, her problems stayed with her. She had no money, no
home and two children.
The Committee found an apartment and bought furniture. She
got pregnant, un-pregnant, and then had a baby. She had a drug
problem, but could not get into a treatment program. So, we got
her into a treatment program, but she dropped out. Her sisters
cared for her children. She disappeared and we have not been able
to find her since. She showed us, unfortunately, how difficult it can
all be and how many services are needed to help. She was so
smart, but she was so vulnerable, and our village community was
not enough to sustain her.
When Lisa Steinberg died, the Committee rallied to Hedda
Nussbaum's defense and urged the District Attorney not to indict
her. This success spawned a long series of discussions of the rela-
tionship of domestic violence and child abuse and the final evolu-
tion of an organization called the Coalition of Battered Women's
Advocates.
In 1991, the New York City Child Fatality Review Panel found
that in seventy-one percent of the cases where a child died in a
homicide, the mother was also abused. This encouraged us to
again look in a very public way at family violence and the way the
City and the State agencies respond to domestic violence and child
abuse.
At the urging of advocates, Borough President Ruth Messinger
and I, as chair of the City Council's Subcommittee on Women, con-
vened an outstanding Task Force on Family Violence. After four
months of investigation and research, involving more than one
hundred interviews with City officials, service providers, and the
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victims of family violence, the Task Force released its report, Be-
hind Closed Doors.82
This report concluded that there was no coordinated response to
the problem of family violence, that government agencies have so
far failed to develop procedures and protocols that recognize the
linkage between women battering and child abuse, and that bat-
tered women and children are often ignored by the system
designed to help them, or help feebly, or in some cases harm the
women.
Ironically, this report played an important role in the 1993 may-
oralty campaign. Giuliani often referred to it as evidence of the
poor response of the previous democratic administration to the
problem that many women face. His own administration's re-
sponse to domestic violence has been more difficult to assess be-
cause his administration is not generous with its information,
though it is expansive with its rhetoric.
There is now a twenty-four-hour hotline in operation, which re-
ceives over 70,000 calls annually. The Coalition for Battered Wo-
men's Advocates notes, however, that in 1996 approximately one
percent of the battered women requesting shelter actually received
the assistance they need. Comptroller Alan Hevesi's office re-
ported in 1997 that of the fifty-seven callers who got through to the
hotline operator, only four were referred to a shelter. Of the fifty-
seven calls, thirty-six, or sixty-three percent, were not successfully
referred and received no shelter assignment. The remaining seven-
teen callers, thirty percent, were referred to the City's Emergency
Assistance Unit.
Also during the Giuliani years, very few shelter beds have actu-
ally been added, alternative-to-shelter programs have been slow
getting started, as have non-residential domestic violence pro-
grams, and an ACS program to train child care workers to look for
domestic violence has been stalled.
The quality of police enhancements is still questionable. Domes-
tic Violence Officers exist in each precinct, but battered women's
experiences vary widely. Domestic Violence Incident Reports are
not always completed, and arrests are not always made. Dual ar-
rests or threats of dual arrest jeopardize battered women and deter
some of them from seeking further police assistance.
The Police Commissioner testified that the recent increase in
homicides was due to an increase in domestic violence incidents,
82. See MESSINGER & ELDRIDGE, supra note 77.
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that several of the women had orders of protection and some of
them had the police pendants and cellular phones that they pro-
vided. This is the same Police Commissioner who asked me in a
hearing last week if the question I asked him was, "Am I still beat-
ing my wife?"
There is an extensive public education campaign that the admin-
istration is carrying on. Posters and domestic violence programs
are very visible on MTA buses and subways, and there is now a
city-wide campaign to stop relationship abuse among young peo-
ple. But there is no way to assess the campaign's effectiveness
other than noting the hotline calls.
Yet, even as the numbers of women calling the hotline increase
and the recognition of domestic violence grows, another challenge
appears. We know that domestic violence can happen anywhere
and to anyone, but now we are able to see that the social welfare
policies of the 1990s are bringing new violence to poor families.
We see families seeking shelter because of violent situations being
turned away by the shelter system on an average of three times
before they are finally accepted in a shelter. Families are forced to
live doubled and tripled up in housing designed to accommodate
single families in very stressful situations, often unwanted and
abused.
It is interesting to note that at the same time the Police Commis-
sioner says that homicides have increased because of domestic vio-
lence incidents, the Commissioner of Human Resources Agency,
Jason Turner, has -warned that women may be feigning domestic
violence in order to get housing. We are not talking about sending
a family to the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. Rather, if the family is not
lucky enough to get a domestic violence shelter bed from the do-
mestic violence hotline - and that is an average of three beds per
victim because we work on an average of two children and the
mother - the family has to go to an Emergency Assistance Unit.
Until now, they slept on the floor or on chairs, sometimes for sev-
eral days. We have just passed a bill that prohibits the EAUs from
not providing sleeping facilities when the family, goes to the Emer-
gency Assistance Unit and we are waiting. f6r. the Mayor's
signature.83
The families are interviewed by a NOVA (National Organization
for Victim Assistance) worker - that is a specialist in domestic
violence - and again, if they are lucky, they are assigned to a do-
83. See N.Y.C. Local Law 19, int. 521-A (1999).
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mestic violence shelter, but more likely they will be sent to an as-
sessment shelter for thirty days and then to a regular shelter that
has no programs for battered women and their children, and often
the stay lasts for more than a year.
The Council's General Welfare Committee recently held a hear-
ing in Harlem on foster care. The stories from the hearings support
the recent figures that show the number of children in foster care
has increased. But what the figures do not show is that the major-
ity of children are in foster care because of neglect charges rather
than abuse charges, and the neglect can sometimes mean a missing
baby sitter or a falling ceiling in their home. In one case, the ceil-
ing that fell down was in an apartment that was maintained by the
city. Mothers and grandmothers testified about their nightmare
experiences in the family court and the difficulties in getting their
children out of foster care.
Of course, sometimes foster care is necessary, and even benefi-
cial, but I remember well when Rose Washington, then the Com-
missioner of Juvenile Justice, testified that the profile of a typical
youngster in the juvenile justice system included at least one foster
care placement. Bear in mind that the average foster care place-
ment lasts several years. Children are placed quickly in foster care
out of fear of disaster, but also because the Giuliani Administra-
tion rejected the policy of family preservation and eliminated the
very support services that policy brought.
An experienced homemaker could remedy many of these ne-
glect situations at much less financial cost, and certainly without
the traumatic impact foster care has on a family.
Rent subsidies to help parents find acceptable homes for their
children exiting foster care are disappearing, as are payments to
prevent eviction and homelessness. But still, the Agency for Chil-
dren's Services requires that a child has his or her own room before
that child is allowed to leave foster care.
Recently, we have heard of two tragic infant deaths because the
young nursing mothers lacked Medicaid cards for the baby and ad-
equate after-health care. The cards arrived after the babies died.
The mothers were denied service because they did not have the
cards, even though the infants are supposed to be automatically
covered by their mother's Medicaid card. One of the mothers,
Tabitha Waldron, is now on trial in the Bronx for criminally negli-
gent homicide, while the other young woman, Tatiana Weeks,
struggles to regain custody of her three-year-old son.
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These are only a few examples of the difficulties that poor wo-
men and their families face. At a recent meeting in my community,
a ninety-two-year-old man reprimanded me for sounding so hope-
less. And, of course, he is right. We cannot give up. But it is
difficult.
When we look back, we do note that we have made great strides
in the public recognition that domestic violence is criminal vio-
lence, and we have seen improvements in the government's
response.
But we have to go beyond, just responding to the violence each
year by trying to add more shelter beds and increase programs for
victims. I think we have to recognize the relationship today be-
tween poverty and violence and we have to change the public poli-
cies that drive that poverty to try to prevent the violence.
" There has to be more decent, affordable housing and more
protection of existing housing and existing rents. We must
stop looking at child care as an accessory service.
" Universal non-sexist quality education would provide a strong
foundation for families, teaching early equality and dispute
resolution, as well as giving the children the advantages Head-
start programs have long demonstrated.
" Poor people must have adequate legal representation if we
are to have a just society.
" Everyone should have good health care and ample educa-
tional opportunities.
* We must acknowledge and adapt to the changing
demographics of our city and of our country.
" And finally, of course, people should work, and I believe they
want to work but punitive systems that trick people and trap
them will not succeed.
We must reexamine how we treat the poor. I am not really talk-
ing in the rhetoric that Giuliani likes to say is "left-wing rhetoric."
I believe it is just common sense and compassion. Poverty and wel-
fare reform in its present form disrupts family life and diminishes
our opportunities to bring tranquility to our families.
Those of you who represent these women and children have an
enormous task and an awesome responsibility, but the rewards are
indescribable when you have helped one family find peace and a
future.
Thank you.
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TRENDS AND TACTICS ON THE FEDERAL FRONT
MS. DOMONKOS: It is my pleasure to introduce our modera-
tor, Andrea Williams, a Staff Attorney at the NOW Legal Defense
and Education Fund, where she works on issues related to violence
and poverty. She is the co-chair of the National Task Force to End
Violence Against Women, which is a vast national coalition of or-
ganizations focusing currently on the passage of the federal Vio-
lence Against Women Act 1999.84
Andrea also works on implementation and monitoring of the
Family Violence Option, which exempts battered women from
some of the restrictions of welfare form. She also provides techni-
cal assistance to lawyers and battered women on domestic violence
and child custody.
Prior to joining NOW Legal Defense, she was a Staff Attorney at
the Bergen County Legal Services in New Jersey, where she
worked in the areas of housing, family and unemployment law.
She is a graduate of the Rutgers School of Law in Newark, has a
Bachelor of Arts in political science from Boston University, a
Master of Arts in African American studies from Atlanta Univer-
sity, and has taught women's studies.
MS. WILLIAMS: Thank you very much.
In terms of the order of presenters, we will start with Juley
Fulcher from the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence,
and then we will follow up with Suzanne Goldberg from Lambda
Legal Defense. We will then have Joan Zorza, who is the Editor of
Domestic Violence Report and a legal advocate, followed by Leslye
Orloff from AYUDA, and then Marcellene Hearn who is with
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund. We will end with Linda
Garder.
The purpose of this panel is to give a sense of the laws and other
resources that are available on the national level to assist battered
women and children. It is also to assist practitioners as they handle
cases involving domestic violence, and particularly the inner sec-
tion of domestic violence and child custody.
Let's start with Juley Fulcher. Juley is going to talk about the
Violence Against Women Act and some of its provisions that are
important avenues for battered women and children.
MS. FULCHER: Thank you, Andrea.
My name is Juley Fulcher. I am the Public Policy director of the
National Coalition Against Domestic Violence. I work primarily at
84. See S. 245, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 357, 106th Cong. (1999).
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the federal level, drafting and lobbying legislation that will be of
assistance to victims of domestic violence and their children. One
of our primary focuses for the past couple of years has been the
children, simply because we really have been letting them slip
through the cracks in a lot of ways.
I am going to talk to you about what little there is out there on
the federal level that addresses children and the custody issues in
the domestic violence context, and also talk more specifically about
some of the proposals that currently exist. These are pieces of leg-
islation that are in front of Congress right now that we are trying to
get passed but are not yet law. So I am switching back and forth
between the two, and will try to be clear.
When we are talking about domestic violence and we are talking
about child custody in the context of domestic violence, most of the
laws that we are dealing with are going to be state laws. Custody
and family law issues are within the purview of the state to make
decisions about how the state is going to treat these cases.
However, we do an awful lot of things at the federal level that
can have a tremendous impact on the lives of battered women and
their children. A lot of that comes from funding sources. The Fed-
eral Government, of course, gives out a lot of money to the states,
to non-profits, and all sorts of folks throughout the country that
can provide the kind of essential assistance that is needed in order
to get women and children to safety. The Federal Government
often will earmark that funding in such a way that it is only avail-
able under certain circumstances. This earmarking can actually en-
courage or coerce states into changing their laws in ways that the
Federal Government would like to see.
So we have a lot of opportunity at the federal level to have an
impact of the lives of women and children in the custody context
and in a domestic violence situation, even where this is not usually
what we think of as a federal law-making area. And then, of
course, there is the interstate context and jurisdiction conflict and
all those other things that are typically decided at the federal level
that we are also addressing.
What I am going to try to do is go through a section of what is
called the Violence Against Women Act of 1999. This is an omni-
bus package. It is a huge bill, almost 400 pages long. The package
has everything but the kitchen sink to try to address domestic vio-
lence, sexual assault, stalking and generally all forms of violence
against women.
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To give you a little bit of history, the original Violence Against
Women Act passed in 1994 ("VAWA") 8 5 was something that was in
front of Congress, more or less, for four years as a package. What
finally passed was not the full proposal by any means, but did do a
lot of good things and sent a lot of money out to the states to ad-
dress domestic violence. There was not much in there that was spe-
cifically addressing children, although certainly some of those
funds that helped women get out of a bad domestic violence rela-
tionship also helped in the protection of the children.
This new package is designed to do two primary things. The first
one is to keep all of those programs running that were initiated
under the original VAWA. Quite literally, funding authorization
runs out for those programs in fiscal year 2000; actually, a number
of the programs have already run out. So to the extent that the
programs that already exist have done good things, we need to
make sure we maintain those programs. One piece of this bill does
that.
The rest of the bill, which is the bigger part of the bill, is a group
of new proposals that address domestic violence. Actually, some
of the proposals have been floating around since before the first
bill passed.
Title II of the eight-titled bill is called "Limiting the Effects of
Violence on Children." Included within this title is a whole set of
subtitles, each of which is an independent piece of legislation with
its own set of sponsors, that is designed to address a different piece
of the puzzle. I will just go through them in the order they are
listed in the bill.
The first one that is listed under title II, subtitle A is called "Safe
Havens for Children. '8 6 Every one of us, no matter where we live,
has read newspaper articles or heard on the news about a woman
and/or her children who are injured or killed during visitation ex-
change. These kinds of cases have, unfortunately, happened in
every corner of our country. It seems, from my perspective, that it
is happening on almost a weekly basis.
Of course, anybody who is out there litigating these cases and
who is trying to set up a reasonable visitation schedule and is used
to dealing with it in the context of domestic violence, knows that
that can be a very dangerous time for your client. The visitation is
a time that is often used by a batterer to threaten the victim, to
harass her, to sometimes threaten or injure the children, and, in a
85. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40701-40703, 108 Stat. 1902, 1953 (1994).
86. See H.R. 357, 106th Cong. § 211, 212 (1999).
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way, just to generally manipulate the situation and maintain some
sense of control in a relationship that otherwise is pretty much be-
ing severed both by these people and through the court system.
So it is a time that you work very hard to try to come up with
something, to craft something that will protect your client. But,
very often, there is no choice but to have the victim of domestic
violence in the same room or in the same place with her batterer
on a regular basis - maybe once a week, twice a week, who knows
- for visitation exchange. So essentially, she is being forced back
into that relationship, even under those temporary circumstances,
on a regular basis.
Now, we often try to do it at a public place: at a police station, if
your police station is cooperative with those kinds of things; Mc-
Donald's, one of the more popular points where we do this ex-
change; or, lots of other places. We sometimes try to get
intermediaries involved, a third-party exchange perhaps; but, of
course, we have to rely on both of these people being able to agree
on an individual that they both feel comfortable entrusting their
children to, and that is willing to come in contact with both people.
That is not always an easy task either.
So visitation is a very, very difficult problem. The last thing we
want to have happen is forcing people into a situation where vio-
lence could erupt and people could get hurt. The idea behind
"Safe Havens for Children" is to provide federal funding that
would be available in grants to create supervised visitation centers
in local communities. The supervised visitation center could be
used in two ways:
• One is for actual visitation exchange only. The children are
not really being visited at the center; instead, it is just a nice,
secure, safe location where there are trained personnel there
to make sure that there is no violence and the children can be
exchanged.
" The other way in which such a center can be used is that you
actually have trained personnel who can supervise the visita-
tion in cases where there has been a history of child abuse or
child sexual abuse.
There are some communities that have managed to scrape up
enough money to get some of these centers going. But for the
most part, most of our communities cannot afford it or cannot af-
ford to do it on as broad a scale as is needed for the community.
That is the idea behind the "Safe Havens for Children" proposal.
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A second proposal that is listed in this Title tries to directly ad-
dress the problem of domestic violence and violence against wo-
men in an education/prevention mode.87 We all know that adult
women find themselves in domestic violence relationships at num-
bers far higher than any of us would ever feel comfortable with.
But what we fail to think about sometimes is that you do not just
all of a sudden become an adult one day and then find yourself in a
violent relationship without any history whatsoever to back that
up. We have children who are growing up in violent households,
who are witnessing violence on a daily basis, and this is essentially
their model of what a relationship is. In fact, children of homes of
domestic violence are far more likely to grow up to be either a
batterer or a victim of domestic violence themselves, not to men-
tion the host of other problems that may come along with growing
up in a violent home that way.
Under the original VAWA, Congress recognized that we need to
start an education prevention level at a young age. In fact, it gave
some grants for folks to develop some education programs that
could be specifically targeted to children of different ages.
Those programs were developed. There were programs devel-
oped for the elementary school level, the middle or junior high
school level, as well as the high school level. Unfortunately, they
only put forth the money to develop the model, and the models
have not yet been implemented. So what we would like to do is
implement those models and make those models broadly available
to school systems, to non-profits, domestic violence programs and
sexual assault programs in communities. We want to try to go into
the school systems, adapt these models to wherever people are liv-
ing, and to try to educate the children at those younger ages. This
is a very important piece of the puzzle to make sure that we are
going in and teaching the children about the problem, about the
potential dangers, and about ways in which they can avoid becom-
ing either a batterer or a victim of domestic violence. These pro-
grams also address sexual assault as an issue.
Another approach is to try to help the schools develop policies
for dealing with the violence in the lives of the children who attend
those schools. Anybody who has ever gone into a classroom and
tried to teach about any subject as a means of public education
knows that you end up with at least one or two students coming up
to you afterwards saying, "You know, that happens in my life," or
87. See id. § 221.
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"a friend of mine has that problem." And that is the point. We
know it is out there, we know it is widespread; that is why we
wanted to do the education in the first place. But we have got to
make sure that those schools are prepared to deal with the children
who then come forth and say, "That's me, that's my home, I need
help." So we very much want to deal with that.
One other big piece of this is that we are not just talking about
children who are witnessing the violence between their parents.
We are talking about teen-agers who are experiencing violence in
their own relationships as well. With teen dating violence, we do
not have statistics as good as we would like, but the early studies
are showing anywhere from ten to forty percent of teen-agers stat-
ing that they themselves have been in a violent dating relationship.
That is a little bit frightening to think about, but we may be actu-
ally addressing the people who are in these violent relationships,
especially at the high school level, in those education programs.
There is a piece of the bill that specifically addresses the federal
law on parental kidnapping, the Parental Kidnapping and Preven-
tion Act ("PKPA").8 8 The PKPA is already in place. It is primarily
designed to keep one parent from kidnapping the children and run-
ning to another state with the kids, but does a lot of talking about
jurisdiction, specifically which states have jurisdiction to decide
custody. I am going to briefly state a couple of things that would
be amended in the PKPA through the Violence Against Women
Act of 1999.
One change would allow an affirmative defense to people
charged with parental kidnapping if they left the state with the chil-
dren in order to escape domestic violence or abuse of the child or
children. 89 So, if a parent who does not have legal custody or visi-
tation rights that are being violated at the time, specifically took
the kids in violation of the order to escape domestic violence or
child abuse, then that would be a defense to the criminal charge.
Also, it would amend the civil portions of the PKPA with respect
to determining jurisdiction over a custody case. 90 Lots of times
when we are setting up that list of factors we are not thinking of
the dynamics of the domestic violence relationship. The bill would
amend the statute so that a judge could take into account things
like domestic violence, child abuse, stalking and child sexual abuse,
in determining which state gets jurisdiction over the matter.
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
89. See H.R. 357, 106th Cong. § 233.
90. See id. § 234.
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The last piece addresses bringing the federal law more in line
with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act,
which Joan Zorza is going to be talking more about later, so I will
just leave that for her.
There is also a piece of the bill that is a "Sense of Congress"
about domestic violence in the context of custody cases.91 It is es-
sentially saying that it is in the children's best interests to not be
given in custody to a batterer, so that the batterer is not the pre-
ferred custodial parent.
Now, senses of Congress like that already exist, in the sense that
Congress calls to states to reform their laws in such a way that they
conform with that ideal. It does not really have any authoritative
impact, but it can be very influential in getting legislative changes
on the state level, so it is an important piece.
There is also a piece of the bill that provides funding to train
child welfare workers, individual people who are working with
child protective services.92 These are people whose job it is to
maintain the welfare and safety of our children. They do an impor-
tant job, but they do not always have the background that they
need to understand what is going on in domestic violence house-
holds. We want to make sure that all of those child protective ser-
vice workers are adequately trained to deal with the job that they
have, and we want to arm them with the tools that they need to do
that job effectively and make sure that children are kept safe.
The last piece I will mention is child abuse accountability. 93 We
all know that you can split up someone's retirement benefits in a
divorce settlement. Generally we cannot get at your retirement
benefits in any other way but through divorce, family law matters.
There is always that precedent.
This piece would help a victim of child abuse who, as an adult,
sues their abuser and wins but who cannot collect in any way, to
attach the retirement pension benefits of their abuser. Essentially
it provides another way through family law that an abuser's pen-
sion benefits could be attached.
So that is the bill's proposal in terms of addressing children, and
the effects of violence upon them.
MS. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Juley. Let us take maybe three to
five minutes now if anyone has questions or comments for Juley.
91. See id. § 241.
92. See id. § 251.
93. See id. §§ 261-264.
728
2000] ,WOMEN, CHILDREN AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 729
AUDIENCE: I was interested in your statements talking about
the abuser not being preferred as the custodial parent. What is the
future view of that, or what is your opinion about using that in the
future? I deal with a lot of custody issues, and there are a lot of
times when we have a parent who claims to have been abused by
the person who is asking for custody. Obviously the other party
denies it, and it becomes an issue of fact. I would like to know
where this is going.
MS. FULCHER: There are already state laws that address this.
What we are usually talking about in those state laws that are ad-
dressing it is that there is a finding of fact that one person has com-
mitted domestic violence against the other, and then once that
finding of fact is made, there is some sort of taking into account of
the fact of domestic violence in determination of custody.
There are different ways that happens state by state, so it may be
one in a laundry list of things you consider when you are determin-
ing best interests of the child. Sometimes it is stronger than that.
Maybe you do not give custody to a batterer unless there are some
extenuating circumstances.
But the idea on the federal level is just a sense of Congress that
says, "You should be addressing this in your state laws very di-
rectly, and there should be a preference for not giving custody to a
batterer." Although they are not saying "never, never, never,"
they are saying some sort of preferential system that once there has
been a finding of fact of domestic violence, that it is taken into
account and that there be a preference for not giving the kids to
the batterer.
AUDIENCE: I wonder if we do not beg the point when we talk
about custody, because "custody" is a legal term and it implies a
shift of custody from one parent to the other. But whenever we
are addressing visitation, for example, if it is for a week-end or a
week or overnight, we are essentially putting the child in that par-
ent's custody during that period of time. All of the laws that I have
seen talk about a preference being given or taking this into consid-
eration in a custody determination, but by far the most common
case that comes into court is a visitation case where you are putting
the child in the other parent's custody, but it is not "custody." I
wonder if there is anything that is being done to also include visita-
tion in that.
MS. FULCHER: I guess I am misspeaking a little bit, because it
does talk about custody and visitation as a package.
AUDIENCE: But not in New York.
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MS. FULCHER: But yes, it does differ from state to state, and
there are states that actually also determine their visitation provi-
sions based on the same issues. One example is the District of Co-
lumbia. If there is a finding of fact of domestic violence, it is the
burden of the batterer to show the court that visitation can take
place and keep the children and the victim of domestic violence
safe through that process. So there are states that are addressing it.
But you are right, it is an important piece.
MS. ORLOFF: Just something else to know about that is that
the National Council of Juvenile and family court Judges several
years ago issued a Model Code, which is a model state statutory
code that they are trying to encourage states to pass. In that, they
basically recommend that there only be supervised visitation when
there has been a finding of abuse. But very few states have fol-
lowed that, I believe.
MS. ZORZA: About thirteen states have that, but it is very
complicated because a lot of states have put much stronger factors
in it than New York has. New York has a consideration, that
judges must consider the domestic violence, but it does not say
what weight or what protection needs to be given.
AUDIENCE: You mentioned that a woman who has been the
subject of domestic violence might have a claim to her husband's
pension. I am representing a woman in an uncontested divorce
whose husband has a pension. She had a restraining order against
him, but it has lapsed, and there is no formal judicial procedure. I
am wondering what level must she have gone to have a claim to her
husband's pension?
MS. FULCHER: The specific piece that I was mentioning had
to do with child abuse actually, not domestic violence. It is a pro-
posal that if you later sue your parent for committing child abuse
against you when you were a child and you win damages, that you
could then attach your parent's pension or retirement benefits in
order to settle that claim. When I referred to adults, I was refer-
ring to just the standard within a divorce that you have the ability
to attach part of the retirement benefits of your spouse.
MS. WILLIAMS: Thank you very much.
Suzanne Goldberg from Lambda Legal Defense is now going to
talk about lesbians and domestic violence and child custody.
MS. GOLDBERG: Thanks. Hi. I am pleased to be here. My
name is Suzanne Goldberg. I am a Senior Staff Attorney with
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund.
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For those of you who are not familiar with Lambda, we are a
twenty-six year old national organization. We work to secure and
protect the rights of lesbians, gay men and people with HIV.
When Andrea first asked me to speak on the panel, particularly
because it was a federal issues panel, I wondered what I could add.
It is not that lesbians and lesbian parents do not have struggles
with domestic violence. Certainly we do, both lesbians who are in
a heterosexual relationship or leaving a spouse, and lesbians who
are in a same-sex relationship as well. And just to pick up on the
point we were just discussing, this also includes lesbian youth in
high schools and young women who are in same-sex relationships
where there is battering, where there is a whole host of issues.
Even though to the extent that programs exist today, some sorts
of social support programs, how minimal those are when you think
about how those programs address the particular needs of the les-
bians. We are really talking about very, very minimal attention. So
I was thinking that makes this job a little bit difficult this morning.
In addition, at the federal level, the government has actually
passed a law, the Defense of Marriage Act,94 that explicitly refuses
to recognize same-sex couples' marriages, at the federal level, and
permits states not to recognize same-sex couples' marriages. So we
are not talking about a friendly federal environment for lesbians or
gay men, or lesbian or gay parents. We do not even have protec-
tions against employment discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion. So we do have a very long road to go at the federal level.
But I do think it is quite hopeful - or I hope it is helpful at least
- to sketch out the landscape that is faced by lesbians who are in
domestic violence situations and have children, and highlight some
of the particular issues that arise when the battered parent is a
lesbian.
What I want to do, first of all, is offer a thumbnail sketch of the
standards that are typically applied when a lesbian is seeking cus-
tody of her children, just to get us all on the same page; second,
talk about how some courts have handled cases when lesbian par-
ents have been the victims of domestic violence, or when domestic
violence has been an issue in a custody battle; and third, offer some
practical or practice issues for people who are representing
lesbians.
Has anybody here represented a woman in a custody battle who
is a lesbian where domestic violence is an issue? A couple of peo-
94. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1997); 28 U.S.C.
§1738c (1997)).
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pie in the room. So even in a room of approximately one hundred
people, five people.
What is often hard to figure out, even when you are representing
somebody who you presume is heterosexual, is whether they in fact
are a lesbian and are not comfortable, for whatever reason, in dis-
closing that information. And certainly, when a male spouse finds
out that his wife is lesbian or is engaged in an extramarital affair
with another woman, that is very frequently a trigger for domestic
violence.
So here is the basic background on custody disputes involving
lesbian parents, to lay the groundwork for some more specific is-
sues. You could also re-title this section "In Many States, Lesbian
and Gay Parents Have a Very Tough Struggle."
The states basically break down in three ways.
" One, there are states where being a lesbian is a per se negative
factor in a custody determination. So if there is a divorce pro-
ceeding from a marriage, a parent is shown to be a lesbian or
gay, that parent is typically denied custody and often faces
very severe restrictions on visitation, including a requirement
of supervised visitation, no overnight visitation, or no visita-
tion in the presence of another same-sex adult who is not a
relative. These are not uncommon. We are dealing with these
kinds of matters all the time at Lambda.
* Then there is a set of other states that do not have the explicit
negative - it is not even a negative presumption, just sort of
an explicit per se "a lesbian parent is a bad parent" rule - but
they still find ways to deny lesbian parents custody and/or re-
strict visitation with their children anyway, by saying, for ex-
ample, "Your state has a sodomy law." Twelve of the
seventeen states that still have sodomy laws prohibit oral and
anal sex to everybody in the state, not just to same-sex
couples. But the court will say, "Well, you are a lesbian, and
therefore you must be violating the sodomy law," even if the
ex-husband is violating the law as well. But that never comes
up. So courts find a way, in other words, to punish the lesbian
parent.
• Then there are other states, including New York, New Jersey,
and most of the states immediately around us, where sexual
orientation is not treated as a relevant factor unless the other
parent shows that it is.
I want to move now to cases in which courts have addressed do-
mestic violence issues in the context of a lesbian or gay custody
battle. The bottom line in many of these cases, regardless of where
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they are from, is that the lesbian parent will still be seen as the
worst parent in the court's eyes, even if the heterosexual father is a
batterer, has battered his ex-wife, has battered his children. Now I
am talking about lesbians who are leaving heterosexual
relationships.
In other words, the courts take the position that the influence of
a lesbian mother on her child is going to be far worse than the
influence of a violent father on his child. I think the best way to
illustrate this is through a couple of examples.
There is a case that was recently decided, actually about two
months ago, by the Mississippi Supreme Court. It is called Wei-
gand v. Houghton." In this case, a gay father was actually seeking
custody of his child because the child's heterosexual mother had
gotten into a relationship in which the stepfather was abusing her
and threatening to kill the child.
The majority of the Mississippi Supreme Court looked at this
situation. It went through extensive balancing, but called the inci-
dents of domestic violence "isolated," even though the defense
pointed out that these incidents led to the family being evicted
from their home because of the repeated episodes of domestic vio-
lenze and explained that the son witnessed the incidents.
There were two justices who dissented. When I read this dissent,
I thought it was interesting because it acknowledged the effect of
domestic violence. There are clearly other issues which this court
also appeared to have, including economic bias toward the father
because he appeared to have more money than the mother. But
the dissent said:
The Chancellor and majority believe a minor is best served by
living in an explosive environment in which the unemployed
stepfather is a convicted felon, drinker, drug-taker, adulterer,
wife-beater, and child-threatener, and in which the mother has
been transitory, works two jobs, and has limited time with the
child.96
As Ronnie Eldridge said before, we can have a whole other dis-
cussion about that last part of the Justices' comments about the
mother working two jobs and having less time with the child. But
as far as the first part is concerned, clearly what the court is point-
ing out here is that the fact that the father who is seeking custody is
gay is so bad as to outweigh the potential damage to the child
95. 730 So. 2d 581 (Miss. 1999).
96. Id. at 588.
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caused by living with the violent stepfather. Thus, while the child
could be living with his father in a safe and stable home with every
material and educational opportunity, again there is a little bias
here.
[T]oday's decision affirms the Chancellor's finding that he
should remain with his mother and her present husband, an
adulterer and a convicted felon, who has beaten Machelle and
threatened Paul's life. No child should be subjected to such a
potential for short- and long-term psychological and physical
abuse just because the Chancellor thinks little of homosexuals.97
So when you have a lesbian or gay parent who is in a domestic
violence situation, even where domestic violence might be consid-
ered a negative factor on the other parent's side, the lesbian or gay
parent still faces significant barriers to being treated as an equal in
court.
Another interesting case is Ward v. Ward,98 an Appellate Court
case in Florida, where a lesbian mother lost custody of her child,
even though the child had not spent any significant time with the
father. One of the issues that arose in the case, although it was not
exactly presented to the court because of procedural reasons, was
the fact that the father had served time in a Florida prison for mur-
dering his first wife. There is a statute in Florida that creates a
rebuttable presumption that shared parental responsibility by a
parent who has been convicted of a felony of the second degree or
higher involving domestic violence will be detrimental to the
child.99
But the court goes on to say, "[T]he considerable evidence in the
record concerning [the father's] conduct, and record since being
convicted and imprisoned, would seem to support a conclusion that
the presumption would be rebutted in [this] case." 100
Even though the child in this case never really saw the father, he
was able to obtain a shift in custody because he had remarried and
presented himself as being in a stable relationship.
Another way this issue comes up is where the lesbian parent is
involved with another person - the lesbian parent has a same-sex
partner. In Bottoms v. Bottoms, °'0 one of the factors that the court
considered in taking a child away from the mother and transferring
97. Id.
98. No. 95-4184, 1996 WL 491692 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 1996).
99. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) (West 1995).
100. Ward, No. 95-4184, 1996 WL 491692, at *4.
101. 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995).
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custody to the grandmother was that the mother's same-sex part-
ner had disciplined the child by hitting him on his bottom.
There was no evidence in this case - there were not even allega-
tions - of physical or sexual abuse of the three-year-old or four-
year-old boy. But the parental discipline of the child was being
treated differently because the parent in question was a lesbian.
You can imagine what would happen if a court actually took cus-
tody away from a parent anytime a parent were to hit the child on
the bottom for disciplinary purposes.
Not all cases turn out this way, but there is a definite trend in this
direction. I want to recognize here that neither side of these cases
has perfect analyses, but what is important to note is that when
domestic violence is occurring, the sexual orientation of the lesbian
or gay parent is often treated as at least as negative a factor as the
other parent's violent behavior.
Third, from a practical standpoint, I just want to highlight that
access to courts for protection against domestic violence can be dif-
ferent for lesbian and gay parents than for heterosexual parents.
This is for a couple of reasons.
In most states - I believe this is true in most states, including
New York but someone please jump up and correct me if I am
wrong - people can only go into family court, as opposed to crimi-
nal court, to seek an order of protection if they are either married
to the batterer or have a child in common with the batterer.
MS. WILLIAMS: Or a family relationship.
MS. GOLDBERG: So same household is enough? I do not be-
lieve it is actually.
MS. WILLIAMS: No.
MS. GOLDBERG: In New York State, since lesbian couples
cannot marry under law, if a lesbian is experiencing domestic vio-
lence from her partner, she has to go to criminal court to seek pro-
tection for herself and her kids.
When we think about how poorly funded and supported some of
the programs are, even in family court, and how insensitive even
some trained family court judges are, most of the people here
know that in criminal court it is an even less pleasant experience,
certainly, for a parent and for kids.
In addition, same-sex couples face an entirely different legal re-
gime regarding child custody and visitation issues. Again, I just
want to mention the existence of the Defense of Marriage Act on
the federal level, which discusses the event that some state ulti-
mately recognizes same-sex couples' marriages - which may or
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may not happen within the next six months in Hawaii or Vermont.
The Federal Government felt it was necessary to just act in ad-
vance and protect itself against the possible onslaught of same-sex
couples' marriages, apparently. If a state does recognize same-sex
couples' marriages, the Federal Government has already decided
that it will not.
To the extent that there are federal laws developed that will pro-
tect a woman from her spouse in the context of same-sex violence,
it is unlikely that those laws are going to be beneficial to a same-
sex couple who is able to marry, if same-sex couples are able to
marry.
When crafting those laws, it is very important to think not only
about people who are either escaping violence from a legal spouse
or escaping violence from the biological parent of their child, but
also about people who have a relationship that is not legally recog-
nized but that still puts them in great danger.
In New York State, for example, unless both parents have a legal
relationship with the child, the non-biological or non-adoptive par-
ent is treated as a legal stranger to the child. In New York, a case
called Matter of Dana"°2 made it possible for a parent to do a sec-
ond-parent adoption, so that both parents could establish a legal
relationship with a child.
A few years earlier, a case decided in 1990, called Alison D. v.
Virginia M.,103 involved a lesbian seeking visitation with her child.
The two parents had planned to have the child together, they had
raised the child together, they had split up, and the biological
mother decided to deny visitation to the non-biological mom in
that case.
The non-biological mom went in and sought standing to seek vis-
itation with the child, not custody. The court said that the non-
biological mother was a legal stranger to the child and she had no
ability to enter court and seek to maintain any connection with the
child who she has helped to raise from birth.
So even where violence is occurring by the biological parent or
the adoptive parent, the other parent, who may not have a legal
relationship with the child, has absolutely no standing to go into
court and seek protection. This is regardless of the fact that they
planned the conception, the birth, and cared for the child together
from early on.
102. 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995).
103. 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
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Also, what happens sometimes in same-sex relationship cases is
that a biological mother will accuse the non-biological mother of
domestic violence or of abuse toward the children as a way of justi-
fying to courts and to herself that she should deny the other parent
any access to the child whatsoever.
There was a recent California case, called Kathleen C. v. Lisa
W. 104 at the Appellate level, which upheld this idea that a parent
who has been standing in loco parentis, and who has functionally
been parenting a child, does not have a legal relationship with the
child. What the court specifically said is that this woman - who
had again planned the conception, raised the child from birth, gave
the child her last name as his middle name - could not see the
child anymore and that, he was no longer her child, after the couple
broke up.
The court noted that in early 1996, appellant visited with the
children surreptitiously on several occasions. There was another
previous child who she was also parenting. There were no allega-
tions of domestic violence or harm to the kids. She was just trying
to see her children.
Respondent, the biological parent, learned of these visits and
sought a restraining order under the Domestic Violence Prevention
Act.10 5 This is just an example of a different perspective on how
domestic violence laws are sometimes used in battles between
same-sex parents to actually prevent another parent who has not
been a violent parent from gaining custody or visitation to their
child.
The upshot of all of this is that if you are representing a lesbian,
or you are thinking about representing lesbian or gay parents in
custody battles, there are some different issues to be aware of that
lesbian parents face.
(1) Being a lesbian alone is often a negative factor in custody
and visitation determinations, and the heterosexual parent's vio-
lence may be treated as balancing out the negativity of the other
parent's lesbian or gay sexual orientation.
(2) Lesbian parents often do not even have access to court to
seek the kind of remedies that are necessary for parents who are
facing domestic violence.
There is a whole range of issues that are helpful to consider. I
think we are making some small progress on the road, but obvi-
ously we have a very long road ahead as well.
104. 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48 (Ct. App. 1999).
105. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6200-6390 (Supp. 1999).
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MS. WILLIAMS: Let us take some questions for either Suzanne
or Juley.
AUDIENCE: Suzanne, could you explain a little bit more about
the federal and state laws regarding marriage mentioned in the last
part.
MS. GOLDBERG: Currently, no state in the United States rec-
ognizes the marriages of same-sex couples. People have relation-
ships, wedding ceremonies or commitment ceremonies, but they
are not legally recognized in any state as being married. So all of
the rights and obligations that come along with the marriage are
not available to lesbian and gay couples, including the rights and
obligations that grow out of having a child together in a marriage.
At the federal level, prompted by the possibility that there could
be a same-sex marriage, like the one in an ongoing Hawaii lawsuit
that may lead to the recognition of same-sex couples' marriages in
that state,'0 6 the Defense of Marriage Act was passed by Congress
and then signed by Clinton.
The Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") has two central provi-
sions. One is that the Federal Government will not recognize val-
idly contracted same-sex couples' marriages from any state.'0 7 So
in no part of federal law, whether we are talking about tax issues,
Social Security issues, immigration issues or anything else, will
same-sex couples' marriages be recognized.
Secondly, DOMA provides that states do not have to recognize
another state's same-sex couple's marriage.108. For example if Ver-
mont or Hawaii, where lawsuits are currently pending seeking the
freedom for same-sex couples to marry, actually decide to recog-
nize same-sex couples' marriages, through the DOMA, New York
does not have to recognize those marriages, nor does Connecticut
or any other state.
Obviously, that raises serious problems with, among other
things, the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, which
seems to require that marriages in one state should be recognized
in another. That is a whole other discussion, but that is essentially
what I was saying.
MS. WILLIAMS: Other questions?
AUDIENCE: Suzanne, since I started teaching at law school in
1975, it has become apparent that groups representing lesbian and
gay individuals or couples are in an extremely difficult position be-
106. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), aff'd, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997).
107. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. 1999).
108. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. 1999).
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cause in almost every instance when you are taking a public policy
stand that would help gay and lesbian couples and individuals, you
are getting into a very difficult situation where a change in a law
could be extremely detrimental to women. And if you really look
at these situations, you realize that until homosexual individuals
can get married, we are always going to have that battle at each
policy front.
For example, the big issue in New York involving the case that
we are talking about - if a lesbian partner gets visitation rights,
then does that mean that a boyfriend could get visitation rights?
And the boyfriend is often a scary individual because the boyfriend
is often involved in domestic violence with the mother. So what it
really comes down to is until we get approval of gay and lesbian
marriages, we are going to have this eternal problem on our hands.
It is an extremely difficult problem.
I also wanted to address one comment to the NOW Legal De-
fense Fund, which was brought up by Suzanne. We really need a
federal law that requires states to pass laws that would prohibit the
courts from considering the wealth or lack of wealth of a parent in
a custody or visitation matter. That happens all the time, and it
obviously hurts women.
MS. GOLDBERG: May I just offer a quick response? You
have absolutely pointed out one of the real tensions that surfaced
in Allison D. v. Virginia M., which was the case in which a lesbian
co-parent sought standing to seek visitation with the child she had
helped raise.
Certainly, I think marriage is one solution. I do not know that it
should be the only solution to the problem, although certainly
same-sex couples should have the same legal right to marry as het-
erosexual couples.
One of the ways I think that tension was resolved or addressed
in the Allison D. case is that it was very clear that the standard we
were suggesting to the court for a parent to have access to court to
seek standing was one in which the biological parent or the child's
legal parent had consented to the other parent being a parent to
the child, which is a difficult standard to craft, but it is not as diffi-
cult as you might think. You can craft a standard.
One of the standards that was suggested through some of the
amici briefs - which is not a perfect standard from anybody's
standpoint, but I think it addresses this kind of situation - is
where the two parents planned the conception of a child, planned
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to raise a child together, and did so up until a certain point when
the parents split up.
If that is the case, our argument is that that parent who does not
have the biological relationship should absolutely be able to seek
standing. That co-parent should absolutely have standing to Seek
visitation and/or custody, which was not an issue in that case. And
then, if there is an issue of domestic violence or any other problem-
atic issues, those are for the courts to resolve. But the question is,
should the person who has been a parent to the child from birth
and deliberately created and shared the child's life with the other
parent be barred from even getting into court because they do not
have a legal or biological relationship?
Certainly, if there is a boyfriend in the household who then
leaves the household, if the child is his biologically, he does have
standing to go into court and seek custody.
AUDIENCE: I am not talking about them. I am talking about
the other boyfriends.
MS. GOLDBERG: Right, the other boyfriends who come into a
child's life later. Again, that was not the situation in Allison D.,
where the two parents planned to have the child together, and that
does make for a more complicated situation.
Again, I think that we can develop ways to craft that. I do not
think offering standing to everybody who claims a parental rela-
tionship with a child is a perfect solution, because that means that
the child's legal parent, let us say in this case the mom, is dragged
into court by somebody who has a claim at least for standing.
We also have to remember that even if a person does have stand-
ing, it does not mean that they are entitled to visitation. The mom
can still show that this person who has standing is actually a threat
to the child and that maintaining the relationship would be
harmful.
MS. WILLIAMS: Our next speaker will be Joan Zorza, who is
Editor of The Domestic Violence Report. She will be followed by
Leslye Orloff from AYUDA.
MS. ZORZA: I am going to talk about a very complicated sub-
ject - the new interstate custody laws. They deal with when a
state can hear a custody case at all - i.e., when it has jurisdiction,
particularly, when two or more states are involved; and, when a
state must honor and enforce another state's custody decree.
Why do we even have these laws? Basically, the U.S. Supreme
Court, starting in 1947, went through a series of cases in which they
said, "We will not give full faith and credit to custody orders." The
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result was to encourage parents who lose custody to kidnap their
child. Every order was considered a temporary one, subject to
modification upon a change in circumstances, and crossing a state
line was always a change in circumstances. Most of the abductors
were fathers at that point.
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act ("UCCJA") 10 9 was
conceived of as a solution by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners who had originally drafted the Uniform Child Custody Ju-
risdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"). It was far from
perfect. They certainly never looked at domestic violence, but, in
fairness, they did this in 1968, before there was much understand-
ing nationally of domestic violence.
States were very slow to adopt the UCCJA. New York, for ex-
ample, took ten years.110 States also adopted it with many changes,
and that gave other states an excuse to squabble over whether to
honor and enforce another state's custody decree when they did
not always comply with each other's terms.
Congress got tired of the situation, and basically in 1980 they
came up with their own solution, the PKPA. As federal law, it ap-
plies to every state, and it also preempts state laws where they are
inconsistent. The biggest difference that the PKPA has over the
UCCJA is that it prioritized home state jurisdiction over "signifi-
cant connection" jurisdiction. Under the UCCJA, they were con-
sidered equal, but now the PKPA changed that. The PKPA also
gave a state that issued a custody order exclusive continuing juris-
diction to modify it unless none of the parties or the child still lived
in the state. Congress also did not consider domestic violence.
The UCCJEA is the second look-around that the National Con-
ference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws did in examining
the whole system. They realized they had to take another look be-
cause the PKPA was no longer consistent with it. They also had to
look at whether the full faith and credit provisions of VAWA com-
plied with it, and make sure it was consistent with the many other
issues that came up in the interim.
They also were aware that custodial parents had a great deal of
trouble enforcing custody decrees.
Again, when they started, they had absolutely no intention of
looking at domestic violence, which is pretty shameful at this point
in time. Several domestic violence advocates at the eleventh hour
of basically forced them to do so, particularly Leslye Orloff of
109. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 75-d (McKinney 1999).
110. See id. art. 5-A.
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AYUDA and a small group, myself included, working through
Roberta Valente of the American Bar Association's Commission
on Domestic Violence.
The result is far from perfect. What they did is they made many
good concessions, basically helpful to battered women, but there
are still some major, major problems in areas where they failed to
protect battered women.
One of the better provisions is any order that is entitled to full
faith and credit under VAWA is considered res judicata. Note that
this makes consensual orders for orders of protection in New York
res judicata, which is a real change from how people look at them.
Obviously, the respondent has to have been notified of the domes-
tic violence action or to appear for there to be res judicata. Obvi-
ously the respondent does have notice when orders are consensual.
Let us take a look at some of the provisions as to how the
UCCJEA actually acts.
How do courts determine jurisdiction? There are now four types
of jurisdiction, and they are prioritized. By that, I mean you start
at the first one and are forced to stay there unless it does not apply
or the state has declined jurisdiction, in which case you can move
on to the next one, and so on. Again, home state jurisdiction is
before "significant connection" jurisdiction, as before.
The third type is a new one, called "a more appropriate forum."
The idea is basically the same. And, as before, there is a situation
to cover when there is no state that otherwise fits. That is some-
times called "vacuum jurisdiction."
Once a state has made an initial custody determination, it has ex-
clusive continuing jurisdiction, and no other state is allowed to
modify its order, unless there is temporary emergency jurisdiction,
or everyone has left the state and no substantial evidence still exists
in the state regarding the child's care. This is consistent with the
PKPA.
Emergency jurisdiction is a fifth type of jurisdiction, and it is re-
ally one of the first places the National Conference of Commission-
ers are taking domestic violence into account. It is only, however,
for extraordinary circumstances and only for short-term orders.
For the first time, it can be used not just when the child is being
subjected to or threatened with abuse, but when a sibling or a par-
ent is endangered. So domestic violence clearly comes into this.
This is a very, very helpful change.
What is not so helpful is that the word "sibling" is never defined.
I have talked to a number of the Commissioners. I guess they are
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so middle class, not one of them ever thought about the fact that
families might include other people, like step-children and half-sib-
lings and so on, or that a grandchild could live in the same family.
Unless "sibling" is defined more broadly under state law, there will
be situations where temporary emergency jurisdiction will not pro-
tect those at risk.
Once the court gives such an order, the idea is it is only for a
temporary period to get the child returned, somehow, in safety to
the other court. Courts are encouraged to include terms that will
provide for safety, and also set a reasonable timeframe for the
child to be safely returned.
An order of protection is meant to be, and often can be, the
vehicle for a court of another state to take emergency jurisdiction.
Once two states are involved, once again, as under the UCCJA,
they have to communicate with each other. If they resolve the
emergency, they also have to figure out how to protect the abused
person and how long that order needs to remain in effect. The
court can include a provision that once the child has lived in the
emergency state, that state becomes the new home state. How-
ever, if the respondent files for litigation in the original state with
six months of when the child left, then that state "wins," so further
litigation must take place in the prior state.
There are very helpful provisions, for the first time, in the
UCCJEA governing whether and when jurisdiction should be de-
clined. As before, there are two grounds: inconvenient forum, and
when there is misconduct. In looking at inconvenient forum, the
court must consider if there has been domestic violence if it is
likely to continue, and which state would do a better job of protect-
ing the parties and the child.
Notice there are a couple of other helpful criteria which we
suggested:
" The relative finances of the parties. Many of us know bat-
tered women usually have less finances.
" The health of the parties, which is often relevant to badly
abused victims.
* Child support, which is a complicated thing, because often in
changing jurisdiction you lose the ability to collect it. While
some battered women will want to pursue it, others do not for
fear it will escalate the violence.
* The whole notion that courts, for the first time, are somewhat
encouraged to hear the cases of all of the children in the fam-
ily together.
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* Declining jurisdiction because of conduct. Once again, except
in emergency circumstances, the court has to decline jurisdic-
tion if the person came to court with unclean hands, unless
certain circumstances are met. However, they are very clear:
domestic violence is not to be considered misconduct. So if
someone has fled to escape abuse, that is different from a nor-
mal abduction.
Unfortunately, New York's proposed version inserts its usual
contempt standard - unless required in an emergency to protect
the child, sibling or parent - which is a pity, because the usual
standard should be whether the flight was justified in the event of
an emergency.
The UCCJEA has optional provisions for address confidential-
ity. Again, these are very ambiguous and ambivalent. They urge
states to have a way of impounding or keeping addresses confiden-
tial. The problem is, they also contain a provision for going to
court so that law enforcement and various others can get that
information."'
There is another very dangerous provision for battered women
on registering decrees that practically force anyone who wants to
enforce their order, if they are going to stay in the state more than
thirty days, to register the decree. Unlike with the Violence
Against Women Act orders, these orders require giving notice to
the other side. This is a very, very big problem for battered wo-
men, because once the abuser is notified he is able to find her. At
a minimum he can find her at the court hearing on registering the
order.
One of the very best things the UCCJA allows is it creates an
interstate network of prosecutors that can enforce orders, if the
state decides to do this. It is somewhat of a mixed bag. It is
modeled on California's system, which has been very, very good.
But, often batterers are very skilled at manipulating the system and
turning everyone against the victim. This leaves her even more vul-
nerable and dis-empowered, and puts the children at great risk.
I want to mention that the PKPA has been amended on October
12, 1998 with no discussion,' 12 I believe, within Congress. It was
just tacked onto an appropriations bill. The amendment did two
things:
(1) The first is relatively innocuous. It said that the definition of
custody includes visitation and whenever the word "custody" ap-
111. See UCCJEA § 209.
112. See H.R. 4738, 106th Cong. (1999).
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pears, "and visitation" automatically follows. That has always ef-
fectively been the case, so it is really not a change.
(2) The second change appears to require grandparents to be
notified and be made parties in every custody case. Can you imag-
ine doing a paternity case with all of the grandparents present?
Who is a grandparent? How is Grandma going to feel if, fifty years
later, some old boyfriend comes into court saying, "Hey, you know,
I think I am the grandfather of that child because did we not have a
kid together, Grandma?" I do not think anyone has looked at the
cost, how much this is going to slow down court cases, what it is
going to cost states. Do you have to give attorneys to every grand-
parent, at least to every incompetent grandparent? What does it
mean if everyone has left the state except for, say, one grandparent
who has Alzheimer's, and cannot even recognize anyone? Since
these grandparents are technically contestants, what are we going
to do?
It is a crazy law. As Julie said, VAWA will hopefully correct this.
It is a very serious blunder, particularly for battered women. Bat-
terers are often notorious in involving their families in the litiga-
tion against their victim. Most divorces with grandparents
intervening, unfortunately, involve grandparents who may sexually
abuse the child, or who cover up or even encourage their son's abu-
siveness of their daughters-in law.
MS. WILLIAMS: Thank you very much.
MS. ORLOFF: Good morning.
My name is Leslye Orloff. I currently run the Immigrant Wo-
men Program at NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund and
was formally with AYUDA in Washington, D.C. I am going to
very briefly talk about two things that normally could take me a
day: the immigration provisions of the Violence Against Women
Act and the implications for family lawyers in custody cases and
divorce cases of those laws, and I will also discuss our recommen-
dation that anybody who is working with an immigrant client
makes sure that action in the family court case does not cut off
eligibility or harm the ability of a battered immigrant victim of do-
mestic violence to get relief in the immigration case.
One of the things I want to start with is that you should be rou-
tinely screening any case that comes into your office, for two
things:
(1) Domestic violence is the first. One of the biggest problems
we encounter with the cases of immigrant battered women is the
failure to identify eligibility for VAWA relief. A family court case
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goes forward, or a battered immigrant is sent to court to get a pro-
tection order on her own, without the assistance of the family law-
yer who is representing her in the family case. Problems arise.
Immigration women end up with orders that do not work, or are
cut off from VAWA immigration relief. Alternatively, the opportu-
nity to obtain evidence you need in the immigration case is missed
because the family lawyer moved forward without coordinating
and collaborating with the domestic violence advocates that are
working with her and with immigration experts on this issue.
Essentially, the immigration provisions of the VAWA are avail-
able to help three categories of people: battered immigrant women
married to U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, abused im-
migrant children who are abused by their U.S. citizen or lawful per-
manent resident parent; and the category we often forget about,
mothers who are not abused themselves or non-abusive, but are
parents of an immigrant child who is being abused.
One of the important things, particularly since I am talking to
people who I assume are mostly doing family law cases, is that the
definition of "child" in the immigration law is different than in fam-
ily laws in every state, in that it includes step-children. So if an
immigration mother marries a U.S. citizen who abuses her child
from a previous marriage, but does not abuse her, she can file for
immigration papers under VAWA so that she is free to cooperate in
protecting her abused child - either getting a protection order,
calling the police, or cooperating in prosecution.
To win a VAWA immigration case there are many factors one
must prove. For instance, you have to prove that you are married
to a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident or that you are the
child of a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident, or the mother
of a child who is being abused by the mothers' U.S. citizen or law-
ful permanent resident spouse. You have to prove that you reside
in the U.S. and that you have resided at some point with your
abuser. You must show that you were battered or subject to ex-
treme cruelty. This is a definition of domestic violence much closer
to the international human rights laws definition of domestic vio-
lence than to the definition contained in state protection order
laws. It includes forms of emotional abuse that your statute in New
York and most state protection order statutes do not cover.
So, one of the first questions we often get asked is, "How do you
prove extreme cruelty?" We have trained INS to look to the power
control wheel for guidance in determining when extreme cruelty
exists together with or in addition to battering. This is why those of
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you that are family law lawyers working on causes of battered im-
migrants cases need to partner with domestic violence advocates,
because they know how to identify this kind of evidence. We en-
courage you to not only get a complete history of the violence, but
get a complete history of how the abuser exerts power and control
in the relationship.
From an evidentiary perspective, it is important to note in
VAWA immigration cases all of the evidence is presented to INS in
writing or other forms of paper documentation. This may include
copies of protection orders, police reports, medical records and af-
fidavits from battered women service providers or advocates, and
affidavits from witnesses who are too terrified to go to court and
testify in front of the abuser. INS actually prefers information
provided in affidavits from battered women's advocates, over the
psychologist the victim may have paid a fortune to. Why? Because
the battered women's advocates are the real experts. When a bat-
tered women's advocate writes the affidavit, the expertise and the
level of detail that INS needs to see is there. When you pay a psy-
chologist to do an analysis, maybe three or four lines saying "I find
they have Post Traumatic Stress Disorder," this is nice and helpful,
but not as helpful as the affidavit of the battered women's advocate
who has significant experience working with the battered immi-
grant. If you plan to use a psychologist it is best to use one who has
a relationship with the victim beyond the evaluation.
The other thing that is really important is that there are federal
confidentiality provisions here that preclude INS from disclosing
any information to the abuser, so you can get an affidavit from that
witness and the abuser can never find out that they helped or
cooperated.
Another factor you have to prove is good moral character, which
essentially means that the battered immigrant has no criminal con-
viction. This is where collaboration between advocates, family law-
yers and criminal defense attorneys is critical, because any battered
immigrant woman who pleads guilty to just about any crime risks
being deported, even if she'has her Green Card. So in advising
women who get caught up because of dual arrest or self defense or
violation of mutual protection orders or violation of their own pro-
tection orders or whatever other crime it is very important that
they have a criminal defense attorney and that their criminal de-
fense attorney consults with an immigration expert. There are peo-
ple available who are real experts in immigration implications of
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criminal cases who must be consulted as this law is an area of the
law that is complicated and constantly changing.
So I urge all of you, if you have any of these cases, to call The
Immigrant Women Program at NOW LDEF, and particularly call
the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers' Guild
that specializes in criminal issues and make sure somebody has
talked to a real expert on this.
Finally, you might think it was enough if she proved that she has
a valid marriage and she has been abused and she is a person of
good moral character, that that should be enough to get her Green
Card based on the marriage. Well, unfortunately, VAWA's immi-
gration legislation, also required proof of one additional factor -
that she or her children would suffer extreme hardship if they are
required to leave the country.
The INS VAWA regulations contain lists of factors that you may
move to demonstrate extreme hardship. Usually it is best to pro-
vide evidence regarding multiple factors. These factors include the
nature and consequences and the extent of physical and psycholog-
ical abuse and the impact of loss of access to the U.S. court
systems.
One of the best ways for a battered immigrant woman to prove
the impact of lost access to the courts to INS is to have as many
court orders as possible involving her and her children: protection
orders, custody, visitation, child support. These orders represent a
connection between her and this country's legal system for protec-
tion that INS has to cut if they want to deport her.
And so, we need the help of attorneys in family law cases to try
to get these orders, to get her not only the protection she needs,
but to enhance her ability to win her immigration case.
It is the same thing with domestic violence shelters and services.
The more she is involved in the support group, that her kids are
getting counseling, that she is getting counseling, that she is in-
volved in a job training program or other supportive service of-
fered by a domestic violence program, the more things you can get
her involved in, the harder it will be for INS to deport her.
Other factors useful to move extreme hardship include the effect
of abuse on children. Documenting this can be extremely helpful
as INS is often sympathetic to these issues. One of the hardest
extreme hardship factors to prove are the conditions in her home
country. How do the laws and the protections that she is receiving
here differ from what she will be able to get when she goes home?
What is her abuser's connection to that country? In many cases, he
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may come from the same country, and if he is an American citizen
or a lawful permanent resident, he certainly has the ability to travel
to that country.
There are also traditional extreme hardship factors. All I want
to say about this list is that for those of you who do work in immi-
gration cases or know immigration attorneys, most immigration at-
torneys who have not been trained in VAWA will turn first to this
list of traditional extreme hardship factors. This list should be used
primarily as a backup. INS has a specialized unit that adjudicates
VAWA immigration cases. If adjudicators see a case emphasizing
traditional factors rather then VAWA factors first, the adjudicator
may think that the victim has no significant evidence to prove ex-
treme hardship, so we recommend focusing on VAWA extreme
hardship factors first and if in fact you are going to use these tradi-
tional factors, you will need to look at them emphasizing the do-
mestic violence issues involved.
For instance, you need to look at age, number and language abil-
ity of children. If the children have witnessed abuse and they are
going to be sent back to a country where they cannot communicate
effectively, then that is the way to present that issue, instead of
saying that they do not speak Spanish, or whatever other language,
adequately.
Now I will focus on how VAWA immigration issues play out in
family court cases. First, a divorce is an absolute bar to self-peti-
tioning. If in fact there is a divorce pending, the battered immi-
grant has to file her self-petition with INS before the divorce
becomes final. Worse yet, if the case is denied, then she cannot re-
file the self-petition. So our recommendation is that the divorce
not become final until her case is approved by INS, which, depend-
ing on the quality of the representation she has in the immigration
case, can take as fast as three weeks or as long as six months.
Most cases with good advocacy, either by domestic violence ad-
vocates who have been trained to assist her or by immigration at-
torneys, can be resolved within three months. But our advice is to
try to make sure that she has received an approval of her self-peti-
tion before the divorce becomes final.
When a divorce case is pending, what we recommend to immi-
gration advocates that are working in this field is that the self-peti-
tion be filed as soon as possible. Consider filing what we call a
"skeletal application," which just includes the basics, without all
the documentation other than her affidavit. The point is to get the
case filed and get the process moving before the divorce becomes
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final. Do not file a fee waiver. And again delay the divorce until
approval.
Further, the family law court provides a good opportunity for
use of discovery when there is a VAWA immigration case. First, it
can delay the case. More importantly, battered immigrant women
need access to information to prove their immigration case that the
abuser often controls, particularly if she has fled the residence
without taking information she will need with her.
The following list was written for advocates working with bat-
tered immigrants doing safety planning of the kinds of things you
want to try to get in discovery:
* Copies of her or his work permits, Green Cards, visa applica-
tions, because sometimes he has a Green Card and has filed
the application for her.
" Birth certificates, adoption records.
" Divorce certificates for herself or her spouse.
" Xeroxes of his or her passport information.
" Other forms of identification.
" Proof of a valid marriage. This is something that for those of
you who do not know immigration law might seem unusual.
Photos of the couple at their wedding, or on vacation together
and family events photos are good.
" Love letters. INS loves love letters, because it presumes all
marriages are fraudulent unless you prove otherwise. So if a
battered immigrant woman comes to you before she leaves
her spouse, you want to get copies of the love letters. If the
abuser works outside the house it is often safest to gather
these and other documents like copies of the abuser's pass-
port or Green Card while the abuser is at work.
I want to end on very briefly talking about protection orders.
Most states have a variety of relief available in protection orders.
New York and almost every state, has a catch-all provision in their
protection order statute that can be used for creative relief. I want
to review several kinds of creative relief that are very useful in bat-
tered immigrant women's cases, both from an immigration per-
spective and also to deter international child snatching.
For example, to obtain needed documentation in a case where
the victim fled the home but has left needed papers and documen-
tation at the house, our first choice of remedy is use the protective
order to get the papers., A second choice is to keep her in the
house if she has not left and to evict the abuser if she can safely
remain. This way she has access to the evidence she needs and she
and the children are not displaced. A third choice is if she has left,
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then use either the divorce, custody, discovery, or protection or-
ders to get these materials in the protective order:
* We ask that he be ordered to give her copies.
" If he filed an immigration application for her, that he be or-
dered not to withdraw it as part of the protection order
proceeding.
" That he be ordered not to contact INS or the counselor to do
anything that would undermine an existing petition he has al-
ready filed.
* That he take all action necessary to ensure that a petition that
he has filed on her behalf is granted. For example, a lot of
abusers will tell the victim, "I am not going to show up at the
last interview." The court in the protection order case can
actually require that he attend the interview and cooperate
using its contempt proceedings, to coerce that compliance.
" That he relinquish possession of various documents or pro-
vide copies of documents that would be helpful to her immi-
gration case that either belong to him or belong to her.
I have written a chapter for a training manual for advocates on
"Creative Use of Protective Orders for Battered Immigrants" that
we can get to anybody who is interested. That contains detailed
lists of how protection orders can be used to better assist battered
immigrants.
Creative use of protection orders can also be quite effective in
deterring international child kidnapping. In cases of battered im-
migrants, an abuser threatens to take the children and go home to
El Salvador, or Haiti, or wherever, this can be very serious. What
we have tried to do is get provisions included in protection orders
that require the abuser to sign a statement, along with the judge,
and the victim who is the children's mother. It instructs the consu-
late that would have to issue a visa to U.S. citizen children not to
issue a visa absent this judge's court order. In many cases, we have
been able to deter the issuance of the visa and cut off his ability to
take the children out of the United States to his home country.
The other thing you can do is get the children's passports turned
over to the court, held in the court record. You can also take a
copy of this order and submit it to the Passport Office so that they
do not reissue passports to the children. These are things that can
all be done to try to head off the child snatching problem.
In her VAWA immigration case, she has to prove that the abuser
is a lawful permanent resident or a citizen. Sometimes the only
record of his legal, immigration status is in INS's files. The abuser
can be ordered as part of the protection order proceeding to sign a
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statement that is an official INS form for a Freedom of Information
Act request. He can be ordered to sign this request for informa-
tion that specifically authorizes INS to search its records and report
the information to the victim or the victim's attorney.
In closing, the final thing I want to say is that there are a few
things that you absolutely should not do if you are getting a protec-
tion order for a battered immigrant woman:
(1) First, do not send her to court by herself because she will not
get the relief she needs. If you are a family lawyer and you are
doing the divorce case, you should also be assisting your client in
the protection order case. Your representation at this early stage
can make a tremendous difference down the road as you proceed
with the other aspects of the case.
(2) Second, do not ever agree to a mutual protection order and
contest any protection order case brought against her by her
abuser. For battered immigrant women having a protection order
against them can be devastating, because if the battered immi-
grants violate that order it is a crime and they become deportable.
So mutual orders or orders brought against her need to be con-
tested as if it were a criminal case for assault or murder and she is
going to go to jail. Failure to litigate these cases and acceptance of
pleas can often lead to the deportation of only non-citizen battered
immigrants.
(3) Third, never agree to a consent order where it says on the
face of the order "No finding has been made and the abuser did
not admit anything." They are dangerous; it enhances the danger
because the abuser has not taken responsibility for his violence.
The orders may undermine gun control laws. For battered immi-
grants especially, such orders unnecessarily complicate her VAWA
immigration case and may be worthless from an INS perspective.
It is really important that you not agree to a consent protection
order that says "No Finding Made." You must litigate those cases.
This is why battered immigrants should go with a lawyer to court
and why she should be prepared to put on evidence.
In my experience, after sixteen years of doing protection order
work, if you go to court with a witness and one additional piece of
evidence - whether it is the medical record, the police report, a
witness affidavit, or a photograph - generally you are going to win
a protection order trial. So do not settle if he wants something on
the order that says "No finding," because if she is an immigrant
woman, you are going to undermine her ability to get immigration
relief.
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MS. WILLIAMS: Thank you very much. Let us take a few min-
utes for questions.
AUDIENCE: For Leslye. I have a case right now where the
divorce has commenced already and we are in family court on the
order of protection. But it seems like she does not have much INS
documentation. All that is missing is the final interview, but she
has no real papers concerning what her current status is. How do
you get information about her status if she does not have it?
MS. ORLOFF: Well, chances are what he has done is filed a
spouse-based petition for her, which is called an 1-130. What I
would do in a case like that is I would go ahead and file the VAWA
case and get it approved, because once you have done that, INS is
cut off from communicating with him. The confidentiality provi-
sions do not only say that everything has to be kept from him, it
precludes INS from solely relying on information that he provides
to deny the application. So if in fact you order him to go to this
interview and he says it is a sham marriage, they cannot rely on
that absent independent proof to find that. So such an order can
help the 1-130 case.
But also, if he is a citizen, you might be able to get the INS to
give her a Green Card based on the approved self-petition at that
same interview if he does not show up in the end. So there are
some creative ways of approaching the case.
AUDIENCE: Leslye, I was very struck by what you said about
the dual arrest and retaliatory arrest situations and the implications
for those women if they take a plea. We know that they are
pushed, sometimes by the prosecutors and sometimes by defense
counsel who do not understand the ramifications, to take a plea
and agree to an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal. The
idea is they sell it to her by saying, "Look, at the end of six months
or a year, your case will be sealed." I am curious whether INS has
access to those proceedings and can pierce the seal and use those
convictions to make her deportable and unqualified for the self-
petition.
MS. ORLOFF: It is actually worse than that because there was
just a decision that came out from the Bureau of Immigration Ap-
peals, two weeks ago that said expurgations of orders on vacations
of orders for reasons other then the fact that they were legally de-
fective at the state level are irrelevant from the immigration per-
spective. So it is really bad.
For years, the history of immigration law had been that if you
could get it expunged or vacated, the immigration ramifications of
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that proceeding would not effect the immigration proceedings. We
now have a decision that reverses this position, so battered immi-
grants must avoid convictions altogether. They must have the case
dismissed or continue it without a finding or admission and have it
dismissed after a certain amount of time has passed.
One of the things that we are doing in the new VAWA, that we
have actually been able to get some significant Republican support
for in the Senate, and hopefully, support from INS to change the
definitions of "good moral character" and create some waivers for
battered immigrants who may have had criminal convictions. For
battered immigrant women, the goal is to allow INS or the immi-
gration judge to independently determine if the battered immi-
grant was acting in self-defense or that the crime she was convicted
of was related to her ability to survive the abuse.
MS. WILLIAMS: We have time for one more quick question.
AUDIENCE: I have also heard from the New York immigration
groups and the Bar Association that a consent order was consid-
ered as good.
MS. ORLOFF: As long as the consent order just says "The
court has jurisdiction and these are the remedies." But if the con-
sent order says, "I am entering a consent order, but I am making
no finding as to the abuse or the abuser has not admitted domestic
violence," then it is a problem.
The court has to find that it had jurisdiction, and they can find
that based on her uncontested affidavit. Even though the consent
order may affect the custody case down the road, the key issue is
that for immigration purposes, battered immigrants need protec-
tion orders issued that do no waive findings. The subject matter
jurisdiction can be based on the victim's uncontested affidavit and
the consent order can be issued.
AUDIENCE: What if it just says "On consent."
MS. ORLOFF: That is fine. Consent is not the problem. The
problem is that there are states, like Iowa and Hawaii, where some-
body has rewritten court forms and you cannot consent without a
statement that no findings have been made.
AUDIENCE: But the meaning of our consent order is there is
no admission.
MS. ORLOFF: Right, but the order can be based jurisdiction-
ally on her uncontested affidavit, despite no admission by the
abuser. INS is only having problems when the face of the order
says "No finding."
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MS. WILLIAMS: Our final two speakers will be Linda Garder,
who is going to talk about international child custody and the
Hague Convention, and Marcellene Hearn, who is going to talk
about some of the welfare provisions and protections that are
available to battered women.
MS. GARDER: Good morning.
Let me give you a little bit of a framework. The Hague Conven-
tion on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction is a
treaty between about forty-seven Member Countries in which the
focus of the Treaty is to return children to what is termed the "ha-
bitual residence."
Now, the ironic thing about that is the habitual residence is
never described, nor defined, in any of the information on the stat-
ute or the implementing legislation, and it only comes out of the
case law that we have some idea of what habitual residence is.
A habitual residence tends to be that place where both parents
were with the child beforehand or where the child and one of the
parents was living before any proceedings take place or before the
child was taken or retained in another country. So the focus is on
returning the children. It is not on the underlying issues, including
domestic violence or issues of custody, who is the better parent,
grandparents, or any of those issues. So it is very, very difficult to
have an order that prevents a child from being returned under the
Hague Convention because of domestic violence. I bring that to
your attention because it has a tremendous backlash as well in
some of the case law.
The whole goal is to send the child back and let that other coun-
try decide what is going to happen - who is going to be the better
parent, whether it is a best interest test, or whatever it is, and never
to get into the issues of the best parent.
As a result, as an attorney, when I go in to litigate a Hague Con-
vention case and the other side starts rattling the cages about
"Your client is a terrible mother, she let the kids run in the street,"
and then I have to get my client up, who says, "I did not do that; he
was beating me." You need to stay away from that. So one of the
important things in the Hague Convention proceeding is to make
sure that you do not get into that because it undermines the whole
issue of domestic violence, and I will get to that as an exception
under the Hague Convention.
One of the other difficult parts about the Hague Convention that
you will see as you look through it is that the United States took
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what is called a "reservation" under the Hague Convention. That
reservation has devastating effects for women and violence.
Let us say, you and your spouse or the father of the child were
living in the United Kingdom and that child is brought here by the
father because you went in and made allegations of abuse, he got
petrified, picked the child up, and came to the United States. Even
if you are a U.S. citizen, it does not matter whether you are a U.S.
citizen who was living in Britain or whether you are a foreign per-
son that has a child brought here. You are not entitled to any free
legal services, end of story. What happens is that you must depend
on pro bono attorneys or people that will help you with minimal
payment in order to get your child back.
That reservation under the Hague Convention is an embarrass-
ment, as far as.I see it, for the United States, because if my child is
taken to Britain, Britain provides me with free legal services, re-
gardless of my financial condition, to help me return that child to
the United States. So it is an extremely difficult part of the way
that the United States has enacted its legislation.
The Hague Convention is different from the current UCCJA be-
cause of the defenses to the return. In the United States, there are
two major' defenses used to return. The primary one is the showing
of any grave harm to the child. That is the one that we would like
to put issues of domestic violence into, but the case law in the
United States is very emphatic that that will not be sufficient, so
you do need the resources and other situations, as in the battered
immigrant women, to provide another safe haven.
What happens under Article 13(b) in the Hague Convention is
that if you can show that there is grave harm to the child, and that
the child would be in either physical or psychological harm if the
child is returned, then that is a defense to return even though the
taking was wrongful or bringing the child into the country was
wrongful.
What has happened in the case law in the United States - and
particularly you will see it in a Sixth Circuit case called Friedrich v.
Friedrich'13 - is that the court has said we are not looking at issues
of whether it would be harmful to return the child to that parent;
we are looking at the country - is there war and famine? It is
going to be those kinds of issues, and there have to be really, really
compelling situations to not return. For example, I cannot imagine
that today if there was a case of a child being returned to Yugosla-
113. 78 F.3d 1060 (6th Cir. 1996).
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via, that the United States would agree to take the child to Yugo-
slavia now.
However, that does not mean that that is the protection for the
child or for the battered person at all, because what happens is if in
fact - let us take the case of the United Kingdom again - the
parent brings the child here and you want to take the child back to
the U.K., you can be successful in arguing that the child was wrong-
fully brought here, the child ought to be returned; but the other
parent will come in and say, "There is grave harm, because that is
the parent who hurt this child. She let him walk in the street -
forget the whole issue of violence because she let him play outside
unattended."
What the courts will now do, and the United States is becoming
more involved in it, is to issue what are called "undertakings." Un-
dertakings are agreements that the child will be returned, but there
will be some kind of safe harbor provisions for the child to be re-
turned to that country until a custody order can be entered.
That has even further eliminated the issue of domestic violence,
because even if there is domestic violence and they both go back
and both live in the same house, the court quite likely is going to
return the child and have the child met at the airport by social ser-
vice people or whatever, and have the child taken into custody un-
til that issue can be addressed.
One of the issues that has occurred with these cases also is the
issue of passports. We talked about that with the immigrant wo-
men. I would urge you in any of your custody cases to see whether
people could have two passports, and I say "could" because they
will deny to the end that they have that second passport, but you
will find quite often that a middle eastern country, which could
care less how many passports they issue for the same person, will
have issued a second and a third passport to that person, and may
have even issued a passport for the child of that person. The same
standards are not in place as they might be here for the United
States to get a child's passport.
There is a provision with the State Department to file your or-
ders and have the passport not issued to another parent, so you can
do that through the State Department. I do it in a lot of my cus-
tody cases. The other parent gets very irate and says, "I am not
going to flee." I say to them, "So then it does not matter, does it?
Turn the passport in."
Always ask the court to hold the passport. Do not put yourself
in the position of holding this passport. I had an adverse counsel in
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a case recently who swore up and down at the custody conference
he was not going to release the guy's passport. He did not but his
secretary did. So what happens is you do not have those kinds of
safeguards that you would have requiring a court order to release a
passport.
That is not your only protection, because what will happen is
some of these people can get other passports. So you must be in
touch with embassies, other kinds of organizations that will help
you in restricting passport applications.
The "grave risk" defense, under Article 13(b) of the Convention,
requires that the person who opposes the return proves by "clear
and convincing evidence" that it would be harmful to the child to
be returned. That is a very, very difficult issue to raise and to de-
fend in Hague abduction cases.
If you are in federal court on an abduction case, federal courts
do not want to hear about custody issues. That may very well
sound like those issues, and so if you are trying to raise a defense to
returning a child because of the potential for abuse, you will find it
very difficult.
The other thing that I have seen happen a lot lately can be seen
in a case called Lops v. Lops.'14 It is an Eleventh Circuit case,
Court of Appeals in Atlanta, and certiorari was just denied at the
U.S. Supreme Court on that case. That happens to be my case.
The situation is that the Mom and Dad were living in Germany.
Mom was being abused by Dad. She took the children and went
across the country line, stayed for about four months, but she in-
formed the attorneys and the custody proceeding started. She
brought the kids back for the custody proceedings in Germany, and
Dad, of course, was as nice as pie at this time and denied, denied,
denied. He had brought his Mom and his stepfather from Georgia
over to visit with him and help with these proceedings and assured
the court that he was a wonderful and caring father and certainly
had not beaten his wife and would not do anything to the kids.
They eventually reached an agreement and Dad was allowed to
have the kids for a couple of hours to get an ice cream cone. Of
course, after that Dad would not let Mom near the kids again,
claiming that while the Mom had the children she had had an affair
and the children had watched sexual acts in place in front of the
mother. So it was almost, as I see it, a defensive reaction "She is
114. 140 F.3d 927 (11th Cir. 1998).
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going to claim abuse, so I am going to find something wrong with
her."
In effect, what happened in that case was while Mom was not
sleeping at the house, Dad was sleeping at the house with the kids,
Dad takes off and the kids disappear. Two and a half years later,
the children were located in Georgia at the grandmother's house.
This is a very important issue for you to consider with grandpar-
ents, and if you ever do a Hague Convention case and you have a
suspicion that the grandparent was involved, name them as a de-
fendant. I am telling you that because it was very, very effective in
this case. It sort of happened accidentally. We thought that the
grandmother had helped to take the kids, and in a lot of cases they
do.
As a result, what happened was we got a judgment against the
grandmother and the father, because the grandmother was the one
who had the deep pockets and we have a judgment pending on that
right now, but we had to hire an attorney to collect. What happens
is that if you can get a judgment against them, that is your only way
of collecting fees under the Hague Convention.
Under ICARA, there is a provision for attorney's fees. If a child
is ordered returned, the other side pays fees. It is mandatory.
How much the fees are is certainly discretionary, but it is a
mandatory order for fees. Sometimes it is difficult to get them if
the person does not have any money, which is why I tell you about
the grandparents issue.
There is one case in the United States that has dealt extensively
with the issue of abuse that the court did not order the return. Ac-
tually, there are two. There is Severinal15 in Texas and Brown v.
Brown116 in North Dakota.
All of the Hague Convention cases are available on a Web site
called www.hiltonhouse.com. You will find unreported cases in
there, and first-level court cases in there that you would not find
published anywhere else. It is an extremely good resource. You
can get into it and search on all the issues, and if you search on
Article 13(b), you will find some of these cases where the defense
to return has been raised.
You will also find in there the Friedreich case, which is very im-
portant, and Zimmerman v. Zimmerman.117 In Zimmerman, there
were allegations of abuse, and what happened was the court took
115. Steffen F. v. Severina P., 966 F. Supp. 922 (D. Ariz. 1997).
116. 600 N.W.2d 869 (N.D. 1999).
117. 569 N.W.2d 277 (N.D. 1997).
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these undertakings into place so that the children could be
returned.
One of the frustrating things about the Hague Convention is
that, while under the UCCJA you get judges talking back and
forth, it appears to me that the matter of an ocean makes a big
difference in these cases, and judges are very, very hesitant to pick
up the phone and call a judge in Germany, or elsewhere. Even
though I quite often will say, "I will get you an interpreter, I will
work out the time changes, I will set it up," they are very reluctant
to do that. Some of these cases could be resolved quite easily if
that had happened.
I think one of the issues is: can the courts in another country
ensure that people are protected? So if you have allegations of
abuse and the child is still returned, I think everybody has a fear
that the child will still not be protected. What happens is judges are
very fearful of saying, "Well, I do not think a judge in the U.K. is
going to be able to protect this child as well as I could," and quite
often judges are glad to get rid of these cases, so they will do
whatever they have to do to get it off of their dockets.
I think it is very difficult to determine that a child is going to be
protected. There are agencies in each of the other countries.
There is International Social Services, which has an office here in
New York, that will assist in these cases to ensure that the children
are protected when they arrive, because if both parents are in one
country and you are sending them all back to the other country,
you have to do some preparation before they go.
I think that the backlash that comes out of this is that if people
claim abuse and the courts do not see it on your Article 13 defense,
if they just do not see it, you could get a return where the court
might be willing to make a return under another circumstance. If
the child stayed more than a year in the other country before the
parent filed under the Hague and the parent can show that the
child is well settled in their new environment, the court can also
determine at its discretion not to return children. So that is one of
the other provisions in the Hague that allows you to ride piggy-
back on some of the things.
If the parent has been in the country for a year, as long as they
are not hiding you are going to be in trouble because there is an
issue of filing right away to get the child returned. If they are hid-
ing, if you wait and do not know where the child is, that is fine.
What the Lops case will tell you is that if you file your Hague Con-
vention petition in the other country but you cannot bring a cause
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of action in a court because you do not know where to file, you are
not going to be barred from still getting the child back. However, if
you know where the child is and you do not do anything for a year,
you could be barred from getting the child returned.
There are various state statutes that apply. People always say to
me, "Well, you have to have custody order, do not you?" I always
say, "No." Under the Hague Convention, this is particularly true.
You do not have to have a court order. It is certainly helpful; we
all know that, but it is not mandatory. You can have returns based
on a right to custody that arises by operation of law, by a particular
statute.
I have written affidavits for use in other countries that have cited
the laws in a particular state that say, "Look, we have got a right to
custody in this state that arises because you are a parent to that
child." It does not have to be there'because you have gotten cus-
tody order.
One of the things that I would caution you about as well as when
working with clients who are making allegations of sexual abuse
that are going to be difficult to prove, and that is, that the first
thing people say is, "Well, if there is no custody order, you can just
pick that child up and take them anywhere you want." That may
be true under your state statute, but I will remind you that the
International Parental Kidnapping Act'1 8 counsels against that, be-
cause what you will find is that you can be dragged back to this
country or to another country because you have taken a child to
another country.
I am involved in a case right now where we are extraditing a
parent from the U.K. back to the U.S. for having abducted a child.
So, more and more, some of the district attorneys are taking steps
to do that.
Under the International Parental Kidnapping Act, though, there
is a defense for fleeing domestic violence. I would urge you that if
you are counseling a client about that, that their proof ought to be
extremely good. It will not work otherwise.
I have a case that involved Poland, where Mom had been emo-
tionally abused by the father of the child. She could not stand it
anymore, she had put up with a lot, and she picked up and took the
child to Poland. She got the Polish courts to let her keep the child
there in a custody order she had there. The father filed a Hague
Convention application to return the child to the U.S. The Polish
118. 18 U.S.C. § 1204 (1999).
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denied it because they said that the father's activities in going to a
nudist camp on week-ends, his continual activities with other wo-
men in the presence of the child, would make the situation harmful
under Article 13(b), denied the return, the father appealed.
While it was on appeal and the child was still in Poland, Dad
snatched the child back. Dad shows back up in Pennsylvania, but
he had gotten a custody order while Mom and the child were away.
I go in to litigate this in front of the judge and I say, "But, Your
Honor, Poland said we should not send this child back to the U.S.,
it would be harmful." The judge looks at me and says, "I do not
really care. He's got a Pennsylvania custody order." So the judge
would not return under the Hague Convention; he was just going
to ignore it. You do run across that.
One thing I would recommend to you is that you try to work
with your district attorneys, your judges, to get more information.
The ABA has a publication out for judges on abduction cases and
the UCCJA.119 It is a very, very good publication.
The other thing I would lobby for is to get programs put on your
state bar association agendas, at conferences, and specifically those
for judges as well, on issues of abduction so that they become in-
formed. There is nothing more frustrating than being in front of a
judge who just does not want to listen to anything about these trea-
ties or federal statutes - all he wants to do is take care of what is
on his docket.
Those are some of the issues. There are all kinds of resources
with the State Department on the World Wide Web that you can
get. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children has a
number of wonderful publications and information available.
Thank you.
MS. HEARN: Hi. My name is Marcellene Hearn. I am a Staff
Attorney at the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund here in
New York City.
A good part of what I do is part of a project called the Battered
Women Employed Project. It is a new project that we are doing. It
is a joint project with the Legal Aid Society of San Francisco, also
known as the Employment Law Center, and us. We are doing di-
rect services, training for attorneys, and training for domestic vio-
lence advocates on the issues of battered women's employment
rights.
119. See Hoff, supra note 111.
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Today I am going to focus on one particular remedy that is avail-
able for battered women who are receiving Public Assistance. It is
called the Family Violence Option. It enables women to be ex-
empted from certain welfare program requirements. I am going to
talk both about how that has come into effect in New York law,
and also what the new regulations at the federal level are.
As most of you may know, many women who are victims of do-
mestic violence receive welfare as a way to help them make the
transition, as a means of economic support when they are trying to
escape a battering situation.
What are we talking about here in New York City? There really
are no numbers about how many women actually in New York City
who are on Public Assistance are also victims of domestic violence.
However, various studies that have been done in other places show
that between fifteen and fifty-six percent of women who are cur-
rently receiving Public Assistance were victims of domestic abuse
within the last twelve months.
What does that mean in New York? As of March 1999, in New
York City there were approximately 579,000 people on welfare.
That includes children, so if you subtract the children out, there are
198,000 adults in New York City receiving Public Assistance. If
you take those same percentages, that means that anywhere be-
tween 30,000 and 110,000 of current adult welfare recipients in
New York City could have been victims of domestic violence
within the last twelve months. So it is a lot of people.
As you know, in 1996, under welfare reform, there were major
changes at the federal level in the way welfare programs were go-
ing to be implemented. The most radical change was that states
have been given a block grant to operate their welfare systems.
There are no longer entitlements to welfare benefits and the pro-
gram is no longer called AFDC. It is called Temporary Assistance
to Needy Families ("TANF"). 120 Here in New York it is known as
Family Assistance.12
Two of the main parts of the TANF statute are that a certain
percentage of each state's welfare population needs to be partici-
pating in a work activity for a certain number of hours per week.
Secondly, that there is a five-year lifetime limit on receiving wel-
fare benefits. Each state is allowed to have twenty percent of its
population receiving welfare for more than five years under what is
called the "hardship" exemption.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1991).
121. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 111-g (McKinney 1999).
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New York is actually meeting the work participation rates - we
are far exceeding them - because another part of the welfare stat-
ute was that there would be a reduction in your work participation
rate if the number of people on welfare also went down. We have
had huge reductions in the number of people receiving welfare, so
therefore our work participation rate is very low at this point.
Nevertheless, New York City has announced that it would like to
have universal participation in work activities. In New York, what
that means is the City would like to have everybody participating
in thirty-five hours of something. If you have children under six,
you are only supposed to be doing twenty hours of a work activity
and the other part of your thirty-five hours will be made up with
things like job search, job training, GED programs and other
programs.
Why this is a problem for battered women is that if you are not
going to your work activity for some reason, you get a sanction,
and that sanction in New York is a pro rata sanction. What that
means is that if there are three people on the welfare case, your
case is reduced by one-third, if the mother is being sanctioned for
not participating in her work activity. If there are two people on
the budget, that means the budget is reduced by one-half. The
benefits are not very high to start, and when you have these sanc-
tions it can create serious problems for the family.
Welfare-to-work activities, or WEP as it is called in New York,
also known as the Work Experience Program - if you are not
someone who works with welfare recipients on a regular basis, you
may have seen articles in The New York Times about WEP work-
ers.122 What they are doing is they are working for Sanitation;
there was an announcement yesterday that the MTA is going to
take 1000 WEP workers to clean subway trains; they are working
in parks. So we have this program where in New York we have an
ever-growing number of victims of domestic violence who are go-
ing to be participating in work activities.
I am sure you all know about what problems domestic violence
victims have when they are working. I do not need to tell you that
women are often harassed at work: they may be assaulted by the
122. See Andy Newman, Pact Reached on Using Welfare Recipients to Clean Sub-
way, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1999, at B3; Nina Bernstein, New York City Plans to Extend
Workfare to Homeless Shelter, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1999, at A5; In an Interview, the
Governor Stresses Crime, Welfare and Tax Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1998, at B1;
Gary Pierre-Pierre, Giuliani's Stand Thwarts Subway Workfare Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 12, 1997, at B5.
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batterer; the batterer may call them repeatedly; and, it may cause
the woman to be late or to miss days of work, either because the
batterer is sabotaging her actually going to work, or she has to miss
time to deal with child custody issues or getting her orders of pro-
tection. This is a real problem if you are going to be sanctioned for
missing a day of your welfare work activity. And if you are not
able to defend yourself in a fair hearing, that sanction is going to
mean half of your budget being cut off.
Because of these issues, Congress enacted the Family Violence
Option. 123 It was part of the welfare statute. It enables states to
opt into this program where they are able to waive domestic vio-
lence victims from certain welfare program requirements, including
the work requirements, and also including mandatory child support
enforcement, which can also be a problem in domestic violence
cases.
In New York, there is what they are calling the "partial child
support waiver." This is where the state will pursue child support
but the woman does not actually have to go to court. And then,
there is the full child support waiver, a New York regulation, where
the state will not pursue child support at all in the case.
Specifically in New York, every applicant for welfare and every-
one who recertifies - that is after being on welfare for a certain
period of time, now about a year in New York - has to go back in
and reprove all the reasons why they are on welfare, and why they
are still eligible for welfare. Every person who is recertifying or
applying should be screened for domestic violence.
There is a universal screening from. It has about five or six ques-
tions on it. If a woman answers "Yes" to the screening questions,
she should be referred to the Domestic Violence Liaison. There
are currently in New York City twelve Domestic Violence Liaisons.
There are plans to hire more so that there will be one at every
welfare center. Currently it is about one liaison per three centers.
So often a woman will have to come back and go see the liaison
several days later at a different center than the center where she
gets her benefits.
The liaison has three jobs. They screen the woman to determine
her credibility; they can refer her to services; and finally, they eval-
uate whether a waiver is appropriate in her case.
The standard in New York is whether the program requirement
that the person is seeking to have waived - be it the work require-
123. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(A) (1999).
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ment or the child support enforcement requirement - would place
the victim or her children at a greater risk of abuse or would make
it more difficult for her to leave to escape the domestic violence
situation.
The final point that I would like to note is when the woman does
not raise the issue at the point of the application or recertification
- for example, she does not really know that she needs a waiver
until she goes to begin, which is the part of welfare that falls under
the Office of Health and Human Services that does the assessment
for work. If she does not realize that her domestic violence situa-
tion is going to be an issue and she does not come forward, she is
able to do it at that point or at any point, and she should request to
see the Domestic Violence Liaison whenever it is an issue or a
problem.
And then, I would finally like to talk about the new TANF regu-
lations. Those are the regulations that have come down from
Health and Human Services that affect what New York has done.
The TANF regulations added some requirements to the Family Vi-
olence Option that did not exist in the initial statute, and they may
come back to be an issue in New York.
The regulations themselves are fairly good. The initial proposal
for the regulations were not particularly good, and a lot of domes-
tic violence advocates, and probably some people here in this
room, made comments on the initial regulations.
Apparently, in the Preamble to the regulations HHS said the sin-
gle issue that they heard the most comments on in the TANF regu-
lations was the Family Violence Option. I will quickly go over a
few things that are in the regulations.
One thing that the states were very concerned about, was that
states that granted Family Violence Option waivers would be pe-
nalized when they did not meet their work requirement rates or if
they were having more than twenty percent of their population
who were receiving benefits for more than five years. They were
worried, you know, "What if we miss our work participation rate
by the 100 or 1,000 Domestic Violence Option waivers we gave
out?"
So the regulations clarify that if the reason that the state fails to
meet its work participation rate, or the reason that more than
twenty percent of their population is receiving welfare for more
than sixty months is because they gave Family Violence Option
waivers, that those waivers will not count against them.
2000] WOMEN, CHILDREN AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 767
However, in order to count in that category the waivers have to
be what is called a "federally recognized good cause waiver." Now,
what is a federally recognized good cause waiver? It has several
requirements:
" First, the waivers need to be reviewed every six months. In
New York, ours are reviewed every four months, so it is un-
clear how that is going to work out. But initially, HHS has
proposed that the waivers would be limited to six months, pe-
riod, that they would not be any longer than that. As a result
of comments, now they need to be reviewed very six months
but can be for as long as necessary. And as we know, some-
times six months is not long enough for someone to work out
their domestic violence situation and be ready to work.
" Another requirement of the federally recognized good cause
waiver is that the evaluation of whether a waiver should be
granted must be done by someone who is trained in domestic
violence. That is probably not a problem in New York be-
cause the Domestic Violence Liaisons are supposed to be, and
are being, trained in domestic violence.
" A new requirement is that the waiver needs to be accompa-
nied by what is called an "appropriate service plan." This is
new. It is not in the federal statute. It is only in the regula-
tions. This service plan needs to be designed to lead to work.
This raised a lot of concerns when people commented on the
regulations because they were worried that this would cause
state welfare agencies to send people to work when it was not
appropriate. However, they added some additional descrip-
tions of the service plan that may prevent that: it has to be
developed by someone who is trained in domestic violence; it
should not emphasize work over safety; and it must include an
individualized assessment. New York does not have a service
plan provision in its regulation because our regulation was en-
acted before the TANF regulations came out two weeks ago.
" The other thing is that the state must have adopted the Family
Violence Option. We have adopted it, so that is not an issue,
but in other states, like California, where it is up to a county
whether they are going to adopt the Family Violence Option
or not, the state will not be able to count those waivers in
those counties because the whole state has not adopted the
Family Violence Option.
* And finally, the states are required to report the numbers of
waivers they have given out to HHS.
MS. WILLIAMS: Thank you very much. Are there any ques-
tions for any of the panelists?
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AUDIENCE: On the Family Violence Option, if the state has
the federally recognized good cause waiver and let us say they pro-
vide extensions or exemptions to the duration limit to thirty per-
cent of their population, of their case load, and ten percent were
due to the Domestic Violence Options, does that mean that they
will be held harmless for that whole ten percent?
MS. HEARN: Can I clarify your question? Your question is if
they have given waivers for some other reason for thirty percent of
their population?
AUDIENCE: Right, for disability, for age, for whatever.
MS. HEARN: Okay. It means that they are held harmless for
the ten percent.
AUDIENCE: They would be held harmless for the full amount
of the Domestic Violence Waivers; is that correct, or is there a
ratio?
MS. HEARN: No. It is for the full amount - there is a more
elaborate mathematical formula, but it is sort of like the domestic
violence people just do not count. They drop out of both the nu-
merator and the denominator.
MS. WILLIAMS: Other questions on any of the areas?
AUDIENCE: Would you address the issue of Medicaid eligibil-
ity as well as welfare ability, especially with domestic violence cli-
ents? Specifically, I understand that there is a problem in New
York City with respect to the regulations indicating that they
should be processed the first time around, and very often what
happens is the clients are not given enough information and are
told to come back. Any further update on that?
MS. ORLOFF: I only can report with respect to battered immi-
grant women. We are seeing nationally a big problem because
TANF workers, and workers processing Medicaid, public housing
or a number of other benefits, do not have any full understanding
of battered immigrant women's legal rights to access benefits. Af-
ter the Violence Against Women Act was passed in 1994 we were
able to get welfare access for battered immigrants who have filed
prima facie VAWA applications with INS. After filing a self-peti-
tion, INS will issue a prima facie determination, usually within two
weeks. This grants battered immigrants permission to apply for
benefits.
The problem is that people are getting turned away from bene-
fits offices. These are however undocumented battered women
who do not have legal status other than the prima facie determina-
tion. They are getting turned away despite the fact that they are
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legally entitled to benefits. What we are seeing - I am not hearing
stories from New York, but from other places - is a lot of race
discrimination and anti-immigrant sentiment, workers denying
benefits based on language capacity or because the applicant has a
Spanish or Asian surname. The Attorney General guidance makes
it clear that this is discrimination. The Justice Department may
look into such issues for enforcement actions.
But battered immigrant women who qualify for VAWA or who
are lawful permanent residents are eligible for Medicaid. Every-
body, regardless of immigration status, is eligible for emergency
Medicaid. Full Medicaid is available to anybody who would qual-
ify as a qualified alien under federal law which includes battered
immigrant women who have pending applications before INS and
can show where there is a substantial connection between the need
for the benefit and the abuse.
AUDIENCE: This is for Joan Zorza. Has the UCCJEA been
adopted anywhere yet?
MS. ZORZA: Yes, at least two states have adopted it, Alaska
and Oklahoma, and it is pending before a whole slew of other
states. This time it looks as if it will move faster than happened
before, where New York, for example, took ten full years before
they even moved at all, and finally did adopt it.
AUDIENCE: Is it currently before the legislature?
MS. ZORZA: It is currently before the legislature. OCA put in
the bill.
AUDIENCE: Is it. likely to pass this year, do you think?
MS. ZORZA: It is unclear whether it will actually move that
quickly. It might make sense to take a look at it. There are a few
points that have been changed. As battered women's advocates,
we may want to put in our little two cents to make it a much
stronger, better statute.
The other problem that has come up, that would be wonderful if
the PKPA would look at, is this whole problem of notification for
registering orders. It is totally unnecessary. For example, we could
use our Order of Protection Registry and never have to give notice,
or if a decree is registered, there is soon going to be a National
Order of Protection Registry, which would be a very good way to
register the order in the original state where issued and therefore
automatically get it into the national system and not have to go
around registering it court by court.
So this is just crying out for a federal solution. I think it is just a
very poor way of dealing with it, and ultimately a waste of local
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courts' time to have to deal with it and to require that people give
notice, because most people who need to register these orders - I
should not say most; a large number - need it because they need
protection for themselves or their children. To have to alert the
abuser that they are in the state where it has to be registered is
ridiculous.
MS. WILLIAMS: Other questions?
AUDIENCE: Juley, is anything being done to address the
grandparent provision that was passed without notice to anyone?
MS. FULCHER: Yes. The piece that I mentioned briefly about
addressing the PKPA does address that and tries to fix that prob-
lem, as well as some others. It generally brings the PKPA full faith
and credit requirements in line with what the new UCCJEA full
faith and credit requirements are, just because in the past the
PKPA lined up very neatly with the UCCJA, so the requirements
that applied in most states were the same exact requirements that
were applying on the federal level. We are trying to do that with
the new UCCJEA, and part of that is bringing along this problem
with the grandparents issue and solving that as well in the same
part.
MS. ZORZA: Can I say one other thing about that? If one is
lucky enough to abduct your child out of the country and it is to
flee an incident or a pattern of domestic violence, there is a total
defense. One reason the PKPA has the amendment to add the do-
mestic violence defense is to bring it in parity with international
abduction. So it is a ridiculous situation. If you are stopped within
the country, you have no official defense, although you might be
able it on justification grounds.
But the federal law is not dealing with this notice requirement
problem for custody decrees.
MR. WILLIAMS; Are there other questions?
AUDIENCE: I have a question for Ms. Fulcher. It has to do
with the retirement benefit provision of that federal law that is pro-
posed. It was the one provision that you discussed that troubled
me. I have two related questions.
First, does the proposed law, that a child could attach a parent's
retirement fund if they have been abused, apply only to federal
retirement funds; and, if not, why is it appropriate for the federal
government, in your view, to be dealing with that type of policy
issue? It does not strike me as something that uniformity among
the states for enforcement, and it strikes me as something that
would be peculiarly appropriate for individual state resolution.
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MS. FULCHER: Yes. I guess the first answer to your question
is that it is set up in such a way that it does address federal pensions
and government pensions, but not private pensions, as you might
expect. The only reason why they have done it that way is because
that is what the Federal Government can do. They cannot create
the laws that address the private ones, which, you are right, the
states would have to do that if they so chose to do so.
AUDIENCE: I have a question about VAWA '99. When is it
actually before the Congress, and is this something that we should
know how our individual state legislators are leaning in terms of
lobbying efforts?
MS. FULCHER: Absolutely. It is very hard to describe in some
ways because, as I explained, VAWA '99 is an omnibus package,
and in many instances pieces move. That was the whole design of
it, that we have one package that we can talk about very easily, but
the expectation is that we break it apart and different pieces are
moving at different rates.
VAWA '99, as you described it, and you have in your materials
the summary, is a House bill. It has currently more than 160 co-
sponsors in the House, so it is a good-sized group, but still a long
way to go. There were 233 co-sponsors of the original VAWA
when it finally passed, so we have got a ways to go on getting
sponsorship.
There is a second bill that is in the House, called the
Reauthorization Bill.12 4 It was just introduced a few weeks ago
with the idea that reauthorization is the thing that we are most in
need of happening right away. There is a lot of energy around it.
It is only a few weeks in introduction and we are already up over
sixty co-sponsors of that bill as well, so there is a lot of movement
on reauthorization.
There are also a lot of pieces that are going individually. There
is going to be an immigration piece introduced soon. The Housing
piece has been introduced individually, and there was already some
movement about trying to attach that onto a bankruptcy bill.
There are all sorts of little things like that that are happening.
On the Senate side, there are a couple of bills out there that
address reauthorization and some of the pieces that I discussed
here, but not all.125 There is also new legislation that is probably
going to be introduced in the coming month on those as well.
124. See H.R. 1248, 106th Cong. (1999).
125. See S. 245, 106th Cong. (1999).
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So it is hard to give in a nutshell, but we keep in our offices the
list of who is supporting the different pieces of legislation and what
they all do. People are welcome to call. Actually, on the summary
that is in your materials it has our office phone number, and we can
always let you know up-to-date where sponsorship is, where move-
ment is, so you can follow that.
MS. ORLOFF: As to the battered immigrant women's provi-
sions, we have support from both sides of the aisle, Republicans
and Democrats, in the Senate, so I think, we may not need help in
the Senate, but we will need help in the House. Independent pieces
of legislation will be introduced in both houses that are, if all goes
well, substantially identical.
MS. WILLIAMS: In addition, NCAdomestic violence,
AYUDA, NOW Legal Defense, and other organizations have in-
formation on the Violence Against Women Act, so you can contact
any of us for informational sheets, facts sheets, and copies of the
provisions.
I would like to thank all of our panelists for participating with us
today, and special thanks to the Lawyer Committee and Julie
Domonkos for inviting us here. I hope that you found this helpful.
Thank you.
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THE ROLE OF ADVOCATES, GUARDIANS AND FORENSIC
EXPERTS IN CUSTODY AND VISITATION CASES
MS. DOMONKOS: It is my pleasure to introduce the Modera-
tor of this afternoon's panel, Justice Silbermann. Justice Jacqueline
Winter Silbermann was elected to the civil court in November
1983, where she sat from January, 1984 through December, 1985.
In January 1986 she was designated as an Acting Supreme Court
Justice. A year later, Justice Silbermann was appointed Supervis-
ing Judge of the Civil Court, New York County, and was assigned
as an Acting Supreme Court Justice to an IAS Part, handling pri-
marily matrimonial matters. In March of 1989, Justice Silbermann
was appointed the Administrative Judge of the Civil Court of the
City of New York, the first woman to hold that position. Justice
Silbermann held that position until January, 1997, at which time
she became the Administrative Judge for Matrimonial Matters
statewide.
Justice Silbermann is an active member of many bar associations,
including the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the
New York Women's Bar Association, the Metropolitan Women's
Bar Association and the New York State Bar Association. Of spe-
cial note today, she is a Board Member of Fordham University
School of Law and she is also an alum.
Justice Silbermann has lectured extensively in the field of matri-
monial law and landlord-tenant law. Today we are very delighted
and grateful that she is here to moderate our panel.
JUDGE SILBERMANN: It is truly a delight to be here and to
be speaking on this very important topic. As you probably know
from the forum, and it is no news to any of us, the laws were
amended in 1996 to give judges the power to consider domestic
violence when they make a determination in custody and child
support.1 26
But what have the courts done with this? That will be the focus
of this afternoon's discussion. It will be on the role of the attor-
neys, the law guardians and the forensic experts in making this im-
portant factor one that the court can fully understand and be able
to assess its impact on the family, and therefore meaningfully use it
in making the difficult determinations relating to children.
The panelists will be focusing on domestic violence as it affects
the ability of the parent to parent and the effects on the child. To
126. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240.1(a) (McKinney 1996).
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date, there have only been a handful of cases discussing domestic
violence in relationship to the court's decision involving children.
Unfortunately, as I see it and as I read these cases, they focus
only on physical abuse and appear to be Draconian in their re-
quirement for hard evidence in the nature of injury, photos, police
reports, hospitalizations, et al. The cases all seem to focus, as I say,
on this physical abuse and not emotional or verbal abuse - not
anything about that kind of verbal battering.
Before I turn the microphone over to Professor Evan Start, who
will discuss new research in the field of domestic violence and pro-
vide us with an overview of this field and the role of the forensics, I
just want to highlight a few of the decisions of interest in the field.
In re Smith127 granted the father sole custody of the parties' three
children, saying there was "[N]o credible evidence of domestic vio-
lence. ' 128 Justice Sondra Miller dissented, saying the father admit-
ted he was the subject of an order of protection and that he had
been ordered to enter a batterers' program.129
Benzon v. Sosa 131 is the most interesting of the lot. The Third
Department held that extraordinary circumstances existed suffi-
cient to deprive the biological father of custody.131 The mother
had died in a car crash; the father had nothing to do with it.132 The
father had been involved in an extremely violent relationship
which had exposed the children to verbal altercations and physical
violence on a routine basis. 133 A temporary order of protection
had been issued.1 34 The father had a twenty-six-year history of al-
cohol and cocaine abuse, impulse control problems, and depres-
sion. 135 All of this was substantiated by the testimony of the
clinical social worker who had talked about the exposure of the
children and their fright, and that the children had been actually
exposed to it.136 So this is a case where they gave custody to the
grandparents. 37 That is the most exceptional of the cases.
127. 682 N.Y.S.2d 889 (App. Div. 1988).
128. Id. at 890.
129. See id. (Miller, J., dissenting).
130. 663 N.Y.S.2d 938 (App. Div. 1997).
131. See id. at 940.
132. See id. at 939.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 940.
137. See id.
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The next case is Burnham v. Basta.138 The court concluded that
relocation was not in the best interests of the child, and they added,
"Nor can we entirely discount the petitioner's allegation of domes-
tic violence between respondent and her husband. Respondent's
denials notwithstanding, the substance and detail of petitioner's
testimony, along with the observations of the court-appointed
evaluator, suggest that his concerns may not be entirely
unfounded. 139
Perez v. Perez14 ° held that the transfer of physical custody from
wife to husband was in the child's best interest in light of the wife's
interference with the child's relationship with her father.141 The
court also held that it was not an abuse of discretion to limit the
introduction of the evidence of domestic violence during the par-
ties' marriage and post-divorce custody proceedings.'42
Irwin v. Schmidt143 is also an interesting decision. The Second
Department held that the best interests of the children in this case
would be served by granting custody to the wife in light of the evi-
dence that the husband had been charged with assaulting his cur-
rent wife.' 44 The court held, "[This conduct] demonstrated that
[the husband] possesses a character which is ill suited to the diffi-
cult task of providing . . . children with moral and intellectual
guidance." '45
In Karcher v. Byrnes,'46 the Third Department held that the fam-
ily court's decision to dismiss the Family Offense Petition and grant
the father's application for custody of both children was justified
based on credibility findings and on the evidence presented. They
said,
There was insufficient, credible evidence to support findings
[that] petitioner had ever physically abused either of the chil-
dren, [ ] the children would be at risk if placed with petitioner in
unsupervised setting, [ ] that the respondent had overcome her
abuse of marijuana, alcohol, and cocaine, or could adequately
provide for the children. 1'
138. 659 N.Y.S.2d 945 (App. Div. 1997).
139. Id. at 947.
140. 659 N.Y.S.2d 642 (App. Div. 1997).
141. See id. at 643.
142. See id. at 644.
143. 653 N.Y.S.2d 627 (App. Div. 1997).
144. See id. at 628-29.
145. Id. at 630.
146. 649 N.Y.S.2d 484 (App. Div. 1996).
147. Id. at 485.
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The Third Department also found in Quick v. Quick148 that the
alteration of the established custody arrangement was supported
by contradicted evidence that the children were either subjected to
or permitted to witness explicit sexual activity on numerous occa-
sions while at the mother's home, and indeed were physically as
well beaten.149
Finally, in Joseph v. Joseph,15 ° the Second Department held that
repeated incidents of domestic violence in the marital residence
justified a grant of exclusive occupancy to the wife.151
I could go on. I think the cases illustrate that the courts are only
focusing on physical abuse. They are looking for clear and con-
vincing evidence. I do not think at this stage that the courts are
sufficiently aware, and I am concerned.
I am going to let Professor Stark address whether the courts, the
law guardians and the forensic experts in the field are sufficiently
familiar with the meaning and importance of domestic violence as
a factor, and what the true issue is that we have been directed to
consider in making our decisions.
Each of the panelists has extraordinary r6sum6s. To the extent
that they feel that it is important to tell you a little about them-
selves, each will introduce themselves. I will just introduce them
by name.
Is it not true that domestic violence is more than battering and
that just as we learned that rape is not a crime of violence, that
domestic abuse is a crime or an issue that concerns more than vio-
lence, it may concern power and control?
MR. STARK: Yes, it is true. I want to start. I will take off really
from the Judge's question.
JUDGE SILBERMANN: You can answer my question.
MR. STARK: The dilemmas that I face as a forensic expert, and
those faced by guardians, judges and attorneys, I believe, have
something to do with what Judge Silbermann was saying about the
narrow window. That is not the right metaphor, but the small win-
dow, shall we say, that the domestic violence law and the concept
of woman battering as domestic violence gives us to understand a
victim's experience, and therefore the experience of her children.
By extension, I think the second point that Judge Silbermann
made is also correct. Namely, that we are ill-served to use what I
148. 641 N.Y.S.2d 473 (App. Div. 1996).
149. See id.
150. 646 N.Y.S.2d 167 (App. Div. 1996).
151. See id.
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call a "calculus of harms," particularly physical harms, to asses a
battered woman's situation and its severity, for example, the custo-
dial issues involved, or the child's best interest in the case. I want
to illustrate that today and reiterate this point in a variety of ways.
I do not know how many of you know Linda Gordon's marvel-
ous book, Heroes of Their Own Lives.152 She is a historian at the
University of Wisconsin. One of the things that Dr. Gordon shows
is that approximately one hundred years ago, we routinely saw
child abuse, child sexual abuse and domestic violence as part of a
piece emanating from a single power center in the family. Because
of the prejudices that prevailed at the time, the source of the
problems was identified as an "immigrant brute." Nevertheless,
there was a clear understanding that a dominant male in these fam-
ilies was responsible and should be removed for the problems to
stop.
Dr. Gordon also shows how this insight was "forgotten." Over
time, child sexual abuse, child abuse and domestic violence, each
went their own way. In her book, she traces a shift in focus starting
in the 1920's from blaming the male to blaming the mother. First,
poor mothers were blamed, then the "neurotic mother" was added
and then the "emotionally needful mother," and so forth.
Through a process she describes as the "pathologizing of abuse,"
making abuse a sickness rather than a crime, what essentially hap-
pened is we were able to transform the culprit - the accountable
agent for these problems - in a way that left us in the 1950s really
not seeing domestic violence at all.
By the 1950s, and certainly by the time that Kempe so-called
"discovered" child abuse in the early 1960s, child abuse had been
transformed largely into a mother's crime. 53
When we started asking women in the early 1960s about their
rape experiences, many told incredible stories about their being
abused by their fathers and about domestic violence. To under-
stand their experiences, we began to put some of these things to-
gether again.
And then, of course, in the battered women's movement we be-
gan to hear similar stories on a much larger scale. It was really
profoundly new to us, though it should not have been. It was new
not only to the women's movement, to us as individuals, but also to
the larger social question that began to listen.
152. See generally LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES (1988).
153. See C. Henry Kempe, THE BATTERED CHILD SYNDROME, 181 JAMA 17
(1962).
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If you read the consciousness-raising newsletters that came out
in the early- and mid-1960s, there is no talk about domestic vio-
lence at all. And where there is discussion of rape, for example, it
is primarily stranger rape.
So the first point I want to make is that we had forgotten some-
thing we knew. We had to reconstruct the links between the vic-
timization of women and children by listening to women's voices in
a way that we had not for many years, and giving names to things
that women themselves could not at that point. This was a tremen-
dous victory for us as professionals and as human beings.
We have unquestionably come a long way. The fact that my
daughter has grown up thinking that a boyfriend who hits her is not
expressing his love but is instead doing something wrong is a major
change, even more profound than our legal or medical accomplish-
ments in this area.
When we started out our own research, my wife and I, some
years ago, and discovered that domestic violence was the leading
cause of injury for which women sought medical attention; this was
also a tremendous victory. And when we opened the battered wo-
men's shelters, that was a tremendous victory as it was to pass the
mandatory arrest laws or to push the House Judiciary Committee
to recommend - and now, in the new domestic violence law, if it
passes, to actually statutorily require - that evidence of domestic
violence be sufficient to establish a presumption of custody. Those
are all tremendous victories.
But despite these tremendous gains, the domestic violence
revolution has, in some sense, stalled. Part of the problem, I think,
as Judge Silbermann was emphasizing, stems from the same dra-
matic image behind our success - namely, the emphasis on vio-
lence and the automatic revulsion evoked when we see the black
eye or the broken nose or the picture on the Marshal's poster or on
"ER."
The evidence that we have stalled is all around us. We have ar-
rested over a million men for domestic violence crimes; yet, almost
none of them, surely fewer than 590, have gone to jail. Our batter-
ers' programs proliferate, we have several thousand now in the
United States. Yet, there is no compelling evidence that these pro-
grams are successful. One of the most impressive studies we have,
from the Urban Institute, shows that men who do not go to these
778
2000] WOMEN, CHILDREN AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 779
programs actually do somewhat better than men who do, in terms
of their recidivism rates. 154
Our shelters themselves - I helped start one of the first shelters
in the United States and I am a great devotee of the battered wo-
men's shelters - have become increasingly like second-rate social
services. They have lost a lot of the vision of empowerment and
radical change we began with. The early days of the battered wo-
men's movement, we said we had succeeded when a woman left
our office, and we knew she was going to do the wrong thing, but
did not stop her. Because we valued her empowerment, we took
pride in respecting her ability to do the wrong thing without getting
punished - as she had by her abuser - more than being "right."
Today's advocates are experts in violence equal to any group of
professionals. But political change through the empowerment of
women no longer drives the battered women's movement.
We have lots of data on domestic violence. We now know that
domestic violence is typically repeated, for example, often several
times a week. That is a tremendous victory. But, there is a million
miles between thinking of domestic violence as something that re-
occurs and understanding that for the battered woman battering is
an ongoing experience, that the moments between hits are as a
much part of the totality of her experience as the hitting itself.
We have come a long way, but we are in trouble. One reason we
are in trouble is because we have developed a sort of "crisis
calculus of physical harms" mentality around this narrow issue - I
believe relatively narrow issue - of physical abuse.
The reason we know physical abuse is only part of the story is
because we are confronting a number of dilemmas that cannot be
explained by a physical abuse model. One of these is the dilemma
I just mentioned - the difference between a model based on epi-
sodic violence and women's reports of battering as an ongoing ex-
perience of terror that is profoundly disabling.
Other evidence of the dilemma - and we do not have time to go
into all of it - came from our own research. We found that bat-
tered women were many times more likely to attempt suicide than
non-battered women, nine times more likely to abuse drugs, fifteen
times more likely to abuse alcohol and many times more likely to
abuse or neglect their own children than non-battered women.
155
154. ADELE V. HARRELL, URBAN INSTITUTE, EVALUATION OF COURT ORDERED
TREATMENT FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENDERS (1991).
155. See EVAN STARK & ANNE FLITCRAFT, WOMEN AT RISK: DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE AND WOMEN'S HEALTH (1996) (summarizing the findings).
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Even though they are many times more likely to abuse their own
children, only 0.5 percent of battered women abuse their own chil-
dren, whereas something like fifty-five percent of batterers abuse
their children. So we have this whole array of problems that bat-
tered women evidence disproportionately as compared to non-bat-
tered women.
There was no obvious explanation for why this was so. Why
should somebody, because they are hit up side the head, and
maybe hit three or four times, and maybe even by the person they
love, suddenly develop this profound array of problems? We also
found that battered women developed the problems disproportion-
ately only after the onset of the abuse. Prior to the onset of abuse,
battered women do not look any differently than any other women.
So we know that these problems develop in the context of physical
violence, but we do not have any real explanation for why.
I do not have time to critique at length, but we could look at the
dominant explanations - that they are severely traumatized or
they suffer this terrible Battered Women's Syndrome that Lenore
Walker described in pioneering works in the early 1970s and is very
frequently cited by forensic experts in this field. 156 In fact, eighty
to ninety percent of the battered women you are going to meet are
not going to have Battered Women's Syndrome, nor are they going
to be severely traumatized by their experience. They are not going
to be basket cases and they are not going to have "learned help-
lessness." They are going to come out of their experiences
wounded yet tough, though they may be drinking or drugging and
doing other things that jeopardize their health or the well-being of
their children.
The dilemma is, bottom line, that conventional explanations
based on the personality of victims did not account for why other-
wise psychologically normal women would develop an incredible
array of problems that creates enormous dilemmas for law guardi-
ans or anybody else who works in this area.
It turned out that the solution to this mystery was that it was not
physical trauma that was creating these problems, but a pattern of
coercion and control that went far beyond physical abuse - which
is not severe and life-threatening in the typical case. In fact, most
physical abuse that we see involves pushing, shoving, grabbing,
holding, belly bopping, stepping on, grabbing wrists and things like
that - minor events that are relatively trivial from a medical or
156. See, e.g., LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979).
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criminal justice standpoint. Yet, cumulatively and when combined
with patterns of intimidation, control and isolation, these events
are as devastating as the most fundamental violations of human
rights and hostage-taking, and may have even more profound ef-
fects on their children. We will not have time to get into that now,
but we will get into that later.
I hope to go into this aspect of coercive control in the discussion.
Suffice it to say now that as terrible as the effects of physical abuse
or being exposed to physical abuse of one's mother may be for a
child in terms of short-term or long-term psychological effects or in
terms of modeling this behavior as an adult, it may turn out that
when coercive control is the context in which domestic violence
occurs, the effects are even more devastating.
I hope I have at least stimulated some questions in your minds:
what does shifting to an understanding of woman battering as coer-
cive control mean in terms of re-framing our evaluations of women
and kids in our practice? What kinds of questions does it mean we
should be asking? What kinds of recommendations does it imply?
And how do we present to a court whose prism is a calculus of
physical harms the more profound understanding of the threats
posed to women and children when an offending partner violates
their most fundamental rights and liberties as well as their physical
integrity?
JUDGE SILBERMANN: I promise you, Professor, that we are
going to get back to the issue of coercion and control specifically,
not only in addressing custody but in framing appropriate visitation
orders, are our children at risk, even if they have not observed any
elements of physical violence - maybe there has not been any
physical violence, or maybe there has - but if there is this coer-
cion and control element, what happens in a visitation order? So
we will be thinking about it. I leave that.
Our next speaker is Harriet Weinberger, who is the Law Guard-
ian 18B Head at the Second Department. I hope she will talk a
little bit about what is being done or should be done about training
law guardians to address this issue; or maybe Katherine Law, who
is her colleague in the First Department in the Law Guardian
Panel, who will follow her, will be addressing a little bit about the
education of law guardians to focus the court's attention outside
this prism and to expand the prism of domestic violence.
MS. WEINBERGER: Good afternoon. I am delighted to have
been asked to speak to you today.
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As Justice Silbermann said, I actually wear two hats in the Sec-
ond Department. I am the law guardian director for the Second
Department, which includes ten counties: Kings, Queens and
Richmond counties in the Second and Eleventh Judicial Districts;
Nassau and Suffolk counties, which comprise the Tenth Judicial
District; and the Ninth, which consists of, Westchester, Dutchess,
Orange, Rockland and Putnam counties.
In New York City, because of the volume of cases that come into
our family courts requiring appointment of attorneys from the As-
signed Counsel Panel and the Law Guardian Panel, we do not al-
low these lawyers simply to be law guardians or just assigned
counsel.
Eighteen B, 57 for those of you who are New York City practi-
tioners, does not refer to lawyers who represent children; 18B is
Article 18B of the County Law that provides for representation for
indigent adults law guardians are separate entities. In New York
City, as I know, having practiced myself as a law guardian with the
Juvenile Rights Division of Legal Aid for many years, when they
wanted a lawyer to represent a child, they said, "Get me an 18B."
It is slang that does not exist outside of New York City.
The same lawyers in Kings, Queens and Richmond who appear
on the Law Guardian Panel, are also on the 18B Panel in family
court. So those lawyers may be the law guardians on custody and
visitation cases involving domestic violence, and those same attor-
neys at different times can be representing the petitioner, the vic-
tim of the domestic violence, or of course could also be
representing the respondent who is the alleged batterer.
One of the components of our program in the Second Depart-
ment is the training of our lawyers. Training for law guardians and
Assigned Counsel Panel lawyers in the Second Department is
mandatory. You cannot remain on the panel unless you attend
training. I have been Law Guardian Director for the past ten
years, and that has been the rule in our department for those ten
years.
Our training sessions include a fundamentals program for every
new law guardian and assigned counsel lawyer. It is a seventeen-
hour training program. It covers every aspect of the law and the
types of cases that lawyers are called upon to be knowledgeable
about whether they are appearing as law guardians or as attorneys
for the adults.
157. See N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722 (McKinney 1999).
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One of the topics on which we lecture is domestic violence. It is
mandatory. You may not get on the panel in the Second Depart-
ment until you have completed that training.
The focus of our domestic violence training has been particularly
on interviewing techniques for law guardians; the traumatic and
psychological impact of domestic violence, particularly on children;
the dynamics of domestic violence and what is meant by "coercive
control." A program we sponsored this past fall in Nassau County
concentrated very heavily on the battered women's shelter and
community resources.
In our department, we have books that my office has prepared
and distributed that list community resources for one of the ten
counties, including facilities and resources that are available.
Whatever hat an attorney is wearing, whomever you are represent-
ing, whether it be the victim or the children, there are facilities and
telephone numbers you can call and get assistance.
Before I focus on the role of the law guardian in custody dis-
putes involving allegations of domestic violence, I would like to
make some general remarks as to the role of the law guardian.
There is some confusion as to that role. As many of you know, the
Family Court Act specifically delineates those cases in which law
guardians must be assigned.
In custody and visitation cases, it is not mandatory to assign a
law guardian, which is defined as the attorney for a child. It is dis-
cretionary with the court. There has been a lot of dispute as to
whether or not this is necessary. A lot of matrimonial practitioners
think it is not. My experience is they are usually the practitioners
with whom the law guardian has not agreed. Nevertheless, it is
discretionary, and there are certain cases, where the children are
very little, and there is some thought that perhaps some courts
have had knee-jerk reactions and have assigned law guardians just
because there are children in the picture.
Assuming that the court has put some thought into it and the law
guardian has been appropriately assigned, the law guardian serves
a tremendously important function. The law guardian is there to
advocate for the child's wishes and also has to safeguard the child's
best interests.
It is a very difficult role for a law guardian. It is very difficult to
advocate something someone wants that may not, in your perspec-
tive and your feeling, be in their best interests. I know Katy is go-
ing to speak about that specifically, so I will not deal with that issue
extensively.
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I would like to relate a story about a case that occurred in one of
our counties. It was a divorce matter that lasted several years. The
parties were very affluent. The father was an alcoholic. He had a
very abusive relationship with his spouse and his children, both
physically and psychologically. There were three children. One of
the children became school-phobic. He had been an honor stu-
dent. His condition deteriorated so much that he would get to the
steps of the schoolhouse and retch and was unable to enter. The
child was subsequently institutionalized for about one year. A law
guardian was assigned at the beginning, when the case first came
before the court. This case lasted about four years before it was
finally resolved.
The law guardian was the only constant in this case. There were
five judges from beginning to end, and several attorneys each for
the mother and the father. The law guardian was the attorney for
all three children, and spent a lot of time particularly with this
young man.
Well, after four years, it appeared that the matter was finally get-
ting resolved. What happened was, of course, there were big
money issues to be determined. The mother and her lawyer or the
mother just got beaten down. The father controlled the finances.
She was an at-home mom. She had been a homemaker. He was
not paying the mortgage regularly, nor was he paying his child sup-
port. She had two other children in addition to this one.
What the father wanted was overnight week-end visitation with
the children, particularly with the eldest child, the one who had
spent a year in the hospital. The child did not want to have over-
night visitation with his father. There was a supervised visitation
arrangement that had been worked out by the law guardian. The
in-hospital therapist and the doctors attending the child had indi-
cated that overnight unsupervised visitation was contra-indicated.
The therapist the child was now seeing at home had also indicated
it would be ill-advised.
The next thing the law guardian knew was that a proposed judg-
ment of divorce was drafted. The law guardian was never notified,
never saw it and never received a copy of it. And, of course, the
proposed judgment provided for overnight week-end visitation.
The law guardian, when she finally got a copy of it, moved to
vacate the judgment of divorce, and moved for a hearing on the
issue of visitation. I will tell you that the judgment of divorce was
changed to provide for only supervised visitation after a hearing,
but only after a lot of hard work.
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What I found most astonishing about all of what had transpired
was the correspondence from the father's attorney that the law
guardian sent to my office for me to see. It was vicious. It said,
"What's your problem? If you need to mother somebody, go home
and mother your own children. How dare you interfere with this
family relationship? You had no business being involved in this.
This is none of your business. We were going to resolve it. The
mother and the father were going to resolve this. We worked out
an arrangement and you interfered. Really, go home and raise
your own kids." It was horrible.
That harmful visitation arrangement was almost allowed to hap-
pen. I am not sure what the court understood at that time, whether
the court even realized that the law guardian had not been made
aware of the proposed judgment. This was a happy ending, which
is why I chose that story. I think it really underscores just how
important and how essential the law guardian was. At the end of
the case, the mother did call the law guardian and thanked her
profusely, saying, "I had no more energy. I could not do it any-
more. I could not wind up on the street, and I was hoping that with
therapy, things would work out and he would not be too scarred. I
just could not handle it anymore."
Particularly in cases involving domestic violence, the parties are
not on an equal footing. I am not suggesting that the law guardian
is to advocate for one of the parties, because he/she should not.
The law guardian should be there to advocate for the child.
There is one more item I would like to address before Katy takes
over, please, if any of you are under the impression that the law
guardian walks in as neutral or is in some way a neutral magistrate
or a neutral, impartial person, please disabuse yourself of that
thought right now. That is the court; that is the judge who is to be
a neutral magistrate. The law guardian is a lawyer. He or she is
there to represent the child. He is not a guardian ad litem. A
guardian ad litem is someone who gets appointed to represent
somebody with some sort of disability. A guardian ad litem need
not even be a lawyer.
A law guardian would be an advocate. We stress that. We try to
stress that to our lawyers in training. But for all of you, particularly
matrimonial practitioners, really, it must be understood, and the
court must understand, that the attorneys are not there as the -
right arm of the court - they are not there just to assist in settle-
ment. If that helps, that is wonderful. And certainly, if a law guard-
ian's presence can facilitate a settlement, that is terrific. They are
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
not arbitrators. They are not there for any purpose other than to
advocate the wishes and the interests of the child.
I think I will be talking with you later. I would like to introduce
Katherine Law. I represent the Second Department and I went
first today, which rarely happens and I thank you for that opportu-
nity. I would like you to meet Katherine Law. She is the law
guardian director in the First Department.
Thank you.
MS. LAW: Thank you, Harriet.
I am here today as a fraud. I have had my job for four months,
and prior to my coming to be the Law Guardian in the First De-
partment, I spent twenty-five years of practice in the criminal area.
I started my professional career as an Assistant District Attorney
in New York County.
I think it is fair to say that anybody who is over forty years old
has seen domestic violence, if not in one's own family, then cer-
tainly in society. You may not recognize it when you see it, but the
older you get, the more likely it is that you have seen it up close
and personal.
I had a great-uncle who was a battered spouse. My grand-
mother's brother was just absolutely beaten down by a shrew of
woman. What can I tell you? Everybody in the family knew it.
His role was to provide the money, and after that Aunt Frances
took over and ruled the roost. I have seen instances in which this
man, who was in his vigorous early seventies, was bruised inexpli-
cably, he had inexplicable broken limbs. It was an amazing experi-
ence. I never recognized, until I got to be a teen-ager, exactly what
was going on there.
I have seen it certainly among my friends after I grew up. It does
not matter whether or not you are rich or poor. I do not know if
anybody besides me saw an article in the New York Times, the gra-
vamen of which was that a Manhattan investment manager was
beaten by her fifty-two-year-old husband and the police were
called by her fifteen-year-old daughter, and three of the family's six
children were in the house during the assault, and here is a woman
who managed a portfolio of $12 billion. 158 She was hospitalized in
Lenox Hill, and there is a criminal prosecution in process now.
Certainly, when I went to the Manhattan District Attorney's of-
fice in 1976, I was introduced to domestic violence cases. That was,
as you may remember, the height of the Women's movement. I was
158. Husband Faces Charges In Beating of His Wife, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1999, at
B6.
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enthusiastic and ready to prosecute to the full extent of my limited
powers as an Assistant District Attorney. Mr. Morgenthau was be-
hind everybody who was doing this type of work. At that point,
there was not a special Domestic Violence Unit in the organization,
but Leslie Crocker-Snyder was working to get the rape laws
changed so that you would not have to have corroboration to pros-
ecute a rape case.
I had a case while I was assigned to the criminal court in which a
woman had been battered on a regular basis and she finally agreed
to have the defendant arrested. She came to court time after time.
She had an order of protection. We came right down to trial. The
Saturday before the trial was to be started on Tuesday, she came to
my office and I prepared her. On Tuesday morning, she came in
and said, "I want to drop the case." I said, "May I inquire why?"
She said, "Well, on Sunday he painted the living room and I just do
not want to do it anymore." So I said, "Okay. You recognize that
the next time you call the police, there will be somebody in the
precinct who remembers this." She said, "Yes, I realize that."
That was an overwhelming experience for me. All my idealistic
principles were threatened by that response. But I came to under-
stand on a visceral level exactly how powerful this is.
I subsequently handled a homicide case in the District Attor-
ney's office in which, after an extremely busy day I was assigned to
pick up four different homicides, I was called about 2:00 o'clock in
the morning to the Sixth Homicide Zone. You know how long it
has been since this happened. There was a woman there who was
bruised all over her head and she was under arrest for having
stabbed her husband to death. I said, "You have the right to re-
main silent, you have the right to a lawyer, you do not have to say
anything, but if you do say something it can be held against you.
Having given you your rights, would you like to tell me what hap-
pened?" She said, "I do not know why I stabbed him. He done it
to me thousands of times before. Why did I do it now?"
I saw this lady the next day in arraignment. She was represented
by Brian Bookbinder of the Legal Aid Society, who was an attor-
ney with whom I had a good professional relationship. I said,
"Brian, would you consider putting this woman in the Grand
Jury?" He said, "Let's see what her medical records show."
Her records from the hospital showed over a period of ten years,
that she fell off a bus and broke her arm, tripped over the carpet
and had a concussion, and fell on the ice and knocked two teeth
788 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
out. Repeatedly, this woman had been battered over a period of,
as I say, ten years. There was, I will tell you, one stab wound.
The story that this woman told in the Grand Jury was that her
husband, who was drunk, and a mean drunk, was at home and she
wanted to go to church. She said he told her, "Fix me a meal." So
she did. She took her hat off, she put the supper in the pot, and she
said, "It is ready. Do you want to eat? I'd like to go to church."
He said, "I do not want to eat now." So she goes off to church, and
when she comes back, he says, "All right, woman, fix me a meal."
It was already fixed and in a pot on the stove. She tells him to wait
a minute and goes to wash her hands before she starts to pick it up.
He comes in the kitchen, he picks up the hot pot off the stove, and
starts at her with the pot. He beat her about three or four times
with this hot pot, and she instinctively backed up and grabbed a
paring knife that had been on the table and stabbed him once in
the chest.
The medical examiner told the Grand Jury that this was not a
life-threatening wound, except that he bled out before the ambu-
lance could get there. So what can I tell you, except that the Grand
Jury concluded that this was justifiable and she was not indicted?
It is one of the things that made me feel as if my life had a purpose,
because if it had not been for the fact that I had seen her that night,
if it had been a different Assistant District Attorney in that Homi-
cide Zone, and if I had not had a good professional relationship
with her defense attorney, it would not have happened that way.
His family was so upset, they were absolutely furious, and I was
able to say, "The Grand Jury heard it; what can I tell you?" In any
event, that is one good purpose.
Having spent twenty-five years in criminal practice, I was asked
last December if I would be interested in being the law guardian
director. I asked, quite reasonably, what a law guardian director
does. The bottom line is in the First Department we do what Har-
riet does in the Second Department, in terms of certifying our at-
torneys to practice in family court.
We hope that the judges in supreme court, when they are choos-
ing law guardians for the children in custody and visitation cases,
would use certified law guardians. There are many people - I do
not know how many, but there are some people certainly - who
are competent to act as law guardians in custody and visitation
cases who are not actually on the family court panel.
Law guardians must play a totally ambiguous role. On one day
they are defending juvenile delinquents, or they are representing
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children in PINS cases. Does everybody here know what a Person
In Need of Supervision is? It is where basically there is no act for
which the child is charged at this particular point, but their parents
think that life is so unbearable with this child that they actually
bring them to family court.
On the other hand, they represent them in these custody and
visitation cases. These lawyers also have to do a variety of other
tasks not having to do with representing children. So you have to
be well versed in the Family Court Act, you have to be well versed
in the domestic relations law, you have to be well versed in the
criminal law, the constitutional law of search and seizure in Fourth
and Fifth Amendment cases.
It is an incredibly complex law. We have difficulty in attracting
law guardians. If any of you would like to be law guardians and
you are not already, may I encourage you to write to me at 60
Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10010, and ask for an ap-
plication. If you do not know how to do it, we will train you.
The only problem is that, as I an sure you recognize because you
are in this room today, it is incredibly poorly paid. We pay our
lawyers $40.00 an hour for in-court and $25.00 an hour for out-of-
court time. This is absolutely a manifestation of what this society,
and the legislature in Albany in particular, thinks of children. The
fact that we pay these lawyers $40.00 and $25.00 for out-of-court
time to represent children is a state disgrace. If any of you know
people that I could talk to, or if you know people in Albany, please
tell them that their reluctance to increase the rates for criminal de-
fendants is killing the practice of law for children and women in
family court.
Thank you very much.
JUDGE SILBERMANN: Our next speaker will be Mary Eliza-
beth Bartholomew from the Sanctuary for Families Center and
Battered Women's Legal Services. She is going to talk about pre-
paring your client to see the forensics and preparing your client to
see the law guardian.
MS. BARTHOLOMEW: Thank you.
We cannot talk enough about domestic violence. It is too com-
mon a problem. Whatever statistics you hear - we all understand
that it is prevalent, it is frequent and it is everywhere, if any of
these statistics are to be believed - and yet, even here, yesterday
and today, there has been talk about the use of an order of protec-
tion and the underlying allegations of abuse as a strategic weapon
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in matrimonial cases, particularly in exclusive possession of the
marital home and also custody and visitation cases.
It is as if somehow the existence of an underlying matrimonial
case makes the allegations of domestic violence less important or
less believable, when in fact divorce is the natural consequence of
domestic violence, it is the natural consequence of physical vio-
lence and sexual abuse.
If there is a lot of domestic violence - and we all in this room
believe that there is - then we are going to hear about it in a lot of
cases. Judges and lawyers who have no problem understanding this
or accepting the fact that there is a lot of domestic violence in our
world and understand that it is pervasive have a lot of trouble ac-
cepting that it could be true in specific instances. We should be
troubled by that.
I am here to talk about preparing women clients to meet with
forensics and law guardians, the two persons who are absolutely
key to the final decision in their custody and visitation cases.
I represent indigent women, often immigrant and undocumented
immigrant women. But, whoever the client is, she needs to first
understand who the people are - what is a law guardian, what is a
forensic evaluator.
Part of your job in preparing your client is explaining the law,
the legal system and the social service system that underlie this de-
cision-making process. Very often women, but especially battered
women, have ideas about their legal rights and about what is the
right thing to do that have come directly from their abusers, and
these ideas, naturally enough, serve the interests of the abusers.
We are all formed by the law. It tells us who it is that we are; it
tells us who it is that we can be. In other legal cultures, women
have to leave their home and their children, if their abuser hus-
bands tell them that they have to leave. Too often, our clients learn
that they did not have to leave the home, that they did not have to
leave their children, when it is too late, when they are already in a
shelter, or the first time they get this information is when they see
their attorney or when they seek out help from an immigrant advo-
cacy group, like SAQUI or some of the other organizations that do
such important and good work. By then, her legal case is compro-
mised, as is the well-being of her children. And then, her interview
and her meetings with the law guardian and the forensic experts
become every more important and critical
The isolation that is often a part of the battered women's experi-
ence serves the interests of the abuser. It is our job to explain her
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legal and social rights, and her responsibilities, and to help her
make appropriate and effective choices about her life and the life
of her children.
Probably all of us in the domestic violence world would like to
see domestic violence be the lens through which law guardians and
forensic evaluators see our clients. This is, however, not the prac-
tice. It may be the best practice, but it is not yet the practice.
It is our job to prepare women clients to see the law guardians
and the forensic evaluators on their cases. They often have to tell
these people about the domestic violence, the effect of the domes-
tic violence on them, their conduct, their behavior throughout the
marriage or the relationship, and it is their job ultimately, and our
job, to prepare them to make the domestic violence real, to make it
important, and to make it credible.
This means preparing your client not to be defensive and angry,
when she is probably, and justifiably, both defensive and angry.
She may have already seen hostility to her statements and to her
proofs in the courts or by the husband's attorney, and certainly by
her husband himself. She may have minimized or forgotten some
of the parts of the abuse as a way of dealing or coping with her
everyday life. This is especially true if your client lives in the same
household with her abuser or if she has lived with domestic vio-
lence for a very long time.
By the time a forensic evaluator and/or a law guardian have been
appointed, she is likely, but not certain, to have been in court,
probably a number of times. She may have already heard the hus-
band or his attorney, and the court, insist that it never happened -
that she is lying, that there is no finding of abuse, that the order of
protection that may be there is something that the husband pled to
or consented to because he could not afford to do anything other
than that.
She may have heard that the fact that there are no hospital
records or that there are no police reports may be actual evidence
of her fabrication of the abuse. And she may have heard, and she
may have even said to the hospital personnel, that she did fall
down the stairs or off the bus or those sorts of things. She has to
explain that. She has to make it clear.
None of us want domestic violence to be ignored by the law
guardians and by the forensic evaluator, but just helping your client
appear not defensive and not angry at events that would anger any-
one is a bit of a project. It takes a great deal of time.
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Family law practitioners often say, "I feel like a social worker. I
feel like I am talking to my client, not about the law, but this is very
social work kind of stuff." And it may be.
My clients often see social workers. I am delighted to have a lot
of social workers down the hall. I encourage my clients, as well as
their children, to see social workers, to talk about that kind of stuff
with the social workers. But a social worker cannot really prepare
your client to see a forensic evaluator and/or a law guardian. They
are not lawyers. They do not know what to expect.
First of all, your client has to understand that these two charac-
ters, the forensic evaluator and the law guardian, are absolutely
critical. Cases often settle on the basis of a forensic report, or even
in some cases on the recommendation of a law guardian.
If it is a good report, if it is an attentive and very good law guard-
ian, it should be. It is often the right thing for a case to settle on a
forensic report. But not all forensic evaluators and law guardians
are as sensitive as we in this room would hope that they would be
to domestic violence. They do not understand it.
The new law directs that the courts think about what it is and
take seriously the allegations of domestic violence, but they do not
always do that. Your client has to be prepared, should she not be
asked about the abuse, that she can bring it up, and do it in a way
that is not defensive or that makes her appear that she is obsessing
about it. It is up to your client to make that domestic violence real.
She may have forgotten the dates, the exact details, especially if it
is for a long period of time, she may have minimized it, and these
things may make her appear incredible to these two important per-
sons. Memories dim and bruises fade, but she has to be able to
articulate this and talk about it, and only you can help her do that.
No attorney here would think of having their client go into a
court without preparing them, and yet there are those who believe
that it is not proper for a lawyer to prepare their client to see a law
guardian or a forensic. Even if you were just having your client go
to court when she is going to hear oral argument, let alone take
testimony, none of us would allow her to go in or would think of
having her go in without proper preparation. She needs to under-
stand what is going on, what kind of questions are likely to be
asked of her.
I want to give one small caveat, even though they are not likely
to be happening in the cases that we generally see, and that is,
some lawyers have their clients prepared to see a forensic evalu-
ator by another forensic evaluator. This is generally seen as a re-
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ally bad thing by the courts. The courts feel that it sort of muddies
the water. The court is really relying on the forensic evaluation to
give some expertise, to give the court some help about what it is
exactly that is going on. The preparation by another forensic is just
going to make it more complicated for the judge.
If you have any reason to believe in your cases that the other
side has been prepared by a forensic, be sure, should this case go to
trial, that you find out from the other side, that you ask that person
if, with whom and how the other side has prepared before they saw
the forensic evaluator.
Obviously, in preparing your clients you start by telling them
that they have to tell the truth, that you will review the dates and
the incidents. Your client has to know that she does not have to
recall every single fact, every single ugly detail, and if she does, she
may appear to be over-prepared, to be fabricating or to be ob-
sessing with the domestic violence part of her case.
She does need to understand who the players are, how they fig-
ure into the decision-making process, and overall what needs to be
proved. She needs to explain and tell how the domestic violence
figures into her being a better parent, into how domestic violence
may have compromised her ability to parent, what steps she has
taken and what steps she will take to be the better parent.
Before she sees a law guardian or forensic evaluator, she has to
think about ways to facilitate visitation, pick-up, drop-off, transfer
the children, decide what relatives and friends, if any, are willing to
help or be part of the transfer of the children or could supervise
visitation, should that be indicated or should that be necessary, de-
sired even.
She must understand the theory of the "friendly parent." This
may be a very big project.
The court's understanding of insistence that there is a level play-
ing field in some way is something that she is going to have to be
very familiar with. She cannot be thinking about all of these things
for the first time when she is talking to the forensic or the law
guardian. You have to explore with her who are the people that
can help her, who could possibly supervise visitation, who could
possibly help with the transfer of the child back and forth.
You should review with your client all of the questions that are
likely to be asked so that she does not hear them for the first time
out of the mouths of these important key people - from the date
of the marriage, to the date of birth of the children, to family mem-
bers with whom the children has a relationship. Your client may be
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very nervous. I have had clients get mixed up on dates of birth and
basic pedigree information when they are in court, in inquest and
in intake. They cannot remember lots of numbers, lots of dates,
just because they are so nervous.
Repetition will help them, if you go over it a number of times.
And, as I said, it takes a great deal of time. It is a big commitment
to representing a battered woman in a custody case. It is a big
commitment in terms of time.
You have to go over with her the questions that are likely to be
asked, and go over them lots of different ways. Anticipate with her
those questions that may be asked. What is the worst thing that the
other side, her husband, her abuser - "What is he going to say
about you that is the worst thing that he could say?" - and you
have to find out if it is true, and how she can explain it if is true;
how she can explain it if it is not true.
If she keeps a journal or a calendar - she should be encouraged
to be keeping a journal or a calendar - ask her to bring it with her
to her meetings with you. She may or may not want to bring those
kinds of things with her to meet with the forensic or law guardian,
but certainly you need to take a look at them.
Just getting her talking about some of the really ugly things that
have happened to her will make her more comfortable talking
about it. She may think that it is improper, or even wrong, to
speak negatively about her husband, and she may be very uncom-
fortable speaking about sex, including forced sex. She may not
even understand that forced sex is a crime or that there is some-
thing wrong there.
For your client, nervous as she is, knowing that many women are
victims of abuse and that the forensic evaluator and the law guard-
ian have heard it all before may make her more comfortable. That
is an important thing for her to know, that it is not just something
that she caused.
There are lots of reasons for why victims of domestic violence
feel -defensive. She has been told by her abuser that she is a bad
mother, that everything in their marriage that is wrong is her fault,
especially that domestic violence is her fault. She has to under-
stand that is just not true. She should be able to explain her reli-
gion or her culture or her individual experience or the personal
relationship that she had with the abuser that caused her to make
certain kinds of decisions, like why she stayed with him, why she
went back to him.
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We all think that it is right to leave an abuser, but she may think
that it was the wrong thing to do. That is something that has to be
explained so that the forensic evaluator or law guardian takes it
seriously and understands it. It is essential for these key people to
understand that.
The court needs to know the facts and the why of the facts, but
they need to know it in a focused kind of way. The court needs to
know the specific form and kind of abuse, the patterns of abuse as
well as the history of it. Not all individuals are the same and the
effects of the abuse on the abused and the children are not the
same. That has to be made clear. And, as complicated as it may
be, you want it to be explained in a focused way so that your client
does not just appear to be incredible, which is often the case.
She needs to understand that the jealousy, the controlling behav-
ior, the threats and the isolation are common ways of controlling.
And, the behavior is common to many abusive men. It is not
something that is just particular to her situation. She has to know
the facts and that domestic violence is a systemic problem.
She has to know that it is not her fault, and she has to have
insight into her situation so that she knows that it is not normal.
And importantly, she has to be able to communicate that. The fact
pattern that we have here is a very interesting one because the wo-
man has a communication problem. As much as she knows about
her own situation, she has trouble articulating, she is unintelligible,
and it is going to be a very difficult project for her to get the foren-
sic and the law guardian to really understand what it is that has
gone on or for the jury to pay attention or to listen.
The courts, the law guardians and the forensic experts, they are
there in a way to predict the future, so her insight into the situation
is terribly important.
I have talked so far about law guardians and forensics as if they
are the same. They certainly are not. In some ways you prepare
them in the same way. In other ways they are tremendously differ-
ent. Generally, getting women to talk about these things, so that
she is comfortable telling some pretty personal and awful stuff to a
virtual stranger is going to help her. The focusing will help her.
To make her do this in a way that she does not sound defensive,
that she does not sound bitter, that she does not sound angry, hos-
tile, or obsessive - repetition can only do that. There are differ-
ences between the way you prepare somebody to see a law
guardian and a forensic evaluator. For example, the law guardian
is an attorney. You can attend any conference, any meeting that
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your client has with the law guardian. You have a right to be there.
You certainly should be there. That person is an attorney for the
child. Some attorneys always go; some attorneys never go. There
is thinking that is all over the board. It may be a specific case.
There are attorneys that have said that they think it makes their
client look bad. In many cases, you may want to go just because
you can explain and talk about the language; she may have trouble
remembering to make the points that she needs to make about the
incidents and the effects on the children. You have the right to be
there with the law guardian.
You do not have a right to be there when your client is inter-
viewed by the forensic. The most important thing that your client
could possibly learn from you about the forensic evaluation is that
this person is there to make determinations to help the court. The
forensic evaluator may want to talk to her own therapist, the chil-
dren's therapist, lots of other people. Anything she has said to her
own therapist will come out and be given to the forensic expert,
and also it will be given to the court. Any idea that she might have
had before about confidentiality, she has to rethink that with you.
There may be some things that she feels uncomfortable about
other people knowing about - suicide ideations, suicide attempts,
drugs, alcohol, all kinds of things.
Not that they are there in every case, but there is always some-
thing that the client sees as really some horrible secret that she has.
However minor you might think of it as being, it is something that
is going to make her nervous and may make her appear incredible.
For example, a woman told me the other day, after knowing her for
a year, that she shoplifted once when she was a kid. She was so
nervous about that, it was just totally unjustified. But that may
very well compromise her ability to be straightforward with some-
one else.
She has to know that she has to rely on herself, only herself, to
discuss these things, to bring up the domestic violence to the foren-
sic, because no one is going to be there to tell her.
She may want to bring in pictures or she may want to bring her
notes or her journal or whatever, and she may want to direct the
attention of the forensic evaluation to somebody else, to a neigh-
bor or a teacher, somebody who knows her and her children very
well. Then the forensic, of course, has the discretion to go forward
and interview that person or not.
You want to teach her - this is a teaching project - to focus on
the questions and make the points that she needs to make to get
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from here to there without losing sight of what it is she needs to
say, not to get distracted, to make her points.
She has to understand the reasons for her behavior. Especially
in cases where there is cultural difference, that has to really be ex-
plained. She is the one who has to explain about why she did not
leave, why one thing or another happened. You should only speak
with her about this to make her appear not confused, disoriented
or scattered. You do not want your client to appear flaky because
she is uncomfortable talking about these things.
As a practical matter, when preparing a client to see anybody, to
go to court or do anything, you have to talk to them about the
usual things - how to dress, what to wear. Not that every battered
woman needs that type of information, but some people do. I al-
ways talk to my clients about looking the forensic evaluator or the
law guardian in the eye. She may come from a culture where that
is disrespectful. If she is having so much trouble looking people in
the eye and talking to somebody, you may want to just have her
explain to the forensic evaluator that it is disrespectful in her cul-
ture to do certain things. If she can explain her culture or what
reasons she has for doing things that are different from the way
that the rest of us do things here, then you have gone a long way
towards helping her be prepared.
What we want to do ultimately is see that domestic violence is
not seen as mental illness. That is something that she may very
well be facing.
And if you get a report back that looks to you nothing like the
client you have, nothing like the woman that you know, then you
have to think about going to trial, taking it to trial. A good forensic
report should reflect who it is that you know to be your client. If
somehow they did not meet, then you have to think about going to
trial.
JUDGE SILBERMANN: What a wonderful primer that was.
Now we have Betty Levinson of Levinson & Kaplan, a very fine
practitioner in the field of matrimonial law as well as many other
fields.
MS. LEVINSON: Thank you.
I thought it would be helpful to start with a little bit of historical
background concerning my work as it has been interwoven, in a
very small way, with what has happened in New York courts re-
garding domestic violence over the last three decades.
When I started practicing, it was the 1970s. As Katy mentioned,
it was the height of the Women's Movement. There was a case
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being litigated at the time, called Bruno v. Codd.159 Mr. Codd was
the Police Commissioner of the City of New York. There were
those of us who were representing petitioners in the family court,
particularly abused women, who felt that family court, of all places,
was a very inhospitable environment into which to bring those
kinds of concerns.
The old family court was populated with very cranky, officious
court officers, petition clerks who very often - in an effort to
make their work easier - would only take one or two factual alle-
gations from the petitioner. When the petitioner found herself
before the judge, swearing to the facts and wanting to get on the
witness stand and tell her story, she would be limited to only the
two facts that the petition clerk had permitted her to allege. It was
only after a long period of time that we practitioners figured out
that we could go into the courthouse and basically purloin the
court forms. This was before everything was computerized and we
used to take the quadruplicate forms, with white-out for each of
the lawyers, and we would actually prepare these petitions in our
offices and then go into the court, basically bypassing the petition
clerk. That was the only way that you could get past the "guard
dog."
And then, when you finally got to see a judge - this was in 1976
and 1977 - you might be told that an order of protection was not
going to be granted because your client had decided if she was go-
ing to begin a divorce action. If she was not willing to divorce this
beast, about whom she was making these complaints, then he could
not be that bad, and she was not entitled to an order of protection.
There were lots of things about going to the family court in those
days that made life very difficult. When Bruno v. Codd began, with
Carmen Bruno was the lead plaintiff in a class action, we sued the
family court, the probation department, and the police department,
in an effort to create an environment that would be more hospita-
ble to battered women. The case was ultimately settled with a con-
sent decree and thus began our consciousness, in the legal
community, about domestic violence.
As Evan pointed out, the book that marked the beginning of the
women's movement, The Feminine Mystique16 ° by Betty Friedan, if
you look in the index, makes no mention of domestic violence. It
does not come up in the book even once. So on that level the pro-
159. 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
160. BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963).
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gress we have made since then is thrilling. It gives me goose bumps
just to think about how far things have come.
Over the years my work with victims of domestic violence
brought me to a variety of courts. I started out as a criminal de-
fense lawyer. In fact, Katy's story about having a homicide defend-
ant testify in a Grand Jury is something that I actually did in the
1980s, but with a twist. I brought a social psychologist into the
Grand Jury and asked the Grand Jurors to listen to her testimony,
which also ended in voting "No bill."
Of more recent vintage is my representation of many women in
matrimonial proceedings. I continue to do some criminal work and
I have done some tort work as well. In fact, one of the tort cases
that I have been dealing with over the last ten years is the case in
which Hedda Nussbaum sued Joel Steinberg for tort. We have a
lower court decision tolling the statute of limitations. 161 As you all
may know, there is a one-year tort statute of limitations for inten-
tional torts in New York. 62 That is now on appeal.
But returning to the question of matrimonial cases and domestic
violence, I have to tell the truth. In spite of the enormous progress
with training programs, public education and the receipt into our
language of the term "domestic violence," I think we are still in
deep, deep trouble.
I want to speak a little bit about litigation from the vantage point
of supreme court practice at the current moment. One of the things
that Mary Elizabeth would agree with me about, I think, in terms
of preparing your case, is the importance of knowing who is going
to be hearing your case, who your law guardian is, and who your
forensic evaluator is. I will try to illustrate this by using some of
my own cases as examples, and relating back to some of the things
which have been talked about today. First, we need to address the
problem of communicating the reality of domestic violence. After
people hear about it so much on the radio, see it on posters in the
subway, the shock rubs off and the immediacy disappears. What
we thought we were getting, in terms of a sympathetic judicial ear,
or an appropriately trained forensic evaluator is very often not the
case. In fact, the reason that it took so long for us to learn about
domestic violence is that so much of it is profoundly counter-intui-
tive. Unless you really pay attention, and hear the individual vic-
tim's voice, and allow yourself to become part of, in your mind's
161. See Cerisse Anderson, Tolling of Time-Bar Allows Nussbaum to Sue Steinberg,
N.Y. L.J., Mar. 11, 1997, at 1.
162. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 215(3) (McKinney 1999).
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eye at least, the home where these events are taking place, you are
really not going to get it. Anybody who is working with you in a
case, either collaboratively or in some other capacity, is also going
to have a great deal of trouble getting it.
The first time I tried to get an order of protection in supreme
court, I was appearing in what used to be called "Special Term,
Part Five." It was in room 300 of the supreme court. That is where
all the matrimonial cases were heard. Lawyers actually used to ar-
gue motions. It was very exciting, and it was also a bit of a show,
because everybody would get up and watch the other attorneys do
their stuff. As a young lawyer, I appreciated the opportunity to see
varied styles and approaches. On the case I am referring to, I made
an application for an order of protection. The judge denied my
request because, he said, we had not given notice to the police de-
partment. Since this was an order that would have to be enforced
by the police department he refused to give me an order.
Today, although we do practice in a more enlightened era, it is
kind of shocking that judges need a statute to tell them to consider
domestic violence when making custody decisions. I thought they
always had to. I thought Friederwitzer163 said "best interests of the
child. ' 164 Maybe I was wrong - how foolish of me.
But the fact remains that you just do not know what you are
getting until you have it. I agree 1000 percent with what Mary
Elizabeth said before: if there is a disjunctive quality between the
forensics report and your experience of your client, bells should
ring.
One of the most serious problems that we have in our courts -
which is a reflection of the general issue of not having enough
money - is that each of the matrimonial judges in New York
County were just assigned an additional hundred cases. Judges and
cases are being shuffled again. When this happens it is clear that
OCA chooses to use its money on women and children last, and
that the folks in Albany just do not see these cases as a priority.
The establishment of "standards and goals" - I hope you have
all heard that phrase - is the result of an administrative decision
that says that cases have to go "clippity-clop." Not every case
ought to go "clippity-clop," particularly those that require really
serious investigation.
From an administrative point of view, there is a real tension be-
tween investigation, forensic involvement and having a client in a
163. See Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 432 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1982).
164. Id. at 769.
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position in which she is able to testify. Do you have any idea how
hard that is for somebody who has been living in a situation where
every minute of her day is spent, her energy is consumed every
second, trying to avoid a conflagration, trying to protect her kids
from an abusive spouse? Enervating does not even begin to de-
scribe it. To get a client to the point to which Mary Elizabeth de-
scribed is difficult for any happily married, stand-up kind of person.
But is incredibly difficult for someone suffering from these kinds of
experiences. Thus, the speed with which some cases are now being
shoved through the system, I believe, is inconsistent with the needs
of battered women.
Let us talk about the forensic evaluators. Who are they? Where
do they come from? What do they know? And, except for Evan,
are they any good?
Not too long ago I came into a case where the forensic examina-
tion had already been completed. I was making a decision as to
whether or not I wanted to take the case because another lawyer
was in it already and it was already moving along. I generally want
to be there from moment one, to craft and develop the case in my
way. I had all the papers delivered to my office before meeting the
client. I read the forensic examination of the woman. I said, to
myself, "I do not think I am going to take this case. I do not like
this woman at all." But I had made an appointment to see her, and
I said, "The straight-up thing to do is to have her come in and see
what's what." And I did.
The profile that came through the forensic report was, in my
judgment, extraordinarily distorted. It did all of the things that you
would expect somebody who knew nothing about coercive control
to do. We cannot overstate the importance of understanding what
the "punch plus" is. In my office I call the "punch plus," the fact
that you do not have to have bludgeoning every day, you do not
have to be physically abused every week, you do not even have to
experience physical violence every month or every six months.
When control is initially exerted with physical force, and you know
that it could happen again, and you know that a gesture or a cer-
tain phrase or a certain look means "You better watch it," there is
no need, very often, to follow up with another physical punctuation
of that control.
So what do forensic witnesses understand about women who
have domestic violence issues, and should we expect such experts
to raise or pursue domestic violence issues in their interviews with
our clients?
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The report to which I just referred was received in evidence at
the custody trial, and the forensic experts testified. In this case,
one of the children had reported to his therapist that he had seen
his father push his mother down a flight of stairs. This statement
was contained in notes that were turned over to counsel during the
trial. Here is the transcript of some of the question and answers:
I asked the doctor: "You did not feel it was necessary to inquire
as to whether or not the memory of his seeing his father throw his
mother down the stairs was significant?"
Answer: In the context of the other things that she told me, I did
not pursue that.
In addition, the following questions and answers transpired:
Q: Dr. so-and-so, you testified earlier that you did not consider
yourself an expert in the area of domestic violence, is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: Are you associated with a hospital?
A: Yes.
Q: Which hospital is that?
[He names two important hospitals here in the City.]
Q: And do either of those hospitals have domestic violence
protocols?
[Objection overruled.]
A: I suspect that they do.
Q: But you have not seen those protocols yourself, have you?
A: I do not recall having seen one. I know that they have a
required course and some years ago but I do not recall. I think it
was on child abuse, but I am not sure of the details.
Q: Whether or not you have seen the protocols, would it be your
understanding that a denial of physical abuse by someone speaking
to a stranger would be unusual?
A: Would be unusual? No. But there is the context of custody
disputes in which I think it is far less unusual. Yes, I am familiar,
and you talked about that when you first examined me, et cetera,
et cetera, et cetera.
Anyway, the point of this is, that here is a guy who is being ap-
pointed by judges of the supreme court, who has never seen a pro-
tocol, does not know how to interview clients. If you go to a
doctor, they take your blood pressure, they take your pulse -
there are sort of basic above-and-beyond-the-pedigree stuff. There
are basic questions that need to be asked in a custody case.
Also we need to consider the question of shame and the degree
to which it affects people's willingness to reveal a history of domes-
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tic violence. In my own experience, women who have achieved
very high positions in life - lawyers, doctors, all kinds of profes-
sionals - need to be asked.
MR. STARK: There are also the women who are so rich they do
not have to work.
MS. LEVINSON: They do not necessarily reveal. You have to
keep on reminding yourself that this is not self-evident and that
you have to ask questions. In fact, in the process of interviewing
one client who exhibited a disconnection between the description
in the report and the reality in the office, I learned for the first time
all kinds of hideous things about her relationship with her husband
which were later testified to at trial. Of course, all were met with
objections by the father's attorney, and it was only by happen-
stance that we had evidence to rebut his claims of recent
fabrication.
That leads me to another issue. I had the extreme pleasure of
having tried a very long case in front of Judge Silbermann. Fortu-
nately that did not involve domestic violence, but I cannot tell you
how rare and wonderful it is to try a case with a judge who under-
stands the rules of evidence, because when you deal with domestic
violence it is not always clear that the rules are understood.
For example, somebody - I think it was Judge Silbermann -
mentioned earlier that domestic violence has an impact on children
in a household even if they are not there when it happens; they do
not necessarily have to be witnesses. Unfortunately, I have to tell
you that there are judges sitting in New York County, and law
guardians working in New York County, who do not understand
this. In the record, I can show you chapter and verse of a judge in
New York County saying, "If it did not happen in front of the child,
you may not question the witness about it." That is scary. It hap-
pened not so long ago.
All of the comments that I make about forensic evaluators I
make about law guardians. I have never attended a law guardian
training about domestic violence. However, I have had the very
mixed and distressing experience of attending a training in judicial
seminars regarding domestic violence, and I am upset to report to
you that judges who go to these trainings are not attentive listen-
ers. They believe that they have nothing to learn. In fact the do-
mestic violence aspects of "Continuing Judicial Training" are
generally the least well attended, and it is only when judges are
dragooned in to listen that they actually come. They are disre-
804 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
spectful - they speak to each other and gossip about the next golf
round. I have been there and seen it. It is really upsetting.
The same questions must be asked in regard to law guardians. I
am not at all certain that Judge Kaye's directive, that every child in
a custody case in the state ought to have a law guardian, is a good
idea. In fact, let me be more direct. I think it is a well-intentioned,
but disastrous, policy which is creating a second and third tier of
authority and eviscerating the function of judicial discretion. It is
creating a kind of "pink-collar ghetto" in which the kinds of issues
that ought to be dealt with by a judge are delegated. By these is-
sues, I mean disputes regarding custody, visitation, supervision and
acquiring the subtle read on the personalities that is necessary to
make decisions in the case. These are the things that give the judge
the information, the hands-on, day-to-day knowledge that are
needed in dealing. with such matters. To delegate these functions
to law guardians, which many of the judges do, is really
unfortunate.
Let me say something else about law guardians. One of the
things that I did when I first had a law guardian was to get a copy
of Law Guardian Representation Standards.'65 It was published in
January of 1.994 by the New York State Bar Association. I read
this and a lot of cases. I have since had a bunch of experiences
with law guardians, so I know a lot more than I did then. What I
learned was not what I was getting.
In the trial of a custody and visitation case that consumed 3000
or more pages of record, the law guardian submitted an eight-and-
a-half-page report without a single citation to the record or a stat-
ute or case. I had very serious questions about what benefit was
being derived from such a report.
I understand that lip service to children is not going to protect
children. This again is from supreme court experience. I think that
the Legal Aid Society law guardians, many of them, should be be-
atified, if not sainted. There is just not enough money to go around
to pay everybody.
Let me make a disclaimer here. I am disqualified because of a
family relationship ever to be a law guardian, so there is no sour
grapes here. I cannot be one, so that should be clear.
A policy that requires law guardians in the supreme court in
each and every case is problematic. I am not saying they should
never be appointed; in severe, difficult cases, I think they can be
165. COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, N.Y. ST. B. Ass'N LAW GUARDIAN
REPRESENTATION STANDARDS, 2 CUSTODY CASES (1994).
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great. But, my experience so far, in a number of cases, is that they
are always on trial and you can never get them in the office. If they
are not returning my telephone calls, imagine how difficult it is for
a child to get his or her telephone calls returned. The view from
the trenches, frankly, is problematic, and I look forward to reform
in a way that allows us to really start focusing, particularly in the
area of domestic violence, on a way that brings people who do have
the background, experience and motivation, to work with these
very difficult cases.
I think I will stop there.
JUDGE SILBERMANN: We have some very interesting ques-
tions to discuss. For instance, if the court knows that there is do-
mestic violence, be it physical or not physical, if the child has never
witnessed it or never been a party to it, is it still appropriate not to
have supervised visitation? Let us talk about it after the break.
Rather than my asking more questions, does anyone else have
questions for the panel? Or maybe I should ask a question to start
with.
Let us assume there is this element of coercion and control,
which I believe domestic violence is, and assume there has been no
witnessing of it by the children in the'sense that they were not in
the home when it occurred. Let us say custody has not been con-
tested - that physical custody, physical residence, and decision-
making is going to be with the mother - but we are crafting a
visitation order. Professor, would an unsupervised visitation order
to the abuser father be of danger to the child? Is there something
that the court should be concerned with, or can we fashion our
usual weekend visitation order one week during the month?
MR. STARK: Most of the literature on this issue concentrates
on the statistical frequency with which domestic violence is linked
to harms to children - it describes how many kids are likely to be
hit deliberately or inadvertently by batterers; how witnessing af-
fects kids, and on modeling.
But even more important than these statistical links is trying to
figure out what is going on in the situation. It is one thing to say
that these problems overlap; it is another thing to understand how
they overlap. The Judge's question bears more on the second
problem than the first.
We use the term "tangential spouse abuse" to describe the fact
that in the typical case where there is battering and harm to the
children, the harm, either deliberately or inadvertently, is intro-
duced by the batterer as a stage in his trying to hurt or control the
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mother. In other words, the children are harmed as part of coer-
cive control. That is crucial to the question you are asking, and this
dynamic can be illustrated by other elements of the assessment -
a sudden interest in the child or in custodial issues the use of the
child to spy on the mother, and so forth.
This situation can be complicated. For instance, if the mother
figures out what is going on, she may take her anger out on the
child and this issue may replace the focus on her abuse, just what
the batterer wants. Remember, with the offender out of the house,
it is now safe for her to be angry and anger may be one of the few
emotions that keeps her sane.
I have one client who threw a shoe that hit her teen-ager in the
foot. The domestic violence issues immediately got back-staged
and the father got temporary custody of the teen-ager, even though
her actions were a response to tangential spouse abuse. She had
discovered that the child was taping her phone calls for the father.
She was cleaning his drawer, found the tapes and got furious. In
this situation, which parents bears the greater responsibility for
hurting the child? Here the father was controlling the child to con-
trol his wire. If you can hurt mom by hurting the child, after you
separate; you manipulate the child to exercise control. You can see
how complex this dynamic might get.
Unless you are doing an assessment which includes isolation ele-
ments, intimidation elements and control elements, as well as phys-
ical abuse, you are not going to be able to identify how or to what
extent the batterer is using visitation to manipulate the children or
to hurt and control the mother. That is the first answer.
A pointer in the assessment is that the effects of battering on
children are specific to their developmental age or stage, and need
to be associated accordingly. Let us say you have an eighteen-
month-old child whose primary life task is to maintain a sense of
continuity with a trusted parent, to have a secure sense of bounda-
ries. You may also know that even supervised visitation is going to
create a sense of intimidation and threat that infringes upon that
sense of continuity and trust. In this case, a good forensic evalua-
tion would reveal that supervised visitation, even though the child
may not have been physically hurt, is inappropriate, at least until
the mother feels secure, perhaps because the father has gotten
help.
This raises a question about Mary's earlier point. We certainly
do not want forensics to think the mother is obsessive. I have been
involved in a number of cases where the forensic evaluator has
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started by calling the mother delusional because she tells incredible
stories about her abuse. Then, when she provides documentation
that supports her version of events, she brings in the multi-volume
diaries she has kept, for instance, the diagnosis is changed delu-
sional to obsessive. We do not want her to have that kind of label.
Expressing anger or fear is an important part of a woman's re-
sponse to battering, however. I just finished working on a case
with Nancy Goldhill who heads the Family Division of New Jersey
Legal Services. In this case, the violence had ended some time
before, but the mother was still extremely fearful of her husband.
When she expressed this fear and, more importantly, when her
eight-year old son also expressed fear of his father and refused to
comply with visitation orders, the court appointed psychologist
concluded that the child was suffering "parental alienation syn-
drome." In essence, this means that the mother's fear is exagger-
ated and that she is responsible for alienating the child from his
father. Not only did the judge give his father extensive visitation,
then temporary custody pending a final resolution. He also or-
dered the boy held down (by five police officers) and taken to a
shelter for delinquent youth overnight. After the traumatic shelter
stay, the boy complied with the visitation order convincing the
judge and psychologist that they had been right.
How should the mother's fear have been handled? Though the
violence had ended, the fear was certainly real and based on subtle
signs of intimidation and not so subtle threats, though these were
hard to document. Moreover, the husband had sold the family res-
idence while the mother and son were in India, had no contact with
mother or child while they were away, refused to shelter them
when they returned and shown not the slightest interest in the boy
since was suddenly dedicated to pursuing custody, a probable sign
of tangential spouse abuse. Mary is right to caution her clients
about showing feelings that forensic experts may misinterpret in
ways that could be detrimental to their interests or the interests of
their children. But it would be far better if forensics was able to
reframe these cases so that the fear because intelligible to the
court.
So often, in these cases, if an attorney working with battered wo-
men will tell them not to be emotional, obsessive or fearful, and
not to show their anxiety. But, then you get to court, the batterer
walks in, and the woman hits the roof - she gets anxious and emo-
tional, and so forth. And who gets angry at her? Not just the
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judge. Her own attorney gets angry as well, because her own attor-
ney does not understand what is going on.
MR. STARK: One final point. Mary and Betty said that there
are some forensic reports that are out of kilter with the client you
know.
When I see a forensic report that has any relationship to the cli-
ent I know, I fall over in shock. That is not just because forensics is
ill-equipped. It is because these are not - at least this would be
my position - problems for which forensics in a traditional psychi-
atric sense are appropriate.
In New York, you probably know Judge Kaye is now consider-
ing, and the state is now considering, having assigned forensic clin-
ics that will do all forensics in family cases in New York State.
Some counties have that, right?
JUDGE SILBERMANN: No, that is not what we are consider-
ing. We are considering training, in other words, some sort of certi-
fication of the forensics that we have, similar to what we do for the
law guardians. I know that both Harriet and Katy in their respec-
tive departments are working on it.
Do you want to say something, Ms. Levinson?
MS. LEVINSON: Yes, Judge.
On the subject of forensics and qualifications, this is my fantasy:
that there would be a clearinghouse that would prevent well-
known frauds from passing the threshold of the courthouse. I can-
not tell you how much time I have had to spend preparing cross-
examination.
Certain guys are not qualified. In fact, the last time I dealt with
this particular doctor, who has a mail house degree, Judge Sax, it
was a blessing from above; I could not believe he did it - he re-
fused to qualify him.
Even if you have a lot of money, why should you have to throw
away money preparing examination of somebody who you know is
bogus?
Here is another idea. We should nominate people. Once they
are looked into and once they are found wanting, they will not be
allowed to testify in our courts, period.
JUDGE SILBERMANN: I agree.
MR. STARK: But also, what I am suggesting is that battering is
not a forensic problem in the traditional sense. It is not a psychiat-
ric problem, even if there are psychiatric issues involved. It is not a
mental health problem, even broadly understood. It has a whole
set of different parameters. So if you take somebody who is
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trained to see a certain way and present them with a problem that
does not look familiar, they will stretch the problem to fit what
they know. The best ones are often the worst ones. I mean, I have
seen the most experienced, skilled clinicians thrown off by these
cases.
We just lost a custody case in New Haven which the head of the
Clinical Social Workers Association testified on behalf of the dad.
The lawyer asked her, "If you believe there was domestic violence
in this case, would you reach a different conclusion?" She said,
"Absolutely." But she did not have the skills to identify the do-
mestic violence, to establish the credibility of the pattern, and the
two children that she was interviewing both consistently denied
that there was domestic violence in the case, even though we had a
mountain of evidence that said they had been exposed to it over
many, many years. They looked perfectly good on the surface.
From a strictly clinical forensic standpoint, the mother was lying,
the kids were doing well, everything else was fine. The only thing
we knew was that there was domestic violence, they had been ex-
posed to it repeatedly over the years, but had responded to it by
doing what we call identifying with the aggressor. They had denied
it, repressed it. They picked the stronger parent to identify with.
In Knock v. Knock,166 we showed that the nine-year-old girl who
wanted to be with the father and who was doing perfectly well in
school had been exposed to extreme domestic violence over an ex-
tended period and that she had a "healthy" reaction. We won, de-
spite the fact that several Yale psychiatrists testified that the father
was not ill. So, you see how very complicated these cases can be
for traditional forensics.
JUDGE SILBERMANN: You have been patient. Yes?
AUDIENCE: My question relates to this issue, and your answer
is a good preface to it. This is a question for how law guardians
and forensic evaluators should be questioning children in these sit-
uations in regard to the issue of recovered memory and implanted
memory. My question is for Ms. Weinberger and Ms. Law, and
then if Dr. Stark would comment on suggestions he would have for
ways of dealing with this: What kind of training and interviewing
techniques are you doing, and what would you suggest to supple-
ment that?
MS. WEINBERGER: I will tell you what we have done in our
Department. We have had various mental health experts. The
166. 621 A.2d 267 (Conn. 1993).
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chief child psychologists at North Shore Hospital and LIJ have lec-
tured, and we have had other experts in the City, including the
head of the Mental Health Clinic of the New York City Family
Court who spoke about the problems, what to look for, what does
not seem to be apparent, identifying with the aggressor. These are
clearly concepts that before this training none of us knew. Cer-
tainly I include myself with that as well. We sat there and heard
the most amazing things.
But it is a question really of reinforcing it and doing it more
often and having this training ongoing for all the departments and
all the counties and all the law guardians and all the assigned coun-
sel. As I said, our lawyers are representing these victims, not just
the children, and there is just a lot that has to be done.
It is different from anything we have ever done before. We
started to teach the law and then, when the law was changed in
1994 and we started to do training on it, what we did was we were
training on the law, we were training on the Family Violence Pro-
tection Act of 1994.
We met with some of the groups that sponsored this program
today, and they said to me, "Harriet, you are missing something.
Your guys now understand the law, they now know they can come
in and ask for support orders as well and orders of protection, but I
do not think you really understand the functions and the dynamics
of domestic violence."
That is what we have tried to do. And certainly, we are hopeful
that there will be suggestions.
MR. STARK: What Betty was saying I think was very wise. She
was saying it in a nice way. She was saying, "Look, this is not
about best interest; this is about justice." That is why sometimes it
is better to have a judge, even a foolish judge, make a decision than
it is to bring in a law guardian who is going to be overly dependent
upon a forensic report that is based on a mental health model. We
are often dealing with a social dilemma to which mental health ad-
aptations are made and sometimes it is better to keep mental
health experts in the wings.
I have a client who is a softball player. She pitches for a champi-
onship team that has not lost in fifteen years. Her boyfriend comes
out on the field when he is upset because she has looked at a man
in the crowd or she has done something else he does not like, and
he says to her, "Darling, you are cold, here's your sweatshirt." She
breaks out in a rash and she cannot pitch after that, though nor-
mally one of the greatest pitchers in the county.
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Looked at from a forensic standpoint, nothing has happened. In
fact, people think he is a gentle and caring man. But in the context
of the battering, when he gives her the sweatshirt he is saying to
her, "You are going to need this sweatshirt to cover your arms to-
night when I am finished with you." The terror and injustice are
the same whether he hits her that night or not. But forensic evalu-
ators would have no idea what is going on in that situation, and no
psychologist is going to figure that out.
I have another woman lying in Bellevue. Every time she wakes
up, she says her husband is trying to take her money from her, but
she lives on Park Avenue. The psychiatrist writes down that she is
persevering. In other words, he looks at her as just repeating the
same story again and again, so he gives her more and more medica-
tion. She keeps saying, "Just call, find out."
What we need is a very different kind of evaluation than tradi-
tional forensics can provide. When you are dealing with power and
control, you are not dealing with psychological dysfunction in the
traditional sense. And if you focus on the psychological dysfunc-
tion and then try to look back through that prism to understand the
much more complex situation, you will not see it.
So what we do is we do an assessment where we look at isolation
and control in great detail; we look at relations to friends, how they
are controlled, and stuff like that; intimidation in great detail; con-
trol - everything from money and food to coming and going, to
shopping and stuff. But 99.9 percent of the time, even if we tell
people these stories, they will not believe until they hear it them-
selves through intensive interviewing, it has taken us years of expe-
rience to understand what is going on in the microdynamics in
these families.
This is what puts the kids at risk. It is not merely that the kids
are screamed at or beaten, not that they are witnessing terrible vio-
lence, though they may be, but that they are living in an atmos-
phere of such total control that the space it takes for individuality
to emerge is not available. In other words, they cannot breathe
free air. And how does a traditional forensic evaluation see that?
MS. DOMONKOS: Thanks to Judge Silbermann and our won-
derful panelists. This is the end of the conference. Thanks so
much. We will see you next year.
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APPENDIX A
(Hypothetical)
Juliette is a twenty-one year old woman with an eighteen month
old baby, Amy. Juliette is Serbo-Croatian and joined her family in
the United States when she was nineteen. She is profoundly hard
of hearing and although she is able to speak, her speech is not al-
ways intelligible. Juliette entered into an arranged marriage
shortly after arriving in the U.S. She lives with her husband, Neil,
who is the father of the baby. Amy was born with a congenital
heart defect. She needs to see a pediatric cardiologist every three
months. Neil takes them both to the doctor because he does not
like to give Juliette money to pay for anything besides food. Neil
constantly belittles Juliette about her disability. He does not allow
her to attend special job training programs, telling her she will
never be able to get a real job anyway. Although he sponsored her
residency, Neil continually threatens that he will not go with her to
her interview with the Immigration and Naturalization Services.
On several occasions, the verbal and emotional abuse escalated
to physical violence. Once, Neil punched Juliette in the face,
knocking a tooth out. In her country, women would not dare call
the police. Juliette called her mother who immediately came over
and helped Juliette put ice on her mouth. Her mother told her she
should try to make the marriage work; her parents could not afford
to take care of Juliette any longer. Her uncles who arranged the
marriage would be very upset if they found out Neil was abusive.
Several months later, when Juliette was pregnant, she and Neil
were fighting. Neil kicked her several times in the stomach and
threatened her with a knife, saying he never wanted children, espe-
cially "immigrant deaf" children. Juliette was afraid for her unborn
child - this time she called the police. Juliette had bruises on her
side but the police did not take pictures. A neighbor heard Juliette
screaming for Neil to stop, that he was going to hurt the baby. The
police arrested Neil who was held in jail overnight and released the
next day. Juliette knew she could not get a job and wanted her
baby to have a father. She thought that if she pressed charges Neil
would remain in prison forever; she did not want that. Neil was
given an adjournment contemplating dismissal ("ACD") and Ju-
liette was issued a one year order of protection. No statement was
taken from the neighbor.
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Juliette was still afraid of Neil after this incident. She also be-
came very depressed, especially immediately after giving birth.
She refused to go with Neil for several of Amy's doctor appoint-
ments - and she never let Amy go with him alone. Recently, Neil
pushed Juliette to the ground while she was holding the baby. Ju-
liette broke her nose and Amy had a bruise under her eye. When
she tried to get up he kicked her legs and pulled her hair and threw
her to the ground again. Neil then grabbed the baby. Juliette
rushed into the bedroom, where Neil had taken the baby, to see if
the child was all right. The baby was screaming hysterically for her
mama; Juliette worried about her heart. She tried to comfort Amy
but Neil kept pushing her away.
While trying to get the baby, Juliette scratched Neil's face.
When Neil saw all the blood gushing from Juliette's nose he feared
she might call the police again, so he called the police first. Even
though Juliette's nose was swollen, red and still bloody, the police
only spoke with Neil. Juliette was so upset all she could do was cry
and hold onto Amy. The police arrested both Neil and Juliette.
They were not able to get a statement from Juliette because there
was no interpreter. The domestic violence police officer felt bad
for Juliette and let Juliette's mother take the baby. He explained
that he would lose his job if he did not arrest Juliette even though
her order of protection was still in effect from the last incident.
Juliette was held in jail overnight. Neil was charged with felony
contempt, attempted assault and harassment. Juliette was charged
with attempted assault and harassment. At the arraignment, mu-
tual temporary orders of protection were issued. Both parents
were assigned counsel, but Juliette only had a few minutes before
her case was called to meet her lawyer and was not able to commu-
nicate with her.
When her mother picked her up after the arraignment, she took
Juliette to St. Luke's Hospital. Juliette's injuries were drawn on a
body diagram as part of the hospital record. She spoke with a do-
mestic violence social worker who noted the history of domestic
violence and that Juliette had a safe place to stay. The social
worker suggested Juliette go to family court.
For several days Juliette was so depressed she did not go out.
About a week later she was able to go to family court to file for an
order of protection and custody. When she got to court, Juliette
noticed a table offering services to victims of domestic violence.
She approached the Courtroom Advocates Program ("CAP")
where a law student advocate took the time to sit and listen to
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Juliette. Together they filled out the information sheet for Juliette
to bring into the petition room. The advocate explained the differ-
ences between family and criminal court, including the different
remedies available to her in family court, like temporary child sup-
port. When she was ready to file the petition, the petition clerk
informed her that Neil had already filed family offense and custody
petitions. There was a temporary order of protection issued
against her. This was the first Juliette heard of this.
The CAP advocate went into the courtroom with Juliette. The
CAP advocate informed the Judge about Neil's prior criminal case
and the ACD, which was still in effect. The judge had no informa-
tion about the criminal court case itself but the order of protection
came up in the Order of Protection Registry. After reviewing Ju-
liette's allegations, the family court judge issued a temporary order
of protection and temporary custody to Juliette. The judge also
directed the Administration for Children's Services ("ACS") to in-
vestigate because Amy was present during the incident. Juliette
never reported the injury to Amy's eye. Juliette's application for
temporary child support was denied and she was told she would
have to come back to court another day to file a separate petition
for child support.
After intake, the advocate referred Juliette to one of the legal
service agencies who supervise CAP so Juliette could get a lawyer
as soon as possible. She also referred her to a social services pro-
gram equipped with special services for the disabled. The law stu-
dent advocate called her criminal court lawyer and advised her of
the history of violence and that Juliette had hospital and police
records. They decided it was all right for the student to call the
Assistant District Attorney and provide them with the hospital
records too.
Two weeks after Juliette appeared in family court, the ACS
worker came to investigate. Juliette tried to tell her about the
lengthy history of violence Neil perpetrated against her. The ACS
worker asked a lot of questions about the scratches on Neil's face
and Juliette's arrest. She also asked about whether Juliette was
able to take care of the child's heart condition given that she was
deaf. Juliette was too afraid to tell the worker about Amy's eye.
The next day the worker came back with the police and removed
the baby. A neglect petition was filed against Juliette for "engag-
ing in domestic violence, failing to protect the child and medical
neglect."
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There is now a child protective case against Juliette in family
court, as well as cross family offense and custody cases, in addition
to the cross complaints in criminal court.
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THE ROLE OF THE LAW GUARDIAN IN A
CUSTODY CASE INVOLVING
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Nancy S. Erickson*
INTRODUCTION
A law guardian for a child has an extremely difficult job, one
that arguably requires a higher degree of diligence than that of an
attorney representing a competent adult. Yet, under New York
law, the role of the law guardian for a child involved in a custody
case is not clearly defined.
When domestic violence is involved, the law guardian's role be-
comes crucial. As Judge Marjory Fields stated in 1994:
A law guardian may help provide protection for the child by
countering the tendency of battered women when they testify to
minimize the violence committed against them. The law guard-
ian can present the child's wishes to the court. Finally, the law
guardian will have greater credibility with the court when
presenting evidence of the impact of the violence on the child,
and the child's fears of the violent father,'
The role of the law guardian for the child in a custody case in-
volving domestic violence has been expanded as a result of the en-
actment of chapter 85 of the 1996 Laws of New York ("Chapter
85"),2 which requires that judges in child custody cases consider
domestic violence when determining the best interests of the child.
This article will outline the statutes, cases and rules governing
law guardians in New York and will discuss how Chapter 85 affects
the law guardian's role.
* J.D. Brooklyn Law School; LL.M., Yale Law School. The author was a profes-
sor of law for many years and has written several books and many articles on family
law, including child support, custody, marital property, domestic violence and adop-
tion. She is currently a solo practitioner concentrating in matrimonial and family law
and is employed as a Senior Trial Attorney by Legal Services for New York, Brooklyn
Branch. The views expressed in this article are solely the views.of the author and do
not necessarily reflect the positions or policies of Legal Services for New York.
1. Marjory D. Fields, The Impact of Spouse Abuse on Children and its Relevance
in Custody and Visitation Decisions in New York State, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
221, 247-48 (1994).
2. 1996 N.Y. Laws ch. 85, § 2.
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I. NEW YORK STATUTES, CASES AND RULES GOVERNING
LAW GUARDIANS
A. Definition of "Law Guardian"
Section 241 of the Family Court Act ("FCA") declares that "mi-
nors who are the subject of family court proceedings.., should be
represented by counsel of their own choosing or by law guardi-
ans."3 Some children who appear before the family court have
"counsel of their own choosing" either because their parents or
others pay for the lawyer or because the attorney volunteers.4 This
is not usually the case, however, and courts often must appoint a
law guardian for the child pursuant to the provisions of the FCA.
It is clear what a law guardian is not: a law guardian is not a
guardian ad litem,5 a forensics expert, a social worker or a finder of
fact. A law guardian is an attorney for a child, but the law guard-
ian's role may be different from the role of an attorney for an adult.
Many attorneys, parents and even judges do not understand the
role of a law guardian. There is a longer history of law guardians in
the family court than in the supreme court, so it is not surprising
that supreme court judges and practitioners more often misunder-
stand the role of a law guardian. It has even been remarked by
more than one matrimonial attorney that some supreme court
judges view the law guardian's role as akin to that of an assistant to
the judge. Although the law guardian can, of course, be of assist-
ance to the judge (as can forensics experts and social workers), this
is an inaccurate view of the law guardian's role.
Recognizing the difficulty of defining the law guardian's role,
Justice Lewis R. Friedman stated in 1994 that "[t]oday law guardi-
ans are essential to the functioning of the family court and serve
vital roles in all types of cases in that court and in supreme court
3. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT §241 (McKinney 1999).
4. Id. § 249 Practice Commentaries at 246 (McKinney 1999).
5. A guardian ad litem ("for the case") is a person, often but not necessarily a
lawyer, appointed by the court to represent the interests of an infant or an incompe-
tent person. For a good explanation of the differences between guardians ad litem
and law guardians, see N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Ethics
Opinion 656 (1993). In a particular case, it could be necessary for a child to have both
a guardian ad litem and a law guardian. For example, when a child needs to be the
plaintiff (petitioner) in a case and there is no parent capable of bringing the case on
the child's behalf, a guardian ad litem - perhaps a grandparent, aunt, uncle or other
relative or friend - may be needed to act in that role; additionally, a law guardian
may be necessary to act as the child's attorney.
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matrimonial and custody cases. Yet, there is, and has been, no
clear definition of the role of a law guardian."6
Judge Friedman reviewed the history of the use of "law guardi-
ans" to represent children in various types of proceedings, pointing
out that, "There is consensus in the legal community that there is
an essential duality of the law guardian's role - defense attorney
[advocate for the child's position] and guardian [to act in the best
interests of the child]." 7
He noted that although the legislature amended the FCA in
1970, the statutory definition of the role of the law guardian is still
not particularly helpful.8 Section 241 of the FCA merely states that
the law guardian is needed as "counsel to help protect [children's]
interests and to help them express their wishes to the court."9
This statutory definition does not assist the law guardian to de-
termine which of his/her roles should prevail - the role of advo-
cate or the role of guardian. In other words, the law guardian
needs to know whether he or she should argue for the result the
child wishes or the result the law guardian believes would be in the
child's best interests.
In his Practice Commentaries on section 241 of the FCA, Doug-
las J. Besharov states: "The convoluted wording of this section re-
flects: (1) the underlying ambivalence of its drafters about the role
of Law Guardians, and (2) the problems inherent in establishing
guidelines for the representation of young people of varying de-
grees of maturity."1
As a practical matter, when a child is very young, the law guard-
ian cannot determine the child's wishes. Conversely, the law
guardian would have a difficult time arguing against the result an
older teenager would want. However, most children are "in-be-
tween" - they can articulate their wishes to a certain extent, but
the law guardian may agree or disagree as to whether the child's
desired outcome would be in the child's best interests.
To solve such problems of ambiguity, a more useful definition of
the role of the law guardian is needed than the definition in section
241 of the FCA, and attempts are being made to develop such a
definition. There is now a Statewide Law Guardian Advisory
Committee ("LGAC"), chaired by Justice Edward 0. Spain of the
6. Marquez v. Presbyterian Hosp., 608 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1014 (Sup. Ct. 1994).
7. Id. at 1015.
8. See id.
9. N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 241.
10. Id. Practice Commentaries at 218.
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Appellate Division, Third Department, which was established in
1996 by the Office of Court Administration and meets periodically
to deal with issues relating to law guardians. The work of the
LGAC should lead to greater uniformity throughout the state with
regard to law guardians. In fact, the LGAC has already made one
recommendation for legislation that deals with payment of fees for
law guardians."
The LGAC has developed the following working definition of
the role of the law guardian:
The law guardian is the attorney for the child. In juvenile delin-
quency and persons in need of supervision proceedings, it is the
responsibility of the law guardian to vigorously defend the child.
In other types of proceedings, it is the responsibility of the law
guardian to diligently advocate the child's position in the litiga-
tion. In ascertaining that position, the law guardian must con-
sult with and advise the child to the extent and in a manner
consistent with the child's capacities. If the child is capable of
knowing, voluntary and considered judgment, the law guardian
should be directed by the wishes of the child, even if the law
guardian believes that what the child wants is not in the child's
best interests. However, when the law guardian is convinced
either that the child lacks the capacity for knowing, voluntary and
considered judgment or that following the child's wishes is likely
to result in a risk of physical or emotional harm to the child, the
law guardian would be justified in taking a position that is con-
trary to the child's wishes. In these circumstances, the law guard-
ian should report the child's articulated wishes to the court if the
child wants the law guardian to do so, notwithstanding the law
guardian's position."2
This definition of the law guardian's role expresses the inherent
duality of the child's desires versus the child's best interests, but
adds an additional factor that would weigh against advocating for
what the child articulates as her/his desires: the likelihood that
harm would result.
11. S. 7397, 221st Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1998) (dealing with payment of law guardian
fees by parents). The low fees paid to law guardians is a barrier to recruitment of a
sufficient number of well-trained attorneys to represent children.
12. LAW GUARDIAN PROGRAM ADMINISTRATIVE HANDBOOK 2-3 (emphasis ad-
ded). To contact the LGAC, write to Associate Justice Edward 0. Spain, Appellate
Division, Third Department, 61 State Street, Troy, New York 12180.
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B. The Law Guardian's Role In Private Custody Cases
Pursuant to Statutes and Court Rules
There is a dearth of statutory and regulatory authority relating to
law guardians. The courts have found it necessary to fill in the leg-
islative and regulatory blanks by a great deal of judicial interpreta-
tion. This judicial interpretation will undoubtedly be accelerated by
the declaration of Chief Justice Judith Kaye that a law guardian
should be appointed in any case involving the custody of a child.13
1. In Divorce Cases
The Domestic Relations Law does not deal with law guardians;
the statutes relating to law guardians are in the FCA instead, and
most are applicable in divorce and other matrimonial actions. 14
The Matrimonial Rules, however, do specifically refer to law
guardians in paragraph (f) of Section 202.16 of the Uniform Rules
for Trial Courts. Paragraph (f) deals with Preliminary Confer-
ences: "At the close of the conference... [t]he court may appoint
a law guardian for the infant children, or may direct the parties to
file with the court, within 30 days of the conference, a list of suita-
ble law guardians for selection by the court. ' 15 This implies that
early appointment of a law guardian in a divorce case is valuable.
2. In Family Court Cases
Non-marital children, 16 of course, are not affected by the Matri-
monial Rules. Their parents usually go to family court to deter-
mine custody and visitation disputes.' 7
Married parents can also seek judicial intervention in the family
court and tend to do so in many situations. For example, when
emergency relief is needed, the family court can grant such relief
on the same day when application for relief is made. Additionally,
because family court has no filing fees and tends to be more "user
friendly" to litigants without attorneys, married parents sometimes
go to family court when private counsel is unaffordable.
13. See Getman v. Getman, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 16, 1997, at 36 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 16, 1997).
14. See, e.g., Borkowski v. Borkowski, 396 N.Y.S.2d 962 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
15. McKinney's 1999 New York Rules of Court § 202.16(f)(3).
16. Non-marital children are those of parents who are not married. For further
discussion, see infra note 18.
17. But see Allen v. Farrow, N.Y. L.J., June 8, 1993, at 1, 22 (App. Div. June 8,
1993). Woody Allen and Mia Farrow were never married, but Allen was the father of
one of Farrow's children and adopted another child of Farrow. The custody battle
over their children was brought in supreme court.
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Once paternity is established, the FCA makes no distinction be-
tween marital and non-marital children with regard to custody and
visitation. This may mislead law guardians and others to believe
that the general practices regarding marital children should be rou-
tinely and uncritically applied to non-marital children when to do
so may not be in the best interests of those children. 18
The Matrimonial Rules are not applicable in family court even
when the parents are married, so there is no requirement of a Pre-
liminary Conference in family court (although many family court
judges do treat the first court appearance as a preliminary confer-
ence). There is also no statute or regulation directing exactly at
what point in the course of a family court proceeding a law guard-
ian should be appointed. If early appointment is valuable for mari-
tal children, it should be equally - if not more - valuable for
non-marital children.
Certain provisions concerning law guardians are contained in
Part 1 of Article 2 of the FCA. Section 241 of the FCA sets forth
the legislative findings and purpose; 9 section 242 defines "law
guardian" as "an attorney admitted to practice law in the state of
New York and designated under this part to represent minors pur-
suant to [FCA section 249]. " 20 Sections 243 and 244 describe the
process by which the Office of Court Administration or an Appel-
late Division may designate a legal aid society, an individual attor-
ney or a panel of attorneys to act as law guardians and the duration
of such designation.21 Sections 245 and 248 deal with compensa-
tion of law guardians and state appropriations therefor.22
Section 249 specifies when appointment of a law guardian is
mandatory and when it is discretionary. Law guardians must be
appointed in all child protective, juvenile delinquency and person
in need of supervision proceedings, among others.
18. For example, the non-marital child may not even know his or her father - he
might be a total stranger. Then it cannot be assumed that unsupervised visitation will
not be traumatic to the child. There are other concerns as well. See, e.g., Nancy S.
Erickson, Custody of Non-Marital Children, 14 WOMEN'S ADVOC. 1, 6-7, 11 (May
1993). With regard to domestic violence, the mother may have done the right thing -
she may have acted quickly to terminate the relationship with the father when he
abused her. Consequently, she may never have lived with him or may have lived with
him only briefly, so she may not have enough evidence of abuse to convince the court
that he might be dangerous to the child.
19. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acar § 241 (McKinney 1999).
20. Id. § 242.
21. See id. §§ 243-244.
22. See id. §§ 245, 248.
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In cases where appointment is not mandatory, including custody
cases between parents, Section 249 indicates that "the court may
appoint a law guardian to represent the child, when, in the opinion
of the ... judge, such representation will serve the purposes of this
act, if independent legal counsel is not available to the child. 23
C. The State Bar Association's Law Guardian
Representation Standards
The appointment of law guardians to represent children in court
proceedings was statutorily authorized in 1962. By the 1980's, the
New York State Bar Association (the "NYSBA") concluded that
"standards ... are needed to guide and assist law guardians in ful-
filling their essential obligations. ' 24 In 1988, the NYSBA adopted
and published law guardian standards for delinquency, PINS and
child protective cases. In 1994, standards for private custody or
visitation disputes were promulgated ("Standards" or "NYSBA
Standards").25
These Standards have not been enacted into law or officially
adopted by any Appellate Division as part of its rules; however,
three out of the four Departments use the Standards informally
and provide them to lawyers who take their law guardian training
programs. The Fourth Department developed its own "Guide-
lines" prior to the NYSBA Standards.26 There are some significant
differences between the Fourth Department Guidelines and the
NYSBA Standards, perhaps necessitating a careful review of these
documents by an appropriate body and development of uniform
statewide standards for law guardians.
The NYSBA Standards should be studied by any attorney who
accepts assignment as a child's law guardian and by any attorney
who takes part in a court proceeding in which a law guardian has
been assigned. Like the Code of Professional Responsibility,27 the
Standards contain short "standards," and also more lengthy "com-
23. Id. § 249.
24. N.Y. ST. B. Ass'N, LAW GUARDIAN REPRESENTATION STANDARDS, 2 Cus-
TODY CASES 1 (1994) [hereinafter LAW GUARDIAN STANDARDS].
25. See id.
26. The Fourth Department used many of the same sources as the drafters of the
Law Guardian Standards, and that Department uses its own standards in its law
guardian training. Its standards are entitled: "Guidelines for Law Guardians in the
Fourth Department" (Jan. 1987) (for Abuse and Neglect, Foster Care, Termination of
Parental Rights, PINS, and J.D.s), "Guidelines for Counsel for the Child in Custody
and Visitation Proceedings" (Apr. 21, 1992) and "Appeals Guidelines for Law Guard-
ians" (Nov. 9, 1993).
27. See N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1994).
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mentary. ' '28 The thrust of the Standards seems to encourage law
guardians to focus on the fact that their role is the role of an attor-
ney, no matter what the judge, the parties or any agency or other
person believes that law guardian's role is or should be.
For example, Standard B-6 states: "The law guardian should not
submit any pre-trial report to the Court, but may submit legal pa-
pers and argue orally based on the evidence. '29 The Commentary
to Standard B-6 states, in part:
In some cases, a law guardian has been requested by the Court
to submit a separate pre-trial report and recommendations, or
the attorney has elected to submit such a report .... The prepa-
ration and submission of such a report is inconsistent with the
purpose and role of an attorney. The law guardian is not a social
worker or a probation investigator .... Further, a law guardian
who submits a report and recommendation opens the possibility
that he will or should be called as a witness [which is] incompati-
ble with legal representation.3 °
D. Caselaw Interpreting the Role of the Law Guardian
Since 1962, interpretation of the role of the law guardian has
been developing in case law. Most case law deals with compensa-
tion of law guardians31 and various aspects of the law guardian's
role as an attorney in proceedings, such as the law guardian's par-
ticipation in the case and the application of attorney-client
privilege.
Another issue addressed in court opinions is the weight to be
given to the recommendations of both the law guardian and the
forensic evaluator. In two highly publicized (and highly criticized)
cases, Rentschler3 2 and Renee B.,3 3 the First Department chastised
the trial courts for failing to follow the recommendations of the
court-ordered forensic evaluator.34
However, the court may not abdicate to either the law guardian
or the forensic expert the court's own responsibility for deciding
the case. The court may and should decide a case contrary to the
28. See LAW GUARDIAN STANDARDS, supra note 24.
29. Id. at Standard B-6, commentary.
30. Id.
31. The role of the law guardian has also been analyzed in various legal publica-
tions. See, e.g., Joel Brandes, Compensation of Law Guardians, N.Y. L.J., July 28,
1998, at 3 (analyzing the role of the law guardian).
32. Rentscheler v. Rentschler, 611 N.Y.S.2d 523 (App. Div. 1994).
33. In re Renee B., 611 N.Y.S.2d 831 (App. Div. 1994).
34. See supra notes 32-33.
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positions expressed by a law guardian or forensic expert if the evi-
dence convinces the court that the law guardian's position is not
the position best supported by the evidence.35
E. Who Can Be a Law Guardian?
Theoretically, any attorney could assume the role of a law guard-
ian in a custody case. However, as a practical matter, because
many parents can barely afford to pay their own attorneys' fees,
much less the fees for attorneys for their children, many children
need to be assigned counsel. As discussed above, when a law
guardian is assigned under such circumstances, the law guardian is
paid by the State, pursuant to section 245 of the FCA.36
It is unclear whether courts have the authority to direct a parent
to pay the fees of a law guardian. However, since the adoption of
the matrimonial rules, many more supreme court judges have been
appointing law guardians in custody cases than in the past. Quite
often, judges direct one or both of the parties to pay the law guard-
ian's fees. The law guardian in such cases usually bills her/his time
by the hour, and the court directs the parents to share the fees on
some pro rata basis set by. the court; e.g., sixty percent by the
mother and forty percent by the father, fifty/fifty or some other
split.
Some experts take the position that since neither the matrimo-
nial rules nor the Domestic Relations Law provides for the pay-
ment of the law guardian's fees, "legislation is needed to authorize
such awards. ' 37  Nevertheless, judges continue to make such
orders.
F. Training of Law Guardians
Aiding in the administrative issues inherent in the appointment
process, each judicial department has a law guardian program.38
35. See Chait v. Chait, 638 N.Y.S.2d 426 (App. Div. 1995).
36. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 245 (McKinney 1999).
37. Brandes, supra note 31, at 3. See also supra note 11 for a bill that would ac-
complish that result.
38. The directors'of the four programs are as follows:
Katherine Law, Esq., Appellate Division, First Department, 27 Madison Av-
enue, New York, New York 10010 (212-779-7880); Harriet Weinberger, Esq.,
Appellate Division, Second Department, 45 Monroe PI, Brooklyn, New
York 11201 (718-875-1300 x202); John E. Carter, Jr., Appellate Division,
Third Department, P.O. Box 7288, Capitol Station, Albany, New York 12224
(518-486-4567); and Tracy M. Hamilton, Appellate Division, Fourth Depart-
ment, 50 East Avenue, Suite 403, Rochester, New York 14604 (716-530-
3170).
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Because there are very few statutes and rules governing law guard-
ians, the director of each law guardian program has a great deal of
leeway in setting up the program and administering it, within the
broad guidelines of the provisions of the FCA and the applicable
rules.
Law guardian training is usually done on a Departmental basis.
In the more populous departments, the counties often have their
own training as well. The lengths of the training programs and their
contents vary significantly among departments, with the Third De-
partment having at this time the most extensive and structured
program.
Domestic violence issues are usually not covered in the basic
training materials, but that subject is often handled by means of
special seminars and meetings for law guardians. For example, in
October 1998 the Nassau County Law Guardian Advisory Com-
mittee and the Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department,
sponsored a seminar on Domestic Violence for members of the
Nassau County Law Guardian Panel. Speakers addressed such top-
ics as relevant legislation (including Chapter 85 of the Laws of
1996), the traumatic psychological impact of domestic violence on
children, interviewing techniques for law guardians, the dynamics
of domestic violence and coercive control, battered women's shel-
ters and their services for children, and other community resources.
Special seminars, however, may not be sufficient. Uniform do-
mestic violence training is necessary in all departments. Careful
review of the training materials for law guardians to assure cover-
age of domestic violence is called for so that law guardians under-
stand the history, interpretation and impact of Chapter 85 and the
problem of domestic violence more generally.
II. CHAPTER 85 OF THE LAWS OF 1996 AND ITS EFFECT ON THE
ROLE OF THE LAW GUARDIAN
A. Chapter 85: Language, History and Purpose
New York State recently joined the overwhelming majority of
states that recognize the need to protect children against spouse/
partner abusers.39 Legislation ensuring that judges in child custody
and visitation cases consider domestic violence when determining
39. "[A]t least 38 states and the District of Columbia have laws making domestic
violence a relevant factor in custody decisions by the courts." Legislative Memoran-
dum in Support of Chapter 85 [hereinafter "MIS"]. Since that time, several other
states have also required courts to consider domestic violence in custody
determinations.
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the best interests of a child was sponsored by Representative He-
lene Weinstein and Senator Stephen Saland and was enacted into
law as Chapter 85.40
1. The Language of Chapter 85
Chapter 85 amends section 240(2) of the Domestic Relations
Law by adding the following language:
Where either party to an action concerning custody of or a right
to visitation with a child alleges in a sworn petition or complaint
that the other party has committed an act of domestic violence
against the party making the allegation or a family or household
member of either party, as such family or household member is
defined in article eight of the family court act, and such allega-
tions are proven by a preponderance of the evidence, the court
must consider the effect of such domestic violence upon the best
interests of the child, together with such other facts and circum-
stances as the court deems relevant in making a direction pursu-
ant to this section.41
Chapter 85 also amends the FCA to make this same language ap-
plicable in family court custody and visitation proceedings.
2. History and Purpose of Chapter 85
Laws enacted in many other states similar to Chapter 85 create a
presumption against custody to the batterer and require the bat-
terer to prove he is not a danger before unsupervised visitation
may be ordered. Congress, the American Bar Association and the
National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges have all rec-
ommended this type of law.4z
40. See 1996 N.Y. Laws ch. 85.
41. Id. (emphasis added). It should be noted that the allegations of domestic vio-
lence need to be proven only by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, it is not
necessary to bring a criminal charge against the abuser, and the standard used by the
family court or supreme court is simply the ordinary civil standard. This matter may
seem too rudimentary to require discussion; however, some judges seem to be looking
for a higher standard of proof - such as clear and convincing proof or even that
beyond a reasonable doubt - before they will make a finding of domestic violence.
It is not necessary for the victim to meet such a high standard, and a court cannot
properly require her to do so. It should also be noted that the perpetrators of domes-
tic violence can be female and the victims can be male. However, since the National
Institute of Justice reports that 95% of victims are female and 95% of perpetrators
are male, we will use "she" to refer to the victim and "he" to refer to the perpetrator.
42. See H.R. Cong. Res. 172, 101st Cong. (1990); ABA, THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE ON CHILDREN (1994); NATIONAL COUNCIL OF Juv. & FAM. CT. JUDGES,
FAMILY VIOLENCE: A MODEL STATE CODE §§ 401-406 (1994).
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Although Chapter 85 is weaker than those laws, it will provide
valuable guidance to judges in child custody cases, cautioning them
that custody to a spouse abuser is rarely in the best interests of the
child, and that limitations on visitation may be necessary to protect
both the child and the abused parent.
Some judges may still look at spouse abuse in a very dangerous
manner, expressing this simplistic view: "He hit her, but he never
hit the kids, so the domestic violence should have nothing to do
with the custody case." Judges, attorneys (including law guardi-
ans), and even forensic evaluators may fail to recognize the many
forms that domestic violence can take, apart from any physical as-
saults on the body of the victim.
B. The Effects of Domestic Violence
Domestic violence is a "pattern of coercive control," which
"comprises a pattern of assaultive and controlling behaviors, in-
cluding physical, sexual, psychological, financial and/or emotional
attacks on a member of an intimate relationship by her partner. 43
Thus, domestic violence may and sometimes does exist without any
actual physical assaults. This is especially the case in recent years,
when the general population has become more educated on the
issue of domestic violence, so that abusers are aware that to avoid
incarceration they must be careful not to actually hit their victims,
especially in places where bruises will be obvious.
Those who would define domestic violence as limited to physical
assault (or threats thereof) might conclude that if the perpetrator
of domestic violence never hit the children, his violence toward his
partner/victim should be ignored in a custody case. Decades of
study and experience, however, strongly indicate that such igno-
rance is wrong. New York case law prior to Chapter 85 already
indicated that domestic violence - especially when it is witnessed
by the child - should be considered a significant factor in custody
and visitation proceedings. 4 Even then some judges held that
43. Lois Schwaeber, Domestic Violence: The Special Challenge in Custody and
Visitation Dispute Resolution, 10 DIVORCE LITIG. 141, 141 (Aug. 1998), reprinted in
the materials used in the Second Department's Law Guardian Continuing Legal Edu-
cation Program on October 22, 1998, in Nassau County.
44. See Sheridan v. Sheridan, 611 N.Y.S.2d 688 (App. Div. 1994) (justifying reloca-
tion); Keating v. Keating, 538 N.Y.S.2d 286, 291(App. Div. 1989) (denying visitation);
Anonymous G. v. Anonymous G., 517 N.Y.S.2d 985, 988 (App. Div. 1987) (requiring
supervised visitation); Molier v. Molier, 386 N.Y.S.2d 226 (App. Div. 1976) (denying
visitation).
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spousal abuse demonstrated that the abuser is "not a fit parent to
whom the welfare of a child should be entrusted."45
1. Harm to Children Who Witness Abuse or Reside in a
Violent Home
The legislative Memorandum in Support ("MIS") of the bill that
became Chapter 85 of the Laws of 1996 points out:
Children who have witnessed their fathers beating their mothers
have suffered from delayed development and sleep disturbances
and feelings of fear, helplessness, depression, guilt and anxiety.
Studies indicate that these children suffer somatic symptoms as
well, with a higher incidence of colds, sore throats, hospitaliza-
tions and bedwetting than children from non-violent homes.46
Chapter 85 was intended to expand existing New York precedent
"by acknowledging that children may also be harmed even when
they do not actually witness the violence. '4 7 The MIS indicates
that the legislature based this conclusion on studies of how domes-
tic violence affects children. "A child does not have to directly wit-
ness the attacks on a parent to suffer emotional trauma. Studies
have indicated that children raised in a violent home have reac-
tions of shock, fear and guilt. Such children also have impaired
self-esteem and developmental and socialization difficulties. 4 8
2. Risk of Child Being Abused by the Abuser
The legislature also recognized that children may be at increased
risk of being abused themselves if custody is given to a parent who
abused the other parent.49 Studies show that "a high correlation
has been found between spouse abuse and child abuse. '50
Even if there is no evidence that the spouse abuser has abused
his children in the past, it is likely he will do so in the future, for at
least two reasons. First, research has shown that once the victim-
spouse is no longer available to the abuser, he often transfers his
45. Farkas v. Farkas, N.Y. L.J., July 13, 1992, at 31 (Sup. Ct. July 13, 1992).
46. MIS, supra note 39, at 3 (citations omitted).
47. Id. at 2.
48. Id. at 2-3 (citing DEL MARTIN, BATrERED WIVES chs. 6-7 (1976); Westra &
Martin, Children of Battered Women, 10 MATERNAL-CHILD NURSING J. 41, 49
(1981)).
49. See, e.g., id. at 3 (emphasizing the spouse abuse-child abuse correlation).
50. Id. (citing Rosenbaum & O'Leary, Children: The Unintended Victims of Mari-
tal Violence, 51 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 692 (1986); LENORE E. WALKER, THE
BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984)).
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abuse to the children.51 Contrary to popular myth, abuse does not
automatically end when the victim leaves the abuser. In fact, abuse
often increases when the victim tries to escape from her abuser.5 2
Spousal abuse is not a matter of a partner suddenly getting angry
and swinging; rather, an abusive partner is abusive because he
wants to maintain control over the victim or victims. The abuser
may use physical force and threats of physical force, but often also
uses mental and emotional abuse or threats to attain the same goal.
If the victim leaves, the abuser experiences a loss of control that
often triggers an attempt to regain control; most often, this leads to
increased abuse. 3 If the victim is protected from abuse, the perpe-
trator may transfer the abuse to the children, perhaps because they
are identified with the victim. 54
A spouse abuser who never abused the children during the
spousal abuse may abuse the children thereafter. The risk of abuse
is greater for older children than for younger children.55 Thus, if
the children are placed in the custody of the spouse abuser, every
year that they get older increases the risk that they will be abused
by him.
Courts must also be careful to protect children of spouse abusers
even if the abuser does not get custody. The children may be en-
dangered if the abuser has unsupervised visitation with the
children.56
3. Risk of Intergenerational Violence
Society at large is endangered if a battering parent is permitted
to raise children. According to the MIS, "children who are raised
in violent homes learn to use physical violence as an outlet for an-
51. See, e.g., DEL MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 76-77 (rev. ed. 1981) (mentioning
that an abuser may "strike out" at others in response to victim's attempt to leave).
52. See id. at 76-79.
53. See, e.g., Daniel Saunders, Child Custody Decisions in Families Experiencing
Woman Abuse, 39 Soc. WORK 51, 52 (Jan. 1994), reprinted in the materials used in the
Second Department's Law Guardian Continuing Legal Education Program on Octo-
ber 22, 1998, in Nassau County.
54. See id.
55. See MIS, supra note 39 (citing Hershey, Domestic Violence: Children Reared
in Explosive Homes 9 (1982) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)); see also
Fields, supra note 1, at 222. According to one study, among children of battered wo-
men, 17.6% are abused in the under 3 year old age group; 37.5% were abused in the
3-5 year old group and 41.5% of children 6-11 were abused. See MIS, supra note 39,
at 3.
56. See Saunders, supra note 53, at 155-58.
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ger and are more likely to use violence to resolve conflicts. ' 57 One
New York supreme court case emphasized that "a man who en-
gages in the physical and emotional subjugation of a woman is a
dangerous role model from whom children must be shielded."58
4. Manipulation of the Legal System
Abusers are usually conniving and manipulative. They can and
will use any means available to them - including the legal system
- in order to keep their victims in their power. Spouse abusers are
also likely to be highly persuasive and even charming,59 as evi-
denced by the initial control they maintained over their spouse-
victims. They will try to misuse the legal system with this charisma
in an attempt to convince the judge, the law guardian, the forensics
evaluator and all other court actors to look favorably upon them.
Spouse abusers are often even more effective at controlling their
children than their spouses, because of the age and dependency of
the children. Many children identify with the abuser and claim a
preference to live with him, even though this would not be in their
best interests. The children may identify with the abuser in the
hope that doing so will best protect their mother, themselves or
other siblings. Other times their identification stems from their in-
ternalization of the abuser's negative put-downs of their mother.60
In almost all of these situations, a custody award to the abuser will
only further harm the child and increase the likelihood of in-
tergenerational transmission of domestic violence.
Thus, abusers present serious difficulties to the legal system,
which presumes that all persons are "innocent until proven guilty"
and assumes that all litigants stand on the same footing. To mix
metaphors, it is important to remember that the playing field is not
57. MIS, supra note 39, at 3 (citation omitted). Batterers themselves are likely to
come from violent homes. See id. (citing Hilberman & Munson, Sixty Battered Wo-
men, 2 VICTIMOLOGY 460, 1337 (1978)). Furthermore, male children of violent par-
ents are ten times more likely to beat their wives. See id. (citing STRAUS ET AL.,
BEHIND CLOSED DOORS (1980)).
58. Farkas v. Farkas, N.Y. L.J., July 13, 1992, at 31 (Sup. Ct. July 13, 1992) (empha-
sis added).
59. See WALKER, supra note 50; David Adams, Identifying the Assaultive Husband
in Court: You Be the Judge, BOSTON B.J., July/Aug. 1989, at 23; Joan Zorza, The
Gender Bias Committee's Domestic Violence Study: Important Recommendations and
First Steps, BOSTON B.J., July/Aug. 1989, at 13. See also Saunders, supra note 53, at
53.
60. See, e.g., Schimler v. Schimler, 611 N.Y.S.2d 559, 560 (App. Div. 1994) (imply-
ing that father's constant denigration of mother in presence of the son created an
unhealthy emotional environment).
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level where there has been domestic violence - the abuser is and
has been the winner for a long time and the victim has been abused
and intimidated.
The abuser is likely to be confident, assertive, calm and "in con-
trol." He puts on a good appearance in court. Conversely, the vic-
tim is likely to be frightened, shaken, nervous, uncertain and often
depressed.61 Knowing that the abuser has successfully managed to
manipulate others to maintain control, the victim realistically fears
the abuser can also manipulate the legal system; consequently, the
victim may appear paranoid when she is merely fearful that the
abuser will again be successful in the manipulation of those around
him. Judges, law guardians, attorneys, forensics evaluators and all
other actors in the legal and social services system must be aware
of this problem in order to stop the cycle of manipulation.
C. The Effects of Chapter 85 on the Law Guardian's Role in
Custody Cases
In all custody cases, whether or not domestic violence is in-
volved, one of the functions of the law guardian, as the child's at-
torney, is to investigate the facts of the case in order to determine
what custody/visitation order would be in the best interests of the
child.62 Even prior to the enactment of Chapter 85, some judges
wisely urged law guardians to take a very active role in custody
cases involving domestic violence. Chapter 85 emphasizes this
message in order to prevent an abuser from manipulating the court
into granting him custody when it would not be in the child's best
interests.
Many factors need to be taken into consideration in determining
the best interests of a child. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act ("UMDA"), 63 upon which many states' laws are modeled, con-
tains a list of factors that includes domestic violence as one of six
61. See, e.g., Saunders, supra note 53, at 53-54.
62. In Braiman v. Braiman, 407 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1978), which is well-known for its
holding that joint custody is inappropriate where parents are "antagonistic and em-
battled," there apparently was no law guardian for the three children. Id. at 449. The
Court of Appeals, reversing and remanding for a new hearing, suggested that the trial
court "may wish to consider appointing a qualified guardian ad litem for the children,
who would be charged with the responsibility of close investigation and exploration of
the truth on the issues and perhaps even of recommending by way of report alterna-
tive resolutions for the court to consider." Id. at 452 (citations omitted) (emphasis
added). The Court did not indicate why a guardian ad litem rather than a law guard-
ian was being suggested. See id.
63. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT §§ 101-506 (amended 1973).
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factors to be considered.64 The New York State Legislature has
never before specified factors, but has left the task of deciding
what is in the best interest of the child to the courts.65
In 1996, the legislature specified that there is one factor the
courts must consider - domestic violence.66 If domestic violence
is proven by a preponderance of the evidence, then the court must
consider the effects of such domestic violence upon the best inter-
ests of the child.67
The legislative history of Chapter 85 indicates that domestic vio-
lence should be a "weighty" factor in the determination of child
custody and visitation.68 The legislature did not specify exactly
how much weight is to be placed on domestic violence as a factor in
comparison with other factors. However, it is safe to say that the
legislature considered domestic violence a very important factor,
since it is the only factor specifically listed in the statute.
Chapter 85 has a profound impact on-the role of the law guard-
ian. However, the degree of impact can only be calculated when
the duties of a law guardian are delineated. The most detailed de-
scription of the role and duties of the law guardian in New York
State is found in Volume II of the NYSBA Standards.69 Although
the Standards are not "law," they are relied upon to a great degree
by each of the appellate division law guardian programs. The re-
mainder of this article will review the duties of the law guardians as
set forth in the Standards and will analyze the impact Chapter 85
may have on these duties.
The Standards are divided into four parts, dealing with the four
stages of a custody case: Preliminary Stages, Pre-Trial, Trial and
Post-Trial. This article will address the standards law guardians are
expected to comply with at each stage.
1. Preliminary Stages
Part A of the Standards is devoted to the Preliminary Stages of
the litigation and contains nine standards. Standard A-1 states,
64. One of the factors listed in the UMDA is "the physical violence or threat of
physical violence by the child's potential custodian, whether directed against the child
or directed against another person, but witnessed by the child." Id.
65. See, e.g., Eschbach v. Eschbach, 451 N.Y.S.2d 658, 660 (1982).
66. See 1996 N.Y. Laws ch. 85, § 2.
67. See id.
68. See MIS, supra note 39, at 1.
69. See LAW GUARDIAN STANDARDS, supra note 24.
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"The law guardian should obtain and examine every available rele-
vant document. 7
0
In every case, according to the Commentary to A-i, the law
guardian should obtain and examine all relevant court documents,
including documents in "any prior cases involving the family. 71
Thus, in a custody case where domestic violence is alleged, the law
guardian should obtain and examine all court documents in any
prior (or concurrent) family offense, divorce or paternity case, for
example.
What if the only proceeding between the parties is a family of-
fense proceeding - should a law guardian be appointed for the
children? It is not yet routine for a law guardian to be appointed in
a family offense proceeding. However, it should be routine, except
in cases where a recent custody order to the victim already exists.
If there is no custody order, or if the abuser has obtained custody,
it is likely that a custody case will soon be commenced and perhaps
a law guardian will be needed. The intent underlying Chapter 85, as
evidenced by the legislative history, leads to the conclusion that a
law guardian should be appointed for any family offense case
where the family contains minor children, regardless of whether
custody or visitation is an issue at that time.
Therefore, if there are concurrent family offense and custody
proceedings, and a law guardian has been appointed to the latter,
that law guardian should also be appointed for the family offense
proceeding. If the court failed to take such action and the law
guardian decided that he or she should attend or participate in any
hearings in the family offense proceeding, the court should permit
and encourage such involvement. Although it could be argued that
the law guardian could simply await the outcome of the proceed-
ings, or get the transcripts of the hearings, where the credibility of
witnesses is concerned, there is no substitute for attending the
hearings. Additionally, the law guardian's active participation
could bring out facts that otherwise might not be uncovered.
Once the law guardian obtains the relevant documents, they
must be carefully analyzed. Although some of the documents may
be misleading, the law guardian should attempt to determine the
true facts. An obvious example is a typical divorce judgment,
which often indicates that the divorce was granted on a relatively
70. Id. at 5.
71. Id.
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innocuous ground, such as constructive abandonment.72 This might
lead the law guardian to assume that the divorce complaint, and
counterclaims, if any, are superfluous. However, as many practic-
ing attorneys know, domestic violence victims of severe abuse will
often agree to grounds so as not to anger the abuser any further.
Thus, the law guardian should look at the victim's original divorce
complaint, which may often contain allegations of cruelty. These
allegations are often the true facts in the case.
Standard A-2 states, "[t]he law guardian should interview and
observe the child to ascertain the detailed facts relevant to custody,
the child's wishes, the need for independent evaluations and the
need for or appropriateness of interim judicial relief. 7 3
The Commentary to Standard A-2 states, in part, as follows:
An initial client interview is of course crucial. The child's per-
ceptions and factual descriptions concerning the role, relation-
ship and specific activities of each parent . . . are critical to
formulating a law guardian position and structuring a litigation
strategy .... Of equal importance may be the child's knowledge
and perceptions concerning intra-family relationships, such as
conflicts between his or her parents[.]74
The Commentary goes on to state that the "responsibility [of the
law guardian] is to secure and verify every salient fact. '75 In truth,
this standard simply compels the law guardian to perform for his/
her client the same investigation that he or she would do for an
adult client. Ideally, the attorneys for the parties should bring out
all the facts, which would reduce the burden on the law guardian.
However, perfection cannot be expected, particularly if one litigant
is poor, traumatized by spousal abuse and fearful.
Standard A-3 states:
The child should be advised, in terms the child can understand,
of the nature of the proceedings, the child's rights, the role and
responsibilities of the law guardian, the attorney-client privilege,
the court process, the possible consequences of the legal action,
and how the child may contact the law guardian at any time dur-
ing the course of the proceedings.76
72. See generally N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(7) (McKinney 1999) (defining con-
structive abandonment).
73. See LAW GUARDIAN STANDARDS, supra note 24, at 6.
74. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 10.
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The Commentary to Standard A-3 summarizes this canon by stat-
ing that: "The initial interview should not be a one-way street.""
While the law guardian must obtain information from the child, the
child must also obtain information from the law guardian. The
Commentary recognizes that this may be a difficult task.78 It also
stresses that the law guardian should attempt to help the child un-
derstand that the law guardian is available to the child by phone,
mail or in person throughout the proceedings, which may last a
long time.79
Standard A-4 states, "The parents' or other party's attorneys
should be advised of the role and responsibilities of the law guard-
ian, including the law guardian's legal standing in the proceedings,
and the law guardian's responsibilities to participate fully to pro-
tect the child's interests and to express the child's wishes."'80 This is
an extremely important standard. Often attorneys do not under-
stand that the law guardian, as the child's attorney, must be served
with all documents and has a right, as the Commentary to Standard
A-4 indicates, to "participate in conferences, to introduce evidence,
call witnesses, cross-examine other parties' witnesses and to advo-
cate" the position s/he deems appropriate for the particular child.81
Some attorneys view the law guardian as having a lesser role as a
mere neutral observer. Others view the law guardian as assuming
the role of a forensic examiner, therapist or social worker for the
child, or a referee to hear and report to the judge. The Commen-
tary indicates that the attorneys in a case must realize that the law
guardian is "an attorney representing a party in interest. 8 2
Attorneys sometimes find the law guardian's role difficult to un-
derstand, especially in private custody cases, where they may as-
sume that the best interests of the child will emerge and become
apparent to the court from the advocacy of the two parents' attor-
neys, and that the court will rule for one parent (sole custody with
visitation to the other) or for both (some kind of joint custody).
They tend to forget that the court could become convinced that
neither parent is fit and recommend that charges be filed against
them by child protective services.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. Id. at 11.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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Similarly, the child could have wishes and needs that the parents
fail to express or for which they fail to advocate. For example, as a
result of being abused, a battered mother may be so depressed and
frightened that she gives in to the abuser's demands for overnight
visitations with the child, although the child may be expressing to
the law guardian a fear of or lack of readiness for such overnight
visits.
This is not to say that the child will always express his/her con-
cerns to the law guardian. It is quite common in domestic violence
cases, for example, that the child or children are so traumatized by
the abuser or so much under his control that they do not feel safe
speaking with anyone about their true feelings. Sometimes threats
are made by the abuser that he will hurt or even kill the child, the
mother or someone else who is dear to the child if the child reveals
the truth to anyone. Thus, it often takes a good deal of patience,
careful listening and analysis of all the available data in order for
the law guardian to determine what position should be taken in
order to protect the child's interests when the child may not be
expressing his or her true wishes to anyone.
Standard A-5 states, "The child's present home and any pro-
posed home should be visited by the law guardian."83 This stan-
dard is often ignored, especially in localities where a home visit
might be inconvenient for the law guardian. Sometimes the law
guardian relies on home visits by child protective services, proba-
tion or some other individual or agency worker. This reliance is
unwise. The Commentary to Standard A-5 denominates the law
guardian's home visit as an "important element in determining the
child's interests and formulating a law guardian position,"'84
because
[t]he physical characteristics of the home may be ascertained
and the child may be observed in his or her usual environment.
Frequently, the parenting roles of the litigants may be clarified
by carefully observing the home and by discussing with the child
and with the parent the different aspects of the household.85
In a case involving domestic violence, the layout of the abuser's
household may reveal the abuser's self-absorption and failure to
relate to the child with respect and caring. For example, the abuser
may arrange his household space in such a way that the child has
very little space of his own - a bed in someone else's room, a part
83. Id. at 13.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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of a closet in another room, and no space in which to do his home-
work or be involved in his own interests or activities. Other as-
pects of the household may indicate the abuser's typical need for
control, such as restricting others' access to the telephone, to por-
tions of the house and even sometimes to the refrigerator.
Standard A-6 states, "The law guardian should interview the par-
ties and any other relevant person, including any one with relevant
knowledge of the child or the parties, as well as any potential fac-
tual or expert witnesses. '8 6 The Commentary lists many persons
who should be interviewed, in addition to the parents themselves:
collateral relatives, school officials, child care personnel, mental
health professionals and other potential witnesses. 87 The Com-
mentary advises, "[i]nterviews may be of special importance in
light of the limited discovery techniques customarily employed in
custody cases." 88
In cases involving domestic violence, it is often surprising how
many persons who might be expected to side with the abuser do
not do so when contacted by a person who is concerned about the
child. The abuser's parents, for example, sometimes are quite pro-
tective of their grandchildren even when to do so requires them to
turn their backs on their own son. Siblings of the abuser who wish
to distance themselves from him may acknowledge the violence he
has demonstrated toward his wife and toward others.
On the other hand, those who wish to protect the abuser from
being found out may appear truthful at first. They may simply
deny the existence of any abuse or indeed of any household dis-
putes at all. Under questioning, however, they may reveal their
lack of candor in various ways, even if they continue to deny the
abuse.
Standard A-7 states, "The law guardian should apply for appro-
priate court orders to protect the child or obtain temporary relief,
determine visitation, and limit repeated or unnecessary interviews
or evaluations. '89
Standard A-8 states, "The law guardian should participate when-
ever any party requests an interim court order which may affect the
child." 90 These standards underscore the guardian's role as a "full
86. Id. at 14.
87. Id. at 15.
88. Id. at 14.
89. Id. at Standard A-7.
90. Id. at Standard A-8.
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participant in the proceedings, assigned to represent the child's in-
terests,"'" An example provided in the Commentary is that
[w]here child abuse is alleged in the course of a custody action,
the law guardian should move quickly for independent evalua-
tions and may need to apply to stay the custody action while the
child protective service investigates abuse or neglect allegations.
When appropriate, the law guardian should also determine the
need for and immediately seek a protective order limiting visita-
tion or contact between child and the alleged abuser.92
A law guardian should be especially attuned to the possibility, in
a case where one parent has abused the other, that the children
may fear the abuser or that when the abusive parent can no longer
abuse his spouse, he may transfer his abuse to the child.93
Standard A-9 states, "When appropriate, independent court or-
dered evaluations or studies should be requested." 94 This Standard
speaks for itself. According to the Commentary, independent eval-
uations could include "psychiatric, psychological, educational,
medical, and social work evaluation.... 95 Forensic evaluations in
custody cases are quite often ordered by the court sua sponte. If the
court does not do so, it might be appropriate for the law guardian
to request evaluations.
Where domestic violence is an issue, it would be important for
the law guardian to request that the evaluator have training and
experience in the area of domestic violence. This would be to the
benefit of both parents, because an evaluator with training and ex-
perience in domestic violence will be more capable of determining
whether or not abuse took place, if so, what impact it had and will
have in the future on the child, and what plans for parental contact
with the child would be in the child's best interests.
If the issue of domestic violence were ignored by the forensic
evaluator, the evaluation would have little usefulness to the law
guardian or to the court, and a second evaluation might be neces-
sary. This would not be good for the child. As the Commentary to
Standard A-8 states: "While evaluation may be necessary, the
child should not be subjected to continuing rounds of visits with
different experts. . . ." Thus, care should be taken to appoint a
knowledgeable evaluator in the first instance.
91. Id. at 16.
92. Id. at 17.
93. See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
94. See LAw GUARDIAN STANDARDS, supra note 24, at Standard A-9.
95. Id. at 18.
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An additional caveat is that the mental health of the victim may
be damaged by the abuse, as discussed above. Therefore, the fo-
rensic evaluator and the attorneys should recognize this and should
focus on her parenting abilities prior to the abuse and her potential
for achieving a high level of parenting capacity after she is pro-
tected from the abusive partner.
2. Pre-Trial
Part B of the Standards deals with the pre-trial stage. The Stan-
dards emphasize the fact that the law guardian's role is to be the
child's attorney, and that thorough preparation is as essential for
the law guardian as for each of the attorneys for the two parents.
Standard B-i states, "All available potential evidence should be
obtained and analyzed, including discovery documents, financial
statements, expert evaluations and witness statements. '96 This
Standard is contrary to the way many law guardians now operate in
terms of breadth of preparation. Many law guardians consider
grounds for divorce and financial issues to be outside of their area
of interest. However, both of these are relevant to the best inter-
ests of the child.
On grounds, the Commentary states:
If, for example, custody is one aspect of a divorce action based
on alleged cruelty, the allegations and documents to support a
fault divorce may well be relevant to the issue of parental fitness
and best interests of the child (and false allegations may be as
significant as valid charges).97
This Commentary is obviously very significant for cases involving
domestic violence: it is likely that a batterer will be unfit for cus-
tody or at least less fit than the victimized parent. As discussed
above, many states' laws contain a presumption that custody not be
awarded to a parent with a history of domestic violence, and both
the American Bar Association and the Congress have recom-
mended this type of law.98
Although New York's law contains no such presumption, it does
require the court to consider the effects of domestic violence on the
best interests of the child. Thus, where domestic violence has been
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence and the court
96. Id. at 16.
97. Id. at 19.
98. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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nonetheless determines that custody should go to the abuser, the
court would have to explain why.
Financial matters are also relevant to the custody issue. The
Commentary states:
The required detailed financial statements, including the net
worth statements, are crucial to determine the material needs of
the child and may be important in determining a parent's motiva-
tion and sincerity.9
The Commentary's emphasis on motivation and sincerity is par-
ticularly important in domestic violence cases. Batterers' need for
control often leads them to lie about, hide or obfuscate their true
financial situations. One motive that often leads an abuser to try to
gain custody of the children is to punish the victim of his abuse for
leaving him, and he may view both depriving her of custody (and
visitation, if possible) and depriving her of money (child support)
as punishment that he wishes to mete out to her for her perceived
sins against him.
Standard B-2 states, "The law guardian should develop a posi-
tion and strategy in conjunction with the child concerning every
relevant aspect of the proceedings." 10
This Standard may be a surprise to many attorneys - even those
who have been law guardians. Some law guardians view their role
essentially as observers who will listen to both sides, will try to
work out a compromise and then if settlement is not possible, will
come to a conclusion as to the child's best interests at the end of
the trial, at the same time as the judge.
This Standard makes it clear that the law guardian is an active
participant, stating, "[T]he formulation of a comprehensive posi-
tion and plan may be the paramount law guardian responsibility,
for it represents the key to effective advocacy necessary to protect
the youngster's interests." 101
The Commentary cautions that the law guardian's position
should not be set in stone at an early stage but "should be devel-
oped through an ongoing and extended attorney-client dia-
logue.' 0 2 Nor should the child ever "feel compelled to choose
between parents."'01 3 The child should be advised that neither the
child nor the law guardian will make the ultimate decisions -
99. See LAW GUARDIAN STANDARDS, supra note 24, at 19 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at Standard B-2.
101. Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 22.
103. Id.
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those decisions are for the judge, after considering all of the evi-
dence, including the child's wishes.1 °4
Again the Commentary indicates that all aspects of the litigation
relevant to the child (including financial) should be included in the
law guardian's plan. Especially relevant to battered spouses is the
Commentary's mention of possible needs for protective orders or
"curtailed" visitation (e.g., supervised transfer of the child or su-
pervised visitation).
Standard B-3 states that "It]he law guardian should participate
fully in pre-trial conferences and negotiations and should endeavor
to resolve the case without the need for a trial."'' 5 This Standard
emphasizes the law guardian's active role and need to establish a
plan. Although some law guardians adopt an inactive role by sim-
ply waiting for the parties to reach a settlement and then rubber-
stamping an approval, this Standard clarifies that the law
guardian's position as the child's attorney requires the law guard-
ian to reject a settlement which would be deleterious to the child
"even if both parties to the custody dispute agree."'' 0 6 This recog-
nizes that the parents may be so caught up in their own issues (or,
in the case of a battered woman, so intimidated) that their settle-
ment may be inappropriate for the child.
The commentaries also stress the weight that the law guardian's
proposals may carry with the judge, a weight that should be justi-
fied by the work put into the case by the law guardian, not simply
by the law guardian's status and position.'0 7 For example, Standard
B-4 states, "The law guardian should discuss the case periodically
with the child."" 8 Additionally, Standard B-5 provides that, "[t]he
law guardian should prepare thoroughly for trial." 10 9
These Standards carefully delineate the distinction between pre-
paring a pre-trial report and advocating a position for the client:
A law guardian may of course advocate a position and discuss
the relevant available evidence and facts at pre-trial conferences
and negotiations ... in making closing arguments, or in arguing
a motion.... The law guardian, as an attorney, may also prepare
and submit a post-trial memorandum summarizing and discuss-
ing the evidence in the record, making legal arguments, and ad-
vocating a disposition .... A post-trial memorandum, unlike a
104. See id. at 23.
105. Id. at Standard B-3.
106. Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
107. See, e.g., id. (noting that "great weight" may be accorded).
108. Id. at Standard B-4.
109. Id. at Standard B-5.
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pre-trial report, is based on testimony and other evidence found
in the record. 10
Standards B-6 and B-7 further clarify the role of the law guard-
ian. Standard B-6 states that "[t]he law guardian should not submit
any pre-trial report to the Court, but may submit legal papers and
argue orally based on the evidence." '' Standard B-6 is an appro-
priate interpretation of the law guardian's role but is a major devia-
tion from common practice in some counties, where a law guardian
is expected to submit a pre-trial report to the court. Standard B-7,
which states that "[t]he law guardian should not engage in any ex
parte communication with the Court," also emphasizes the law
guardian's role as an attorney.
11 2
3. The Trial
Part C of the Standards deals with the trial aspect of the custody
case. The Standards in Part C simply emphasize that the law
guardian is an attorney, like any other attorney, with responsibili-
ties toward his/her client. 3 The only difference is that the law
guardian is the attorney for a person under the legal disability of
infancy. Standard C-1 is geared toward that difference.
According to Standard C-i, "[w]hen necessary, the law guardian
should move for protective orders at the commencement of the
trial. 1 1 14 Examples of such protective orders include a motion to
protect the child from having to testify in open court and a motion
to bar certain evidence of questionable relevance or validity that
might be highly emotional. 11
5
The Commentaries also mention that "a party may be pressur-
ing the child to take a position or to testify in a specific way; such
harassment may be prohibited by a protective order."' 16 This type
of pressure and harassment by abusers is quite common in cases of
domestic violence. It is unclear how a protective order could rem-
edy this, especially where the abuser has temporary custody or sub-
110. Id. at 29 (citations omitted).
111. Id. at Standard B-6.
112. Id. at Standard B-7.
113. See id. at 30. Standards C-2 and C-3 will not be discussed herein. Standard C-
2 states: "If appropriate, the law guardian should present a law guardian case, includ-
ing independent evidence and witnesses." Id. at Standard C-2. Standard C-3 pro-
vides: "The law guardian should be familiar with the relevant records, reports and
evidence, insure that necessary witnesses testify and relevant material is subpoenaed
and introduced into evidence, and cross-examine witnesses." Id. at Standard C-3.
114. Id. at Standard C-1.
115. See id. at 30-31.
116. Id. at 31.
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stantial access to the child. As is the case with spouse abuse,
pressure and harassment by an abuser takes place mostly in the
"privacy" (secrecy) of the home. The abuser takes great care to
keep his conduct from being viewed by people who could testify
against him and to isolate the child as much a possible from anyone
to whom the child could - intentionally or inadvertently - reveal
what occurs in the "privacy" of the home. Thus, the insistence of
the Standards that the law guardian develop and maintain an ongo-
ing, trusting relationship with the child, rather than speaking with
the child once or twice, is extremely important.
Standard C-4 states that "[t]he law guardian should deliver a
summation, and prepare any necessary memoranda of law." '117
Standard C-4 and the Commentaries to C-4, like many of the other
Standards, may surprise attorneys who have not previously ana-
lyzed the Standards or dealt with law guardians who take an active
role in their cases.
There is sometimes an assumption that the law guardian will sim-
ply provide a general articulation of the desired outcome of the
custody/visitation portion of the case, leaving it to the attorneys for
the parents to go into detail and to handle the other aspects of the
case. Standard C-4 and its Commentaries make it clear that the
law guardian is to be actively, fully involved in all aspects of the
case:
Summation presents perhaps the best opportunity to articulate
the law guardian position, as buttressed by the evidence. Every
relevant issue, including custody, visitation, parental decision
making, conditions for custody, and child support should be de-
tailed so the court is apprised of the exact plan developed by the
law guardian (even if fully discussed at the pre-trial level).
When appropriate, the law guardian should also offer to submit
a post-trial memorandum outlining the evidence, the legal issues
and the law guardian's conclusions and recommendations. 1 "
Standard C-5 states that "[i]f the Court conducts an in-camera
interview with the child, the law guardian should request that it be
held in chambers with only the judge, the law guardian and a court
reporter present and only after the law guardian has advised the
child of the purpose of the interview."'1 9 This portion of the cus-
tody case differs so much from the usual conduct of a trial that the
law guardian must be very careful to determine exactly how the
117. Id. at Standard C-4.
118. Id. at 31.
119. Id. at Standard C-5.
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Court wishes the in-camera interview to be done and must be pre-
pared to oppose any procedure he or she believes will be detrimen-
tal to the child. Similarly, if an in-camera interview is held, the law
guardian should ensure that the child is fully prepared so that the
interview can accomplish the goals it is meant to achieve.
The question that remains is what those goals are. According to
the Commentary to Standard C-5, "[a] special law guardian re-
sponsibility is to protect the child against the usually intimidating
and traumatic experience of testifying against his or her parent in
their presence. '120 Yet the Commentary also notes that "[i]n ex-
ceptional cases, it may be appropriate or beneficial for the older
child to testify in open court. ' 121 In cases where the child wit-
nessed his or her mother being abused, was "caught in the cross-
fire," or suffered as the intended victim of parental abuse, the child
may want no contact or only supervised contact with the abuser. In
such circumstances, the law guardian may determine that testi-
mony in open court is necessary to protect the child.
It is particularly important for children over the age of eighteen
to testify in cases where the child wants no contact with the abuser.
This could avoid tragedies like the Third Department case of Perez
v. Perez,22 in which the court held that the abusive father could
stop paying child support for the eighteen-year old daughter who
refused contact with the father. The child was deemed by the court
to have no right to support just at the time when she needed it the
most - for college. Thus, the custodial mother was left with the
full obligation to put the child through college. The trial court had
severely limited evidence of the domestic violence that had oc-
curred during the marriage.
4. Post-Trial
Part D of the Standards deals with the post-trial stage. These
Standards may seem particularly unusual to attorneys who view the
law guardian's role as passive or see the child as a person who
should be protected but not informed.
Standard D-1 states that, "[t]he law guardian should explain to
the child, in terms the child can understand, the court's determina-
tion and its consequences, the rights and responsibilities of each of
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 659 N.Y.S.2d 642 (App. Div. 1997). The court gave no reasons or authority for
the proposition that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the introduc-
tion of evidence of domestic violence during the parties' marriage. See id. at 644.
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the parties, including the child, the possible right to appeal, and the
possibility of future modification." '123 The task of conveying this
information to the child is commonly left to the parents, but Stan-
dard D-1 indicates it is the responsibility of the law guardian. While
many adults underestimate the abilities of children and thus would
view such attempts to convey information to the child as a waste of
time or even harmful, this standard assumes that the child is capa-
ble of understanding these rules.
The Standards express confidence both in the law guardian and
in the child. The Commentary to D-1 states, in part, that "[I]t is of
particular importance that the child understand his or her continu-
ing relationship with each parent ... and each parent's continuing
responsibilities to the child. ' 124 The Commentary further notes
that "[i]t is also helpful to maintain communication with the child
subsequent to the trial. Post-trial problems may thereby be amelio-
rated or appropriate legal action commenced.' 1 25 The Commen-
tary notes that the law concerning "the law guardian's ability to file
post-disposition enforcement or modification motions is not clear,"
but that as an alternative, the law guardian could advise a parent to
do so.
12 6
According to Standard D-2, "[t]he law guardian should examine
the court order to insure that it complies with the findings and dis-
position.' 1 27 The Commentary notes that "[i]f necessary, the law
guardian should submit a counter-proposed order or
amendment. "128
Standard D-3 states that "[i]f the law guardian believes that the
court's determination is contrary to the child's interests, after con-
sidering the wishes of the child, a notice of appeal should be filed
and measures undertaken to assure that the appeal is perfected ex-
peditiously.' 1 29 The Commentary clarifies that "[i]f necessary,
temporary appellate relief should be requested, such as a stay of
the order.' 30 The Commentary also notes that while the law
guardian has standing under section 1120 of the FCA to initiate,
argue and appeal from an order of the family court, standing to
initiate the appeal is less clear when the case arises out of the
123. See LAw GUARDIAN STANDARDS, supra note 24, at Standard D-1.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 34-35.
126. Id. at 35.
127. Id. at Standard D-2.
128. Id.
129. Id. at Standard D-3.
130. Id.
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supreme court."' If a parent appeals the decision, whether from
family court or supreme court, the law guardian should file a brief
and participate at oral argument or request that the court appoint a
new law guardian for the appeal. 1
32
The law guardian's initiation of or participation in an appeal
would be particularly important if the trial court granted custody
or inordinately liberal visitation to an abuser and the law guardian
believed that this would endanger the child. Additionally, many
abused spouses have few resources, both monetary and emotional,
to mount an appeal, and thus the law guardian's participation can
be particularly helpful.
CONCLUSION
A law guardian in a custody case involving domestic violence
must, at a minimum, investigate the case carefully and form his/her
own conclusions. First, the law guardian must determine whether
domestic violence took place. If the law guardian determines that
domestic violence has taken place he/she must determine the ef-
fects of the domestic violence on the best interests of the child.
The law guardian should include in the determination whether the
child was hurt in the line of fire; witnessed the violence, although
was not physically hurt; or did not witness the violence but was
present in the violent home. Even if the child was born after the
mother left the abusive situation and never had any contact with
the abuser, the law guardian can infer from an abuser's past acts of
violence toward the mother a future propensity of similar behavior
toward the mother and/or the child. Third, the law guardian must
determine what kind of visitation would best protect the victim and
the child. Lastly, the law guardian must determine how to give the
victim the necessary support to ameliorate the effects of domestic
violence on the child.
The NYSBA Standards for custody cases, promulgated in 1994,
are exceedingly helpful guidelines for law guardians in cases in-
volving domestic violence, although modifications of these guide-
lines may be necessary and appropriate as experience develops
under Chapter 85 of the Laws of 1996.
The law guardian programs in the Appellate Divisions are in the
process of training their law guardians with regard to the new law
and the phenomenon of domestic violence. They should be en-
131. See id.
132. See id. at 38.
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couraged to continue and improve that training, as research on do-
mestic violence continues to inform us all about the effects of
domestic violence on children - effects that are much more seri-
ous and long-lasting than previously thought.
CHARGING BATTERED MOTHERS WITH
"FAILURE TO PROTECT": STILL
BLAMING THE VICTIM
The "Failure to Protect" Working Group*
INTRODUCTION
Domestic violence harms children and families. In the past sev-
eral years, efforts to recognize this harm have led to the passage of
new state laws that allow for concurrent criminal and family court
jurisdiction in domestic violence cases, mandate arrest in domestic
violence situations and require courts to consider domestic vio-
lence as a factor in custody decisions." Unfortunately, the height-
ened awareness of the harm domestic violence causes children has
also resulted in a punitive policy towards battered women in the
child welfare system. Increasingly in New York City, abuse and
neglect proceedings are brought against battered mothers. Their
children are removed from them, and the only allegation is based
upon their children's exposure to domestic violence. This ap-
proach has the result of discouraging battered mothers from seek-
ing the services they need to escape domestic violence and often
causes further harm to children and families.
Charging battered mothers with "failure to protect" implies that
they are neglecting their children, because they did not prevent the
violence. It places blame upon the mother, the primary target of
the violence,2 for the actions of the abuser. The mother is accused
of exposing her children to violence when the exposure is caused
* This Article was written by the "Failure to Protect" Working Group of Child
Welfare Committee of New York City Inter-agency Task Force Against Domestic Vi-
olence, consisting of: Kim Ahearn, C.S.W., Social Worker, Domestic Violence Pro-
gram, Barrier Free Living; Catherine Hodes, C.S.W., Social Worker Supervisor, Park
Slope Safe Homes Project; Linda Holmes, Esq., NAPIL Fellow, Family Law Unit,
South Brooklyn Legal Services; Lauren Shapiro, Esq., Director, Family Law Unit,
South Brooklyn Legal Services; and Iris Witherspoon, Domestic Violence Program
Coordinator, Lakeside Family & Children's services.
1. See Family Protection and Domestic Violence Intervention Act of 1994, ch.
222, 1994 N.Y. Laws 786, amended ch. 224, 1994 N.Y. Laws 808. The chapters, which
amend, inter alia, Family Court, Executive Law, Criminal Procedure Law and the Do-
mestic Relations Law, were signed by Governor Cuomo on June 30, 1994.
2. See Howard Davidson, Child Abuse and Domestic Violence: Legal Connec-
tions and Controversies, 29 FAM. L.Q. 357, 358 & n.8 (1995).
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by its perpetrator. Ensuring full accountability of the batterer for
his actions is one of the central recommendations of this article.
This Article intends to stimulate discussion among child protec-
tive workers and domestic violence advocates to work towards a
policy and practice that does not punish battered mothers for the
risks to their children's safety caused by the batterer. A policy that
more effectively addresses the safety needs of both victims, the
child and the battered mother is suggested. We recommend that
the institutional players in this system - the Administration for
Children's Services ("ACS"), the Legislature, the Judiciary and the
Legal Aid Society's Juvenile Rights Division - create a structure
that places culpability on the batterer and ensures safe and stable
environments for children and non-abusive parents.
I. BATTERED MOTHERS FOUND LIABLE FOR "EXPOSING THEIR
CHILDREN To DOMESTIC VIOLENCE"
A. State Legislature Mandates Domestic Violence Factor in
Custody and Visitation Cases
In 1996, the increased acknowledgment of the effects of domestic
violence on children culminated in a dramatic change in the law.
The New York State Legislature enacted a law requiring courts to
consider domestic violence in deciding child custody and visitation
cases. The law requires the "court to consider the effect of proven
allegations of domestic violence upon the best interests of the
child, together with such other factors and circumstances as the
court deems relevant."3 Prior to the passage of this law, courts
were not mandated to consider domestic violence and often did not
unless a child had directly witnessed the violence.
The legislative history of the law emphasized the negative impact
of exposure to domestic violence, even if the children did not wit-
ness it directly:
[s]tudies indicate that children raised in a violent home experi-
ence shock, fear, and guilt and suffer anxiety, depression, so-
matic symptoms, low self-esteem and developmental and
socialization difficulties. Additionally, children raised by a vio-
lent parent face increased risk of abuse. A high correlation has
been found between spouse and child abuse .... It is well docu-
mented that family violence is cyclical and self-perpetuating.
Children who live in a climate of domestic violence learn to use
physical violence as an outlet for anger and are more likely to
3. 1996 N.Y. Laws ch. 85 § 1; N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1) (McKinney 1996).
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use violence to solve problems while children and later adults
.... Therefore, at the time the court must make judgments re-
garding the custody and visitation of children, great considera-
tion should be given to the corrosive impact of domestic
violence and the increase danger to the family upon dissolution
and into the foreseeable future.4
Domestic violence advocates could never have foreseen that this
law, intended to assist victims of domestic violence in disputed cus-
tody cases, would provide the underpinnings for finding battered
mothers guilty of neglecting their children.
B. Statutory Definition of Neglect and Imminent Risk
The legal basis for finding battered mothers guilty of neglect is
found in Article 10 of the Family Court Act ("FCA"). Domestic
violence victims, whose children are removed because of the vio-
lence, are accused of failing to protect their children from danger
and thus fall under the FCA's definition of neglect. For a court to
find neglect, the parent must have failed to exercise a minimum
degree of care that resulted in physical, mental or emotional im-
pairment or imminent danger of impairment to the child:
in supplying the child with food, clothing, shelter, education,
medical, dental or optometrical or surgical care . . . ; or [ ] in
providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship, by
unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm or a sub-
stantial risk [of harm].5
In order for the court to find that a child was abused, the court
must find that the parent (1) inflicted or allowed physical injury to
be inflicted; (2) created or allowed to be created a substantial risk
of physical injury; or (3) committed or allowed a sexual offense to
be committed.6
To determine whether children should be removed from their
parents, a more restrictive legal standard is applied by the court.
In order to remove children, ACS must prove that removal is nec-
essary to avoid "imminent risk" to the child's life or health.7
4. 1996 N.Y. Laws ch. 85, at 121.
5. N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 1012(f)(i)(A)-(B) (McKinney 1998) [hereinafter FCA].
6. See id. § 1012(e)(i)-(iii).
7. Id. §§ 1022(a), 1027.
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C. In re Lonell J.: A Non-Abusive Battered Mother
Is Neglectful
The central decision that changed the landscape of child welfare
cases involving domestic violence was In re Lonell J.,8 decided in
May 1998 by the Appellate Division, First Department. The court
held that the definition of neglect under the FCA was sufficiently
broad enough to encompass exposure to domestic violence. The
court relied on the legislative findings of the Family and Domestic
Violence Intervention Act of 1994 that showed exposure to domes-
tic violence harmed children. The appellate court found that in the
abusive relationship because the mother stayed; she had "failed to
exercise a minimum degree of care." 9
Without explicitly saying so, the appellate court appeared to
hold the mother "strictly" liable for the actions of her abuser. 10
Although she had done nothing but suffer the abuse of her partner,
her failure to leave him made her neglectful. 1 The decision refers
to the battering as a pattern of domestic violence between the par-
ents and fails to recognize the significant difference between the
roles of batterer and victim. 2
The Lonell J. court looked at the history of domestic violence
without evaluating the reasons why the mother may have stayed in
the home. Nor did the court, in assessing whether the mother en-
dangered her children, consider the steps taken by the mother to
protect her children from the batterer. In fact, the mother made
repeated calls to the police, obtained an order of protection and
made an attempt to leave by going to her mother's house.
Lonell J. is significant because it is the first case in New York
State to hold that a non-abusing mother may be neglectful for fail-
ing to protect her children from witnessing domestic violence. An
8. 673 N.Y.S.2d 116 (App. Div. 1998).
9. Id. at 116-17. For an in-depth analysis of Lonell J., see A. Stone & R. Rialk,
Backlash Against the Abused Victim in Custody Disputes, 4 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
REP. 17, 26-27 (1998).
10. See Lonell J., 673 N.Y.S.2d at 118-19.
11. See id. at 118 (accepting "domestic violence in the child's presence as
neglect").
12. See id. The reasoning of Lonell J. has been adopted by the Second Depart-
ment in In re Deandre T., 676 N.Y.S.2d 666 (App. Div. 1998), where evidence showed
that the father's violent abuse of the mother caused impairment to mental and emo-
tional health of the child. It has also been reaffirmed by the First Department in In re
Athena M.V., 678 N.Y.S.2d 11, 12 (App. Div. 1998), finding that "evidence of acts of
severe domestic violence between respondents in the presence of their children is
sufficient to show 'as a matter of common sense' that the children were in imminent
danger of harm."
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earlier case, In re Glenn G.,13 showed the direction that the New
York State Family Courts were headed in their treatment of bat-
tered women. 14 In Glenn G., a non-abusing battered mother was
found neglectful for failing to protect her children from sexual
abuse by the father.1 " In her defense, she offered evidence that she
suffered from battered woman's syndrome. 6 The family court
judge found that although she did suffer from battered women's
syndrome, she neglected her children per se since she was unable to
prevent the abuse.1 7 The court concluded that the neglect statute
was a strict liability statute, and the reasons for the mother's failure
to remove herself and the children from the batterer had no bear-
ing on her culpability.18 As in the Lonell J. case, the court failed to
consider whether the mother had taken steps to protect her chil-
dren. This shift in the law in defining neglect therefore makes it
easier for child protective agencies, such as ACS, to remove chil-
dren and sustain charges of neglect made against non-abusing
mothers.
D. Strict Liability for Battered Mothers
After five years in Alcoholics Anonymous, Nola's boyfriend, the
father of her two children, began drinking again. The more he
drank, the more violent he became. He flew into jealous rages and
accused her of sleeping with other men. He would repeatedly
shove her, hit her and once threw her downstairs. Nola, too terri-
fied to leave him, tried to protect her children by taking them away
before his violent outbursts. She took the children to her mother's
or sister's house when he began to drink. Nola sought family coun-
seling and repeatedly called the police, but he was never arrested.
ACS filed a neglect petition based solely on the history of domestic
violence. The children were removed without any assessment of
the actions she had taken to protect her children.
13. 587 N.Y.S. 2d 464 (Fam. Ct. 1992).
14. For a more in-depth discussion of Glenn G., see JAMES G. NEWMAN & FLO-
RENCE ROBERTS, NATIONAL CTR. ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW, BATTERED WO-
MEN, BATTERED CHILDREN: AN EXAMINATION OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF
CHILD PROTECTIVE PRACTICE IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES IN NEW YORK, WITH
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BATTERED WOMEN'S ADVOCATES 43-60 (1996).
15. See Glenn G., 587 N.Y.S. 2d at 470 (stating that "[t]he neglect [ ] statute im-
poses strict liability").
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
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Nola's story illustrates the importance of assessing the actions a
battered mother takes to protect her children from exposure to do-
mestic violence. The unfortunate results of Lonell J. are that bat-
tered mothers are automatically held responsible for the actions of
the batterer and that ACS and family court judges do not conduct
individualized assessments. A battered mother often knows first-
hand the batterer's patterns of behavior. Armed with this knowl-
edge, mothers like Nola may use several tactics to anticipate
violent incidents and to keep the children safe. A battered
mother's attempts to protect her children, to seek services or to
leave her batterer are rarely considered. There are still strong
prejudices against women who do not leave their batterers, and the
players in the child welfare system routinely blame the victims of
domestic violence for the harm to the children. These efforts by a
mother, however, should be considered in evaluating whether a
mother has placed her children at risk.
The neglect statute authorizes the court to make a neglect find-
ing where the parent fails to exercise a minimum degree of care
and that failure results or will result in physical, emotional or psy-
chological impairment to the child. In domestic violence cases, by
ignoring the efforts that battered mothers take to protect their chil-
dren and the individual facts of their cases, the "minimum degree
of care" standard has been improperly transformed into a strict lia-
bility standard.
H. BATTERED MOTHERS FACE REMOVAL OF THEIR CHILDREN
AND COURT INTERVENTION
A. Trend Toward Removal Without Offering
Appropriate Services
Service providers for victims of domestic violence report an in-
crease in child protective involvement in domestic violence cases
over the last several years. The removal of children from domestic
violence victims is consistent with ACS's current practice of remov-
ing children rather than providing services to prevent foster care
placement. 19 Although these trends preceded the recent "failure to
protect" case law, such case law has the potential to prompt re-
moval in more domestic violence cases. Additionally, as the public
19. This is part of an overall trend in increased child protective removals. Accord-
ing to the Mayors' Management Reports for 1997 and 1998, there has been a 40%
increase in the number of new children entering foster care, but no increase in the
number of allegations of abuse and neglect. See Children Go to Foster Care Need-
lessly, Suit Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1999, at B3.
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becomes more educated about the harmful effects of domestic vio-
lence on children, it is likely that there will be more reports to the
State Central Registry in domestic violence cases and therefore
more opportunities for removal.2 °
When there is a report of neglect or abuse, ACS has responsibil-
ity to investigate the report to determine whether it is "indicated."
If indicated, then ACS must determine whether the children are in
imminent risk and should be removed from the home. In cases of
domestic violence, deciding whether a report should be indicated
against the victim and when the mother's inaction place the chil-
dren at risk is complicated by the fact that there are no guiding
standards. Since workers are not trained in how to assess domestic
violence cases and what interventions are appropriate, ACS's re-
sponse to domestic violence cases is inconsistent and depends on
the particular worker or supervisor assigned to the case.
Children are too often removed before an effort is made to pro-
vide appropriate services to the mother. Although the law clearly
requires ACS to offer services before removing children from their
home,21 children are frequently removed in domestic violence
cases without ACS first developing a safety plan for the mother
and children and without offering preventive services for the fam-
ily. ACS's failure to offer services and prevent removal is due to
the lack of connections with domestic violence service providers,
the insufficient number of preventive services programs and the
bias on the part of ACS workers that battered mothers are unlikely
to leave their batterers.
In some cases, ACS or the court requires mothers to obtain serv-
ices, such as seeking shelter or an order of protection, which may
not be safe or available options in a particular case. For example,
many women are advised to go to a battered women's shelter, yet
after the children are removed, it is almost impossible for a woman
to leave her batterer to go to a domestic violence shelter. Without
the children, they now have a much harder time accessing domestic
20. See, e.g., Settlement Agreement at 10, Marisol A. v. Giuliani (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(No. 95 CV 10533). The recent settlement between the plaintiffs, a class of children in
foster care or at risk of foster care placement, and the State's Office of Children and
Family Services provides that the State Central Registry must accept reports in do-
mestic violence cases even when no physical harm to children is claimed.
21. Prior to entering an order directing the temporary removal of a child, the
court must determine whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate
the need for removal. See FCA §§ 1022, 1027 (McKinney 1998).
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violence shelters." Domestic violence victims are often referred to
preventive programs that are not familiar with crucial interventions
for battered women and their children, such as making detailed
personal safety plans. In some cases, ACS files a petition stating
that the mother failed to accept offered services even though the
services were inappropriate or she did not have sufficient time to
access them.
When ACS files neglect petitions against the mother, ACS
charges that the batterer and victim are equally culpable for the
harm to the children. As in Nola's case,23 ACS often files petitions
where the only allegation against the battered mother is that the
parents have "engaged in acts of domestic violence." These peti-
tions do not describe how the mother failed to "exercise a mini-
mum degree of care" as the statute requires and reflect ACS's
policy of equally treating the batterer and victim at fault for expos-
ing the children to domestic violence.
B. Instant Response Protocol
Another disturbing development is ACS's recent plan to in-
crease the role of law enforcement in child protective cases. ACS's
Instant Response Protocol, initially designed to ensure a coordi-
nated response in cases of serious sexual and physical abuse, now
includes cases of domestic violence.24 According to a draft proto-
col explaining the expansion, both ACS and the police department
would cross-refer cases of domestic violence where such interven-
tion would be necessary." This is a positive step to the extent that
this collaboration will lead to holding the batterer accountable for
his actions.
We have strong concerns, however, about the possible increased
rate of arrest of battered mothers and removal of their children
from them as a result of the increased role of law enforcement in
child welfare cases involving domestic violence. We are also con-
cerned that battered mothers will be less likely to seek domestic
violence intervention if there is an increased risk that they will suf-
fer arrest and the loss of their children to foster care. The Instant
Response Protocol could lead to these outcomes if there is not
22. Most domestic violence shelters prioritize families with children because there
are so few available beds.
23. See supra Part I.D.
24. See Draft ACS/NYPD Domestic Violence Coordinated Response Pilot Interim
Protocol, Mar. 1999 (on file with authors). According to the protocol, the project will
be implemented on a pilot basis in Manhattan North. See id.
25. See id.
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clear guidance about the role of law enforcement and child protec-
tive workers in these cases and adequate training of child welfare
workers about how to work with law enforcement. The current
protocol does not define any criteria for when ACS should refer a
case to the police or when the police should refer a case to ACS.
Without a clear standard for when arrest, or removal of children is
appropriate, both police and child protective workers .may err on
the side of removing children rather than the batterer.
IH. REMOVAL FURTHER HARMS CHILDREN AND
DISCOURAGES WOMEN FROM SEEKING SERVICES
Removing children from the non-abusive mother's care often
has severe and long-lasting effects on the family. Children who
have witnessed abuse are already victimized by the feelings of
helplessness from watching their mother suffer at the hands of the
abuser. The children are struggling with anger, grief, anxiety and
feelings of being responsible for the abuse and by removing them,
they are victims again by their increased fear of abandonment.26
Keeping the mother and children together as a family while ad-
dressing emotional and safety issues can reduce rather than inten-
sify the trauma of the domestic violence to the mother and child.
Removing children from non-abusive battered mothers will dis-
courage other battered mothers from seeking help. In Massachu-
setts, for example, the Department of Social Services found that its
practice of identifying domestic violence as an indicator of child
abuse without any corresponding training or clinical support re-
sulted in both an increase in child abuse reports and a decrease in
battered women seeking services. 27 When a mother mentions do-
mestic violence to a mandated reporter, that reporter has an obli-
gation to determine whether to file a report with the Central
Registry. This policy of removing children from battered mothers
can be interpreted to mean that any time a battered mother goes
to a social worker, talks to her children's teacher, goes to her doc-
tor or calls the police to report domestic violence, she may be plac-
ing the custody of her children in jeopardy.
The chilling effect of charging battered mothers with failing to
protect their children is that they will be even more reluctant to
reach out to law enforcement, social services and the courts for the
26. See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON VIO-
LENCE IN THE FAMILY, VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY 102 (1996) [hereinafter APA].
27. See NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUv. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, FAMILY VIOLENCE:
EMERGING PROGRAMS FOR BATTERED MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN 15 (1998).
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help they need. Knowing that they may be investigated by child
protective services, charged with neglect or lose their children to
foster care, battered mothers, isolated and afraid, are more likely
to remain in an abusive home so that they can remain with their
children. Efforts to keep a mother and her children together while
addressing emotional and safety issues will encourage mothers to
come forward to seek needed services.
IV. SAFE OPTIONS AND SERVICES ARE NOT
ALWAYS AVAILABLE
The many institutional players in the child welfare system lack
an understanding of the realities and the difficult decisions that
battered women face. The assumption of ACS caseworkers, law
guardians, attorneys and family court judges is that safe options
and services are available and that the battered woman should
have left the relationship when the domestic violence began. There
is little understanding of the fact that leaving itself is dangerous
and there is a lack of social support, resources and safe options for
women and children attempting to flee. Battered mothers' at-
tempts to protect themselves and their children are routinely mini-
mized and dismissed. In Susan Schechter's Women and Male
Violence, she explains:
Battered women are not passive, rather, they engage in step-
like, logical behavior as they attempt to stop the violence or
leave. Not all of them are successful because the major variable,
the violent man, is outside their realm of control. Staying, espe-
cially given the lack of resources and social supports for leaving,
should never be read as accepting violence.28
A. Physical Danger
Leaving the abuser or trying to restrain his behavior often in-
creases danger to the survivor mother and children. 9 In fact, the
most dangerous time for a woman and her children is after they
have left the batterer. Studies reveal that it is during and after sep-
aration that the batterer is most likely to stalk, harass and even kill
the mother. Battered women are well aware of the dangers of
leaving due to the batterer's continual threats. If she takes these
threats seriously, and statistics show that she should, then she may
28. SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE 233 (1982).
29. See N.Y. COMM'N ON DOM. VIOLENCE FATALITIES, REPORT TO THE GOVER-
NOR 14 (1997) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR].
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conclude that it is safer for her and her children in the short term
to stay in the relationship.
B. Lack of Shelter Space and Permanent Housing
A woman and her children, who are able to safely leave their
batterer, face the possibility of homelessness and dislocation, which
can be especially difficult for children who may have to leave their
classmates and friends. In New York City, the Victim Services
Agency ("VSA") received 34,175 requests for domestic violence
shelter during a twelve-month period in 1997-98, as well as an aver-
age of 38.2 unduplicated requests for shelter every day. During
that period, the average daily availability of shelter was 10.6 spaces,
meeting only one quarter of the need.3°
The reality is that there are few safe, affordable housing options
for women fleeing abuse.
C. Lack of Financial or Other Support
Domestic violence cuts across class lines. After leaving an abu-
sive relationship, many battered women have difficulty supporting
themselves and their children. 31 Battered women frequently report
that batterers interfere with their education, training or work. As a
result, abused women are heavily represented in the welfare popu-
lation, at approximately fifty percent of total recipients. Welfare,
however, is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain, and a woman
may wait for months to find out if she is eligible. When there is a
source of financial support beyond the abusive spouse, a greater
percentage of battered women are likely to end the relationship.32
Women can also be forced to rely upon their batterers for other
necessary supports. For example, a battered immigrant woman
may also be prevented from leaving an abusive relationship if she is
isolated from family and friends, unable to speak English, fearful
of accessing the police or unaware of her legal rights. Sometimes
30. See Victim Services Data, Sept. 17, 1998 (on file with Victim Services Agency,
New York, NY).
31. One researcher, studying why battered married women returned to their hus-
bands, found that the answer often lay in their financial dependence on their spouses.
Eighty-four percent of wives in shelters who reported that their husbands were their
only source of financial support planned eventually to return to their batterers. See
B.E. AGUIRRE, NAT'L Ass'N OF SOCIAL WORKERS, WHY Do THEY RETURN?
ABUSED WIVES IN SHELTER 350-53 (1985).
32. See Cheribeth Tan et al., The Role of Social Support in the Lives of Women
Exiting Domestic Violence Shelters, J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 437, 447-49 (1995)
(discussing the strong relationship between social support and the ability to recover
from domestic violence).
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the batterer is the only means of achieving legal immigration status
in the United States. 33 These factors, combined with a lack of edu-
cational and employment options, present tremendous obstacles to
a woman's safety.
D. Criminal Justice System May Not Offer Protection
Cynthia has been physically abused by her boyfriend for the last
six months. He has threatened to kill her and take her child.
When she called the police, they referred her to family court and
did not arrest the batterer. She fled the apartment, and the bat-
terer contacted her and told her that he was destroying everything
in her apartment. She was scared to return that night, but when
she did so the next day, she found her apartment ransacked. He
had ripped up all her clothing, torn up the furniture, destroyed all
the appliances and wrote derogatory statements about her in per-
manent maker all over the apartment. She decided to press
charges, but the prosecutor told her that there was insufficient evi-
dence for felony charges and the batterer would do no jail time.
Cynthia decided to flee the state.
Battered women who seek protection from the batterer often
find limited recourse in the criminal justice system. Despite the
passage of laws requiring police to arrest perpetrators of domestic
violence and to identify the primary aggressor in a domestic dis-
pute, police response to domestic violence too often results in no
arrests or dual arrests of both partners. When the batterer has left
the scene before the police arrive, there is rarely any further inves-
tigation even if the police find that a crime has been committed.
When the batterer is arrested, most domestic violence cases are
charged as misdemeanors. Unless the crime is egregious, most bat-
terers spend little time in jail.34 Many batterers are released on
bail after the arrest, and the arrest often provokes more violence.
In addition, the victim may be faced with pressures from the bat-
terer's family, or even her own, to drop the charges.
E. Family Court May Not Offer Sufficient Protection
Battered women are routinely told to obtain further orders of
protection in family court to prevent the batterer from threatening,
harassing and abusing them. In reality, obtaining an order of pro-
33. See Ginger Thompson, Afraid of Husbands, and the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18,
1999, at 37, 41.
34. See id.
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tection does not guarantee a woman's safety. Pursuing an order of
protection may actually anger the batterer and provoke more vio-
lence. In one study, nearly half of the victims who obtained orders
of protection were re-abused within two years.35 Knowing that an
order of protection will not necessarily provide safety, some wo-
men decide not to seek one.
Legally, such orders can also exclude a batterer from the home
and require him to pay child support, thereby allowing the mother
and children to remain safe in their home with some means of sup-
port. Exclusion orders and temporary child support orders, how-
ever, are difficult to obtain, because unrepresented petitioners
often do not know to ask for this relief. In addition, judges are
reluctant to grant exclusion orders except in the most egregious
cases.
Seeking orders of protection in New York City's Family Court is
even more challenging, because the family court is overwhelmed
and has little resources. Litigants face long waits, delays and ad-
journments. Battered women are thus further discouraged from
obtaining orders of protection. One study found that petitioners in
Brooklyn coming to the initial intake parts received just over four
minutes to be heard on their first court appearance.36
F. Batterer May Seek Unsupervised Visitation or Custody
Genna ended her relationship with her boyfriend when he began
to act violently towards her, but she allowed him to watch their
two-year old while she was at school. He continued to harass her
whenever they exchanged the child. ACS began investigating both
parents based on allegations of domestic violence. Genna got an
order of protection and ceased contacting the father. He has now
filed for custody of their child and has been granted unsupervised
visitation.
Sarah was charged with failure to protect her children because of
their exposure to domestic violence. One of the ways her batterer
had tried to exercise control over her was by constantly threatening
to kidnap their children. On one occasion, he hid their daughter at
his mother's house after an argument. Sarah had to call the police
to get her daughter back.
35. See Do ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 199, 212, 223, 240 (Eve
S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996).
36. See THE FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY
OF THE NEW YORK CITY FAMILY COURT 9 (1997).
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Leaving the batterer often results in the batterer escalating his
coercive control by filing for custody or visitation with the children.
Battered mothers frequently worry about the possibility that the
batterer will kidnap their children, because he has threatened to do
so in the past. More than fifty percent of child abductions result
from situations involving domestic violence, and most of these ab-
ductions are perpetrated by fathers and their agents.37 Fathers who
batter mothers are more than twice as likely to seek sole custody of
their children than non-violent fathers.38 Batterers may file cus-
tody proceedings against mothers or false reports to ACS as meth-
ods of continuing to harass and control their partners.39 For
battered mothers, one of the most difficult issues is how to negoti-
ate custody and visitation issues with the abuser.
V. MODELS AROUND THE COUNTRY AND STATE HAVE
SUCCESSFULLY INTEGRATED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND
CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES
There are numerous models around the country and the state
that ACS should follow in creating a comprehensive approach to
domestic violence and child protection. The most notable of these
is in Massachusetts, where a national model for collaboration be-
tween child protective services and domestic violence service prov-
iders has been established. In 1993, the Massachusetts Department
of Social Services ("MDSS") created a specialized Domestic Vio-
lence Unit ("DVU") as part of its child protective services.4 0 The
principle of the DVU was that the safety of the battered mother
cannot be separated from the best interests of the child. The DVU
focuses on working with battered mothers to develop safety plans
for the mothers and their children.41
The DVU provides two kinds of services: consultation and sup-
port to caseworkers on abuse and neglect cases where there is do-
mestic violence, and provision of direct services to battered
mothers. Eleven domestic violence specialists spend three days a
week in the local MDSS offices to ensure their availability to
37. See APA, supra note 26, at 101.
38. See id. at 40.
39. See NOW LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUC. FUND, THE ABCs OF CHILD CUSTODY
WHEN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IS AN ISSUE (1998).
40. FAMILY VIOLENCE DEP'T, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAM. CT.
JUDGES, FAMILY VIOLENCE: EMERGING PROGRAMS FOR BATTERED MOTHERS AND
THEIR CHILDREN 15 (1998).
41. See id. at 16.
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caseworkers.42 In five MDSS offices, there are interagency teams
comprised of MDSS staff, police officers, battered women's advo-
cates, batterer's intervention providers, court personnel, hospital
staff, and supervised visitation providers who meet to discuss diffi-
cult cases and design effective case planning. This coordinated ef-
fort can help a family to avoid inconsistent services and case
planning.43
The specialist is also available as a liaison with the domestic vio-
lence community to discuss cases or issues that may arise. The pro-
tocol for caseworkers requires accurate identification of the
perpetrator on investigation documents. 44 This program has re-
sulted in a decrease in unnecessary out-of-home placements and
has helped caseworkers to identify domestic violence in their
caseloads.45
Another program aimed at protecting battered mothers and
their children operates in Jacksonville, Florida as part of a commu-
nity-based approach in protecting children. The Domestic Vio-
lence and Child Protection Collaboration includes the city's
Department of Children and Families ("DCF"), a local domestic
violence program called Hubbard House, an area shelter, local
schools and neighborhood tenant associations. 46
DCF Child Protective Service ("CPS") workers, trained in con-
junction with the staff at Hubbard House, are required to routinely
screen for domestic violence and to intervene with the dual goals of
protecting the children and the battered spouse and of holding the
perpetrator responsible. Specific CPS workers are identified as do-
mestic violence consultants and are paired with a Hubbard House
staff member in order to serve as additional resources to other CPS
workers.47 In addition, a "special condition" voluntary foster care
placement program has been implemented The program allows
battered mothers to place their children for up to three months to
avoid charges of abuse or neglect. During that three month period
the mothers work with an advocate from Hubbard House to estab-
lish a safety plan for herself and her children.48
42. See id.
43. See id. at 17.
44. See id. at 16.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 21.
47. See id. at 22.
48. See id. Similar innovative programs around the country include the Family
Violence Outreach Program in Greater New Haven, Connecticut, the Domestic Vio-
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Closer to home, the Orange County Department of Social Serv-
ices in New York State forged a collaboration with the Orange Safe
Homes Project. Based on the Massachusetts model, the guiding
principle of their alliance is that:
The primary focus of MDSS intervention in domestic violence
cases is the ongoing assessment of the risk posed to children by
the presence of domestic violence. The preferred way to protect
children in most domestic violence cases is to join with mothers
in safety planning and to hold offenders accountable.49
The protocol developed by the two groups emphasizes that certain
alternatives must be considered before removing children. These
options include: safety planning with the mother and children, pre-
ventive services, MDSS-initiated Order of Protection for the chil-
dren to vacate the father from home, placement in a domestic
violence shelter and assistance in obtaining an Order of
Protection. °
In fact, the New York State Office of Children and Family Serv-
ices ("OCFS") recently issued an informational letter recom-
mending collaborative efforts similar to those achieved by Orange
County. 1 In 1996 and 1997, OCFS funded two demonstration
projects to improve the provision of services to families impacted
by both domestic violence and child protective services Orange
County and Warren/Washington Counties.52 Representatives from
each discipline met to design and implement a protocol for han-
dling these cases.5 3 A domestic violence worker was stationed at
local social services districts and would accompany child protective
workers on investigative home visits.5 4 During these visits, the do-
mestic violence worker spoke with the mother about her options
and assisted the protective worker in developing a safety plan.
There were numerous benefits to this collaboration. First, by iden-
tifying domestic violence before the crisis stage, children could
lence Collaboration Project of Michigan and the Integration Project in Montgomery
County, Ohio. See id. at 27-39.
49. ORANGE COUNTY DEPT. OF SOC. SERV., ORANGE COUNTY SAFE HOMES PRO-
JEcT, INC., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROTOCOL.
50. See id.
51. Informational Letter from New York State Office of Children and Family
Services to Commissioners of Social Services and Directors of Domestic Violence
Programs, Collaborative Efforts for Assisting Families Experiencing Both Domestic Vi-
olence and Child Abuse/Maltreatment (Nov. 25, 1998) (on file with authors).
52. See id. at 2.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
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more frequently remain in their home. Second, domestic violence
workers were seen as less threatening, and women viewed child
protective services as more of a resource. Third, protective work-
ers learned "to better understand why a victim is unable to leave
and/or why leaving can be more dangerous than staying, and...
[that by helping the battered mother] with the domestic violence
issues, abuse and maltreatment of the child and the likelihood of
re-incidence can be reduced. ' 56 OCFS found that by stationing a
domestic violence advocate at the child protective office, even on a
part-time basis, was likely to offer the greatest benefits.57
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Accountability for Domestic Violence Should Be Shifted to
the Batterer
Where the battered mother is named in the petition, ACS and
the court should consider options that would prevent removal and
place accountability on the batterer. 'Where "imminent risk"
would be eliminated, ACS should request and the family court
should issue an order of protection excluding the batterer from the
home.58 Although no order of protection can guarantee safety, this
practice would at the very least communicate a message of ac-
countability to the batterer, and if the order is violated, the threat
of incarceration may reduce the risk of violence. Further, ACS
should consider referring the case to law enforcement officials or
the District Attorney's office for criminal prosecution of the
batterer.
If the children are removed in limited circumstances, the bat-
terer, not the mother, should be prevented from having un-
supervised contact with the children until he has completed a
batterer's intervention program and has demonstrated to the court
his ability to refrain from using violence.
Finally, family court judges should consider dismissing neglect
petitions filed against battered mothers' under section 1051(c) of
the FCA. Under this section, a Judge may dismiss a petition, even
after a finding of neglect, where its aid is not required on the rec-
56. Id.
57. See id. at 5.
58. Family court may only enter an order directing the temporary removal of a
child after the court considers "whether imminent risk to the child would be elimi-
nated by the issuance of a temporary order of protection, . . . directing the removal of
a person or persons from the child's residence." FCA § 1022(a)(iii) (McKinney 1998).
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ord before it.59 Where the efforts of ACS and the mother since the
filing of the petition have resulted in protecting the child from the
batterer, the court's aid may no longer be required. Moreover, by
dismissing the petition against the mother, the court sends the
message that the batterer, not the victim, will be held accountable
for the harm to the children.
B. Enact Legislation to Address Failure to Protect Issues
The New York State Legislature should address the way in which
current child welfare law separates battered mothers and their chil-
dren. One option is to legislate a "battered woman defense." In
1994, New York State Assemblyman Roger Green introduced a
proposal that called for amending the definition of neglect to pro-
vide a defense that the parent had "a reasonable expectation, ap-
prehension or fear that acting to stop or prevent such abuse would
result in substantial bodily harm to parent or other person legally
responsible for the care of the or to the child."60 The proposed
amendment would also have allowed the parent to introduce ex-
pert testimony to show that the "inability to protect the child was
due to a reasonable expectation, apprehension or fear that
preventing or stopping the alleged abuse or neglect would result in
physical injury to the subject child or respondent."61
Another legislative recommendation calls for an amendment to
the neglect statute to insure that appropriate services are provided
in those cases where a court found abuse or neglect based on do-
mestic violence.62 This legislative proposal would require a judge
at the "dispositional" hearing: 1) to inquire and enter findings as to
whether the respondent had been offered or had received domestic
violence-specific services, and the results of the offer or receipt of
services; and 2) to determine whether issuance of an order of pro-
tection would eliminate the need for placement, or would expedite
the return of the child. Where placement or extension of place-
ment is ordered, the child protective agency should be required to
present its reunification plan to the court and to specifically enu-
merate the services it intends to provide along with a time-frame
for providing services. Even without a legislative enactment,
59. See N.Y. JUD. LAw § 1051 (McKinney 1999).
60. A. 11870, 208th Sess. (N.Y. 1994). The proposal of June 7, 1994 was intended
to amend the definition of an abused or neglected child and evidence of abuse in child
protective proceedings. On February 11, 1999, these definitions were amended but
not in accordance with this proposal. See FCA § 1012, at 39-40 (1999).
61. Id.
62. Newman & Roberts, supra note 14, at 65-67.
BLAMING THE VICTIM
courts on their own initiative should make these inquiries and
findings.
More recently, in the context of amending the state's child wel-
fare law to bring it in conformity with the federal Adoption and
Safe Families Act ("ASFA"), 63 the Victim Services Agency pro-
posed changes to address the need for domestic-violence specific
services to prevent or eliminate the need for foster care in domestic
violence cases. The legislature should consider these recommenda-
tions in the current legislative session.
We commend the New York State Legislature for including in
the state's ASFA implementation statute a requirement that the
Office of Children and Family Services study the extent to which
victims of domestic violence have their children removed due to
the conduct of the perpetrator of the violence and that a report of
its findings be submitted by October 31, 2000.64 We hope that in
conjunction with the study, the judiciary and Children and Family
Services Committees of the New York State Senate and Assembly
will consider amending the neglect statute to ensure that local so-
cial service districts hold batterers accountable for their actions,
and that victims of domestic violence and their children are pro-
vided services rather than for punishment of the perpetrator's
conduct.
Although recommendations for amending the neglect statute
have been made in the past, now more than ever before, such
changes are needed. In New York City, the number of children
placed in foster care has increased dramatically, and federal man-
dates require that states move more quickly to terminate parental
rights. In this environment, the interrelationship of domestic vio-
lence and child welfare must be addressed immediately and
directly.
C. ACS Should Build on Prior Successes by Developing a
Comprehensive Domestic Violence Program
Since 1988, the Child Welfare Committee of the Inter-agency
Task Force Against Domestic Violence has worked with successive
city and child welfare administrations to address domestic violence
63. The stated purpose of the Adoption and Safe Families Act ("ASFA") is to
achieve timely permanence for children in foster care. The ASFA requires states to
file petitions to terminate parental rights after a child is in foster care for 15 months
and allows states to suspend reasonable efforts to reunite families in certain cases. See
42 U.S.C.A. § 670 (1997).
64. See 1999 N.Y. Laws ch. 7, § 56.
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and child protection issues in a meaningful way. Most recently, in
January 1997, the Committee met with ACS Commissioner
Nicholas Scoppetta to present recommendations for a comprehen-
sive and coordinated ACS response to child protective cases where
domestic violence is a factor. The reason for the Committee's con-
cern at the time was that the Commissioner's December 1996 Re-
form Plan did not make any mention of domestic violence.65 The
lack of attention to domestic violence in the Reform Plan was star-
tling since studies show the strong relationship between domestic
violence and child maltreatment, 66 and the City's own Child Fatal-
ity Review Panel Reports show the high correlation between child
deaths and woman abuse.67
This Article calls upon ACS to expand its collaboration with do-
mestic violence advocates and to develop a.comprehensive domes-
tic violence program and timetable for implementation of the
program. The current ACS administration must commit the atten-
tion, energy and resources needed to address this complex problem
as other states and counties have done. This section describes the
efforts ACS has undertaken thus far and makes suggestions for
how to build upon these efforts.
1. Domestic Violence Coordinator
In January 1997, ACS created a domestic violence coordinator
position to oversee the domestic violence work of the agency.
While it is significant that there is a domestic violence coordinator,
the position has not been given the resources or the authority to
significantly expand programming, coordinate efforts or institute
protocols. The coordinator does not work on domestic violence
full time since she is also deputy director of ACS's Office of Inter-
agency Affairs and does not report directly to the Commissioner's
office. Without such authority, little change will be accomplished.
65. ADMINISTRATION OF CHILDREN'S SERVS., PROTECTING THE CHILDREN OF
NEW YORK: A PLAN OF ACTION FOR THE ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN'S SERV-
ICES (1996).
66. Lee H. Bowker et al., On the Relationship Between Wife Beating and Child
Abuse, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 162 (Kersti Yllo & Michelle Bo-
gard eds., 1988) (noting that child abuse is present in 70% of the homes where there is
partner violence).
67. The Child Fatality Review Panel indicates that during the previous three years
in 46.1% of the cases where a child had died, the mother was also abused. See Report
of Child Fatality Review Panel (1993) (on file with authors).
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2. Pilot Projects to Assess Domestic Violence
In 1993, the City made its first attempt to address the interrela-
tionship between domestic violence and child welfare by creating
the "Zone C" pilot project in the Manhattan Field Office.68 The
pilot lasted six months. During this period, child protective case
workers assessed every case alleging abuse or neglect that came
into Zone C for domestic violence. A domestic violence protocol
was developed for this purpose by the then Child Welfare Admin-
istration in consultation with the Child Welfare Committee and the
Urban Justice Center. In April 1995, the Columbia School of So-
cial Work prepared a written report evaluating the Zone C pro-
gram. 69  The report concluded that although workers and
supervisors were initially resistant to the protocol, it was effectively
implemented during the pilot test period.7" The report found that
domestic violence was uncovered in more cases using the protocol
than would have otherwise been discovered and that although
there were identifiable obstacles to delivery, these families were
referred to appropriate services.7' The report established the need
for ongoing training of staff on the dynamics and causes of domes-
tic violence.72
In 1998, ACS planned to replicate the initial Zone C pilot pro-
ject. Building upon the Massachusetts model, a domestic violence
specialist was hired for Zone A, the North Manhattan Field Office.
The specialist reports to the Director of the Field Office, not the
domestic violence coordinator. The specialist is responsible for co-
ordinating with child protective workers on those child protective
cases where domestic violence is identified. She will also be in-
volved in training the child protective workers in the office along
with the Urban Justice Center. If a child is removed from his or
her parent, however, the case is transferred within ninety days to
the Office of Contract Agency Case Management ("OCACM")
and the case planning is then done by the foster care agency. The
68. RANDY MAGEN ET AL., CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOC. WORK PRACTICE,
COLUMBIA UNIV. SCH. OF Soc. WORK, CHILD ABUSE AND WOMAN ABUSE IN THE
CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM: THE ZONE C STUDY 3 (1995). Each borough
has a child protective "field office," which is responsible for investigating allegations
of child abuse or neglect. The office determines whether the report is indicated and, if
so, whether the children should be removed. Field offices are then divided by zone,
and each zone covers a different geographic area. Zone C covers East 57th Street,
South to the bottom of Manhattan and north to West 110th Street. See id.
69. See id. at 2.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 7.
72. See id. at 9-10.
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rest of the pilot project is on hold, like investigating domestic vio-
lence in each new case, but the Urban Justice Center is providing
assistance to the domestic violence specialist.
3. Training
In 1996, the Columbia School of Social Work received one-time
funding to train new child protective supervisors in domestic vio-
lence. This training has never been replicated. Domestic violence
training for all caseworkers should begin at the Satterwhite Acad-
emy and continue periodically throughout their tenure. The curric-
ulum for such training should be developed in conjunction with the
domestic violence coordinator and the domestic violence advocacy
community.
4. Foster Care Agencies
In developing a comprehensive domestic violence program, ACS
must not forget the need to address domestic violence issues with
foster care agencies. Such agencies monitor a large percentage of
the children removed from their homes due to domestic violence.73
Once children are removed from their home, case planning is usu-
ally transferred within ninety days to the foster care agency. The
agencies must be equipped to deal with domestic violence issues so
that mothers can be provided the services they need to be reunified
with their children as quickly as possible. ACS has done little to
ensure that foster care agencies are meeting their responsibilities to
assess, evaluate and develop a plan for services in domestic vio-
lence cases. Only one foster care agency, Lakeside Family and
Children's Services, has a domestic violence services coordinator.
ACS should study this program and encourage its replication when
awarding new contracts to foster care agencies. ACS must also en-
sure that foster care workers receive training about domestic vio-
lence issues and have a domestic violence screening and assessment
tool in place, as preventive services agencies do, for parents with
children in foster care.
5. Preventive Services
Although this Article is concerned primarily with the policy of
removing children from battered mothers, the availability of pre-
ventive services for domestic violence victims is also a necessary
component of a comprehensive domestic violence program that en-
73. See City of New York, Fiscal 1998 Mayor's Management Report 117-20 (1999).
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sures children are removed as a last resort. ACS has made some
strides in the provisions of preventive services for domestic vio-
lence victims.74 The first preventive efforts took place in conjunc-
tion with the Zone C pilot project. Ruth Messinger, then
Manhattan Borough President, helped fund four preventive agen-
cies to increase domestic violence services for families identified by
Zone C workers. In 1994, a preventive pilot project was started in
Staten Island. The Urban Justice Center and ACS (then the Child
Welfare Administration) developed a questionnaire for preventive
workers to assess preventive cases for domestic violence within the
first thirty days. This project, now called the Family Violence Pre-
vention Project ("FVPP"), has grown to include twenty-seven pro-
grams out of a total of 120 preventive programs and is being
expanded to fifty programs in the next year. All twenty-seven of
these programs use a questionnaire that now includes an assess-
ment tool called WEB (Women's Experience of Battering). Each
of the twenty-seven groups has a domestic violence specialist who
meets with an advocate at the Urban Justice Center for consulta-
tion once a month. The Urban Justice Center also provides year
long training and supervision for the FVPP workers who will run
twenty-six week long groups for abusive fathers of families who are
clients of preventive service agencies. Three groups are running in
Manhattan, Queens and Staten Island. The female partners of
these men are in support groups. The family's case workers and
facilitators of both male and female groups keep in close contact
with one another. APIP (Abusive Partner Intervention Program)
is primarily funded by the Urban Justice Center along with some
funding from the preventive agencies themselves.
Specifically, we recommend that ACS take the following actions:
" Develop a comprehensive domestic violence plan for all parts
of the child welfare system with a clear and specific timetable
for implementation.
" Establish a domestic violence office to coordinate preventive
and protective domestic violence services for the agency and
create and implement a domestic violence program that fo-
cuses on safety planning for domestic violence victims.
" Hire two domestic violence specialists for each field office.
" Mandate on-going training on domestic violence issues includ-
ing safety planning for all ACS staff, including protective
workers, ACS OCACM case managers, child evaluation spe-
74. Much of this work has been in coordination with and at the behest of the
Urban Justice Center's Family Violence Project.
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cialists and foster care case planners and supervisors, includ-
ing training on underserved populations, such as disabled and
immigrant battered women.
" Improve assessment tools and protocol for assessing risk to
children in domestic violence cases.
" Form an ongoing working group on domestic violence that
meets regularly with a range of domestic violence advocates
to ensure community input into the development of a compre-
hensive plan and a coordinated response to domestic violence.
" Continue and expand domestic violence assessment and serv-
ices at preventive agencies, and require on-going training for
preventive staff. Each agency should have a full-time domes-
tic violence coordinator.
" Require foster care agencies to demonstrate how they are ad-
dressing and screening for domestic violence, and require de-
velopment of linkages to domestic violence providers/advo-
cates.
" Foster care agencies should be able to demonstrate how they
will achieve early reunification with non-abusing mothers in
domestic violence cases.
" Provide preventive services to families affected by domestic
violence in the context of safety planning.
CONCLUSION
In the past decade, the domestic violence community has been
instrumental in defining and articulating the impact of domestic vi-
olence on children. These same advocates now find themselves as-
sisting battered mothers who are losing their children to foster care
and who are being charged with abuse or neglect for failing to pro-
tect their children from witnessing domestic violence. Mothers are
punished and children are traumatized by the separation while the
perpetrator of the violence generally experiences few conse-
quences. This Article calls for a multi-disciplinary approach to do-
mestic violence. This approach must focus on protecting children
by holding batterers accountable and keeping the non-abusing
mother and children together and on short and long term safety
options and support.
Issues of fairness are not all that is at stake here. The current
policy of removing children from their mothers will have a negative
impact on domestic violence survivors and may have a chilling ef-
fect on the mother's willingness to seek assistance. As the remov-
als of children increase, battered mothers are learning that child
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protective services involvement may be a detrimental consequence
of seeking help from the police, courts, hospitals or social workers.
The needs of battered mothers and their children are different
but linked. We cannot address the best interests of the children
without addressing the safety of battered mothers. The commu-
nity, the courts and the child welfare field must enter into a part-
nership with battered mothers to assist them in addressing the
harm done to children who have experienced the violence. We
must continue to work toward holding batterers fully accountable
for the violence they perpetrate.
It took until 1996, almost twenty years of education and advo-
cacy, for the state legislature and judges to recognize the harmful
effects of domestic violence. Now, child welfare and court systems
have been quick to hold mothers accountable for the harm. Soci-
ety has recognized and accepted the harm, but it is incumbent upon
us to develop meaningful ways to assist battered mothers and not a
system for separating them from their children.
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WEIGHING THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
FACTOR IN CUSTODY CASES:
TIPPING THE SCALES IN FAVOR
OF PROTECTING VICTIMS
AND THEIR CHILDREN
Kim Susser*
INTRODUCTION
In 1996, the New York State Legislature ("the Legislature") at-
tempted to afford additional protection to domestic violence vic-
tims and their children involved in custody disputes by amending
New York's Domestic Relations Law ("DRL") and the Family
Court Act ("FCA") to mandate consideration of domestic violence
when determining the best interests of the child in custody and visi-
tation cases. Four years later, it is evident that the amendment
failed to change the behavior of the courts or overcome the en-
trenched attitudes of many judges, attorneys and forensic evalu-
ators regarding domestic violence.
The first Part of this Article contains a brief overview of the case
law since the passage of the 1996 amendment and considers how
courts applied the mandate to consider domestic violence as a fac-
tor in determining the best interests of the child. Part II addresses
practical issues that arise when litigating custody cases where do-
mestic violence is a factor. Part III uses three case studies to illus-
trate the failure of the amendment to create the necessary change
intended by the Legislature and the need for legislative reform im-
posing a presumption against awarding custody to abusive parents.
The final Part examines the inconsistency in the law between child
* B.A., Clark University, 1986; J.D., George Washington University National
Law Center, 1989. The author supervises the Domestic Violence Clinical Center at
the New York Legal Assistance Group and has practiced in the New York City family
courts since 1990 when she began as a trial attorney in the Juvenile Rights Division of
the Legal Aid Society. She is an active member of the Domestic Violence Task Force
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the Lawyer's Committee
Against Domestic Violence. The author would like to thank Dorchen Leidholdt for
her continuing inspiration in this field, David Zlotnick for his introduction to
academia, Alison Sclater for her research assistance, Amy Barasch, Rhonda Panken
and Jill Wade for their red pens and, finally, her mother for her endless support for
whatever she chooses to do.
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protective cases and custody created by the amendment and policy
initiatives in the area of domestic violence and custody.
The statute states in pertinent part that where there are allega-
tions of domestic violence in any action for custody or visitation,
"and such allegations are proven by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, the court must consider the effect of such domestic violence
upon the best interests of the child, together with such other facts
and circumstances as the court deems relevant in making a direc-
tion pursuant to this section."1 Case law delineates additional fac-
tors to consider when applying the best interest standard.' The
best interest standard is elusive, however, and, as Justice Bernard
Meyer stated in Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, "the only absolute
governing custody of children is that there are no absolutes."3
Prior to enactment of the legislation in 1996, some courts consid-
ered domestic violence in the allocation of custody and visitation
rights, although there were only four reported appellate cases in
New York before 1985. 4 Since then, domestic violence has been
considered increasingly relevant in making these determinations.5
Appellate courts, for example, have consistently held that domestic
violence witnessed by a child is a significant factor in determining
custody and visitation. 6 Courts have also considered acts of vio-
lence in determining a parent's fitness for custody.7 Domestic vio-
lence has also been considered a factor in relocation cases,8 was
1. Act of May 21, 1996, ch. 85, 1996 N.Y. LAWS 273, 275.
2. See Eschbach v. Eschbach, 436 N.E.2d 1260, 1264 (N.Y. 1982) (holding that,
although the mother was not an unfit parent, the court is free to view the totality of
the circumstances to determine the child's best interests); Friederwitzer v.
Friederwitzer, 432 N.E.2d 765, 768 (N.Y. 1982) ("The standard ultimately to be ap-
plied remains the best interests of the child when all of the applicable factors are
considered, not whether there exists one or more circumstances that can be denomi-
nated extraordinary."); Nehra v. Uhlar, 372 N.E.2d 4, 9 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that the
father should be granted custody because he was awarded custody at time of divorce,
he was a fit parent and the mother had obtained possession of the children by lawless
self-help).
3. 432 N.E.2d at 768.
4. See Marjory M. Fields, The Impact of Spouse Abuse on Children and Its Rele-
vance in Custody and Visitation Decisions in New York State, 3 CORNELL J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 221, 242 (1994).
5. New York appellate courts have published 13 decisions holding that domestic
violence is relevant to the issues of custody and visitation between 1985 and 1994. See
id.
6. See LEE ELKINS & JANE FOSBINDER, NEW YORK LAW OF DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE 591 (1998).
7. See Farkas v. Farkas, N.Y. L.J., July 13, 1992, at 31 (Sup. Ct. July 13, 1992);
Rohan v. Rohan, 623 N.Y.S.2d 390, 392 (App. Div. 1995).
8. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Mitchell, 619 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (App. Div. 1994); Olmo v.
Olmo, 528 N.Y.S.2d 880, 881 (App. Div. 1988).
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articulated as a basis to support supervised visitation9 and consti-
tuted "extraordinary circumstances" in cases where a non-biologi-
cal party was seeking custody.10 Courts also viewed violence
committed by a parent against a new partner as an important
concern.
11
In 1996, the Legislature determined that piecemeal decision
making was not a sufficient means toward justice and declared do-
mestic violence a factor that must be considered in determining the
best interests of a child.1 2 The most significant aspects of the
amendment are the specific findings regarding domestic violence
set forth by the Legislature:
The legislature finds and declares that there has been a growing
recognition across the country that domestic violence should be
a weighty consideration in custody and visitation cases.
The legislature recognizes the wealth of research demonstrat-
ing the effects of domestic violence upon children, even when
the children have not been physically abused themselves or wit-
nessed the violence. Studies indicate that children raised in a
violent home experience shock, fear, and guilt and suffer anxi-
ety, depression, low self-esteem, and developmental and sociali-
zation difficulties. Additionally, children raised by a violent
parent face increased risk of abuse. A high correlation has been
found between spouse abuse and child abuse.
Domestic violence does not terminate upon separation or di-
vorce. Studies demonstrate that domestic violence frequently
escalates and intensifies upon the separation of the parties.
Therefore,... great consideration should be given to the corro-
sive impact of domestic violence and the increased danger to the
family ......
These compelling findings enunciated by the Legislature call for
stronger language than that in the amended statute itself. The
amendment simply codifies domestic violence as a factor that must
9. See, e.g., Irwin v. Schmidt, 653 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (App. Div. 1997); Richard C.
v. Deborah A., N.Y. L.J., Nov. 27, 1995, at 36 (Fam. Ct. Nov. 27, 1995); Antoinette M.
v. Paul Seth G., 608 N.Y.S.2d 703, 704 (App. Div. 1994); Anonymous G. v. Anony-
mous G., 517 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987 (App. Div. 1987).
10. See, e.g., Peters v. Blue, N.Y. L.J., June 23, 1997, at 29 (Fam. Ct. June 23, 1997);
Pratt v. Wood, 620 N.Y.S.2d 551, 552 (App. Div. 1994).
11. See TI v. PS, N.Y. L.J., June 5, 1995, at 31 (Fain. Ct. June 5, 1995); Kaplan v.
Chamberlain, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 17, 1993, at 27 (Fain. Ct. Sept. 27, 1993).
12. See Act of May 21, 1996, ch. 85, 1996 N.Y. LAws 273, 273.
13. Id. at 273-74 (emphasis added).
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
be considered when determining the best interests of the child.
The findings call for a rebuttable presumption against the award of
custody to a parent found to have committed domestic violence.
As many as eighteen states have adopted such a presumption.14
Although the Legislature explicitly rejected a presumption, the
new law is clearly meant to impose restrictions on visitation and
custody for one parent who has been found to have committed vio-
lence against the other parent. The legislative history plainly states
domestic violence "should be a weighty consideration."15 Domestic
violence is the only factor specifically codified, thereby implying
that courts minimizing or disregarding evidence of domestic vio-
lence are in derogation of the law.16 The problem lies in the reality
that mandating judges to give a particular factor "weighty consider-
ation" does not give much guidance. The statute has no teeth.
Although the statute's plain language states "domestic violence"
is a factor,17 it does not limit domestic violence to the definition of
a "family offense" as determined by Article Eight of the FCA.1 8
This is not an intentional omission on the part of the Legislature, as
the statute later specifically refers to Article Eight when defining
"family or household member."' 9 The Legislative findings also
14. Lynne R. Kurtz, Protecting New York's Children: An Argument for the Crea-
tion of a Rebuttable Presumption Against Awarding a Spouse Abuser Custody of a
Child, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1345, 1350 (1997); see also Katherine M. Reihing, Protecting
Victims of Domestic Violence and Their Children After Divorce: The American Law
Institute's Model, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 393, 395 (1999). See also, e.g.,
ALA. CODE 1975 § 30-3-131 (Supp. 1999); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403 (West
Supp. 1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101(c) (Michie 1997); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-10-124 (1.5) (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 705A (Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) (West Supp. 1999); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46(9) (Michie
Supp. 1998); IDAHO CODE § 32-717B(5) (1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364 (West
Supp. 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(2)(d) (West Supp. 1999); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 125.480(5) (1998); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:1.7 (1993); N.M. CENT. CODE § 14-09-
06.2(1)6) (1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 21.1(D) (West 1995); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 153.004 (West 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.191 (2)(a)(iii) (West
1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(2)(b)(2)(c) (West 1993); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-
113(a) (1999).
15. Act of May 21, 1996, ch. 85, 1996 N.Y. LAws 273, 273 (emphasis added).
16. See Ilana Gruebel, The Domestic Violence Factor in Child Custody and Visita-
tion Determinations, in LAWYER'S MANUAL ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: REPRESENT-
ING THE VIc-rM 171, 174 (Ronald E. Cohen et al. eds., 2d ed. 1998).
17. See Act of May 21, 1996, ch. 85, 1996 N.Y. LAws 273, 273-74.
18. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812 (McKinney 1999). Section 812 of the New York
Family Court Act defines a family offense as "disorderly conduct, harassment [,] ag-
gravated harassment[,] menacing[,] reckless endangerment, assault . . . or an at-
tempted assault," as delineated by the relevant New York Penal Law provisions. Id.
(amended effective Dec. 1, 1999 to include "stalking" as a family offense).
19. See Act of May 21, 1996, ch. 85, 1996 N.Y. LAws 273, 275.
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specifically refer to "physical or psychological violence. ' 20 As dis-
cussed later,2 1 one Westchester Family Court case adopted an ex-
panded definition of domestic violence, which includes more than
physical acts. Therefore, the definition of domestic violence as it is
applied in custody cases is broader than the definition of domestic
violence applied in family offense cases. 22
Oddly, the statute limits the consideration of domestic violence
to acts committed against a "family or household member," as de-
fined in Article Eight of the FCA.23 Article Eight limits the defini-
tion of family or household member to a spouse, former spouse,
those who have a child in common, or any relative, whether by
blood or marriage. 4 This definition, however, omits paramours,
even if they live with one of the parties. Although there is nothing
to prevent a court from considering violence in such a context,25
this limitation appears to be a significant oversight by the
Legislature.
In 1998, the custody and visitation provisions of the DRL and
FCA were further amended to prohibit courts from granting cus-
tody or visitation to any person convicted of murdering the child's
parent.26 Under this statute, the court is not even permitted to or-
der temporary visitation pending the determination of a petition of
custody or visitation.27 Exceptions include situations where a child
of suitable age and maturity consents to such an order and where
the person convicted of the murder can prove that it was causally
related to self-defense against acts of domestic violence perpe-
trated by the deceased.28 By requiring the court to deny visitation
between parent and child, as a matter of law, the statute constitutes
"a dramatic change in the law."'2 9 In cases of murder, the Legisla-
ture willingly imposed a presumption against an award of cus-
tody,30 but specifically rejected such a presumption in other
20. Id. at 274.
21. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
22. See J.D. v. N.D., 652 N.Y.S.2d 468 (Fam. Ct. 1996).
23. N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 827(vii).
24. See id. § 812.
25. See ELKINS & FOSBINDER, supra note 6, at 595.
26. See Act of July 27, 1999, ch. 378, 1999 N.Y. LAws 1231, 1231-33.
27. See id. at 1232.
28. See id.
29. See ELKINS & FOSBINDER, supra note 6, at 67 (Supp. Mar., 1999) (citing John
R. v. Marlene C., N.Y. L.J., Dec. 8, 1998, at 28 (Fam. Ct. Dec. 8, 1998)).
30. See Act of July 27, 1999, ch. 378, 1999 N.Y. LAws.
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domestic violence custody cases.3 This disparity is analogous to
the criminal justice system's swift response to a domestic violence
homicide, as opposed to its frequently cavalier treatment of domes-
tic violence misdemeanors that, if treated with the same import,
might serve to prevent a domestic violence homicide.
I. POST-AMENDMENT CASES
Much of the case law since the passage of the amendment fails to
address the ultimate issue: How should courts apply the statutory
mandate to give domestic violence the "weighty consideration" re-
quired by the FCA.32 With the exception of two lower court cases
in Westchester County,33 there has been little analysis of the statute
or guidance as to the meaning of weighty consideration. One of
those cases indicated that domestic violence under the statute is
not limited to acts causing physical injury.34 The court held that
there was an "unmistakable pattern of power and control," and
that "[e]conomic, verbal and sexual abuse, coupled with regular
and frequent threats and intimidation, while more subtle in nature,
are no less damaging than a physical blow. 35
The other case held against the recommendations of the court-
appointed expert and the law guardian 36 to find that, although
neither parent presented an ideal environment, custody should re-
main with the mother.37 In that case, domestic violence was given
the "weighty consideration" envisioned by the Legislature 38 over
other factors presented by the facts of the case, including the ex-
pert's opinion that the mother was "evasive, anxious and histri-
onic."' 39 This decision also holds that, when experts do not give
sufficient weight to evidence of domestic violence, the court is free
31. See Act of May 21, 1996, ch. 85, 1996 N.Y. LAWS 273, 273-74 ("Rather than
imposing a presumption, the legislature hereby establishes domestic violence as a fac-
tor ... ").
32. Id. at 273.
33. See E.R. v. G.S.R., 648 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Fam. Ct. 1996); J.D. v. N.D., 652
N.Y.S.2d 468 (Fam. Ct. 1996).
34. See J.D., 652 N.Y.S.2d at 468 ("[Dlomestic violence is not limited to overt acts
of violence which cause physical injury. The Legislature implicitly recognized that
domestic violence is not a static concept . . .
35. Id. at 471.
36. A law guardian is defined as "an attorney who is assigned by a court to repre-
sent a child." NEW YORK STATE BAR Assoc., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE
LAW GUARDIAN SYSTEM: THE PRIVATELY PAID LAW GUARDIAN 1 (1997).
37. See E.R., 648 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
38. See Act of May 21, 1996, ch. 85, 1996 N.Y. LAWS 273, 273.
39. See E.R., 648 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
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to disregard their opinions provided it has convincing reasons to do
SO.
40
In an unreported decision in New York County, the court cited
uncontroverted evidence of domestic violence as well as the fa-
ther's failure to understand its damaging impact on the children in
its award of custody to the mother.41 The court considered its leg-
islative mandate, stating that "the stench of domestic violence per-
meated the trial," and credited testimony that the mother's
relocation was out of her "desperate need to escape a violent rela-
tionship. ' 42 Although no allegations of domestic violence were
specifically pled, as required by the statute, the court conformed
the pleadings to the proof evinced at trial.43
In other cases that consider domestic violence, there was no ex-
amination of the legislative charge, but domestic violence was in-
stead considered regardless of the legislative mandate. One judge
recited a litany of factors that must be considered in determining a
relocation case, yet never mentioned the amendment. 44 In an ap-
pellate case, the court relied on two pre-amendment cases, instead
of the statute, and held that the father was "ill-suited to provide
moral and intellectual guidance" to his children due to his acts of
violence against their mother.45 A third court cited a law review
article, instead of the legislative findings in the amendment, to con-
clude that "young children exposed to domestic violence suffer a
broad range of developmental and socialization difficulties. '46
As a practical point, it matters little whether courts rely on the
statute itself or other material, rather, these decisions illustrate that
even those judges inclined to give domestic violence the weighty
consideration required, overlook the amendment because the lan-
guage is not strong enough to warrant deliberation. The amend-
ment was not needed for judges who appropriately exercise
discretion in their contemplation of domestic violence, it was
meant for those who do not. For judges who do not evaluate do-
mestic violence, the mandate to consider it as a factor is insuffi-
40. See id.
41. See Anthony S. v. Kimberly S., Nos. V-1276-97, V-1747-97, V-1277.97, V-1278-
97, 1998 WL 425464, at *4 (Fam. Ct. June 19, 1998).
42. Id. at *6.
43. See id.
44. See In re Juan C., N.Y. L.J., Oct. 12, 1999, at 29 (Fam. Ct. Oct. 12, 1999).
45. See Irvin v. Schmidt, 653 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (App. Div. 1997). See also In re
Dejesus, 1999 WL 1215165 (N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 1, 1999).
46. Christopher S. v. Ann Marie S., 662 N.Y.S.2d 200, 206 (Fam. Ct. 1997) (citing
M.M. Pagelow, The Effects of Domestic Violence on Children and Their Consequences
for Custody and Visitation Agreements, MEDIATION Q., Summer 1990, at 346).
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cient. The language of weighty consideration leaves too much
discretion to an individual judge or expert. For example, the Ap-
pellate Division affirmed an award of custody to a father who ad-
mitted to being the subject of an order of protection and was
ordered to complete a batterer's program.47 One dissenting justice
argued that the lower court erred as the record was "replete with
domestic violence. ' 48 The dissent further contended that the lower
court failed to "admit and adequately consider evidence relevant to
serious incidents of domestic violence that bear on the father's fit-
ness for custody. 49
In a matrimonial proceeding, another court held that several or-
ders of protection issued on behalf of a mother were not sufficient
evidence warranting consideration of the impact of domestic vio-
lence on her children.50 It was not clear whether the orders of pro-
tection the judge was referring to were issued after a hearing or on
consent. The striking point in this case was that there was a trial on
the grounds for divorce and sufficient evidence was found to grant
the mother a judgement based on cruel and inhuman treatment of
her by the father which the court failed to consider in determining
the best interests of the children. The underlying facts comprising
the cruel and inhuman treatment were not set forth in the decision.
Some might posit that domestic violence is sufficiently addressed
in a line of joint custody cases, which predate the amendment.
Although case law clearly dictates that joint custody is not con-
doned in situations where domestic violence is found, the routes of
analysis differ."t In joint custody cases, courts reason that parents
who are "severely antagonistic and embattled" should not be
awarded joint custody since joint custody by definition requires
joint decision-making.52 The rationale underlying the amendment
to Section 240 of the DRL is based on the wealth of research dem-
onstrating the harm to children exposed to violence, rather than
the inability of parents to cooperate.
47. See Smith v. Purnell, 682 N.Y.S.2d 889, 890 (App. Div. 1998).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Walsh v. Walsh, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 21, 1998, at 32 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 21, 1998).
51. See supra notes 34-50 and accompanying text.
52. Braiman v. Braiman, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 1019 (N.Y. 1978); see also Spencer v.
Small, 693 N.Y.S. 727, 729 (App. Div. 1999) ("Clearly, there could not be an award of
joint custody due to the violent relationship between these parties and respondent's
lack of any positive effort to control his anger." (citation omitted)).
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II. PRACTICE ISSUES
Incidents of domestic violence must be proven by a preponder-
ance of the evidence in order to be considered as a factor under the
statute.5 3 Findings of prior family offenses in family court and crim-
inal convictions should therefore be given a res judicata effect in a
custody or visitation proceeding.54 If there has been no prior find-
ing or conviction, then the violence can be proven anew during the
course of the custody trial.55 Litigators ought to be wary of cases
where the family offense is tried before a judge in family court, but
the custody/visitation case is then referred to a Court Attorney
Referee56 who must consider,-but has not actually heard, the testi-
mony regarding domestic violence. 7 Although it is often less com-
plicated for an attorney to prove the violence in a separate family
offense proceeding and then use the finding as a tool for negotiat-
ing a settlement in the custody/visitation matter, if a settlement on
the custody/visitation is not reached, the court hearing that case
will not have heard the testimony about the domestic violence. In
these situations, one can argue that, notwithstanding the res judi-
cata effect, the trial court ought to hear the live testimony and have
the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses.
The statute and legislative history also provide material for cross
examining expert witnesses who either minimize or disregard do-
mestic violence in their custody/visitation recommendations. The
American Psychological Association ("APA"), for example, has
found that false reporting of family violence occurs infrequently
53. See id. at 275.
54. See Tiffany A. v. Margaret J., 656 N.Y.S.2d 792, 795-96 (Fam. Ct. 1996) (hold-
ing that three prior determinations of parental unfitness serve as "res judicata on the
question of [the mother's] fitness to parent, her right to custody and what is in the
best interests of [the] children"). But cf. Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 432 N.E.2d
765, 767 (N.Y. 1982) (indicating that on petition for change of custody "that no one
factor, including the existence of [an] earlier decree or agreement, is determinative of
whether there should, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, be a change of
custody").
55. See, e.g, Hollister v. Hollister, 678 N.Y.S.2d 820 (App. Div. 1998) (upholding
lower court's determination that respondent did not substantiate domestic violence
accusations by a preponderance of the evidence).
56. See N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 439 (McKinney 1999).
57. It is common practice for the New York City family courts to appoint Refer-
ees, who are lawyers, not judges, to hear custody and visitation cases. This is due to
the shortage of judges in the New York City family court system. See Catherine J.
Ross, Unified Family Courts: Good Sense, Good Justice, TRIAL, Jan. 1, 1999 at 30, 31
("In New York City ... there are only 41 sitting judges. These judges handle over
225,000 cases a year, or approximately 5500 cases annually for each judge. A system
like this one cannot be expected to yield anything more than 'assembly-line
justice.'").
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and that the rate of false reports in custody cases is no greater than
for other crimes.58 Despite this, studies show that mental health
professionals still believe that "as many as one in eight women are
magnifying violence as a ploy in custody disputes. 59 Judges should
not give weight to expert opinions where the expert has not shown
an understanding of the psycho-social literature addressing the
negative impact of domestic violence on children as set forth in the
legislative history of the 1996 amendment.
It is imperative to introduce a copy of the legislative history to
the court in your summation when litigating custody cases where
domestic violence is an issue so that the court can better under-
stand the rationale behind the amendment and accord it the proper
weight. The legislative findings can be annexed to motions and ref-
erenced during the course of a trial. As will be seen below, how-
ever, good practice is not always enough to overcome the long-
standing behaviors and attitudes impacting on these cases.
60
III. CASE STUDIES
6 1
Many cases regarding custody and visitation emanate from the
family court, a court in which most litigants appear pro se or with
court-appointed counsel.62 Written opinions are not issued in most
cases, and many are not appealed. Therefore, it is important to
examine how cases are decided from a practitioner's point of view.
Case studies reveal a more detailed picture of the lower court pro-
ceedings than those usually reflected in appellate opinions. I began
practicing in this area in 1994, the year before this legislation
passed. Using three cases, each in different boroughs of New York
City and each post-dating the amendment, I will show the necessity
for the imposition of a presumption against awarding custody to
58. See AMERICAN PSYCHOL. Assoc., VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY 12 (1996).
59. Joan Zorza, Protecting the Children in Custody: Disputes When One Parent
Abuses the Other, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1113, 1120 (1996) (citing PETER G.
JAFFE, CHILDREN OF BATTERED WOMEN 32-75 (1995)).
60. See discussion infra Part III.
61. Each case study is based upon a family court case in which the author
represented the battered mother. Names, locations and key facts have been changed
to protect the confidentiality of the parties. Written decisions and transcripts are on
file with the author.
62. See, e.g., Russell Engler, And Justice for All - Including the Unrepresented
Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
1987, 2047 (1999) ("The numbers of unrepresented litigants in family law cases have
surged nationwide, with some reports indicating that eighty percent or more of family
law cases involve at least one pro se litigant.").
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abusive parents.63 The mandate to give domestic violence a
weighty consideration was ineffective in each of the cases.
In each case, a family offense petition was filed by the mother
requesting an order of protection. In two of the cases, the custody
or visitation trial proceeded contemporaneously with the family of-
fense trial, and in the other the custody case immediately followed
the family offense trial.
A. Mr. S. v. Ms. B.
The first case is a Bronx County matter in which, during a partic-
ularly vicious assault, the respondent pulled a clump of hair out of
Ms. B.'s head. The parties were never married and never lived to-
gether, but had one child in common. There was a lengthy trial on
the family offense case before a judge who later referred the cus-
tody case to a referee. The referee assigned a law guardian who
appeared on the custody/visitation matter.
Ms. B. initiated the family offense proceeding, seeking an order
of protection. Her petition alleged several incidents of domestic
violence during which the child's father seriously assaulted her. A
few months after she filed her family offense petition, Mr. S. filed
petitions for paternity and custody. He never filed a family offense
petition against Ms. B.
The judge first heard testimony on the family offense case. Ms.
B. testified on her own behalf to an incident that took place in the
respondent's mother's home. His mother often cared for the baby
while Ms. B. was working and attending nursing school. When Ms.
B. picked up the child one afternoon, Mr. S. appeared and they
began arguing about child support. Mr. S. started cursing and
pushed Ms. B. onto the couch while she held the baby. He choked
her and pulled her hair with such ferocity that she was left with a
two to three inch bald spot on her head. Ms. B. introduced medical
records and photographs of the injuries to her head and neck. The
medical records, including x-rays and a CAT scan, indicated a con-
cussion, memory loss, muscle spasm, back pain, dizziness and hair
loss. Mr. S. was left with scratches on his face from Ms. B.'s at-
tempts to break free when he was choking her. Both parties were
arrested for the incident. The criminal case against the mother was
dismissed by the District Attorney's office and the criminal case
against the father proceeded to a jury trial. He was acquitted on all
charges.
63. See discussion infra Parts III.A-C.
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In addition to testifying for himself, Mr. S.'s brother, sister and
current girlfriend testified on his behalf, as did the arresting police
officer, Mr. S.'s roommate and his psychologist. Mr. S. denied any
violence on his part and maintained that the incident at his
mother's home was initiated by the petitioner who had scratched
his face. He also testified that on another occasion the petitioner
threw a chair at him.
Although there were no allegations pending against Ms. B., Mr.
S.'s roommate was permitted to testify, over objection, as to
whether he had ever seen Ms. B. attack Mr. S. The issue arose
again during Mr. S.'s testimony when he was asked about threaten-
ing messages left by Ms. B. on his answering machine. The respon-
dent's testimony concerned alleged threats to take him to court for
his failure to pay child support, which, even if true, do not consti-
tute a criminal act nor address the issues of the case. During his
defense, Mr. S. and his brother, who admitted to abusing heroin
during the time period about which he was testifying, stated that on
a different occasion, Ms. B. once threw a chair at Mr. S. Though
apparently offered as an excuse for Mr. S.'s assaults upon Ms. B.,
the court effectively imputed a counter-claim against Ms. B., which
the court later concluded was proven.
Had the allegations against Ms. B. been properly raised, she
would have been served with a petition at least five days prior to
the hearing and been given the same opportunity to defend herself
as Mr. S. had to defend himself.64 Armed with notice of the
charges that the court considered against her, Ms. B. could have
defended herself against the accusations by requesting pretrial dis-
closure, calling witnesses or introducing other evidence on her own
behalf. Instead, she unwittingly relied on her strong documentary
evidence in pursuit of an order of protection. Although she offered
rebuttal witnesses to counter Mr. S.'s undocumented allegations,
rebuttal testimony was not permitted.
At the conclusion of the family offense trial, the judge found that
Mr. S. committed assault in the third degree, a family offense. He
further found that Mr. S. had caused physical injury and that,
therefore, aggravating circumstances existed. The judge issued a
three year order of protection on behalf of Ms. B., the longest du-
64. Whether family offense charges are raised in a petition or as counter-claims,
the person charged has a constitutionally based right to the notice necessary to pres-
ent a defense. The FCA sets forth specific procedures for counter-claims which in-
clude service of a petition no later than five days prior to the return date. See N.Y.
FAM. CT. Acr § 154(b) (McKinney 1999).
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ration permissible under Article 8 of the FCA.65 Although the
court found aggravating circumstances and issued an order of pro-
tection, the judge went on to state in his oral findings of fact that
the violence was "mutual." Specifically, the court made the follow-
ing findings:
1. I find it credible and that on the occasion in her - in his
apartment.., that Ms. B. did throw the chair, I find that she has
acted [at] times in ways that were extremely inappropriate and
- risky to the child.
2. I find that on occasion, Mr. S. also acted inappropriately in
the presence of the child, and that both parents have contrib-
uted to the atmosphere of that, [sic] I think, have probably cre-
ated impairment to the child.
3. I find in this case that the domestic violence was not unilat-
eral, it was bilateral....
4. The court also finds both parents are involved in a violent
and unhealthy relationship and each parent is equally responsi-
ble for exposing the child to domestic violence.
Following an objection to the findings of fact because there was no
petition against Ms. B., the judge responded, "I can tell you that
there's [sic] been a petition filed against your client. There is a
very strong likelihood [that] mutual orders would have been con-
sidered, that is not before me, that is [moot]."
Time and again the court acknowledged that no allegations were
pending against Ms. B. Nevertheless, the judge stated that if he
could have, he would have issued a mutual order of protection.
Luckily for Ms. B., the issuance of mutual orders of protection,
without the filing of a petition, are illegal pursuant to section 841 of
the FCA.66 Mutual orders of protection are "yet another weapon"
by which a batterer threatens and subdues his or her victim. 67 They
send the message to the batterer that he is not responsible for his
violent acts - she is. It was this message that led to legislation
outlawing mutual orders of protection under these very circum-
stances. Nonetheless, this was the message that the court sent to
Mr. S.
The impact of the decision was practically the same as if a mu-
tual order of protection had been issued. The father and the law
guardian attempted to use these findings against Ms. B. during the
custody/visitation proceedings subsequently heard by a referee.
65. See id. § 842.
66. See id. § 841.
67. See OCA Report Supporting S-4025B, at 2 (N.Y. 1995).
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Most importantly, the unauthorized findings made it impossible to
use the legitimate finding against the father effectively, in the way
that the Legislature intended. How could the referee give the do-
mestic violence the weighty consideration mandated when the pro-
ceeding was clouded by the erroneous findings against Ms. B. from
the family offense case?
Ms. B. appealed the findings. She argued that, although no or-
der of protection was issued against her, she was harmed by the
findings in the subsequent custody case. She argued that since she
did not receive the notice of any cross-claims to which she was enti-
tled, the findings must be stricken. Left standing, the findings
could be used against her in any subsequent modification of cus-
tody or visitation proceeding.
The Appellate Division held that "in the absence of a written
cross-petition by respondent as required by the FCA to provide
petitioner-appellant with notice of her alleged responsibility for in-
cidents of domestic violence the findings of the trial court on that
issue were gratuitous and unauthorized and can be of no dispositive
effect in any other litigation between the parties."68 The Appellate
Division further held that the denial of the petitioner's rebuttal
witnesses was improper.69
The custody and visitation case had already settled by the time
the Appellate Division issued a decision. The mother obtained full
custody and the father was granted visitation on alternate week-
ends from Saturday until Sunday, and one evening a week. The
exchange of the child was to take place at a police precinct.
Of course, at the custody trial, the mother could have tried to re-
litigate the domestic violence instead of settling, but there was a
clear coercive effect that the unauthorized findings had on settle-
ment negotiations. More importantly, if there were a trial, what
weight could the referee really give to a finding against the respon-
dent clouded by "unauthorized and gratuitous" findings about the
petitioner? 70 The referee was prevented from giving weighty con-
sideration to the findings against the respondent because there
were findings against both parties. If there were a presumption
imposed then the referee would have had no choice but to shift the
68. Lorin B. v. Michael S., 679 N.Y.S.2d 11, 11 (App. Div. 1998) (emphasis
added).
69. See id.
70. Id.
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burden to the respondent to rebut the presumption. 71 A presump-
tion statute would address circumstances where each party accuses
the other of violence and requires courts to determine who is the
primary aggressor. Additionally, the mother had already testified
at two trials by that time, one in criminal court and one in family
court: how many times should she have to relive the violence?
The father was later arrested for violating the family court order
of protection by going to the child's school and attempting to visit
him. A jury convicted him of criminal contempt. The criminal
court granted Mr. S. a conditional discharge and a three-year order
of protection was issued on behalf of Ms. B. and the child, except
during court ordered visitation. 72 According to the Assistant Dis-
trict Attorney ("ADA") who prosecuted the case, the judge ad-
monished the defendant not to "breathe or mutter" in Ms. B.'s
direction, but denied the ADA's request for a split sentence of jail
and probation.
Had the findings of fact on the family offense been limited to the
mother's case, as the Appellate Division held they should have,73 it
is likely there would have been stricter limits placed on visitation.
The father would have been held completely accountable for his
behavior instead of getting the clear message that the mother was
partially responsible.
B. J.v.J.
In this Queens County matter, there had been a severe and
lengthy history of violence against the mother. She had filed sev-
eral family offense petitions in Queens County Family Court in the
past, all of which resulted in the respondent either consenting to
the issuance of an order of protection without any admission of
wrongdoing, or in a default judgement being issued against him.
The family offense and custody cases were tried concurrently. The
cases were before the judge for almost three years before they
were resolved. The mother had previously agreed to allowing the
father to have custody of the two children because she believed
that if he had custody then he would stop abusing and continually
stalking her. About one year after consenting to his having cus-
71. In some states the presumption may be rebutted by showing that he had com-
pleted a batterer's intervention program or extraordinary circumstances evidencing
there is no risk of continuing violence. See Kurtz, supra note 14, at 1350.
72. The mother also filed a violation petition in the family court which was later
withdrawn.
73. Lorin B., 679 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
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tody, the children complained to her that their father was con-
stantly yelling at them, treating them like "slaves" by forcing them
to perform excessive chores in the household, and that he had hit
one of them. Upon hearing her children's stories, the mother filed
to modify the custody arrangement.
The allegations in the family offense case were that the respon-
dent threatened her that "you better run for your life" and that he
would "rather see the children in foster care" than with her. Her
petition further alleged an incident occurring around Christmas of
1995, during which time he had choked her with a scarf in front of
the children. The mother testified to years of violence, including
the incidents contained in her previous family offense petitions.
Two specific incidents to which she testified were that the father
had hit her in the face with a two-by-four piece of wood, and that
on a different occasion he had broken her ribs. Both of these as-
saults occurred years before the trial. It was these two most serious
incidents that the judge,-the law guardian and the court-appointed
forensics expert found the least credible.
Mrs. J. was forced to move on several occasions because her hus-
band constantly followed her, attempted to force his way into her
apartment, and yelled and cursed at her outside her window. Each
time she moved she kept her address confidential but the respon-
dent always managed to find her.
During his interview with the probation officer ("P.O.") who was
conducting the investigation and report that was ordered, the re-
spondent admitted that indeed he had followed Mrs. J., and ap-
peared at her apartment at 4:00 a.m. during the time the parties
were separated. The respondent initially lied to the P.O. and de-
nied following Mrs. J., stating, "I never follow her, she is not telling
the truth." Upon further questioning by the P.O. as to how the
respondent knew where Mrs. J. was living, "he smiled at the P.O.
and stated, 'I followed her, I know everything about her."' Despite
evidence to the contrary, the respondent later denied in his testi-
mony that he ever told the P.O. that he had followed Mrs. J., or
that he found her at her apartment at 4:00 a.m., further undermin-
ing his credibility.
Four experts testified at the trial. The first was a school guidance
counselor, a qualified social worker, with whom the children dis-
cussed witnessing specific incidents of their father's abuse against
their mother. The second was the court appointed psychologist
who found the mother "hysterical" in her rendering of the domes-
tic violence. He met with the children for twenty minutes each,
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and recommended that custody be awarded to the father. The
third expert was a psychologist retained by the mother with court
ordered funds, but who was only permitted to evaluate the mother
and children. The father refused to be seen by her as she was the
mother's witness. She recommended that custody be awarded to
the mother and supervised visitation granted to the father. The last
expert was the children's social worker from a private agency
where the family had been referred after reports were made
against the father to the Administration for Children's Services
("ACS"). Her testimony was primarily factual in nature regarding
statements made by the father and children in counseling, and the
children's psychological diagnosis of depression and anxiety. She
had not seen the mother in counseling.
A certificate of conviction against the father for harassment of
his current girlfriend in Connecticut was introduced into evidence.
The underlying facts of that incident could not be established, but
the father admitted that he and his girlfriend indeed had a fight,
and that the incident occurred in front of the children. In addition,
as a result of several reports to the ACS regarding the children, the
father attended individual counseling for several months. These
reports were also admitted into evidence. The father admitted to
hitting one of the children with a belt. After determining that an
"Alternatives to Violence" program was necessary, the caseworker
referred the father to such a program. The father never attended,
and the caseworker never followed up.
The law guardian had represented the children during the earlier
proceedings and resumed his representation on the current case.
Although he supported granting custody to the mother, the law
guardian did not believe that the domestic violence had occurred.
In his written summation, he stated that the mother's history of
domestic violence was "troubling in that its details traveled beyond
the realm of credibility." Although his position throughout the
trial was that his clients wished to live with their mother, he never
conducted his questioning of the parties in a manner that would
have supported the children's position, nor did he present any evi-
dence to that effect. The children were six and seven years old at
the commencement of the case. The bases for his supporting that
custody be granted to the mother were his clients' wishes and, that
although the children maintained a stable residence and did well in
school while living with their father, their daily routine was "lit-
tered with verbal disputes, yelling, displays of anger from the fa-
ther which are intimidating and sometimes frightening to them and
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sometimes result in hitting, yanking of arms, and physical pushing
and restraining." The law guardian repeatedly noted his grave con-
cern that the mother would be unable to prevent her negative feel-
ings about Mr. J. from interfering with the children's relationship
with their father.
At one point during the trial, the judge stated specifically that no
statutory mandate to consider domestic violence was necessary be-
cause case law already required the court to do so. Ultimately
though, the court held that "none of the major parties.were credi-
ble." In particular, the court found the mother "grandiose and his-
trionic," and her testimony, with respect to the history of violence,
incredible. The court characterized the father as a "nominalist"
with "poor impulse control."74
In a somewhat inconsistent written opinion, the judge dismissed
the family offense case, holding that the petitioner did not prove
the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. He then
granted custody to the mother and issued an order of protection on
behalf of her and the children under the custody docket. Although
the court did not believe that the father physically abused and
stalked the mother, it found that he did verbally abuse her, issuing
the order of protection on that basis. The court relied heavily on
its two in camera interviews with the children. The court further
noted that the children presented conflicting statements depending
on whom they were speaking to and when. The court did not give
weight to one child's report of domestic violence because he could
not discern whether it was her actual experience, or whether she
heard about it and incorporated it into her belief system. Custody
was awarded to the mother because she provided emotional stabil-
ity for the children and because the father was found to have used
excessive corporal punishment on one of the children.
The court gave no indication in its written decision of how much
weight, if any, was given to the harassment conviction against the
father in which his current paramour was the complainant. This
incident alone could have provided the basis for a change in cus-
74. It is unclear why the court referred to the respondent as a "nominalist." The
dictionary defines "nominalism" as "[t]he doctrine that abstract concepts, general
terms, or universals have no objective reference but exist only as names." THE AMER-
ICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 845 (2d College ed. 1991) (emphasis added). The
court's statement may allude to the respondent being a father in name only. In the
context of the decision, however, it seems that the judge may have instead meant
"minimalist," referring to the respondent's attempts to minimize the allegations of
domestic violence and corporal punishment.
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tody.75 Domestic violence against a partner who is not the other
parent must be considered in a best interest determination.76
Ironically, the court granted Mrs. J. more relief than she would
have if the order of protection had been awarded on the family
offense case. Protective orders issued pursuant to a custody action,
as this one was, are in effect until the youngest child turns eighteen
years of age. 77 Had the order been issued under Article 8 of the
FCA, the maximum duration could only have been three years.78
A legal presumption alone would not have changed the outcome
of this case because the court simply did not believe the mother's
testimony about the violence. Nonetheless, had the court applied
the legislative findings, then it might have found Mrs. J.'s rendering
of the violence more plausible. For example, the timing of the inci-
dents she relayed was consistent with the fact that violence gener-
ally escalates upon separation. Also, the statements from the
children as to the father's verbal abuse and corporal punishment
are consistent with the finding that there is a high correlation be-
tween spousal and child abuse.79 The testimony of her guidance
counselor revealed that one of the children was exhibiting suicidal
ideation. According to the mother's expert and the children's own
social worker, both children were exhibiting signs of depression
and anxiety. These symptoms can all arise from long-term expo-
sure to domestic violence.80 The mother's relinquishment of cus-
tody to the father in an attempt to avoid further violence is also
consistent with typical domestic violence cases.81 Much of the evi-
dence brought before the court was consistent with the impact of
domestic violence. Viewed within the framework of the legislative
findings, together with the imposition of a presumption against
awarding custody to a batterer, this evidence would have com-
pelled the court to grant custody of the subject children to Mrs. J.
unless Mr. J. could rebut the presumption.
75. See Irwin v. Schmidt, 653 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628-29 (1997) ("Notably, evidence of
the father's acts of domestic violence against his current wife demonstrated that he
possesses a character which is ill-suited to the difficult task of providing his young
children with moral and intellectual guidance.").
76. See id.
77. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §240(3) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
78. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 828 (McKinney 1999).
79. See Act of May 21, 1996, ch. 85, 1996 N.Y. LAws 273, 274.
80. See id.
81. See Zorza, supra note 59, at 1124.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
Some of the facts of this case study parallel the Westchester case
discussed earlier.82 In that case, the expert also found the mother
"evasive, anxious and histrionic," and recommended an award of
custody to the father.83 That court, however, found that the
mother's frequent crying "was heartfelt, not histrionic," 84 and re-
jected the psychologist's recommendation in part based upon the
fact that he skimmed over instances of domestic violence. In this
case, the expert and the judge also found the mother "hysterical,"
but the court was unable to fit her behavior into a framework that
incorporates the dynamics of domestic abuse. Many battered wo-
men suffering post-traumatic stress disorder are mislabeled as
histrionic. 85
The court, the law guardian and the court-appointed expert all
raised typical questions regarding the mother's credibility about
the two most severe assaults. All three failed to understand how
her injuries healed without medical treatment and therefore con-
cluded she had lied or exaggerated. Although Mrs. J.'s cousin cor-
roborated the incident in which Mr. S. hit Mrs. J. with a two-by-
four, and Mrs. J. testified that she went to a private doctor for her
broken ribs, neither the court nor the law guardian believed she
could have possibly sustained such injuries and not sought treat-
ment.86 The law guardian further questioned why those two inci-
dents were not specifically alleged in the mother's earlier family
offense petitions. The fact that Mrs. J. had sought orders of protec-
tion and had drafted the earlier petitions without representation,
that Mr. J. had a later conviction against him for harassing his cur-
rent paramour and had admitted to stalking Mrs. J., and that the
children were complaining of verbal abuse and corporal punish-
ment did nothing to enhance her credibility with the court, the law
guardian or the expert. These factors were not viewed together in
the context of domestic abuse, instead they were perceived in a
disjointed manner. The legislative history sets forth many funda-
mental tenets of the dynamics and impact of domestic violence on
women and children. Courts should look to it for guidance in un-
82. See E.R. v. G.S.R., 648 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Fam. Ct. 1996); see also supra notes 34-
50 and accompanying text.
83. E.R., 648 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
84. Id.
85. See PETER G. JAFFE & R. GEFFNER, CHILDREN EXPOSED TO MARITAL VIO-
LENCE THEORY, RESEARCH, AND APPLIED IssuEs 379 (G.W. Holden et al. eds.,
1998).
86. The medical records were unavailable because the incident occurred almost six
years earlier and the doctor was no longer working at the same location.
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derstanding these dynamics, and apply the findings to the facts
before them.
The APA recognizes that a victim of domestic violence is likely
to be at a disadvantage in custody cases if the court does not con-
sider the history of violence since "behavior that would seem rea-
sonable as protection from abuse may be misinterpreted as signs of
instability. Psychological evaluators not trained in domestic vio-
lence may contribute to this process by ignoring or minimizing the
violence and by giving pathological labels to women's responses to
chronic victimization. ' 87 This heightened disbelief of battered wo-
men, coupled with misinterpretation of their behavior are two im-
portant reasons to impose a presumption against allowing a parent
who commits acts of domestic violence to have custody. Battered
women need help to overcome the image they sometimes present
in court or during psychological evaluations. A victim may re-en-
act her adaptations to living in a hostile environment when she is in
court, "becoming agitated, over-emotional or stupefied into si-
lence. Attorneys as well as judges often react negatively to such
behavior, particularly if the abusive partner appears calm, collected
and sure of himself. '88 This dynamic cries out for the scales of jus-
tice to be tipped in favor of protecting victims and their children,
for the imposition of a presumption, in order to compensate for
negative expert and judicial reactions.
Although awarded visitation on alternate weekends and holi-
days, Mr. J. moved to Florida shortly after losing custody and has
not seen his children since.
C. M.v.M.
The third case was tried in Kings County. Here, the father had
to be continually removed from the courtroom due to his out-
bursts. The visitation trial commenced shortly after the family of-
fense trial. The father was ineligible for appointed counsel and
appeared pro se on both cases. This case was also before the court
for almost three years before its resolution.89 The parties were
divorced.
87. AMERICAN PSYCHOL. Assoc., supra note 58, at 100.
88. Evan Stark, Building a Domestic Violence Case, in LAWYER'S MANUAL ON
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: REPRESENTING THE VICTIM (Anne M. Lopatto & James C.
Neely eds., 1st ed. 1995).
89. Generally, family offense cases in New York City do not take quite that long
to conclude. When the custody case is tried concurrently with the family offense case,
however, they take significantly longer.
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In this case, the judge made a finding of assault on the family
offense case, and found aggravating circumstances based on the
physical injury suffered by the mother. The court issued a three
year order of protection on behalf of the mother and child, except-
ing court-ordered visitation. The mother testified that the respon-
dent pushed and shoved her, kicked her, struck her in the face with
a closed fist and grabbed her throat. The couple's four-year-old
child witnessed this assault at the home of the child's babysitter.
The mother vividly described her daughter's reaction to witnessing
the assault, stating that the child was crying and screaming for her
father to stop. The mother testified that she had bruises on her
legs and her face was red and swollen. Although Mr. M. was ar-
rested for this assault, the criminal case was adjourned in contem-
plation of dismissal and an order of protection was issued for one
year. This is a common result for misdemeanor cases involving do-
mestic violence in criminal court.90
Mrs. M. also testified about incidents of domestic violence that
occurred early in the relationship. In 1992, while pregnant with the
subject child, the father threatened to burn Mrs. M. with an iron
she was using at the time. After the child was born, he threatened
to kill Mrs. M. and kicked at the apartment door while standing
outside the apartment. During this time period, he cursed at her
and called her a "whore" and a "bitch" in front of the children. 91
During his cross-examination of Mrs. M., the respondent called her
a "money-hungry dog" and a "lesbian."
The court took judicial notice that Mrs. M. had an order of pro-
tection in place almost every year since she first sought one in 1992.
These orders were issued either on consent or as a result of the
respondent's default.
The mother presented expert testimony by the child's social
worker who described the specific impact the domestic violence
had on the subject child, including nightmares and clingy, later ag-
gressive, behavior. The social worker, who specialized in domestic
violence, also testified to the negative effects that domestic vio-
lence has on children in general. She submitted reports to the
court almost every time the case was heard, urging the court to
direct Mr. M. to complete a batterer's intervention program.
90. In 1998, approximately 25% of the misdemeanor cases in Kings County were
adjourned in contemplation of dismissal and orders of protection were issued for one
year. See Office of Court Administration, Criminal Records Information Manage-
ment Systems.
91. The mother also had an older son who had a different father.
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A police officer testified to witnessing injuries, a bloody lip and
swollen eye, suffered by the father's current live-in paramour. The
officer testified that the girlfriend identified the respondent as the
perpetrator of her injuries and that the respondent was arrested in
the apartment they shared. The officer also testified that the re-
spondent tried to resist arrest by flailing his arms. The officer's
testimony was particularly relevant because Mr. M. testified as to
his relationship with this particular girlfriend. He stated that she
would act as a role model along with him, helping him impart his
family values to his daughter.
Evidence was also presented regarding issues other than domes-
tic violence. The father never lived with the child. When she was
born, he visited a few times a week for a short time, but always in
the presence of the mother or maternal grandmother. There was a
long period of time during which he did not see the child at all
because orders of protection were in place against him. He filed
for visitation twice, but both cases were dismissed when he failed
to appear.
In his closing argument, the law guardian supported a continued
order of supervised visitation, and highlighted to the court the fa-
ther's uncontrollable behavior in the courtroom. Although the law
guardian stated that his client wished to see her father in an un-
supervised setting and acknowledged that the supervised visitation
had continued without major incident, he cited two reasons for
making a recommendation contrary to his client's wishes. First, his
client's young age rendered her unable to appropriately consider
her own safety. Second, the numerous gifts her father bestowed on
her, even after the court had admonished him to cease this behav-
ior, had improperly influenced the child's thinking.
The court ordered unsupervised visitation for the father on alter-
nate Sundays from 10:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m.
Mrs. M. appealed the visitation ruling, arguing that the family
court did not give the incidents of violence sufficient weight as re-
quired by the statute. Although the Appellate Division granted a
stay of the lower court ruling, ultimately the court affirmed the or-
der for unsupervised visitation, holding that Mrs. M. failed to show
any detrimental effect on the child.92 Apparently, the expert wit-
ness' testimony and the law guardian's recommendation were in-
sufficient. The Appellate Division's failure to hold that domestic
violence constitutes a detrimental effect is at odds with the legisla-
92. See Mackey v. Mackey, 696 N.Y.S.2d 695, 695 (App. Div. 1999).
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tive findings in the statute that clearly state that "a home environ-
ment of constant fear where physical or psychological violence is
the means of control ... must be contrary to the best interests of
the child." 93 The legislative findings also enumerate specific harms
to children resulting from domestic violence.94 This issue is ana-
lyzed further in the following discussion.
IV. DISCUSSION
The enactment of a legal presumption, in addition to the strong
legislative findings already in existence, would have changed the
outcome in all of the cases presented. It is particularly notable that
in the cases in the Bronx and in Brooklyn, the same judge who
determined there was violence in the course of the family offense
case later discounted his own findings in the custody case. This
paradox could not have arisen if a presumption were imposed. The
finding that a family offense was committed would have automati-
cally triggered the presumption against awarding custody to the
person against whom those findings were made. In Queens, had
the court and the expert applied the legislative findings to the facts
presented, the mother's testimony of violence would have made
sense to them. It is likely that the court would have made a finding
that the father committed acts of domestic violence, again trigger-
ing the presumption.
The Brooklyn and Queens cases share a long history of violence
perpetrated by the respective respondents.95 In both cases, the pe-
titioners had prior orders of protection from the family court. The
orders were issued either on consent of the respondents, or upon
their default. These orders were issued prior to the enactment of
the Family Protection and Domestic Violence Intervention Act of
1994,96 and the expanded relief currently available under that
law.97 In part because of the limited relief available prior to that
legislation, there was no incentive to hold a hearing. Orders were
typically issued for one year with the condition that the respondent
not commit a family offense against the petitioner. Thus, there had
never been a hearing in either case, even though several protective
orders were issued throughout the years. Quick dispositions, with-
out due deliberation, often lead to tolerance of unacceptable be-
93. Act of May 21, 1996, ch. 85, 1996 N.Y. LAWS 273, 274.
94. See id. at 273-74.
95. See supra Parts I1I.B-C.
96. Ch. 222, 1994 N.Y. LAws 2232.
97. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr §§ 841-842 (McKinney 1999).
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havior. The permissive posture of the courts, the police and the
community at large contributes to the continuation of intra-familial
violence.98 A hearing, on the other hand, gives weight to the issues
and holds batterers accountable for their behavior. Holding a
hearing would probably empower the victim to return to court if
the order were violated. Furthermore,- it is likely that after a hear-
ing the court may have made an order better fashioned to "provide
meaningful protection."9 9 Last, a hearing would have likely pre-
vented the extended custody trials both parties and the children
had to endure if the court had appropriately considered the domes-
tic violence when rendering its initial custody and visitation orders.
At the very least, it would have limited the time period addressed
in the course of the later trials.
A. Unintended Consequences on Child Protective Cases
Ironically, the legislative findings meant to help battered
mothers in custody disputes are used by courts and child protective
officials rely upon to pursue neglect and abuse cases against them
under Article Ten of the FCA.1°° In these child protective cases,
the Appellate Division has held that exposure to domestic violence
is harmful enough to warrant a finding of neglect, T'0 without expert
testimony. Regardless of any actions that they may have taken to
protect their children, mothers can be found guilty of neglect or
abuse under a strict liability standard, because of their "failure to
protect" their children against the harm that results from exposure
to domestic violence. Courts seem to require a greater showing of
harm in private custody matters between parents. The appellate
decision in Mrs. M.'s case illustrates this point.102
It is the child protective cases, however, where state intervention
is a factor, that ought to require a greater showing of harm. State
control routinely results in the placement of children into foster
98. See Kristian Miccio, In the Name of Mothers and Children: Deconstructing the
Myth of Passive Battered Mother and the 'Protected Child' Neglect Proceedings, 58
ALB. L. REV. 1087, 1104 (1995).
99. Leffingwell v. Leffingwell, 448 N.Y.S.2d 799 (App. Div. 1982).
100. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 1012(f).
101. See In re Deandre T., 676 N.Y.S.2d 666, 667 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that
expert testimony is not required to establish that children are neglected through a
pattern of domestic violence); In re Lonell J., 673 N.Y.S.2d 116, 117-18 (App. Div.
1998) (stating that proof of pattern of domestic violence by the father against the
mother and witnessed by their older child is sufficient to establish neglect absent ex-
pert testimony).
102. See Mackey v. Mackey, 696 N.Y.S.2d 695, 695 (App. Div. 1999).
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care, without offering much assistance to a battered mother. 10 3 The
standards in these two types of cases are completely different - a
finding of child neglect requires proof of impairment of a physical,
mental or emotional condition," 4 whereas custody determinations
rest on the best interests of the child. Certainly if there is neglect
then it may not be in the child's best interest for the neglectful
parent to maintain custody, but the converse is not necessarily true.
Just because it is not in the child's best interest to be in the custody
of one parent does not mean that the parent is neglectful. Appel-
late courts, however, have held that severe domestic violence be-
tween parents in the presence of the child creates imminent danger
of impairment "as a matter of common sense," and no expert testi-
mony is required to make a determination of neglect.0 5
In some private custody/visitation cases, the Appellate Division
requires a showing of a "detrimental effect" before limiting visita-
tion, as in Mrs. M's case discussed above. 106 In others, evidence of
a history of domestic violence was sufficient to support an order for
supervised visitation.10 7 The court of appeals held that "absent ex-
ceptional circumstances, such as those which would be inimical to
the welfare of the child ... appropriate provision for visitation or
other access by the noncustodial parent follows almost as a matter
of course.' 0 8 The language in the legislative history of the 1996
amendment makes it abundantly clear that domestic violence is in-
imical to the welfare of the child. Therefore, no further showing of
exceptional circumstances should be necessary. The court of ap-
peals decision in Tropea v. Tropea,0 9 rejecting a three-tiered test,
absent exceptional circumstances, in custody relocation cases, fur-
ther calls into question whether all custody/visitation issues should
be determined by the best interest standard.
103. See, e.g., V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State Laws' Failure to
Protect Battered Women and Abused Children, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 229, 249
(1996).
104. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 1012(f).
105. In re Athena M., 678 N.Y.S.2d 11, 12 (App. Div. 1998); see also Deandre T.,
676 N.Y.S.2d at 666; Lonell J., 673 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
106. See Mackey, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 695; see also Thaxton v. Morro, 635 N.Y.S.2d 796,
798 (App. Div. 1995) ("[W]hile denial of visitation to a noncustodial parent is a dras-
tic remedy, it will be ordered where there exist compelling reasons and substantial
evidence showing that such visitation is detrimental to the children."); Janousek v.
Janousek, 485 N.Y.S.2d 305, 308 (App. Div. 1985).
107. See Hugo T. v. Jeannine F., 671 N.Y.S.2d 259 (App. Div. 1998); In re Dejesus,
1999 WL 1215165 (N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 1, 1999).
108. Weiss v. Weiss, 418 N.E.2d 377, 380 (N.Y. 1981).
109. 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996).
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Courts have held that expert testimony is necessary to determine
the degree to which a child has been affected by domestic violence,
the prospect of emotional harm to the child if visitation were
granted or denied and the extent to which the abuse is indicative of
a general psychological problem which may pose a risk to the
child.110 This rationale is inconsistent with appellate case law that
holds domestic violence constitutes neglect, without the necessity
of expert testimony."1 Nor does it provide a rationale for the rul-
ing in the third case where there was expert testimony as to both
the general harm resulting from exposure to domestic violence and
the extent to which the individual child was affected by witnessing
the assault on her mother. In that case, the Appellate Division did
not explicitly hold that expert testimony was insufficient to estab-
lish a detrimental effect, it held that the visitation decision was
within the sound discretion of the family court and would "not be
set aside unless it lack[ed] a substantial basis in the record. ''"12
Although the child protective cases hold that expert testimony is
not necessary to prove that exposure to domestic violence consti-
tutes harm, 13 no appellate court has yet to hold that acts of domes-
tic violence between parents, even in the presence of the child, are
sufficient as a matter of law to support a finding of neglect. In each
of the appellate cases finding neglect, evidence was introduced
showing actual impairment to the child's emotional condition as a
result of the domestic violence. 14
The imposition of a presumption against awarding custody to an
abusive parent would make the law more consistent with the child
protective rationale set forth in the recent appellate cases, how-
ever, the child protective cases also need to be reexamined. The
answer is not simply that expert testimony should be required in
child protective cases, but that the strict liability standard should be
replaced with a reasonable person standard that takes into account
a battered mother's particular situation." 5 Otherwise, there is no
distinction between the victim and the abuser; both are viewed as
equally liable. The unique circumstances facing battered women
must be considered in child protective cases just as they must be in
110. See ELKINS & FOSBINDER, supra note 6, at 613.
111. See Athena M., 678 N.Y.S.2d at 11; Deandre T., 676 N.Y.S.2d at 666; Lonell J.,
673 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
112. See Mackey, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
113. See Athena M., 678 N.Y.S.2d at 11; Deandre T., 676 N.Y.S.2d at 666; Lonell J.,
673 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
114. See ELKINS & FOSBINDER, supra note 6, at 78 (Supp. Mar. 1999).
115. See Miccio, supra note 98, at 1097; Enos, supra note 103, at 229.
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custody cases. Battered mothers are not passive; rather, they en-
gage in strategic, logical behavior as they attempt to stop the vio-
lence or leave. The major variable, however, the violent man, is
outside their realm of control. Staying in the home, especially
given the lack of resources and social supports for leaving, should
never be read as accepting violence.116 The battered mother knows
far too well that violence does not end upon separation, but tends
to escalate.1 17
The 1996 amendment does not distinguish between custody and
visitation. In most domestic violence cases, visitation should be su-
pervised until the non-custodial parent can show he has completed
a treatment program." 8
The studies showing a high correlation between spouse and child
abuse should not surprise those familiar with Article Ten of the
FCA that provides for derivative findings on siblings in neglect
cases.119 The rationale for derivative findings is that, if one child is
being abused, it is likely the other children are also being abused,
or may be soon. The burden is on the parent to show the circum-
stances giving rise to the findings of abuse against one child no
longer exist as to the other child.' 20 It is not a far leap to find that
if a man is abusing his wife then he is also likely to abuse his chil-
dren. Like the burden in the derivative neglect cases, the burden
in custody cases should shift to the abusive parent to show that he
has taken steps to remedy the condition and is no longer a threat to
the physical or emotional well-being of the child.
B. Parent Education Programs
Parent education programs are designed to educate litigants
about the effect of custody litigation on their children. The goal is
to inform parents about the problems associated with divorce or
separation and "encourage[s] parents to assume responsibility for
creating a post-divorce environment in which their children are
their first priority."'121 These programs stress the positive influence
of co-parenting where children can enjoy a supportive relationship
with both parents. Research shows this is often true in non-violent
116. See SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE (1982).
117. See Act of May 21, 1996, ch. 85, 1996 N.Y. LAws 273.
118. See AMERICAN PSYCHOL. Assoc., supra note 58, at 99.
119. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a)(i) (McKinney 1999).
120. See In re B.B.M., N.Y. L.J., Feb. 16, 1999, at 25 (Fam. Ct. Feb. 16, 1999).
121. PEACE (PARENT EDUCATION AND CUSTODY EFFECTIVENESS) PROGRAM
AND CURRICULUM MANUAL 1 (1995).
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families.122 The imposition of parent education programs is an im-
portant approach for the non-battered population.
But the research on children of divorce and on children exposed
to domestic violence developed as two separate branches, leading
to conflicting advice for battered women.123 Where domestic vio-
lence is present, a co-parenting relationship and the impact of con-
flict often represents a negative influence on children. 124 Referring
battered women to parent education programs places them in a
situation where they are advised to promote a relationship and set
aside their past conflicts with a spouse who may be a danger to
themselves and their children. Battered mothers and children
share the same interest: Safety first. Many times it is the safety of
their children that prompts battered women to seek judicial redress
in the first place. "Children are a central focus in decisions bat-
tered women make about leaving the batterer or staying in the
abusive relationship.' 1 25 The best way to protect children is by as-
sisting mothers in safety planning and holding offenders accounta-
ble for their behavior.
Suggesting to the battered woman that it may be best to share
custody or allow unsupervised visitation in an effort to maintain an
amiable relationship with her abuser for the sake of the child, can
be very dangerous. It takes an enormous amount of courage for a
battered woman to seek court intervention. Questioning her deci-
sion by referring her to a program which tends to emphasize coop-
eration with her batterer is counterproductive. The woman may
start to believe that her batterer really should have unsupervised
visitation, or even custody, as illustrated by the case of Mrs. J. and
her children when she relinquished custody to her abusive hus-
band, thinking this would prevent him from stalking her.126 She
may begin to believe that since the children really want to visit him,
as Mrs. M.'s young child wanted to visit Mr. M, that she ought to
withdraw her request for supervised visitation.1 27 A battered
mother may begin to believe that maybe the judge is right; after all,
he referred her to the parent education program, and he is the au-
thority figure. Society would never condone referring a rape victim
to a program that sends her the message that she ought to cooper-
122. See JAFFE & GEFFNER, supra note 85, at 378.
123. See id. at 378.
124. See id.
125. Id. at 377.
126. See supra Part III.B.
127. See supra Part III.C.
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ate with her assailant. Referrals to these programs are a poor sub-
stitute for judicial action. When the court fails to intervene it
deepens a battered woman's sense of isolation and can be even
more psychologically damaging. "The court's desire to smooth
things over acts further to victimize the battered woman.''128
Cases where domestic violence is an issue must be screened out
- whether the violence occurred in the past, or is ongoing. Again,
violence does not end upon separation; it tends to escalate. 12 9 If
referrals are to be made at all, they must be made on the consent of
the parties, and litigants who decline to attend should not be penal-
ized. Referrals to these programs ought to be made after the ap-
pointment of counsel so that the individual interests of the parties
will be represented. As a seasoned attorney, I feel pressured when
asked to consent to my client's attendance at a program. It must
be almost impossible for a litigant to feel she has the option of not
attending.
C. Specialized Domestic Violence Parts
Other changes in the New York City family courts will also ad-
vance the concerns of the new law, and the way domestic violence
is handled in general. Chief Judge Judith Kaye has brought a new
awareness to the issues facing victims by creating specialized do-
mestic violence parts in each New York City family court.13 °
Although judges assigned to these parts have no special training,
the specialized parts raise the consciousness of those participating
in the system to the unique problems presented by domestic vio-
lence.131 In some boroughs, the judges who sit in the specialized
domestic violence parts meet regularly with advocates, court offi-
cials, district attorneys and judges from the criminal court domestic
violence parts thereby promoting communication and coordina-
tion.13 2 One of the greatest needs for families experiencing vio-
lence is coordinated services. 133
128. Zorza, supra note 59, at 1120 (citing PETER JAFFE ET. AL., CHILDREN OF BAT-
TERED) WOMEN 108 (1990)).
129. See Act of May 21, 1996, ch. 85, 1996 N.Y. LAWS 273.
130. See Editorial, Kaye Puts Order in the Court, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 19, 1998,
at 48.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See JAFFE & GEFFNER, supra note 85, at 394.
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V. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
Under the law, judges who do not understand the nature and
effects of domestic violence on children and their mothers are left
too much discretion."' The Legislature was unable to create the
social change it desired because it failed to use language lawyers
and judges understand. In order to overcome entrenched attitudes,
legal reform must be clear. The Appellate Division also has not
clearly defined exactly what constitutes "weighty consideration.' 135
Only by implementing the language of a legal presumption can leg-
islation alter individual behavior. 136
Many advocates, myself included, fear the backlash a presump-
tion might create; batterers know far too well how to manipulate
the legal system to gain further control over their victims. 137 A
presumption statute must include additional language to protect
victims of domestic violence. Permitting rebuttal of the presump-
tion through evidence of a history of abuse by the other party is a
necessary start. Although there will be cases in which the pre-
sumption is used against a victim of domestic violence, it is likely
that the numbers of victims and their children who will benefit
from the protection is far greater than the number of batterers who
will succeed in manipulating the system.
The new law, although helpful, has had little impact on the way
family court judges determine custody cases in which domestic vio-
lence is an issue. 138 Although the Legislature specifically rejected a
rebuttable presumption against granting custody to a parent found
to have committed acts of domestic violence, it is apparent that a
presumption is necessary in order to meet the goals advanced by
the Legislature. 39 In addition to the proof by example afforded by
the three cases presented in Part III, the National Council of Juve-
nile and Family Court Judges, 140 along with the American Bar As-
134. See Kurtz, supra note 14, at 1359.
135. See supra notes 34-50 and accompanying text.
136. See David Zlotnick, Empowering the Battered Woman: The Use of Criminal
Contempt Sanctions to Enforce Civil Protection Orders, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1153, 1154
(1995) (discussing Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law,
Language and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665 (1990)).
137. See Zorza, supra note 59, at 1120.
138. See discussion supra Part III.
139. See Kurtz, supra note 14, at 1365-66; Catherine F. Klein & Leslye Orlofff, Pro-
viding Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case
Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 954-59 (1993).
140. See MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE § 401 (1994) (pro-
viding that in custody suits there is a rebuttable presumption that it is not in the best
interest of the child to be in custody of the perpetrator of family violence).
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sociation 41 and the United States Congress 142 all support a
statutory presumption against awarding custody to an abusive
parent.
CONCLUSION
Many new laws and policies are emerging in the area of domestic
violence. In 1994, the Legislature passed the Family Protection and
Domestic Violence Intervention Act - a complete overhaul of
laws dealing with domestic violence in both the civil and criminal
arena. 43 The Legislature declared that domestic violence is now a
crime. 144 It is unfortunate that batterers are not always considered
criminals when they seek custody of their children. If convicted of
a stranger crime, courts are known to accord weight to the bat-
terer's criminal history. 145 When the victim is the child's mother, it
seems to be another story.
All the new reform in the arena of domestic violence addresses
the difference between domestic violence and most other assaultive
behavior - in the former, the victim and perpetrator have or had
an intimate relationship. Custody determinations do not seem to
account for this unique aspect. The framework in which custody
decisions are made is still the same regardless of the 1996 legisla-
tion. Women are expected to cooperate with their batterers for the
sake of the child. Attempts at protection can be seen as interfering
with access, and interfering with access may result in an award of
custody to the abusive parent. 146
141. See Howard Davidson, The Impact of Domestic Violence on Children: A Re-
port to the President of A.B.A., 1 (1994).
142. See H.R. Con. Res. 172, 101st Cong. (1990).
143. Family Protection and Domestic Violence Intervention Act of 1994, Ch. 222,
1994 N.Y. LAws 2704 (granting concurrent jurisdiction between the family and crimi-
nal courts, providing for mandatory arrest, notice to victims, establishes technological
advances and training for courts and law enforcement personnel).
144. See id.
145. See Hyde v. Hudor, No. 84077, 1999 WL 971927, at *2 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct.
28, 1999) (weighing respondent's plea of guilty to assault in the third degree and re-
sisting arrest along with other factors in award of custody to petitioner); In re Nicole
F., 634 N.Y.S.2d 78, 79 (App. Div. 1995) ("In view of respondent's long and violent
criminal history, including at least three felony convictions for assault, none of which
had been disclosed or discovered prior to the agreement of the parties to release the
two-year-old child to his custody ... Family Court erred in granting respondent un-
supervised visitation."). But see Ronald F. v. Lawrence G., 694 N.Y.S.2d 622, 627
(Fam. Ct. 1999) (awarding custody where "[t]here is absolutely no evidence in this
record which indicates that the petitioner's past criminal history has had an adverse
effect upon the children").
146. See ELKINS & FOSBINDER, supra note 6, at 617; Daghir v. Daghir, 441 N.Y.S.2d
494 (App. Div. 1981).
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The New York law on custody is helpful to children who are ex-
posed to domestic violence, but the negative impact on children
must be given more weight when determining custody and visita-
tion. The legislative mandate to give domestic violence "weighty
consideration" is not enough to overcome entrenched attitudes
about domestic violence. The language of the statute should be
changed to a create a presumption against awarding custody to
abusive parents so that judges, lawyers, social workers and psychol-
ogists will change their behavior accordingly.
E
THE UCCJEA: WHAT IS IT AND HOW DOES
IT AFFECT BATTERED WOMEN IN
CHILD-CUSTODY DISPUTES
Joan Zorza*
INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
("UCCJEA" or "Act") is the revised version of The Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act ("UCCJA"), which states are now being
asked to adopt immediately in its stead. The UCCJA was the origi-
nal model act for states to determine when they have jurisdiction to
decide a custody case and when they must give full faith and credit
to the custody decrees of other states. When the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL" or
"Conference") wrote the UCCJA in 1968, it sought to correct two
major problems of its day: child abductions by family members
and jurisdictional disputes arising in interstate custody or visitation
matters. While these issues can arise independently, the NCCUSL
correctly saw the two problems as often interrelated. Indeed, more
than half of the nation's 350,000 annual child abductions occur in
the context of domestic violence, most of them perpetrated by abu-
sive fathers.1 These abductions have been found to be as traumatic
to children as when they are abducted by strangers, with many de-
veloping post-traumatic stress disorder.2
This article explains exactly what the new UCCJEA does, focus-
ing on its benefits and some problem areas for battered women.
Part I discusses the history of the Act, including the difficulties
with, and the inconsistencies between, the Act's predecessors, the
* J.D., Boston College Law School, 1981. Editor, Domestic Violence Report and
Sexual Assault Report, Liaison to the American Bar Association's Commission on
Domestic Violence, Member of the boards of the National Coalition Against Domes-
tic Violence, the New York State Coalition Against Domestic Violence and the New
York City Coalition of Battered Women's Advocates. Before moving to New York in
1990 to start the National Battered Women's Law Project, Ms. Zorza represented
more than 2000 battered women at Greater Boston Legal Services and as a clinical
supervisor at one of Harvard Law School's clinical programs. She has been a consult-
ant with the American Medical Association and the National Council of Juvenile and
Family Court Judges.
1. GEOFFREY L. GREIF & REBECCA L. HEGAR, WHEN PARENTS KIDNAP: THE
FAMILIES BEHIND THE HEADLINES 4 (1993).
2. See id. at 205-06.
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UCCJA and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act ("PKPA").
Part II examines the UCCJEA, detailing the expanded options
available to battered women for temporary emergency jurisdiction,
denial of jurisdiction by courts that ordinarily hold such jurisdiction
and protections for victims and their children. Part III explains
some of the enforcement provisions of the UCCJEA. The article
suggests some changes to improve the UCCJEA and PKPA, but
concludes that despite some of the problems with the UCCJEA,
even as currently written, it is a step in improving child custody
jurisdiction and will better protect battered women and their
children.
I. HISTORY OF JURISDICTIONAL DEBATE
A. The Supreme Court's Refusal to Resolve Important
Jurisdictional Disputes
The jurisdictional problems that arise in interstate custody dis-
putes and the inability to have custody decrees enforced by other
states became increasingly prevalent throughout the last century.
Attempts by lawyers to get the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve the
matter failed, beginning with its 1947 decision in Halvey v. Halvey,3
which refused to require states to give full faith and credit to an-
other state's custody decree. This refusal was based on the notion
that every custody determination, whether issued as a "temporary"
or "permanent" order, was actually only a temporary order, always
modifiable, and that moving to another state constituted a change
in circumstances warranting modification.4
Effectively, the Halvey decree rewarded losing contestants who
abducted their children and relocated across state lines. At a mini-
mum, an abducting family member was guaranteed a de novo trial
in the new state to try to gain lawful custody.' Further, because
any prior custody decree could not be enforced beyond the issuing
state's borders, abductors were also safe from contempt or abduc-
tion charges so long as the abductors never returned to the state
from which they had fled.6
Additionally, if the abductors were able to successfully win cus-
tody in the new state, they were also not at risk from having the
children lawfully removed and returned to the state from which
3. 330 U.S. 610, 612 (1947) (holding that because a custody decree could be mod-
ified at any time, it is not a final judgment entitled to full faith and credit).
4. See id. at 620 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
5. See id. at 613.
6. See id. at 620 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
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they fled.7 However, as Justice Rutledge noted in his concurrence
in Halvey, should the child be taken back to the original state of
jurisdiction, it would set off "a continuing round of litigation over
custody, perhaps also of abduction between alienated parents.
That consequence hardly can be thought conducive to the child's
welfare." 8
This decision was followed by May v. Anderson,9 in a second at-
tempt to require states to honor and enforce the custody decrees of
other states. Despite the May's dissenter's serious reservations,
this later attempt proved just as unsuccessful as the first.10
At the time of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Halvey,
most abductors were fathers or grandparents, who were far better
situated than mothers to win custody in a new state for a number of
reasons. Women of the time faced even greater gender bias dis-
crimination, which impacted them financially and socially, thereby
rendering them less able to litigate their interests or be seen as
financially or socially fit. In addition, the United States had no
awareness of domestic violence, further impeding women's ef-
forts to force courts to recognize abusive situations, and the need
to protect them and not to be blamed for the abuse or receive help
in becoming independent both financially and emotionally from
the abuse. In light of these circumstances, the Conference proba-
bly never guessed how the UCCJA would be used to hurt so many
mothers who later fled to protect themselves or their children from
abuse.
B. Enactment of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act 2
Although the UCCJA was introduced in 1968, states were slow
to adopt it throughout the next twelve years. Those states that did
adopt the UCCJA often made alterations - some quite substantial
7. With no legal remedy available to enforce the original custody decree in a new
state, another effect of these laws was to encourage "self-help" remedies by the left-
behind parent whose children were abducted as the only way to enforce their rights.
8. Halvey, 330 U.S. at 619 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
9. 345 U.S. 528 (1953). There were three dissenters in the case: Justices Jackson,
Reed and Minton. See id. at 536, 542.
10. See Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); see also Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187
(1962).
11. See R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL P. DOBASH, WOMEN VIOLENCE & SO-
CIAL CHANGE 12 (1992). The country's awareness and knowledge of child abuse was
still in its infancy, as Dr. C. Henry Kempe only introduced the phrase "battered child
syndrome" in 1962. See C.H. Kempe et al., The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA
107-12 (1962). In fact, not one battered women's shelter existed at the time.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994).
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- in their own versions. These practices produced conflicting judi-
cial decisions about whether a state had to recognize another
state's decree, even when both states' UCCJA versions differed
only slightly. As a result, far too few custody decisions were being
honored and enforced by courts of other states.
To correct this problem, Congress enacted the PKPA. 13 The
PKPA forced every state to give full faith and credit to any custody
decree, no matter in which state the decision was rendered, pro-
vided it met due process 4 and the PKPA jurisdictional require-
ments.1 5 The PKPA also prevented other states from modifying a
custody order issued by any other state, with only a few excep-
tions.16 It also added various enforcement mechanisms for use
against abductors, including: (1) the use of the Federal Parent Lo-
cator Service to locate abductors; 7 and (2) provision for issuing
federal Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution18 ("UFAP") arrest
warrants under the Fugitive Felon Act, 9 for child abductors fleeing
across state or international lines to avoid prosecution on state fel-
ony abduction charges.
The PKPA, as a federal law, preempts any state's enacted
UCCJA whenever the two are inconsistent.2 0 Both the PKPA and
UCCJA are jurisdictional in that they determine whether a court in
13. See id. When Congress enacted the PKPA in December of 1980, 43 states had
adopted the UCCJA. By 1980 there was enough awareness of domestic violence that
Congress could and should have taken it into account. However, domestic violence
issues were never raised or considered in it. See Patricia M. Hoff, The ABC's of the
UCCJEA: Interstate Child-Custody Practice Under the New Act, 32 FAM. L.Q. 267, 268
(1998).
14. The PKPA requires that, before a court can decide any custody matter, reason-
able notice and opportunity to be heard has been given to all contestants, parents
whose parental rights have not been terminated and to anyone actually having physi-
cal custody of the child. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(e).
15. Specifically, for initial custody determinations, the PKPA prioritizes home
state jurisdiction over significant continuing jurisdiction and otherwise repeats the
temporary and no other state jurisdictional requirements of the UCCJA. See id.
§ 1738A(c).
16. See id. The exceptions are if all of the contestants and the child have moved
from the initial state or the initial state has declined jurisdiction. See id.
17. See 42 U.S.C. 88 654(17), 663 (1994).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1994). Once a UFAP warrant has been issued, the F.B.I. can
become involved in searching for the abductor.
19. Id.
20. See U.S. CONS-r. art VI, § 2 (identifying the supremacy of federal law). See,
e.g., In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993); Hangsleben v. Oliver, 502 N.W.2d
838 (N.D. 1993); Michalik v. Michalik, 494 N.W.2d 391 (Wis. 1993); Shute v. Shute,
607 A.2d 890 (Vt. 1992); Griffin v. District Court, 831 P.2d 233 (Wyo. 1992); Archam-
bault v. Archambault, 555 N.E.2d 201 (Mass. 1990); Marks v. Marks, 315 S.E.2d 158
(S.C. Ct. App. 1984); Serna v. Salazar, 651 P.2d 1292 (N.M. 1982).
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a particular state has the power to decide a case, not how the court
should decide the actual custody issues being contested. The court
may have jurisdiction under state law, for example, to decide the
divorce between the parties, but may not have jurisdiction under
the PKPA/UCCJA to decide the custody issues regarding the par-
ties' children. Similarly, the court may have PKPA/UCCJA juris-
diction to decide custody of one child, but not that of another child,
since the jurisdictional requirements are specific to each child.21
Courts have a real incentive to follow jurisdictional rules because
their orders will not be entitled to full faith and credit when they
do not have jurisdiction.
Specifically, the PKPA preempts the UCCJA by not allowing
courts making initial custody decisions to consider significant con-
nection jurisdiction in cases when there is a home state jurisdic-
tion.22 It prevents any state from exercising modification
jurisdiction when there is already a pending proceeding in a state in
accordance with the PKPA/UCCJA, 23 and further gives the original
state the right to exclusive jurisdiction to modify any of its orders
provided the child or one of the contestants continued to reside in
that state.24
II. THE UCCJEA
A. Re-Examination of the UCCJA
While the Conference knew that the UCCJA would have to be
amended to conform with the PKPA, it was ironically the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act,25 which governs paternity establish-
ment and child support' determinations, collection and enforce-
ment, that was the impetus for the reexamination of the UCCJA.
The Conference began reexamination of the UCCJA in 1994, and
soon realized it must harmonize the UCCJA with the full faith and
21. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c).
22. See id. § 1738A(d). See also infra Part II.C. (describing the difference between
home state and significant connection jurisdiction).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d). The U.S.,Supreme Court held that the PKPA does not
create a cause of action in federal court to resolve which of two competing custody
decrees is valid, thereby ending the litigation that was creeping into federal court to
resolve these disputes. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988).
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d).
25. See John J. Sampson, Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (1996) (with More
Unofficial Annotations), 32 FAM. L.Q. 390 (1998). See also The Nat'l Conf. of
Comm'rs on Unif. St. Laws, Uniform State L'aw Helps Enforce Child Custody Orders
(visited Nov. 4, 1999) <http://www.nccusl.org/pressrel/uccjea99.htm>.
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credit mandate of the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"), 26
which was enacted on September 13, 1994, and requires states to
honor and enforce orders of protection, including ex parte orders.
The Conference would also need to decide whether to cover tribal
court orders, resolve the ambiguities about which custody proceed-
ings are covered, clarify that the "best interests" language in the
UCCJA27 was not meant to open up the merits of the case, resolve
whether orders of protection trigger emergency jurisdiction, deter-
mine when courts have declined jurisdiction, resolve confusion
about how long temporary jurisdiction lasts and finally, determine
how to effectively enforce orders quickly and uniformly throughout
the country. While the NCCUSL continued to ignore the problems
of domestic violence for anyone except those involving the particu-
lar child, domestic violence advocates 28 forced the Commissioners
to make a number of concessions in its final version to include
some protections for victims of domestic violence. While these
changes are rather minimal, in part because of PKPA limitations,
they will help battered women and their children. These changes
are discussed in the remainder of the article.
The Conference's final version has been met with remarkable
success. To date, at least fifteen states have adopted the new legis-
lation,29 and many more states are actively considering enactment
during their current or next legislative session.3 °
26. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2265-2266 (1994) (requiring states to honor and enforce orders of
protection, including ex parte orders). Although the full faith and credit mandate of
VAWA specifically exempts custody orders, certain practice orders, including stay-
away from a child orders, might be inconsistent with the UCCJA.
27. See UCCJA § 3(a)(2) (stating that "it is in the best interest of the child that a
court of this State assume jurisdiction because (i) the child and his parents, or the
child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with this State, and (ii)
there is available in this State substantial evidence concerning the child's present or
future care, protection training, and personal relationships").
28. These advocates included Lesley Orloff, then of AYUDA (an immigration
program for battered women in Washington D.C) and a small group of domestic vio-
lence advocates (including the author) acting through Roberta Valente, then staff di-
rector of the American Bar Association's Domestic Violence Commission.
29. See, e.g., 1999 Ala. Acts 438; 1999 Ark. Acts 668; 1999 N.D. Laws 147 (S.B.
2152). During the authoring of this article, New York State vetoed the UCCJEA. See
N.Y.S. Bills & Statutes, Veto Message No. 64 (visited Jan. 13, 2000) <gopher://
38.246.113.4:70100/vetos/veto% 20%20%2064>.
30. See The Nat'l Conf. of Comm'rs on Unif. St. Laws, A Few Facts About the
UCCJEA (visited Nov. 1, 1999) <http://www.nccusl.org/factsheet/uccjea-fs.html>.
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B. The UCCJEA Notice Requirements
The UCCJEA provides that any first child-custody determina-
tion made concerning a particular child under age 18 - as long as
the jurisdictional requirements are met - binds all parties with no-
tice. This specifically includes child custody provisions in orders of
protection. 31 This notice should be given to any parent whose
rights have not been terminated and to any other person 32 having
physical custody of the child or who had physical custody of the
child barring temporary absences for six consecutive months within
the year prior to beginning the custody proceeding and has either
been awarded legal custody by a court or claims a right under the
law of the state to legal custody.33 Notice, in a way that is reason-
ably likely to give actual notice, can be given to any person outside
of the state under either state's notice laws, "but may be by publi-
cation if other means are not effective." 34 This change will enable a
fleeing battered woman to protect herself against her abuser by
being able to serve him and causing him to be bound by any deci-
sion later made in the case.35 It should also prevent her from being
subject to federal kidnapping charges 36 in cases where he has filed
an action in the home state without ever giving her notice, but the
court nevertheless defaults her and awards him custody.37
C. UCCJEA Initial Jurisdictional Criteria
Except in emergencies, an initial custody determination must be
made by a court having one of the UCCJEA's four jurisdictional
criteria, some of which are new and all of which are statutorily pri-
oritized.38 Parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a court that does
not otherwise meet one of these criteria; however, emergency juris-
31. See UCCJEA §§ 102(4), 205 cmt.
32. See id. § 102(12) (clarifying that "person" includes agencies of states involved
with custody of a child).
33. Cf. id. § 102(13) (noting that "'person acting as a parent' means a person,
other than a parent, who . . . has physical custody . . . [or] has been awarded legal
custody").
34. Id. § 108(a).
35. See id. § 108. He would also be bound if he appeared, unless it was a special
appearance. See id. § 109(a).
36. While 18 U.S.C. § 1204 provides a defense to someone fleeing a pattern or
incident of domestic violence, it does not mean that the charges will not be filed. See
18 U.S.C. § 1204(c)(2).
37. Although the UCCJEA explains that the "[p]hysical presence of, or personal
jurisdiction over, a party or the child is not necessary or sufficient to make a child-
custody determination." UCCJEA § 201(c).
38. See id. § 201(a).
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diction, while largely eliminated for initial permanent determina-
tions,39 can often be used to obtain temporary orders and
modifications. ° The four types of jurisdiction are "home state,"
"significant connection," "appropriate forum," and "no other
state."
Home State Jurisdiction: As required by the PKPA, the UCCJEA
states that if the child involved in the custody dispute has a home
state, only that state may make the initial custody determination,
unless the home state declines jurisdiction. A child's temporary
absences from the state are not relevant to this determination. A
child's home state keeps its status for six months after a child
leaves, regardless of why the child has left,4" provided a parent or
person acting as a parent remains in the home state.42 Unless act-
ing as a parent, grandparents possessing visitation are not consid-
ered "contestants" for purposes home state retention.43
Significant Connection Jurisdiction: As under the PKPA, when
there is no home state or the home state court has declined juris-
diction, a state with significant connection jurisdiction is permitted
to preside over a custody determination. In contrast to the old
UCCJA, the child's presence is not required for there to be signifi-
cant connection jurisdiction, and the "best interests" and "present
or future care" language has been eliminated.44
More Appropriate Forum Jurisdiction: A court in a state that is
the appropriate forum may do so only if courts having home state
or significant connection jurisdiction have decided to exercise it.45
No Other State Jurisdiction: Only if no court of any other state
has jurisdiction on any of the three previous jurisdictional criteria
may a court exercise no other state jurisdiction to deal with these
"vacuum" situations.46 This type of jurisdiction would enable a
court to take jurisdiction in a custody action between the parents
39. But see infra Part II.D.
40. See id.
41. Under the UCCJA, a state could only remain a child's home state for six
months after the child left because of wrongful removal or retention. See UCCJA
§ 3(a)(1).
42. See id. §§ 201, 208 (discussing declining jurisdiction for wrongful removal).
43. However, a recent change to the PKPA appears to preempt this. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A(b)(2) (1999).
44. See UCCJEA § 201(a)(2) & cmt.
45. See id. § 201(a)(3).
46. See id. § 201(a)(4).
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who work for a traveling circus, whose child has never spent, for
example, more than two weeks per year in the same state.47
Once a state court has made an initial child-custody determina-
tion consistent with one of these four jurisdictional requirements,
the issuing court retains exclusive continuing jurisdiction with the
following exceptions: (1) under certain exceptions when a court of
another state has temporary emergency jurisdiction;4 8 (2) when the
issuing court "or the court of another State determines that the
child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent do not
presently reside in"4 9 the issuing state; or (3) when a court of this
state finds "that neither the child, the child and one parent nor the
child and a person acting as a guardian have a significant connec-
tion with this state and that substantial evidence is no longer avail-
able in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training
and personal relationships. ' 50 This section is necessary to bring
this act in compliance with section 1738(d) of the PKPA, which
prevents any other state from modifying an issuing state's custody
decree except when all of the parties and child have left the state,
unless the issuing state has declined jurisdiction.
D. Temporary Emergency Jurisdiction
Temporary emergency jurisdiction only arises in the extraordi-
nary circumstances where a child is present in a state and it permits
that state's court to issue only short-term orders. 51 However, the
UCCJEA does permit a court to exercise this type of jurisdiction in
an emergency to protect the child, its siblings or its parents who are
subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse. This is a
major improvement over the comparable sections in both the
UCCJA52 and the PKPA,53 which only permit jurisdiction to be as-
sumed to protect the particular child in question, and not a parent
or sibling.
If no previous custody determination has been made, and no
child-custody proceeding is commenced in a court having jurisdic-
tion to make an initial child-custody determination, the temporary
47. Many law school exam-like scenarios are possible, for example, a custody fight
over a baby born to two American parents on a Soviet spacecraft or U.S. Navy sub-
marine in international waters.
48. See discussion infra Part lI.D.
49. UCCJEA § 202(a)(2).
50. Id. § 202(a)(1).
51. See id. § 204 & cmt.
52. UCCJA § 3(a)(3).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(C) (1994).
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order made under the temporary emergency jurisdiction can be-
come a final order, but only if it so provides, once the deciding
state becomes the child's home state.54 However, if there is a prior
custody decree that is entitled to be enforced or an action is filed in
a court having jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determi-
nation, the court with emergency jurisdiction must do two things.
First, it must specify in the temporary emergency order a period of
time that the court considers adequate to allow the person seeking
the emergency order to obtain an order from the state having ini-
tial custody jurisdiction. Second, the court "shall immediately
communicate with the court of that State to resolve the emergency,
protect the safety of the parties and the child, and determine a pe-
riod for the duration of the temporary order. ' 56
Once factual findings or rulings of law have been made after no-
tice and opportunity to be heard in a custody or other proceeding
entitled to full faith and credit, for example, in an order of protec-
tion case, no court may re-litigate the issues decided.57 Thus, a
temporary emergency jurisdiction can make a final ruling as to the
underlying abuse. It also will halt the practice of re-litigating the
abuse finding on the theory that the allegation was only made for
tactical advantage or to alienate the child from the other parent.
This new language in the UCCJEA is a significant improvement
for battered women over treatment allotted under the original
UCCJA. For example, it permits a court of another state to assume
temporary jurisdiction when a parent removes herself to another
state when she is being battered or threatened with abuse, and en-
ables her to protect all of the children when only one is being
abused. In addition, it tells both courts that safety of the parties
and child is the first consideration.
However, there are serious deficiencies as well. Forcing women
to rely on a judge to decide whether the temporary order may be-
come permanent leaves the battered woman or protective parent at
the mercy of a judge, who may fail to find that an emergency exists,
or may fail to finalize the order because he or she believes there is
a minimal likelihood of future danger, a common judicial failing.58
54. See UCCJEA § 204(b).
55. See id. § 204(c).
56. Id. § 204(d).
57. See id. § 204 cmt.
58. See, e.g., RUTH I. ABRAMS & JOHN M. GREANEY, REPORT OF THE GENDER
BIAS STUDY OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 90-91 (1989) (stating that the Massa-
chusetts Gender Bias study found that judges expect more collaboration in domestic
violence cases than they do in other serious crimes, and that they often asked inappro-
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Nor will she be protected if her abuser initiates (or re-initiates)
litigation before she has been gone for six months, and it may not
protect her if she is forced to flee to yet another state. Similarly,
the new language will not help in all emergency situations where
she acts to protect someone who is not her and the abuser's child.
For example, siblings are not defined in the statute, and only in a
state that otherwise adopts a broad construction of that term would
half- and step-siblings be included. Without a broad construction,
emergency jurisdiction will not be able to protect a mother from
being treated as a wrongful abductor in a case filed by her current
husband when she has fled with all of her children because her
prior husband was sexually abusing his child. It is even less likely
to protect her if she fled with all children in an attempt to protect
an abused niece, nephew, grandchild or foster child in her care, or
her own parent or sibling who is being severely abused by her hus-
band.59 Regardless of whether the emergency is covered under
section 204, including the state's definition of "sibling," it may still
be possible for her to convince the court that issued the initial de-
cree to decline jurisdiction in a case where the abuse is particularly
severe.
60
Unfortunately, although the comments make it clear that section
208 of the UCCJEA should not be used to harm protective par-
ents,61 section 208(c) makes it extremely risky for a battered wo-
priate questions indicating that the victim deserved to be hit or had provoked the
abuse, or that they felt domestic violence wastes the court's time). The authors assert
that judges scrutinized mothers more closely than fathers and held the women to a
much higher standard. See id. at 63, 73. Judges also often ignored any domestic vio-
lence in making custody awards. See id. at 73. Similarly, the New York study found
that battered women trying to protect themselves and their children from the abuse
are frequently not helped by courts and are treated as unstable or hostile for moving
or preventing a child from seeing an abusive father. See Lynn H. Shafran, Docu-
menting Gender Bias in the Courts: The Task Force Approach, 70 JUDICATURE 280,
286 (1987). Custody courts are even more reluctant to make findings that a father has
sexually abused a child, and are more likely to award a father who sexually abuses his
child full custody than one who does not, and in any case grant him unsupervised
access to the children. See Marsha B. Liss & Geraldine Butts Stahly, Domestic Vio-
lence and Child Custody, in BATrERING AND FAMILY THERAPY: A FEMINIST PER-
SPECTIVE 175, 183 (Marsali Hansen & Michele Harway eds., 1993).
59. Notwithstanding the UCCJEA's inability to protect her in such a situation, a
necessity or justification defense should protect her from any criminal charges.
60. See infra Part II.G.
61. Specifically, the section states:
The focus of this section is on the unjustified conduct of the person who
invokes the jurisdiction of the court. A technical illegality or wrong is insuf-
ficient to trigger the applicability of this section. This is important in cases
involving domestic violence and child abuse. Domestic violence victims
should not be charged with unjustifiable conduct for conduct that occurred
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man who has fled abuse to seek protection under the court's
temporary emergency jurisdiction. This is because the court may
assess her with all of the opponent's "necessary and reasonable ex-
penses" if the court declines jurisdiction or stays her proceeding.6 2
Her risk may be exacerbated because many batterers deliberately
threaten to, and in some instances, drive their victims into poverty
or even homelessness,63 even if it also may make them destitute
themselves. Such an abuser, though taking a calculated risk, may
deliberately escalate the violence to force his victim to flee, and
then purposely drive up his expenses to further punish and control
her. Even if she ultimately prevails, she will have been further
emotionally drained by the flight and litigation, possibly impairing
her parenting abilities.64
E. Jurisdiction for Modifying Custody Decrees
Except under the limited circumstances, when temporary emer-
gency jurisdiction exists, no other state's court may modify an issu-
ing court's child-custody determination unless it has jurisdiction to
make an initial child-custody determination and one of two deter-
minations are made.65 Specifically, the issuing court must decide
either that it no longer has exclusive continuing jurisdiction66 or
that the would-be modifying state would be a more convenient fo-
in the process of fleeing domestic violence, even if their conduct is techni-
cally illegal. Thus, if a parent flees with a child to escape domestic violence
and in the process violates a joint custody decree, the case should not be
automatically dismissed under this section. An inquiry must be made into
whether the flight was justified under the circumstances....
UCCJEA § 208 cmt.
62. Section 208(c) makes her vulnerable to being considered the party who wrong-
fully removed or retained a child if the court does not believe how serious the victim's
fears were or naively assumes that the police could have afforded adequate protec-
tion. Specifically, section 208(a) of the UCCJEA says that someone seeking unsuc-
cessfully to invoke jurisdiction can be assessed "necessary and reasonable expenses
including costs, communication expenses, attorney's fees, investigative fees, expenses
for witnesses, travel expenses, and child care during the course of the proceedings,
unless the party from whom fees are sought establishes that the assessment would be
clearly inappropriate." UCCJEA § 208(a).
63. Joan Zorza, Woman Battering: A Major Cause of Homelessness, 25 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 421, 421-22 (1991); Joan Zorza, Batterer Manipulation and Retaliation in
the Courts: A Largely Unrecognized Phenomenon Sometimes Encouraged by Court
Practices, 3 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REP. 67, 75 (1998).
64. GEORGE W. HOLDEN ET AL., PARENTING BEHAVIORS AND BELIEFS OF BAT-
TERED WOMEN IN CHILDREN EXPOSED TO MARITAL VIOLENCE: THEORY, RE-
SEARCH, AND APPLIED ISSUES 289, 293 (George W. Holden et al., eds., 1998).
65. See UCCJEA § 202(b).
66. See id. § 202(a).
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rum.67 Alternately, in situations where all parties and the child
have moved from the state, either the issuing or would-be-modify-
ing court can determine that the child, the child's parents or any
other person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the other
state. In the absence of an emergency, the would-be modifying
court is prohibited from making any custody determinations except
as to whether all of the contestants have moved from an exclusive
continuing jurisdiction state, a determination that either court is
permitted to make.68
F. Judicial Communication and Cooperation
A primary goal of both the UCCJEA and PKPA is to avoid si-
multaneous proceedings in different states or the wrongful modifi-
cation of a court order of a previous state by a court of a new state.
One of the key mechanisms that the UCCJEA has implemented to
prevent this from occurring is mandating that the courts involved
communicate with each other.69 The changes in the UCCJEA,
however, give the courts fewer situations when they will be re-
quired to do so, having resolved many of the ambiguities created
by the UCCJA.7 ° The times when communication will be required
will likely occur when there is no home state, no state with exclu-
sive continuing jurisdiction, more than one significant connection
state or, in cases involving temporary emergency jurisdiction.
In instances where a court does not have jurisdiction, but feels it
should assume it to, for example, protect someone, it should stay
its proceeding, but ask the court that does have jurisdiction to de-
67. See infra Part II.G.1.
68. See UCCJEA § 110 cmt. The UCCJEA provides no guidance except for judi-
cial communication on how to resolve disputes when two courts make contrary deter-
minations as to whether all parties have moved from the state, particularly when the
determinations are made simultaneously. However, this is only a problem if the home
state determines that all parties have not all left, whereas the other state determines
that the parties have all left. When the courts have made contradictory findings, the
other state can assume jurisdiction because the home state will have effectively de-
clined jurisdiction.
69. Other mechanisms include prioritizing home state jurisdiction, creating the ex-
clusive continuing jurisdiction provisions, restricting when states may modify, requir-
ing all parties to disclose any information about other cases having courts examine
those documents to see whether another state already has jurisdiction, and mandating
that the courts involved communicate with each other. See generally Part II.
70. For example, by prioritizing home state over significant connection jurisdic-
tion, courts will know which state is entitled to make an initial custody determination
since only one state can be the child's home state at any point in time.
2000]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
cline because it is an inconvenient forum.71 The parties to the suit
may be allowed to participate in this communication.72 However,
if they "are not able to participate.., they must be given an oppor-
tunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on
jurisdiction is made. '73 Furthermore, a retrievable record must be
made and the parties must be promptly informed of the communi-
cation and given access to the record.74 Modern technology can be
employed for the purpose of communication; 75 not only may wit-
nesses testify by telephone, audiovisual or other electronic means,
but documentary evidence transmitted by technological means
from another state to the court is admissible.76
Specific provisions permit the court to communicate with foreign
courts, or, when states opt to recognize tribal orders, tribal courts. 77
G. Declining Jurisdiction
As under the UCCJA, the UCCJEA provides that a court with
jurisdiction may decline to exercise it for two reasons: inconve-
nient forum, 78 which can be done at any time,79 and unjustifiable
conduct. 80 However, both grounds have been altered, in part to
take domestic violence into account.
71. See UCCJEA § 207(a); see also supra Parts II.C-D. Section 112 of the
UCCJEA permits a court to ask another court to order an evaluation, hold an eviden-
tiary hearing, conduct discovery, order any party or person having physical custody of
the child to appear with or without the child or forward certified copies of transcripts,
evidence or custody evaluations. The court must preserve copies of the records until
the child is 18 years old, and when requested by a court or law enforcement official of
another state, forward a certified copy of those records. For domestic violence victims
in hiding, the requirement in section 112(d) that law officers of this state can request
records may greatly endanger them. Also potentially troublesome is the fact that the
court can assess "It]ravel and other necessary and reasonable expenses incurred" for
our-of-state discovery or evidentiary hearings. UCCJEA § 112(c).
72. See UCCJEA § 110(b) (while not completely upholding Yost v. Johnson, 591
A.2d 178 (Del. 1991), the court held that it was error not to allow both parties to
participate in the judicial communication).
73. Id.
74. See id. § 110(d). Courts may communicate in other circumstances, e.g., one
court could ask another one to schedule an evidentiary hearing to obtain the testi-
mony of a witness who lives in the second state. See id. § 111.
75. See id. § 111(b).
76. See id. § 111(c).
77. See id. § 110 cmt.
78. See id. § 207.
79. See id. § 207(a).
80. See id. § 208(a).
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1. Declining Jurisdiction for Inconvenient Forum
A court can decline jurisdiction because it is an inconvenient fo-
rum upon a motion of a party, the court's own motion, or at the
request of another court (but no longer at the request of a guardian
ad litem).' Declining jurisdiction in the custody matter does not
mean that the court would have to decline jurisdiction in the di-
vorce or another proceeding, or all aspects of the proceeding;8"
however, once a court has declined custody jurisdiction, it should
stay the custody matter upon condition that it is commenced in the
appropriate designated state, imposing any other conditions that
the court considers reasonable.83 In deciding whether to decline
jurisdiction, a court is required to permit the parties to submit in-
formation and consider all relevant factors, including: (1) whether
domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue, and which
state could best protect the parties and child;84 (2) how long the
child has lived outside this state; (3) how far it is between the
courts; (4) the relative finances of the parties; (5) any agreement of
the parties as to which state should hear the case; (6) the nature
and location of the evidence needed to resolve the case (including
the child's testimony); (7) the ability of the court to decide the is-
sues expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evi-
dence; and (8) how familiar each court is with the facts and issues
in the pending litigation.
Not only are domestic violence and safety listed as factors, but
the relative financial circumstances of the parties must be consid-
ered, which often is a critical issue for battered women, who tradi-
tionally have far less access to finances, particularly when they
must flee their abusers. Health of the parties is another specifically
mentioned factor in the commentary after this section, another is-
sue often relevant to victims of abuse because physical, emotional
or sexual abuse can cause long-term or permanent physical or psy-
chological injuries. Courts are urged not to divide custody of all
the children amongst different courts, but also to remember that it
81. See id. § 207(a); cf. UCCJA § 7(b) (specifically including a guardian ad litem).
82. See id. § 207(d) (noting that a court might retain jurisdiction to determine pa-
ternity, divide property or order child support, but relinquish the custody aspect of a
case).
83. See id. § 207(c).
84. Indeed, this is the first listed factor in section 207(b), thereby finally recogniz-
ing its importance.
85. See id. § 207(b)
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may be desirable not to lose child support collection.possibilities,
two issues that may affect battered women and their children. s6
2. Declining Jurisdiction for Reason of Conduct
In contrast to the UCCJA, the UCCJEA mandates that if a state
court has jurisdiction, except in temporary emergency jurisdiction
situations, the court must decline jurisdiction when a person seek-
ing to invoke its jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct,
with three exceptions.8 7 The court need not decline jurisdiction by
reason of conduct if the parents and all persons acting as parents
agree to the acceptance of jurisdiction, 88 no court of any other state
would have initial, exclusive continuing or modification jurisdic-
tion,89 or the court of the state otherwise having jurisdiction deter-
mines that this state is the more appropriate forum.90 Even if
jurisdiction is declined, the court may retain it until jurisdiction is
assumed in the other court, or so that it can issue temporary orders
to prevent a repetition of the unjustifiable conduct or to ensure the
safety of the child.91
Unjustifiable conduct includes "removing, secreting, retaining or
restraining" a child.92 However, in language specifically favorable
to battered women, the comment to the statute reads:
A technical illegality or wrong is insufficient to trigger the appli-
cability of this section. This is particularly important in cases
involving domestic violence and child abuse. Domestic violence
victims should not be charged with unjustifiable conduct for
conduct that occurred in the process of fleeing domestic vio-
lence, even if their conduct is technically illegal. Thus, if a parent
86. See id. § 207 cmt. Child support may be too dangerous for a battered women
to pursue, particularly if the system cannot adequately protect her. See Paula Rob-
erts, Pursuing Child Support for Victims of Domestic Violence, in BATTERED WOMEN,
CHILDREN, AND WELFARE REFORM: TIES THAT BIND 59, 72-73 (Ruth A. Brandwein,
ed., 1999); Evan Stark & Anne H. Flitcraft, Spouse Abuse, in VIOLENCE IN AMERICA:
A PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH 123, 124, 140-41, 143 (Mark L. Rosenberg & Mary
Ann Fenley, eds., 1991); Jody Raphael, Keeping Women Poor: How Domestic Vio-
lence Prevents Women From Leaving Welfare and Entering the World of Work, in BAT-
TERED WOMEN, CHILDREN, AND WELFARE REFORM: TIEs THAT BIND 31, 37-39
(Ruth A. Brandwein, ed., 1999).
87. See UCCJEA § 208(a).
88. See id. § 208(a)(1). But note that this does not include the state or agency or
the guardian ad litem. This provision is likely to disadvantage battered women, who
are far less likely to have equal bargaining power in negotiating or refusing to negoti-
ate on acquiescence of jurisdiction.
89. See id. § 208(a)(3).
90. See id. § 208(a)(2).
91. See id. § 208(b).
92. See id. §.208 cmt.
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flees with a child to escape domestic violence and in the process
violates a joint custody decree, the case should not be automati-
cally dismissed under this section. An inquiry must be made
into whether the flight was justified under the circumstances of
the case. However, an abusive parent who seizes the child and
flees to another state to establish jurisdiction has engaged in un-
justifiable conduct and the new state must decline to exercise
jurisdiction under this section.93
Following the International Child Abduction Remedies Act,94 a
state court must assess all reasonable costs and fees to be paid to
the parent who establishes that jurisdiction was based on unjustifi-
able conduct. In cases where a fleeing victim sought the court's
temporary emergency jurisdiction but the court declined jurisdic-
tion or stayed its action, the court should presumptively assess all
costs against the wrongful party (i.e., the parent who wrongfully
fled, as determined by the court's denial of accepting temporary
emergency jurisdiction), unless the party from whom the fees are
sought can establish that the assessment would be clearly inappro-
priate.95 This puts a battered woman or mother of an abused child
at enormous risk when she attempts to claim temporary emergency
jurisdiction. It greatly increases the chance that an abusive father,
particularly if he has greater resources, 96 will be encouraged to ag-
gressively litigate, in his effort to make her liable for all of his "rea-
sonable expenses including costs, communication expenses,
attorney's fees, investigative fees, expenses for witnesses, travel ex-
penses, and child care during the courts of the proceedings." 97 Bat-
terers, who are known to retaliate by abusing the judicial process
to further control and demoralize their victims or drive them into
98economic ruin, may well use this penalty to drive their victims
into flight or hiding, and then have the judicial system simultane-
ously reward themselves and punish their victims. California has
attempted to decrease this possibility for abuse of this section by
batterers.99
93. See id.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 11607(b)(3) (1994).
95. See UCCJEA § 208(c).
96. See, e.g., Liss & Stahly, supra note 58, at 179, 181 (stating that batterers are far
less likely to pay child support than other men as part of their tactic of depriving their
partners of access to money).
97. UCCJEA § 208(c).
98. See Zorza, Batterer Manipulation and Retaliation, supra note 63, at 73.
99. California has added language to its act's counterparts of section 208(c) of the
UCCJEA to clarify much more strongly that battered women and protective parents
should not be punished for fleeing from abuse.
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H. Affidavit and Address Confidentiality
The UCCJEA attempts to get each party in its first pleading to
provide under oath essentially the same information that section 9
of the UCCJA required: (1) a child's present address or wherea-
bouts; (2) places where the child lived during the last five years and
the names and present addresses of the persons with whom the
child lived; (3) whether the party has ever participated in any ca-
pacity in any custody proceeding concerning the child and, if so,
which court, docket number and date of any child-custody determi-
nation; (4) information about any other related proceeding, includ-
ing those for enforcement, protective orders, termination of
parental rights and adoptions; and (5) the names and addresses of
anyone not a party who has physical custody of the child or claims
rights to legal or physical custody or visitation with the child.1°°
Likewise, it places a continuing duty on each party to update the
information about "any proceeding in this or any other State that
could affect the current proceeding." 101
However, the UCCJEA notice requirements make two changes,
the first in partial response to those advocates asking for protec-
tions for battered women. That change is an option, which if taken
by a state, can help victims of domestic violence by incorporating
"local law providing for the confidentiality of procedures, ad-
dresses, and other identifying information,"'10 2 including proce-
dures to seal the information and not release it until "after a
hearing in which the court takes into consideration the health,
safety, or liberty of the party or child and determines that the dis-
closure is in the interest of justice.' 0 3 The commentary to section
209 urges states that do not have procedures to keep sensitive iden-
tifying information confidential to adopt such statutory protec-
tions. As suggestions, it refers states to section 304(3) of the Model
Code on Domestic and Family Violence of the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges'0 4 and section 312 of the Uni-
100. See UCCJEA § 209(a).
101. Id. § 209(d).
102. Id. § 209(a).
103. Id. § 209(e).
104. Subsection 3 generally provides: A petitioner may omit her or his name from
all documents filed with the court. If a petitioner omits her or his address, the peti-
tioner must provide the court a mailing address. If disclosure of petitioner's address is
necessary to determine jurisdiction or consider venue, the court may order the disclo-
sure to be made: (a) After receiving the petitioner's consent; (b) Orally and in cham-
bers, out to the presence of the respondent and a sealed record to be made; or (c)
After a hearing, if the court takes into consideration the safety of the petitioner and
finds such disclosure in the interests of justice. See NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND
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form Interstate Family Support Act ("UIFSA") as possible mod-
els.1"5 Obviously, states with identification protections should
consider making them stronger, and are not limited by the protec-
tions in the two suggestions given.
The second change overturns roughly half of the existing case
law1°6 that held that failure to comply with the affidavit require-
ments or knowingly submitting false information was a jurisdic-
tional defect, allowing jurisdiction to be declined and the case
dismissed, and that any resulting custody decree be considered
void.10 7 Instead, section 209(b) of the UCCJEA permits the court
on its own motion or that of a party to stay the proceeding until the
information is furnished. Abusers are most likely to manipulate
courts by falsifying information, and this change in the statute
removes the possibility of having a case dismissed from victims
faced with blatant fraud or deception.
I. Option to Recognize Tribal Orders
Unlike the UCCJA and PKPA, which never addressed tribal
court custody proceedings, the UCCJEA gives states the option of
FAM. CT. JUDGES, MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE § 304(3)
(1994).
105. This statute states in pertinent part:
Upon a finding, which may be made ex parte, that the health, safety, or
liberty of a party or child would be unreasonably put at risk by the disclosure
of identifying information, or if an existing order so provides, a tribunal shall
order that the address of the child or party or other identifying information
not be disclosed in a pleading or other document filed in a proceeding under
this [Act].
UIFSA § 312 (1996).
106. See JOAN ZORZA, NAT'L CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAM. LAW, GUIDE TO IN-
TERSTATE CUSTODY: A MANUAL FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ADVOCATES 35-36 (2d
ed. 1995) (on file with NOW Legal Defense and Educational Fund). See also Evans v.
Evans, 623 N.Y.S.2d 685, 688 (App. Div. 1995) (holding that failure of a party to
comply deprives the court of the "opportunity to ascertain essential facts pertaining to
its assumption and continuance of jurisdiction").
107. See, e.g., Owens v. Huffman, 481 So. 2d 231, 242-43 (Miss. 1985) (supporting
the current position that the case should not be dismissed); Brewington v. Serrato, 336
S.E.2d 444, 447 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (same); Peery v. Peery, 453 So. 2d 635, 639-40
(La. Ct. App. 1984) (same); In re Nelsen, 681 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984)
(same); Pasqualone v. Pasqualone, 406 N.E.2d 1121, 1124 (Ohio 1980) (same); Pal-
trow v. Paltrow, 376 A.2d 1134, 1137 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (same). Cf Breaux v.
Mays, 746 P.2d 708, 709-10 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987); In re Marriage of Bolson, 394
N.W.2d 361, 364 (Iowa 1986); Berry v. Berry, 466 So.2d 138, 139-40 (Ala. Civ. App.
1985) (finding that the court may exercise modification jurisdiction, at least where no
action is pending in another state); Szmyd v. Szmyd, 641 P.2d. 14, 16-18 (Alaska
1982); Gambrell v. Gambrell, 272 S.E.2d 70, 72 (Ga. 1980).
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doing so. 10 8 Furthermore, by taking this option, states help to bring
custody law in greater conformity with the VAWA full faith and
credit mandate" 9 and better protect abused victims. It is likely that
reluctance of some states to recognize tribal custody decrees in the
past" 0 prevented the Conference from including a provision re-
quiring that all states honor and enforce tribal court orders and
clarifying that "state" does include tribal lands. The UCCJEA
does, however, clarify that it is not trying to diminish the protec-
tions of Indian children under the Indian Child Welfare Act
("ICWA"),"u noting that any proceeding subject to ICWA is not
governed by the UCCJEA to the extent it is governed by ICWA. 2 2
In addition, the commentary observes that the UCCJEA "does not
purport to legislate custody jurisdiction for tribal courts," but tells
Tribes how they can adopt the UCCJEA.113
III. ENFORCING AND REGISTERING CUSTODY DECREES
The UCCJEA has made many changes so that it can be better
enforced to ensure return of the abducted child, including situa-
tions governed by the International Child Abduction Remedies
Act'1 4 (ICARA), implementing the Hague Convention. The en-
forcement section of the UCCJEA specifically covers situations
before any party has commenced a custody action in any court, so
that a court can order speedy return of the child to the peti-
tioner." 5 In addition, the UCCJEA requires states to enforce and
not modify the child-custody determinations of other states or
countries, or registered orders that were made in accordance with
both the UCCJEA and the PKPA.11 6 The determinations entitled
to enforcement specifically include temporary emergency jurisdic-
tion orders and the custody provisions after notice of domestic vio-
108. See UCCJEA § 104(b).
109. See supra note 26.
110. See, e.g., Desjarlait v. Desjarlait, 379 N.W.2d 139, 142-43 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985); Malaterre v. Malaterre, 293 N.W.2d 139, 145 (N.D. 1980). Cf. Eastern Band of
Cherokee Indians v. Larch, 872 F.2d 66, 68 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding in a custody dis-
pute involving a North Carolina court and a Cherokee tribal court that a reservation
is a "state" within the meaning of the PKPA).
111. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994) (governing custody proceedings when the state
is a party, but not proceedings where the parents are the sole parties).
112. See UCCJEA § 104(a).
113. See id. § 104 cmt.
114. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 (1994).
115. See UCCJEA § 310 (indicating procedure for filing a warrant to take physical
custody of a child if the child is likely to suffer serious physical harm or be removed
from the state).
116. See id. § 303(a).
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lence orders. Enforcement remedies under the UCCJEA are in
addition to any other remedies available under state law.
n1 7
A. Registration of Decrees
The UCCJEA creates a registration process for custody de-
crees." 8 However, unlike the registration process required by
VAWA's full faith and credit mandate, which does not require giv-
ing notice a second time to register a protection order in another
jurisdiction, the UCCJEA does require giving notice to any parent
or person acting as a parent who has been awarded custody or visi-
tation as part of the registration process before a custody decree
can be registered. 119 Furthermore, very naively, the UCCJEA re-
quires that notice must be given in each state where the order must
be registered, 120 further endangering those who are already at most
risk of retaliation 121 and very likely causing them further delay, un-
certainty and expense.
The UCCJEA's registration process unfortunately ignored the
urgings of the battered women's advocates submitted through
Roberta Valente, former staff director of the American Bar Associ-
ation's Domestic Violence Commission, 22 who suggested that all
custody decrees, particularly those entered in cases involving do-
mestic violence, could be registered statewide, and ultimately na-
tional registry for orders of protection. 23 This would immediately
afford full protection for battered woman and endangered children
throughout the United States no matter where they must flee, and
without imposing time delays and endangerment resulting from
further slow judicial processes124 and notification to their abusers.
117. See id. § 303(b).
118. See id. § 304.
119. See id. § 304(b).
120. See id. § 304. Even if a state provides for registration without any filing or
service fee, and the state is not mandated to do so, one must file at least one certified
copy and an affidavit, which may incur further expense. See id. § 304(a)(2).
121. These are the people who are repeatedly stalked, pursued and abused, who
must repeatedly flee.
122. See Hoff, supra note 13, at 291 n.94.
123. See Susan B. Carbon et al., Enforcing Domestic Violence Protection Orders
throughout the Country: New Frontiers of Protection for Victims of Domestic Violence,
50(2) Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 39, 43 (Spring 1999) (citing the requirements of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2265). The authors note that as of April 12, 1999, only 23 states are participating to
some extent in the National Crime Information Center's Protection Order File
registry.
124. See UCCJEA § 304(c)(2), (d) (providing the respondent 20 days to contest the
registration).
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If custody decrees were all nationally registered,125 so would be any
subsequent orders to vacate, stay or modify the prior order, so any
enforcing court would have access to information about the validity
of the decree.
Although NCCUSL ignored most of the suggestions concerning
registration, it did provide for protecting the fleeing family in those
few cases where a court has denied all custody or visitation to an
abusive parent, by not requiring notice to be given to the abuser.1 26
However, since virtually no courts prohibit all contact by the
abuser with the children,2 7 the fleeing family will be placed in
great danger by having to reveal to which state they have fled as
part of the notice given to the abusive parent.
In cases where her batterer has already abducted the child, the
mother can file a petition to register the child-custody decree with
an accompanying request for a warrant to pick up the child,128 and
will not have to notify the abductor until the child has actually
been recovered. 129 This provision for protection shows that the
NCCUSL takes protection of children far more seriously than it
does of that involving battered women, and still does not recognize
that in about a quarter of cases where male batterers killing their
intimate female partners, they also kill their children.t 30
However, in the typical registration case requiring advance no-
tice (i.e., when no abduction is involved), a victim of domestic vio-
lence must notify her abuser when she files to register the order,
and he, like any other respondent, has twenty days to contest the
validity of the order. 3' The UCCJEA permits a respondent to
challenge the order on only three grounds: (1) the issuing court did
not have jurisdiction; (2) respondent did not have any notice and
opportunity to be heard in the issuing court; or (3) the custody de-
125. The national registry for orders of protection already exists, although not all
states are inputting their data yet.
126. See UCCJEA § 209(e).
127. See Liss & Stahly, supra note 58, at 186. Some courts restrict visitation to
visitation by photograph or tape recording as a compromise when the court recog-
nizes that any actual contact with the child would be too dangerous.
128. See UCCJEA § 310. See also infra, Part III.C.
129. See UCCJEA § 310.
130. See NEIL WEBSDALE, UNDERSTANDING DOMESTIC HOMICIDE 179-80 (1999)
(finding that in 52.6% of domestic child homicides where two parents were involved
in caring for the children, the woman was known to have been beaten before the child
was killed - which is probably an undercount, since agencies did not seek out this
data - and that the man often killed the children to spite the child's mother, whom
he thought had betrayed him in some way). Websdale notes that overall children
made up 26% of all domestic homicides. See id. at 201.
131. See UCCJEA § 304(d).
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termination was vacated, stayed or modified. 3 a It would also be
hoped that any finding of fraud, whether notice or the order itself
had been faked or fraudulently obtained, will be reduced to a writ-
ten finding that can later be used to impeach the respondent. Once
any custody order is registered, the only permissible grounds for
challenge is that it has subsequently been vacated, stayed or modi-
fied,133 although due process considerations and statutory ones
should permit a challenge if the matter could not have been as-
serted previously. 134
B. Challenges on Jurisdictional Grounds
For battered women faced with orders that their abusers have
obtained, the UCCJEA provisions can be an unfortunate change
from under the old UCCJA, which generally permitted jurisdic-
tional challenges to be raised at any time, provided one did not
delay in doing so. 1 35 This ability to raise late challenges is needed
for several reasons. First, some abusers use dubious or illegal tac-
tics, such as failing to give notice, faking her signature, sending her
to the wrong court or on the wrong date or deflecting her attention,
thereby effectively preventing her attendance. Second, abusers
may threaten their victims and witnesses so that they dare not show
up in court. Third, they may emotionally or financially drain their
victims so that the victims are unable to contest custody. 136 If the
notice for registration does not warn that one's ability to challenge
the order at a later time will be solely limited if one does not show
up and contest it now, it is especially unfair to battered women.
Under the UCCJA, it was largely left to the registering or enforc-
ing court to verify the pleadings from the issuing court. While the
registering or enforcing court is not precluded from contacting the
132. See id. § 307(a)(1)(A)-(C). Presumably the fact that an order had been
fabricated could also be raised at any time on due process grounds.
133. See id. §§ 304(f), 308(f)(2).
134. See id. § 305(c)(3). While it is not clear if "any matter that could have been
asserted" encompasses that the party challenging could not have appeared in court or
that the ground for challenging was not as yet known, the better interpretation is that
either issue can be raised. Id.
135. See B.J.P. v. R.W.P., 20 FAM. L. RrrR. 1178 (D.C., No. 91-FM-700m, Feb. 3,
1994) (holding that mother's failure to raise custody jurisdiction issue at outset pre-
vents her from doing so later); Soderlund v. Alton, 467 N.W.2d 144 (Wis. Ct. App.
1991) (finding that lawyer's seven-week delay in notifying a Florida court that he had
filed wife's divorce seeking custody in Wisconsin resulted in malpractice and the
wife's losing custody).
136. See Zorza, Batterer Manipulation and Retaliation, supra note 63; Raphael,
supra note 86, at 32-37.
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issuing court about the validity of the offered decree, the UCCJEA
absolves the registering or enforcing court of responsibility for con-
tacting the issuing court - not a very fair result given how few
battered women are likely to be represented in these situations. 137
C. Enforcement Mechanisms
For a battered woman with a custody decree in one state who
must allow visitation to her out-of-state abuser, it might be wise for
her to have the court condition the out-of-state (or country) visita-
tion on the prior registration of the child-custody decree so that it
will be immediately enforceable. However, prior registration is not
actually needed - though may still be desirable - for orders is-
sued from other Hague Child Abduction Convention 13 8 signatory
countries since that treaty provides for similar swift return of ab-
ducted or wrongfully retained children and enforcement of custody
orders from those countries. 139
1. Issuing Warrants
Another remedy under the UCCJEA permits courts to enforce
orders by issuing warrants to take immediate physical custody of
the child. Section 311 permits the court to issue such a "pick up"
warrant upon credible testimony "that the child is imminently
likely to suffer serious physical harm or be removed from this
State."14 Courts are directed to hear such petitions on the next
judicial day after the warrant is executed, and may only delay if the
next court date is "impossible.1 141 Not only may law enforcement
officers be directed to take physical custody of the child immedi-
ately, but if "a less intrusive remedy is not effective, it may author-
ize law enforcement officers to enter private property to take
physical custody of the child including, in exigent circumstances, by
forcibly entering at any hour.''142 The court must also provide for
the placement of the child pending final relief.' 43
137. Barbara J. Hart, Safety and Accountability? The Underpinnings of a Just Sys-
tem (visited Dec. 2, 1999) <http://www.mincava.unm.edu/hartindx.asp >.
138. See 42 U.S.C. § 11601 (1988).
139. See UCCJEA § 302 & cmt.
140. Id. § 311 cmt.
141. Id. § 311(b).
142. Id. § 311(e).
143. See id. § 311(c)(3).
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2. Enforcing Visitation
Although the UCCJEA forbids courts to modify the custody or-
der of another state or permanently change custody, Section 305
does allow enforcing courts to enforce visitation rights in two lim-
ited situations. The first exception permits a court to provide for
make-up visitation time when visitation time has been ob-
structed' 44 Although the language only talks of visitation (which
undoubtedly shows that the language was inserted at the request of
fathers' rights groups), custodial parents should be likewise entitled
to make-up time if their time with the child has been obstructed.
The second exception allows courts to temporarily designate spe-
cific visitation times when orders do "not provide for a specific visi-
tation schedule" (e.g., "reasonable visitation.")145 In a "reasonable
visitation" case, the court must set an expiration date146 unless, as a
result of judicial communication, the issuing court has deferred ju-
risdiction on this issue to the enforcing court on the grounds it is a
more convenient forum,147 or, although not suggested under the
UCCJEA, the order is issued simultaneously by both courts.
Otherwise, the enforcing court's order expires on whichever date
occurs first, the expiration date set by the enforcing court or the
date of a new order by the issuing court. 148
3. Prosecutor's Role in Enforcement
Probably the most important addition to the enforcement sec-
tion, unless a state opts out,149 is the creation in sections 315-317 of
an interstate network of prosecutors modeled after California's
prosecutors who, for twenty years, have had authority to enforce
child-custody orders from other states and countries. These offi-
cials will be able to help locate and return missing children, as well
as seek enforcement in the state's criminal and civil courts. As a
practical matter, they can also help contact their counterparts in
other states when the child is in another state. For left-behind bat-
tered women, and especially those who have little access to fund-
ing, these remedies should greatly help them in retrieving children
who are wrongfully taken to other states.
144. See id. § 304 cmt.
145. Id. § 304(a)(2).
146. See id. § 304(b) & cmt.
147. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
148. See UCCJEA § 304(b).
149. For example, in adopting the UCCJEA, Maine specifically chose to opt out of
this section. See 1999 Me. Laws 486.
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The danger is that these public officials, acting on behalf of the
court, either fail to act because they do not take the abuse suffi-
ciently seriously or they act against fleeing battered women with-
out raising any domestic violence justifications. Furthermore, they
may be subject to manipulation by abusers, 150 especially if they are
not very knowledgeable about domestic violence. They may also
further endanger battered women and their children by either re-
vealing confidential addresses or workplace locations. Conse-
quently, courts will normally assess expenses pursuant to sections
312 and 317 against the losing party (including all direct expenses
and costs incurred by the public officials). It is also likely that this
section will be used to hurt fleeing battered women and protective
mothers. In contrast, section 208(b), prevents fees, costs or ex-
penses from being assessed against a state under the UCCJEA,
although it does not prohibit recovery authorized by other laws.
CONCLUSION
The UCCJEA has fixed several problems of its predecessor, the
UCCJA, with the result that the UCCJEA is more effective than
the old UCCJA and better reconciled with other federal laws. For
the first time courts that are making child-custody determinations
are encouraged to look at domestic and family violence to protect
the rest of the family from an abuser when a parent, the child or
any sibling of the child is being abused. In addition, the UCCJEA
makes clear that protective parents should not be punished for
fleeing incidents or patterns of domestic violence, and that any ju-
dicial finding or determination that parental or child abuse oc-
curred is res judicata as to each party who had notice of that
proceeding.
A number of improvements in the UCCJEA are left as options
to the states, and it is hoped that battered women's advocates will
urge states to adopt these options on behalf of their clients: ad-
dressing confidentiality provisions, granting full faith and credit to
tribal child-custody determinations and designating prosecutors or
other state officials to enforce child-custody determinations. In ad-
dition, advocates for battered women should urge their states to
adopt the changes made by California 151 for denying jurisdiction by
reason of conduct in its version of the UCCJEA.
150. See Zorza, Batterer Manipulation and Retaliation, supra note 63.
151. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3135 (West 1999).
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The biggest problem with the UCCJEA for battered women is
that it requires notice to be given all over again to register a cus-
tody decree in any other jurisdiction. It is likely that this problem
can only be rectified by federal legislation amending the PKPA, the
VAWA full faith and credit mandate, and requiring the state and
federal registries for orders of protection to also register child-cus-
tody decrees.
Overall, the UCCJEA is an improvement over the UCCJA, and
should be supported by battered women and their advocates, espe-
cially with the proposed changes.
KOK-
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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS A FACTOR IN
CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS IN
NEW YORK STATE
Hon. Judith J. Gische*
INTRODUCTION
In 1996, the New York State Legislature mandated that trial
courts consider the effect of domestic violence in child custody and
visitation disputes.' In 1998, the legislature amended the law to
provide that, under most circumstances, a person convicted of mur-
dering a child's parent shall be denied custody and visitation.2
The amendment was in response to a growing national trend to
give greater attention to the serious effect domestic violence has on
children. While the law now conveys the seriousness with which
the legislature views domestic violence, many problems inherent in
resolving custody and visitation disputes involving domestic vio-
lence still remain.
This essay examines the legislation and case law arising out of
this issue, identifying remaining problems and judicial responses.
Additional interventions will be suggested to assist in the appropri-
ate resolution of these cases.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In 1996, the state legislature amended section 240 of the New
York Domestic Relations Law ("DRL") to provide that in connec-
tion with determining the "best interests" of the child in custody
and/or visitation disputes, the court is mandated to consider as a
factor, if raised, the issue of domestic violence. Thus, section
240.1(a) of the DRL now provides in pertinent part:
Where either party to an action concerning custody of a right to
visitation with a child alleges in a sworn petition or complaint or
sworn answer, cross-petition, counterclaim or other sworn re-
sponsive pleading that the other party has committed an act of
* Acting Supreme Court Justice presiding over the dedicated matrimonial part
in Bronx County, New York. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance and
good counsel of Eileen Kaspar,Esq. in connection with the preparation of this essay.
1. See 1996 N.Y. Laws, ch. 85, § 1 (codified at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 240.1(a)
(McKinney 1996)).
2. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240.1-c(a) (McKinney 1998).
3. See 1996 N.Y. Laws 85, § 1.
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domestic violence against the party making the allegation or a
family or household member of either party.., and such allega-
tions are proven by a preponderance of the evidence, the court
must consider the effect of such domestic violence upon the best
interest of the child, together with such other facts and circum-
stances as the court deems relevant in making a direction pursu-
ant to this section.4
In 1998, the legislature amended section 240.1-c of the DRL and
added section 1085 of the Family Court Act ("FCA") to prohibit
an award of custody or visitation to a person convicted of murder-
ing the child's parent, except in very limited circumstances.5 The
1998 amendment provides in pertinent part:
no court shall make an order providing for visitation or custody
to a person who has been convicted of murder in the first or
second degree ... of a parent, legal custodian or legal guardian
of any child who is the subject of the proceeding
[n]otwithstanding paragraph (a) of this subdivision a court may
order visitation or custody where: ... such child is of a suitable
age to signify assent and such child assents to such visitation or
custody; or... if such child is not of suitable age to signify as-
sent, the child's custodian or legal guardian assents to such or-
der, or ... the person who has been convicted of murder in the
first or second degree ... can prove ... that... [h]e or she, or a
family or household member of either party, was a victim of do-
mestic violence by the victim of such murder; and.., the domes-
tic violence was causally related to the commission of such
murder; and ... the court finds that such visitation or custody is
in the best interests of the child.6
Section 240 of the DRL sets forth the "best interest" standard
for courts to employ in all custody and visitation disputes. Case
law interpreting "best interests" has developed common law fac-
tors which, within the court's discretion, should be considered
before a decision is made.7 The 1996 amendment provides the only
4. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 240.1(a) (McKinney 1999).
5. See 1998 N.Y. Laws 150, § 1.
6. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 240.1-c(b).
7. See, e.g., Fox v. Fox, 582 N.Y.S.2d 863, 864 (App. Div. 1992) (weighing factors
such as 1) the quality of the home environment; 2) the ability of each parent to pro-
vide for the child's emotional needs and her financial status; 3) the ability of each
parent to provide for the child; 4) the individual needs and expressed desires of the
child; and 5) the need of the child to live with a sibling). See also Lynn W. v. Guy C.,
519 N.Y.S.2d 400, 401 (App. Div. 1987); Gill v. Gill, 523 N.Y.S.2d 309, 310 (App. Div.
1987); Cornelius C. v. Linda C., 506 N.Y.S.2d 702, 704 (App. Div. 1986); Milton v.
Dennis, 464 N.Y.S.2d 874, 875 (App. Div. 1983).
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statutorily mandated factor, domestic violence, that the court must
consider. The 1998 amendment is even stronger because it elimi-
nates judicial discretion and mandates a result in custody and visi-
tation cases involving a murder conviction of the petitioning
parent.
The 1996 amendment was adopted in response to a growing na-
tional concern about the effect of domestic violence on children.
In 1990, a joint resolution of Congress urged the states to adopt a
legislative presumption that it is detrimental to a child when cus-
tody is awarded to an abusive spouse.8 The Model Code on Do-
mestic and Family Violence, developed by the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges in 1994, and a report by the
American Bar Association ("ABA") adopted this Congressional
recommendation. 9
New York was one of the last states to adopt the recommended
legislation. Thus, before the New York amendment was adopted in
1996, thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia already had
laws making domestic violence a relevant factor in custody and vis-
itation determinations.'" By 1997, the number of states grew to
forty-four" and, according to the most recent information from the
ABA, forty-six states currently require consideration of domestic
violence before custody decisions are made.' 2
The New York statute, adopted six years after the original na-
tional proposal, differs from the congressional proposal in one ma-
jor respect. New York expressly declined to adopt a presumption
against awarding custody to a battering parent and, instead, only
mandated that domestic violence be considered by courts as a fac-
tor in making such awards. Further, the statutory mandate only
applies when allegations of violence are contained in a sworn
pleading.' 3 In this regard, the New York amendment reflects the
8. See H.R.J. Res. 172, 102d Cong. (1990).
9. See NAT'L COUNCIL OF Juv. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, MODEL CODE ON DOM. &
FAM. VIOLENCE § 401 (1996).
10. See id.
11. See Lynne R. Kurtz, Protecting New York's Children: An Argument for the
Creation of a Rebuttable Presumption Against Awarding a Spouse Abuser Custody of a
Child, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1345, 1348 (1997).
12. See American Bar Association, Family Law Section, Tables Summarizing the
Law in Fifty States, Chart 2: Custody Criteria (visited Nov. 10, 1999) <http://
www.abanet.org/family/familylaw/table2.html>.
13. Certainly the court still has the discretion to consider issues of domestic vio-
lence even when they are not raised in a sworn pleading notwithstanding that the
statutory mandate does not apply. See Anthony S. v. Kimberly S., Nos. V-1276-97, V-
1747-97, V-1277-97, V-1278-97, 1998 WL 425464, at *6-7 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. June 19,
1998).
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tension between the strong public policy in favor of protecting chil-
dren from the effects of a violent household and the concern that
general, non-particularized claims of violence could be raised in or-
der to gain an unfair advantage in a custody/visitation dispute.14
II. CASE LAW
Even before the statutory mandate was enacted, many courts
had seriously considered the issue of domestic violence in connec-
tion with custody and visitation disputes.15 Consideration of the
issue, however, was not uniform.16 Thus, the New York amend-
ments ensure that the issue, if properly raised, must be considered.
Despite the fact that trial courts are statutorily obligated to con-
sider domestic violence, courts still have an enormous amount of
discretion in reaching a decision in a particular custody or visita-
tion dispute. Where the existence of domestic violence is factually
contested, the trial court must decide which of the parties is more
credible. Moreover, the 1996 amendment does not: 1) define what
constitutes "domestic violence"; 2) proscribe the weight accorded
such finding of domestic violence; 3) determine what, if any, miti-
gating factors the court should consider before making a final
award of custody or visitation; or 4) distinguish, in any way, be-
tween the effect of domestic violence in a custody proceeding as
opposed to a visitation dispute.
A. Credibility Determinations on Issues of Domestic Violence
In cases where domestic violence is alleged, there are often fac-
tual disputes that require the court, as the trier of fact, to make
credibility determinations. The importance of a correct credibility
determination is paramount since a custody/visitation issue may
turn on such determination. Appellate courts give the trial courts,
who directly observe the demeanor of the witnesses, great defer-
ence in making credibility determinations. 7 Trial courts rely upon
those things generally considered by any trier of fact in adjudicat-
14. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw §§ 240 Practice Commentary, 240.6 (McKinney
1996).
15. See, e.g., Rohan v. Rohan, 623 N.Y.S.2d 390 (App.. Div. 1995); Acevedo v.
Acevedo, 606 N.Y.S.2d 307 (App. Div. 1994); Antoinette M. v. Paul Seth G., 608
N.Y.S.2d 703 (App. Div. 1994).
16. See Keating v. Keating, 538 N.Y.S.2d 286 (App. Div. 1989).
17. See Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 687 N.Y.S.2d 485, 486 (App. Div. 1999);
Hollister v. Hollister, 678 N.Y.S.2d 820, 821 (App. Div. 1998); In re Millard v. Clap-
per, 679 N.Y.S.2d 434, 435 (App. Div. 1998); Perez v. Perez, 659 N.Y.S.2d 642 (App.
Div. 1997).
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ing the credibility of parties' testimony, such as objective cor-
18roborating documentation, previously issued orders of
protections or adjudications of abuse,19 medical records, 20 photo-
graphs21 and non-party witness testimony.22
Trial courts also may seek forensic evaluations from mental
health experts to assist in determining whether the alleged violence
occurred and whether the children of the particular dispute have
been affected. While forensic input may be analyzed, only the
court can assess credibility and the best interests of children. Thus,
the court is duty-bound to critically evaluate any forensic recom-
mendation and not just blindly accept it.23
B. The Definition of Domestic Violence
The 1996 amendment does not define domestic violence. It
would be reasonable, however, for courts to conclude that domes-
tic violence includes the commission of those acts enumerated in
section 812(1) of the FCA24 as family offenses that justify the grant
of an order of protection. In at least one reported decision, the
trial court broadly defined domestic violence to include psychologi-
cal violence and not just overt acts leading to physical injury.25 The
court's definition in that case drew upon the current mental health
18. See In re Hugo F. v. Jeannine F., 671 N.Y.S.2d 259 (App. Div. 1998) (relying
upon the "documented and undisputed" history of domestic violence in finding un-
supervised visitation inappropriate).
19. See Peters v. Blue, 661 N.Y.S.2d 722 (Fam. Ct. 1997) (observing prior assault
convictions in finding that domestic violence existed). See also Irwin v. Schmidt, 653
N.Y.S.2d 627 (App. Div. 1997); Joseph v. Joseph, 646 N.Y.S.2d 167 (App. Div. 1996)
(considering prior orders of protection and police intervention in finding domestic
violence).
20. See Joseph, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 167 (admitting evidence of medical records).
21. See Spencer v. Small, 693 N.Y.S.2d 727, 728 (App. Div. 1999) (admitting pho-
tographs of petitioner's injuries into evidence).
22. See Anthony S. v. Kimberly S., Nos. V-1276-97, V-1747-97, V-1277-97, V-
1278-97, 1998 WL 425464, at *1 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. June 19, 1998)
23. See Aldrich v. Aldrich, 693 N.Y.S.2d 282 (App. Div. 1999) (finding no error
where the trial court did not follow psychologist's recommendation or consider re-
spondent's alleged acts of domestic violence); In re E.R. v. G.S.R., 648 N.Y.S.2d 257,
261 (Fam. Ct. 1996) (rejecting the court-ordered physician's clinical evaluation and
recommendation.).
24. N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 812(1) (McKinney 1998) (listing offenses of disorderly
conduct, harassment in the first and second degree, aggravated harassment in the sec-
ond degree, menacing in the second and third degree and attempted assault between
spouses, former spouses, parent and child or members of the same family or
household).
25. See J.D. v. N.D., 652 N.Y.S.2d 468 (Fam. Ct. 1996).
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paradigm that refers to domestic violence as a pattern of behaviors
designed to exercise control over the victim. 26
C. The Weight to Be Given a Finding of Domestic Violence
Once the trial court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that there is domestic violence, the court must go on to consider
what effect, if any, the finding will have on its custody or visitation
determination. Courts often look at domestic violence in the fac-
tual context of an entire case, considering the common law factors
of "best interests" as well. Courts may also consider mitigating fac-
tors, such as the parties' successful efforts at domestic violence
counseling.27 Thus, domestic violence, while a significant consider-
ation in custody and visitation disputes, is not necessarily disposi-
tive of the outcome of the case.
While not dispositive, however, a finding that a parent is a bat-
terer will weigh heavily against an award of custody to that parent.
On the other hand, the same finding will not usually result in the
court denying visitation. In order to deny visitation, the court must
find that contact will have a detrimental effect on the child.28 It is
not enough for the court to conclude that no visitation is in the
child's best interest.29 In many cases where domestic violence is
proven, the court will control the nature, duration and conditions
of visitation, without denying visitation altogether. Courts rely
heavily upon supervised visitation and/or referrals to counseling
programs as appropriate safeguards even where the visiting parent
is an abuser.3 °
D. The "Accused But Not Yet Convicted" Murderer Problem
The 1998 amendment is distinctive from the 1996 amendment in
that it directs a custody result, with limited exceptions, in cases
where the party seeking custody has been convicted of murdering
the child's parent. The 1998 amendment still leaves open to court
26. See id. at 471.
27. See In re Millard v. Clapper, 679 N.Y.S.2d 434, 435 (App. Div. 1998); Hilliard
v. Peroni, 666 N.Y.S.2d 92 (App. Div. 1997).
28. See Susan G.B. v. Yehiel B.-H., 627 N.Y.S.2d 384, 385 (App. Div. 1995); Paul
G. v. Donna G., 572 N.Y.S.2d 364, 365 (App. Div. 1991).
29. See John R. v. Marlene C., 683 N.Y.S.2d 724, 727 (Fam. Ct. 1998) ("Denial of
visitation is a drastic remedy that should be invoked only when there is substantial
evidence that visitation would be detrimental to the child.").
30. See In re Hugo F. v. Jeannie F., 671 N.Y.S.2d 259 (App. Div. 1998) (finding
unsupervised visitation inappropriate where there is a history of domestic violence);
In re N Children, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 19, 1996, at 26 (App. Div. Nov. 19, 1996) (directing
therapy before increased access).
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discretion the question of where the child should reside after
arrest, but prior to conviction.31
In general, before a court can consider the custody or visitation
petition of a non-parent, "extraordinary circumstances" must be
established. The courts are divided over whether this threshold is
met when one parent is accused of murdering the other.32 Even
when such extraordinary circumstances are present, the court must
still determine where it would be in the child's "best interest" to
live. Custody cases necessarily require a prediction of future be-
havior based upon past history. The problem with making accurate
predictions for a child's future well-being is exacerbated in these
murder cases, due to the allegations and potential for harm
present.
CONCLUSION
Both the 1996 and 1998 amendments to the DRL focus attention
on the serious, long-lasting, detrimental effect that domestic vio-
lence can have on children living in the household. They each rec-
ognize that children are psychologically damaged by such
behaviors regardless of whether the child, or some other household
member, is the actual victim. The amendments, however, provide
little guidance for the courts and leave many unanswered ques-
tions. Clearly, additional resources and legislation would alleviate
some of these problems.
Victim advocates must recognize that courts' need objective, tan-
gible, corroborating evidence in custody and visitation cases. Ad-
vocates should help their clients prove claims in court by helping
them gather the evidence they need, including medical records,
photographs and police reports. In fact, early intervention with
victims should include evidence collection in the event that there is
a court case.
Absent a legislative mandate, courts will continue to exercise
their discretion in weighing domestic violence against other factors
in custody and visitation cases. Although the statute mandates
courts to consider domestic violence, it is clear that the presence of
violence alone will not be outcome determinative. The legislature
must define "domestic violence" in order for the courts to give this
factor proper consideration. If the legislature continues to give the
trial court unfettered discretion regarding the weight to be given a
31. See Myrna Felder, Murderers and Custody, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 9, 1999, at 3.
32. See Ratliff v. Glanda, 693 N.Y.S.2d 319 (App. Div. 1999); O'Guin v. Pikul,
N.Y. L.J., May 16, 1991, at 24 (App. Div. May 16, 1991).
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finding of domestic violence, a more inclusive statutory definition
would be in order. In the event that the legislature decides to
adopt a legislative presumption in accordance with the congres-
sional recommendation, then a more limited statutory definition
would be appropriate.
Many times, the court will direct a final order of supervised visi-
tation where it finds that there has been domestic violence in the
home. Where supervision by a family member or other adult may
be unavailable, unreliable and/or inadequate, the courts should
look to an outside agency to provide such services. Currently,
however, these programs in the New York City area are oversub-
scribed. Also, program hours may not always be convenient to
working parents or school age children. Resources for creating
new programs or expanding the existing programs are needed so
that the court can, with confidence, order supervised visitation as a
feasible safeguard on visitation with a potentially abusive parent.
It is evident that, where a parent has been convicted of the other
parent's murder, the surviving parent should never be awarded
custody. However, until the accused is adjudicated, the court is
faced with the uncertainty of awarding temporary custody to a par-
ent who may indeed be guilty of murder. The legislature should
consider an amendment that permits a third party to seek custody
of the child without having to prove extraordinary circumstances.
In this manner the court can apply the "best interest" standard to
determine custody rather than having to first make a threshold
determination.
The statutory amendments are an important first step in address-
ing the complex issues of domestic violence in child custody/visita-
tion disputes. In the meantime, those in the court system need to
be vigilant in understanding how the laws work and what resources
and improvements are necessary to ensure that children are in safe
home environments.
STOPPING NEW YORKERS' STALKERS:
AN ANTI-STALKING LAW FOR
THE MILLENNIUM
Demetra M. Pappas*
INTRODUCTION
This essay was to have discussed, and been entitled, Recent His-
torical Perspectives Regarding Judicial Approaches, Prosecutorial
Responses and Anti-Stalking Legislative Efforts in New York State.
At the time research for that article commenced, New York en-
joyed the dubious distinction of being the only state in the United
States that did not have a specifically designated anti-stalking stat-
* J.D. Fordham University School of Law, 1985; M.Sc. (Criminal Justice Policy),
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), 1993. The author is cur-
rently the director of Special Projects at the New York law firm of Anderson Kill &
Olick, P.C., and a doctoral candidate in the Law and Sociology Departments of the
LSE, where she is submitting a thesis entitled, The Politics of Euthanasia and Assisted
Suicide: A Comparative Case Study of Emerging Criminal Justice Policy in the United
States and the United Kingdom. This essay is a result of the author's involvement with
the (New York) Lawyers' Committee Against Domestic Violence, and is abstracted
from a larger work in progress, The Stalked: Social and Legal Consequences Relating
to Victims of Stalking Behavior, which, along with the author's doctoral thesis, will
constitute The Enablement Doublet: Dying and Surviving.
While the author is solely responsible for the contents of this essay, a number of
people enabled her to conduct the research and writing of the project, in record time.
Anderson Kill and Olick, PC's founding partner, Gene Anderson and Maxa Luppi,
Director of Insurance Litigation Support Services, provided a supportive environ-
ment, as did Ronnie ("Miss Ron") O'Farrell. Professor Paul E. Rock (Sociology) and
Professor Robert Reiner (Law) of the LSE have consistently offered academic sup-
port, including successfully nominating a related writing by the author for the 1997
William Robson Memorial Writing Prize. Bob Schumacher, Editor-in-Chief of the
Fordham Urban Law Journal, engaged in an enormous gesture of trust when he al-
lowed the author to change the topic of an invited piece and provided the time and
technical support to make it all happen.
Senator Michael A.L. Balboni generously interviewed with the author on the heels
of the legislation while his staff answered questions, faxed documents and gave freely
of their time and materials. Assemblyman Scott Stringer and Rob Hack, the former
Legislative Director to Assemblyman Stringer, also graciously interviewed and pro-
vided information on short notice. The Hon. Margaret Marrinan, Judge of the Dis-
trict Court, Second District, of the State of Minnesota, and the soon-to-be Hon. Faith
O'Neal of New York acted as sounding boards and provided background information.
Elsa and Mac let the author committee her ideas at all hours of the day and night, the
former from halfway around the world, the latter from halfway across a borough.
Last, but not least, Peter Andrews and Jon Springer have, on a number of occasions
too numerous to count, brought analytical insight to the author's work, and fun to the
author's life.
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ute, and which further had ill-defined harassment and menacing
laws.' Since the first anti-stalking legislation was passed by Califor-
nia in 1990 (effective 1991),2 in response to the murder of the ac-
tress Rebecca Schaffer by an obsessed fan, there has been an
explosion of legislation and litigation regarding stalking behavior,
and there had been numerous (failed) efforts to enact legislation in
New York.
On October 4, 1999, that latter fact became entirely historical in
nature when the New York State Senate passed the Clinic Access
and Anti-Stalking Act of 1999,1 thus ratifying the August 5, 1999
actions of the New York State Assembly.4 This comprehensive
piece of legislation, signed on November 22, 1999,1 has as an effec-
tive date December 1, 1999,6 thus making the Clinic Access and
Anti-Stalking Act of 19997 truly the anti-stalking law of the millen-
nium, and the criminalization of stalking behavior in the United
States the criminal justice project of the decade.
This essay concerns itself with some of the legislative responses
to stalking in New York and will examine some of the specific anti-
stalking provisions of the Clinic Access and Anti-Stalking Act of
1999, recently signed by New York Governor George Pataki. The
signing ceremony was the concluding event of a largely collabora-
tive process, as it was the Governor himself who requested that the
sponsoring Senator, Michael A.L. Balboni (R-Mineola) introduce
anti-stalking legislation.8 The legislative efforts of Senator Balboni
and his Assembly anti-stalking counterpart, Assemblyman Scott
Stringer (D-Manhattan) were, in fact, coordinated so as to facili-
1. See Balboni Anti Stalking Legislation Gains Statewide Support, NEWS FROM
STATE SENATOR MICHAEL A.L. BALBONI (Office of N.Y. State Sen. Michael A.L.
Balboni, Albany, N.Y.), May 4, 1999.
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.0 (West 1991) (amended 1992).
3. S. 6146, 222d Sess. (N.Y. Oct. 4, 1999), substituted by A. 9036 [hereinafter A.
9036] (on file with author).
4. A. 9036, 222d Sess. (N.Y. Aug. 5, 1999). It should be noted that once the bill
passed the Assembly it was referred and delivered to the Senate, which in turn passed
it and returned it to the Assembly on Oct. 7, 1999. See Actions on Bill A. 9036 (visited
Nov. 17, 1999) <http://assembly.state.ny.us>.
5. See Tom Precious, Law Enacted to Protect Clinic Workers, Clients, BUFF.
NEWS, Nov. 23, 1999, at B1.
6. See A. 9036 § 19.
7. See id. § 1 (offering this "short title," to the legislation that refers to various
provisions of, inter alia, the criminal procedure law, the penal law, the executive law,
the family court act and the civil rights law).
8. See Letter from William J. Fitzpatrick, President of the New York State Dis-
trict Attorneys Association, District Attorney, Onondaga County, to N.Y. State Sen.
Michael A.L. Balboni (May 3, 1999) (on file with author).
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tate the legislative process. In this regard, interviews by the author
with Senator Balboni, Assemblyman Stringer and Assemblyman
Stringer's former Legislative Director, Rob Hack, offer elucidation
and amplification of that which is on the printed page.9 The unique
perspectives serve as the focus of this discussion and provide an
education not to be found in any book.
1. THE ELEMENTS OF A COLLABORATIVE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
As a general matter, even where attempts to criminalize stalking
and to punish stalkers have been made, these efforts have often
neglected the concerns of the victims of stalkers, overwhelmingly
women."0 This is not surprising, in view of the gendered nature of
the crime, given that "the politics of battered and raped women
had become estranged from local [victim support] schemes, the
State, and much of the criminal justice system."'1
However, New York had the full benefit of participation during
the "past seven or eight legislative sessions and multiple revisions
of work with a lot of different groups over the years - working
closely with the National Organization for Women and the New
9. Empirical, rather than theoretical in nature, much of what is reported and dis-
cussed herein is based upon these recorded interviews, as well as the legislation and
supporting documents provided by these individuals.
The interviews were sought and conducted by telephone almost immediately fol-
lowing the passage of the legislation. Procedures consistent with Institutional Review
Board requirements were followed, although not required by either the academic in-
stitution with which the author is affiliated or by Fordham University School of Law.
All interviews were preceded by a lengthy consent colloquy, and each of the inter-
viewees agreed to have the in-depth discussions taped.
10. Senate Majority Leader Joseph L. Bruno wrote in a press release that:
[i]n a 1998 study conducted by researchers from the National Institute of
Justice and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, an estimated one
million women and 370,000 men are stalked annually in the United States.
One out of every 12 American women and one out of every 45 men have
been stalking victims and only 12% of all stalking crimes result in criminal
prosecution.
Senator Joseph L. Bruno, Majority Leader, Senate Announces Legislation to Crack
Down on Stalkers, NEWS FROM THE SENATE REPUBLICAN MAJORITY (Office of Sen-
ate Majority Leader Joseph L. Bruno, Albany, N.Y.), May 4, 1999 (alteration in
original).
11. See P.E. ROCK, HELPING VICTIMS OF CRIME 409 (1990). While this comment
was a reference to the relationship between the victim support movement in Canada
and women generally, certainly stalking, which has, to date, been considered a less
serious crime than battering or rape, falls within the ambit of Rock's construct.
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York State Coalition against Domestic Violence. ' 12 Indeed in its
Memorandum of Support of the legislation, the New York State
Coalition Against Sexual Assault gave high praise, stating, "[t]hank
you to Senator Balboni and Governor Pataki for listening to the
advocate community, and working hard to increase the safety and
well being of New Yorkers.' 13
Moreover, the New York legislature enjoyed "bi-partisan leader-
ship on this issue,. with Senator Balboni and [Assemblyman
Stringer] work[ing] closely this year and ... that was to the benefit
of the people we were trying to help."' 4
II. THE GROWTH OF A LAW AND LESSONS FROM THE
EXPERIENCES OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS
When first proposed, the New York anti-stalking legislation was
ten to fifteen lines; the law ultimately enacted was over ten single-
spaced pages long.", By being the last state to enact anti-stalking
legislation, New York had the advantage of learning from the ex-
amples, both positive and negative, of other states. One such ex-
ample is that of providing protection for family members and loved
ones. Rob Hack notes that California originally passed a simple
anti-stalking bill that did not cover family members of the targeted
victim, "where the woman is being stalked and all of a sudden the
guy switches and goes after the sister or the mother, and its all
wrapped into the same kind of offense. 1 6 Indeed, the New York
legislation not only protects against this, but takes the concept of
family one (appropriate) step further, in that, for purposes of the
Act, "members of the same family or household," are included.
17
Senator Balboni spent time researching legislation and subse-
quent litigation in other states, as well as combing through law re-
12. See Interview with Mr. Rob Hack, former Legislative Director to Assembly-
man Scott Stringer (Oct. 27, 1999) (tape of interview on file with author) [hereinafter
Hack Interview].
13. Memorandum of Support of New York State Coalition Against Sexual Assault
to N.Y. State Legislators and Governor Pataki (May 3, 1999) (on file with author)
(referring to a S. 1241-A, a predecessor bill to that ultimately passed); see also Victim
Services' Statement in Support of Anti-Stalking Legislation (undated press release dis-
cussing "the bill introduced by Senator Balboni," and noting with approval that the
bill, "will accomplish the key elements of an effective anti-stalking law, [as it] was
drafted with the concerns of both prosecutors and victims in mind") (on file with
author).
14. See Interview with Assemblyman Scott Stringer (D-Manhattan) (Oct. 29,
1999) (tape of interview on file with author) [hereinafter Stringer Interview].
15. See Hack Interview, supra note 12; A. 9036, 222d Sess. (N.Y. 1999).
16. Hack Interview, supra note 12.
17. A. 9036 § 8.
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view articles, which he described as providing "a road map of
where not to go."' 8 He also incorporated protections arising out of
early opposition by the Coalition for the Homeless, which ex-
pressed concern regarding possible applications of anti-stalking
measures to panhandlers. 19 Among the safeguards to protect
otherwise lawful conduct from being prosecutable as stalking are
provisions exempting otherwise lawful conduct under the National
Labor Relations Act, the National Railway Labor Act, the Federal
Employment Labor Management Act and "any other conduct, in-
cluding, but not limited to, peaceful picketing or other peaceful
demonstration, protected from legal prohibition by the federal and
state constitutions."2 Senator Balboni says that this last provision
was designed to protect panhandlers,
but that taken in the spirit of what the issue is, stalking is a per-
sonal issue, even if not romantic or familial, i.e., someone who
knows someone else, can identify someone else, with whom they
have had repeated contact, and they use this contact as an op-
portunity to continually harass and stalk them; that's not pan-
handling - panhandling is random acts, usually done with
complete strangers, and therefore that doesn't fall within the
central question, you can't make it a felony.2'
III. WHAT ARE SOME EXAMPLES OF WHAT IS STALKING
IN NEW YORK STATE?
Senator Balboni accurately comments on an extraordinary fact
relative to a freshly legislated crime, that, "the nature of stalking,
as an individualized campaign of terrorism against the victim, has
hallmarks which the law enforcement communities are very famil-
iar with."'22 It should be noted that the New York Legislature set
up a standard of intent that does not require that the stalker have a
specific intent to stalk, but rather that the stalker intentionally en-
gages in a course of conduct, which s/he "knew or reasonably
should have known that such conduct 21 3 is likely to cause reason-
able fear of material harm to the physical health, safety or property
18. Interview with State Senator Michael A.L. Balboni (R-Mineola) (Oct. 22,
1999) (tape of interview on file with author) [hereinafter Balboni Interview].
19. See id.
20. A. 9036 § 12.
21. Balboni Interview, supra note 18.
22. Id.
23. A. 9036, 222d Sess. (N.Y. 1999) (amending the New York Penal Law by adding
five new sections: 120.40, 120.45, 120.50, 120.55 and 120.60, providing for, respec-
tively, Definitions; Stalking in the Fourth Degree, a class B misdemeanor; Stalking in
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of the victim or a member of the victim's family or the conduct
causes material harm to the mental or emotional health of the vic-
tim or a member of the victim's family,24 or that the conduct "is
likely to cause such person to reasonably fear that his or her em-
ployment is threatened, where such conduct consists of appearing,
telephoning or initiating communication or contact at such per-
son's place of employment or business, and the actor was previ-
ously clearly informed to cease that conduct. 25
This last, particularly bold, initiative was to provide within the
statute recourse for victims who suffer employment, business or ca-
reer consequences or reasonable fear in that regard, emanating
from the conduct of the stalker, where the stalker has been clearly
informed once to cease that conduct.2 6 Senator Balboni noted that
prior to this enactment, there was no recourse for interference with
employment and business, even civilly.27 This excellent provision
statutorily recognizes that most stalking is statistically done by for-
mer intimates or arises out of or intrudes into the workplace.28
Senator Balboni acknowledged the leadership of Governor George
Pataki, "to get it into the statute.., because now you are going to
see a very different prosecution going on ... because now you are
going to actually take into account business interest. 29
Senator Balboni says that "everything works off of the provision
for Stalking in the Fourth Degree, including a ten-year predicate
felony, and including cases where a stalker stalks multiple victims
as a higher offense. ' 30 Similarly, the legislature has created the sta-
tus crime of the stalking of a minor, which Senator Balboni likened
to statutory rape, where an adult stalks a child.31
IV. THE WAY FORWARD
Successfully enacting anti-stalking legislation is not the end of
the story, although it is a good beginning. Assemblyman Stringer
observes that "[p]assing a stalking/anti-stalking bill is important, it
the Third Degree, a class A misdemeanor; Stalking in the Second Degree, a class E
felony; and Stalking in the First Degree, a class D felony).
24. See id. § 13 (alteration in original).
25. Id. (alteration in original).
26. See Balboni Interview, supra note 18.
27. See id.
28. See K. SEAGRAVE, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN IN THE WORK-
PLACE, 1600 TO 1993 11 (1994).
29. Balboni Interview, supra note 18.
30. Id.
31. See id.
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will deter people from stalking, it will save lives, but we've really
now got to focus our attention not just on the legislative piece, but
on the budget side."'3 2 He further notes that in addition to funding
crisis centers, it is imperative to educate police officers and to
do a lot of preventative education with kids at a young age,
teach young boys to respect young girls at the beginning of their
education, so that.., we don't have to initiate a stalking law -
a lot of this can be prevented through education, through coun-
seling - and we have not yet dedicated the dollars in the state
budget, given our surplus, to these issues. 33
Stringer says the real test for the legislature is going to be in up-
coming budgets,
where money is put into programs, into communities, where we
can deal with domestic violence issues, where we can deal with
stalking issues, if we need, for example, to move a woman and a
child into a shelter to shield them from an abuser or a stalker,
we need clean, safe shelters where women can find a safe haven,
and we have not yet dealt with that in the state budget.34
It is Assemblyman Stringer's hope and goal take a comprehensive
approach, noting that "now we have an obligation to do the pre-
ventative work that will lessen the violence and protect people. 3 5
One thing that Senator Balboni sees as interesting is the devel-
opment of caselaw as a result of the legislation.36 He looks forward
to the statute being challenged in the courts, and to seeing how the
courts of New York State respond to the challenge. 37 It bears not-
ing, in this regard, that the New York State Legislature wisely in-
cluded a severability clause protecting the integrity of each
remaining provision of the statute should any portion of it be held
to be invalid.38
CONCLUSION
There can be no doubt that the New York State Legislature has
benefited from the experiences of other states in terms of how to
craft its anti-stalking legislation. The Clinic Access and Anti-Stalk-
ing Act of 1999 does more than merely protect against stalking as
32. Stringer Interview, supra note 14.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Balboni Interview, supra note 18.
37. See id.
38. See A. 9036 § 18, 222d Sess. (N.Y. 1999).
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traditionally defined or described, including following, phoning
and/or mailing a target. By legislating protections regarding the
safety and lives of victims and their family members, and further
statutorily protecting the victims' employment, educational and fi-
nancial lives, this enactment provides the means for victims to take
back ownership and control of their lives. Perhaps more impor-
tant, the legislation provides the criminal justice system with a way
in which to fight the insidious and pernicious conduct that previ-
ously was viewed as legally innocuous. What was once viewed as
the crime before the crime is now culpable, criminal, prosecutable
and punishable.
Ultimately, that makes the recent historical perspectives a mere
- and soon to be distant - forerunner to the instant history re-
garding anti-stalking legislation in New York. As Senator Balboni
observed,
[i]t is not only the end of the millennium, but it is also the end of
the decade, the decade of the 1990s; the decade saw the wave
across the nation of stalking legislation, beginning in 1990 in
California, so it's fitting that it [is] now 1999 and New York is
the last state - it literally has crossed the nation geographically,
politically and in chronological order.39
39. Balboni Interview, supra note 18.
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UNDERSTANDING THE VICTIM: A GUIDE TO
AID IN THE PROSECUTION OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Jennice Vilhauer*
INTRODUCTION
As one of the most prevalent crimes in the country, domestic
violence is one of the most frequently handled cases for prosecu-
tors across the nation. Despite their commonality, however, do-
mestic violence cases can raise the anxiety level of even the most
experienced prosecutor. There are several causes of such anxiety.
First, domestic violence cases are often plagued by evidentiary
problems that occur when a victim does not desire prosecution.
Second, even in states where mandatory prosecution laws have
been enacted, it can still be difficult to successfully prosecute a case
when a victim is hostile, uncooperative and acting in direct opposi-
tion to attempts made by the prosecutor to help the victim. Third,
most prosecutors receive a basic education on domestic violence
and are only familiar with what have now-become colloquial terms,
such as "battered women's syndrome" and the "cycle of violence."
Unfortunately, they are often not aware of how to utilize their
knowledge to work effectively with the victim. This essay will at-
tempt to provide prosecutors with a better understanding of do-
mestic violence victims from a psychological perspective, in a way
that will aid in the comprehension of the underlying dynamics of
these difficult cases.
I. CYCLE OF ABUSIVE BEHAVIOR
The nature of domestic violence creates an entangled relation-
ship between victim and perpetrator that is not encountered in
most other crimes. The intense psychological dynamics involved in
this relationship are often set in place long -before any battering
incident.' The act of violence is only a physical manifestation of
this deeply entrenched psychological interplay between the couple.
* Former Victim Advocate, Los Angeles District Attorney's Victim/Witness
Assistance Program, Los Angeles, CA; Ph.D. Candidate, Counseling Psychology Pro-
gram, Fordham University, 2002; M.S.Ed. Counseling Psychology, Fordham Univer
sity, 1999; B.A. University of California, Los Angeles, 1993.
1. DAWN BERRY, THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SOURCEBOOK 36 (1998).
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The battery is often the briefest part of the interplay between par-
ties and the most quickly forgotten, both because it is unpleasant
and because focusing on the physical violence prevents movement
into the next (and most gratifying) stage of the cycle.2 Lenora
Walker, a pioneer in the study of domestic violence, has described
this psychological interplay between couples engaged in abusive
behavior as the "cycle of violence."3 The cycle occurs in three
stages.'
The first stage is known as the tension-building phase.5 This is
the longest phase of the cycle that can last anywhere from several
months to several years. During this stage, the perpetrator, who is
usually extremely charming in the beginning of the relationship,
becomes critical by verbally insulting his victim in ways that are
meant to demean and damage her self-esteem. He also becomes
controlling and seeks to isolate her from other people.6
During this stage, the victim is trying to understand the changes
in her partner's conduct and engages in behavior that is intended to
pacify and soothe the perpetrator. However, as a result of the per-
petrator's constant verbal attacks, the victim is made to feel that
she is the cause of the unusual behavior, and thus becomes more
susceptible to his attempts to control her.7
The second stage is the violent phase, in which the batterer en-
gages in physical battering.8 Often the first violent physical inci-
dent is not severe, and may consist of a push or a shove. These
early incidents may not be enough to make the victim realize that
she is in real danger. The violence usually increases each time this
phase occurs and can terminate in death. During this phase, the
couple may become involved with the criminal justice system, if the
victim, or a third party, contacts the police in an effort to stop an
acute battering episode.9
2. See id.
3. See LENORA WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 16 (1982).
4. Although there are domestic violence incidents involving male victims and fe-
male perpetrators, an overwhelming majority of reports show that women are gener-
ally the victims of abuse at the hands of a man. Therefore, this essay refers to the
batterer with masculine pronouns, and the victim with female pronouns.
5. See BERRY, supra note 1, at 36.
6. See James Allison & Eric Martineau, The Secret Formula to Successful Domes-
tic Violence: An Examination of Abuse as a Means to an End and the Options Avail-
able to Halt the Violence, 11 ADELPHIA L.J. 1, 4 (1996).
7. See BERRY, supra note 1, at 36.
8. See id.
9. See LINDA MILLS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEHAVIOR 306-07 (1998).
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The third stage is the honeymoon phase."° During this phase,
the perpetrator calms down, realizes that the victim is hurt and an-
gry and recognizes the possibility that she may leave him. He then
engages in loving contrition. It is a period of relief for both part-
ners: the batterer is apologetic and loving, and the victim believes
that he has once again become the charming man with whom she
fell in love. The perpetrator will usually beg for forgiveness and
swear that it will never happen again."
It is during this phase that prosecutors become involved in a do-
mestic violence case, which makes it extremely difficult for them to
conduct an investigation. Essentially, by the time the police have
taken a report of the battering incident, filed charges and brought
the case to the prosecutor's office, the couple has reunited and the
victim no longer feels that she is in any threat of danger. She may
therefore refuse to testify as a witness to the incident and may re-
cant any incriminating statements made to the police.12 She may
also feel responsible for the incident and even offer a made-up ver-
sion of the events that make her out to be the wrongdoer. 3
When this cycle of violence repeats itself over time, the victim
can develop what is known as Battered Woman Syndrome
("BWS"). BWS can be divided into three parts: 1) the traumatic
effects of victimization; 2) learned helplessness; and 3) self-destruc-
tive coping responses to the violence.'4 BWS is similar to Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder, but includes the added element of re-
peat abuse. One feature of this disorder can be poor memory re-
call of the traumatic events.' 5 This symptom is important for
prosecutors to understand because when some victims claim that
they cannot remember an event, it may not be a lie. Women who
suffer from BWS are less likely to respond to the violence against
them, and consequently, become more deeply entrenched in the
violent relationship.16 Women experiencing BWS are likely to be
10. See WALKER, supra note 3, at 32.
11. See BERRY, supra note 1, at 36.
12. See GAIL GOOLKASIAN, CONFRONTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A GUIDE FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES 35 (1986).
13. See Leonore Simon, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approach to the Legal Proc-
essing of Domestic Violence Cases, 1 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 43, 69 (1995).
14. See Mary Ann Douglas, The Battered Woman Syndrome, in DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE
40 (D. Sonkin ed., 1987).
15. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 424 (4th ed. 1994).
16. See Douglas, supra note 14, at 40.
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more reluctant to cooperate with prosecutors, even though they
are in great need of advocacy.
II. SUGGESTIONS FOR PROSECUTORS WHO HANDLE
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES
Many prosecutors are tempted to rely on expert witnesses to ex-
plain a victim's reluctant behavior to the jury. While this can be a
useful tactic in a case where a witness absolutely refuses to cooper-
ate, and may actually be better than putting a hostile witness on the
stand, it is almost never as effective as getting the victim to corrob-
orate her own evidence. 17
Moreover, the traditional prosecutorial approach to domestic vi-
olence cases may increase a victim's reluctance to cooperate. 18 The
probability of victim cooperation has been better predicted by the
conduct of the prosecutor than by the conduct of the victim or de-
fendant.19 If prosecutors make an effort to know the individual vic-
tim and use adversarial prosecution strategies, they will develop a
better working alliance with the victim, and may be more empow-
ered to effectively handle cases of domestic violence. There are
several techniques a prosecutor might utilize in order to make a
difference.
A. Prosecutors Must Know the Victim
It is important that a prosecutor get to know a victim, taking
time to learn the personalities involved in the case and discovering
potential concerns the victim may have that prevent her from leav-
ing an abusive relationship and increasing her resistance to cooper-
ating with the case. Prosecutors can play a large role in helping the
victim to access resources that can alleviate some of the environ-
mental stresses that are keeping her trapped. They can work
closely with victim advocates and lend their leverage when needed.
Educating the victim about options and providing her with a sense
of empowerment is one of the greatest tools a prosecutor has in
gaining a victim's cooperation. 20 There are a number of issues that
17. See Roberta Thyfault et al., Battered Women in Court: Jury and Trial Consul-
tants and Expert Witnesses, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 58 (D. Sonkin ed., 1987).
18. See GOOLKASIAN, supra note 12, at 56.
19. See LISA LERMAN, PROSECUTION OF SPOUSE ABUSE: INNOVATION IN CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 13 (1981).
20. See GOOLKASIAN, supra note 12, at 68.
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a prosecutor should seek to discover in order to fully understand
the psychological study of an abused victim.
The inherent cycle of violence explains only some of the general
psychological dynamics that occur in abusive relationships. It does
not account for the many complexities surrounding each individual
case. The most important thing for prosecutors to keep in mind is
that all victims are not the same. While BWS and the cycle of vio-
lence are models that have provided a tremendous advance toward
helping professionals understand the plight of the battered woman,
they may have also contributed to creating a stereotype that many
professionals use as a cognitive heuristic to understand the victim.
Prosecutors sometimes presume that they know more then they do,
which limits their own instinct to continue investigating the situa-
tion. Many prosecutors working on domestic violence cases as-
sume that they already know the "how's and why's" of the victim's
behavior. This preconceived notion may be limiting their ability to
process the case in the most effective manner. There may be many
factors that the prosecutor is unaware of, which contribute to the
victim's resistance to cooperate with the prosecution of the case.
In order to gain a full understanding of the case, it is crucial that
prosecutors ask certain questions about the victim's history and
current situation.
It is also important to gain the best possible understanding of the
victim's psychological involvement in the relationship. Not all vic-
tims of domestic abuse suffer from BWS.2 1 Those that suffer from
BWS are more psychologically trapped in the abusive relationship
and less likely to engage in efforts that will help their situation.22
BWS victims are also more fearful of the perpetrator and suscepti-
ble to threats. There are certain factors that may indicate a victim's
psychological enmeshment in the relationship that prosecutors may
detect by asking a few simple questions.
Knowledge about the current relationship will be most useful in
understanding whether or not a victim will cooperate. 23 By the
time most cases of domestic abuse reach a prosecutor's desk, a his-
tory and pattern of abuse has been well established by the couple.
The prosecutor should attempt to assess the length of the relation-
21. See Douglas, supra note 14, at 40.
22. See id.
23. See Mary Asmus et al., Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth: Devel-
oping Effective Prosecution Strategies From Understanding the Dynamics of Abusive
Relationships, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 115, 129 (1991) (citing American Bar Association
Standards for Prosecution 3-1.1 (b) (1980)).
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ship, the extent of abuse and a pattern of coercive control. These
factors will provide the prosecutor with a greater understanding of
the victim's behavior and will help clarify the psychological obsta-
cles the victim must overcome in order to take the stand and testify
against her abuser. For example:
One woman's husband inserted a loaded pistol with one bullet
into her vagina and pulled the trigger four times -- for her it
only took one time to learn to respond to his slightest threat of
violence. There were bruises from his punches and kicks, but no
visible evidence of his near lethal behavior. In this case, an as-
tute observer need not require, evidence of multiple episodes of
physical abuse to understand the scope of his control over her
and her terror associated with it.24
Perpetrators in domestic violence cases control their victims
through fear and intimidation." Often, the fear of threats cause as
much psychological trauma as physical abuse, although in a court
of law, physical injuries may be given much more consideration
than psychological ones. Many victims are terrorized not only by
what they think will happen to them, but by what the perpetrator
threatens to do to their families and loved ones if they stand up to
the abuse.2 6 In one exemplary case, a woman was told by her bat-
terer that, if she testified against him, he would burn down her
mother's house.27 Because he was in custody, the victim agreed to
be cooperative. 28 However, without her knowledge, he was re-
leased on bail before the trial, and her mother's house burned to
the ground the next day. 9 The woman recanted her statements
and "disappeared" until after the trial was over because she felt she
could not expose her relatives to that kind of danger.30 After he
was released from jail, she returned to her relationship with him,
stating, "sometimes I feel safer when I live with him, because then
I know where he is. Otherwise I'm always afraid he'll show up
when I'm not expecting him."31
24. Id. at 44.
25. See BERRY, supra note 1, at 36.
26. See Lynne Rosewater, The Clinical and Courtroom Applications of Battered
Women's Personality Assessments (1987), in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL: PSY-
CHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 92 (D. Sonkin ed.,
1987).
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. Id.
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It is also important for prosecutors to realize that the fear of
harm does not end when a woman is separated from her batterer.
Statistically, a woman is at the greatest risk of severe injury or
death at the hands of the abuser within the first year after she de-
cides to leave the relationship.32 This danger arises because the
perpetrator is angry at the victim for questioning his authority and
seemingly no longer under his control. Leaving the relationship,
therefore, does not reduce or eliminate the danger she is in.33
Other factors that have been shown to increase a woman's sus-
ceptibility to psychological entrapment within a relationship in-
clude: 1) previous experiences with violence, such as child abuse or
witnessing the abuse of a parent; and 2) cultural attitudes.34 Vic-
tims that have been exposed to family violence prior to their cur-
rent relationships are less likely to see the violent behavior within
their relationship as deviant, and less likely to view the efforts of
the prosecutor and the criminal justice system as helpful.35
Also, a woman's cultural attitudes about her role in the relation-
ship may have a large impact on her willingness to cooperate.36 A
woman who holds the traditional idea that her primary responsibil-
ity in the relationship is to respect her male partner may value loy-
alty and commitment to him above her right not to be abused.37
External factors also play a role in whether a victim chooses to
cooperate. While prosecutors have little control over the psycho-
logical dynamics that trap a woman in a relationship, they may be
more able to assist the victim with environmental factors that pre-
vent her from wishing to press charges.
Many victims who wish to leave an abusive relationship, espe-
cially one that they have endured for many years, are faced with
the very real possibility that they will not be able to support them-
selves financially. It is not uncommon for a perpetrator to manipu-
late the situation to gain control of her financial assets, as well as
important papers like a victim's driver's license, passport, birth cer-
tificate and/or immigration papers, so that it is almost impossible
for her to get a job.38 Victims are often unaware of how to access
public aid, and would not qualify for such assistance if still married
to the abuser. Many victims have been socially isolated for years
32. See Allison & Martineau, supra note 6, at 11.
33. See id.
34. See Douglas, supra note 14, at 44.
35. See id. at 45.
36. See Allison & Martineau, supra note 6, at 11.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 9.
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and do not have the education or skills to secure employment in
the marketplace.39 These victims feel completely dependent on the
abuser and are terrified of what will happen if the perpetrator goes
to jail. The average sentence for a first time domestic abuser pros-
ecuted on a misdemeanor charge is no more than thirty days,4 °
which is just long enough for him to lose his job, but not long
enough for him to get over his anger towards the victim. Many
women are more willing to endure physical abuse rather than face
the prospect of having to support themselves and a family with lit-
tle or no resources. 4 1
While having children at home raises an economic concern, there
are other considerations surrounding children that pressure a wo-
man to stay in an abusive relationship. Often victims fear that they
will not receive custody of their children if they leave their rela-
tionship.42 The woman may also be afraid that if she leaves with-
out the children, the husband may turn his abuse against them.4 3
In some states, a report is made to the Department of Child Serv-
ices when children are reported to be present during an incident of
domestic violence, and women fear the state will take custody of
their children.44
Social or religious pressure may also be a factor contributing to a
victim's reluctance to testify.45 A family's cultural beliefs can be
stronger than the victim's own, and if a victim's family strongly be-
lieves in supporting one's spouse and working out one's "prob-
lems," it can place incredible pressure on the victim to stay in the
relationship. The pressures arises because divorce or separation vi-
olates a number of religious creeds that may exert a powerful influ-
ence over the victim. 46
B. Prosecutors Should Utilize Adversarial Strategies
The prosecutor should keep in mind that the primary goal of
prosecution in a domestic abuse case is to protect the victim from
additional acts of violence committed by the defendant. According
to the American Bar Association Standards for Prosecutors, "The
prosecutor is both an administrator of justice and advocate. The
39. See id. at 10.
40. See BERRY, supra note 1, at 143.
41. See Allison & Martineau, supra note 6, at 10.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 11.
46. See id.
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prosecutor must exercise sound discretion in the performance of
his or her functions. The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice,
not merely to convict."47 Domestic abuse cases present problems
for prosecutors that make it difficult to balance the administration
of justice and advocacy. Because of the fact that, unlike other
crime victims, domestic abuse victims often remain in imminent
danger of serious physical harm from the perpetrator, 48 victim
safety must be the foremost concern. This issue requires prosecu-
tors to be sensitive to utilizing the options they have within their
power to guide the victim through the criminal justice system in a
way that will expose them to the least possible threat of harm. Ad-
ditionally, prosecutors must recognize the limits of the system's
ability to protect the victim.
After the abusing spouse has been arrested, the victim is usually
encouraged to obtain a protective order from the court. While
such a judicial decree makes it unlawful for a defendant to go
within a certain distance of a victim, and provides additional mate-
rial to aid the prosecution if the order is violated, it does not guar-
antee a victim's safety.49 Serving a defendant with a restraining
order may fuel his anger with the victim. A protective order can-
not prevent another attack, it can only address the incident after
the fact. A prosecutor whose primary concern is the victim's safety
should therefore warn the victim about the limitations of the order
and evaluate the circumstances of each individual case to deter-
mine whether a protective order is necessary and appropriate.
It has been demonstrated in jurisdictions where there are "no-
drop" policies,50 that proceeding with prosecution, despite the vic-
tim's initial unwillingness to cooperate, is beneficial to the victim
psychologically and may increase her helpfulness later in the case.
When the victim takes an active role in the prosecution of the of-
fender, it can result in feelings of empowerment for her that can
alter the balance of power in the battering relationship and lower
rates of future violence. 51 By taking control of the criminal pro-
cess, the prosecutor sends a clear message that the batterer cannot
use control over the victim to avoid criminal sanctions.52 Whether
47. See Asmus, supra note 23, at 134 (quoting the ABA Standards).
48. See Allison & Martineau, supra note 6, at 11.
49. See id.
50. See MILs, supra note 9, at 307 (stating that mandatory prosecution requires
government attorneys to bring charges against batterers whether or not the victim
desires prosecution).
51. See Simon, supra note 13, at 69.
52. See id. at 53.
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the victim is testifying of her own accord or because of mandatory
prosecution laws, it is important for prosecutor's to always send a
subpoena in order to protect the victim from pressure of the abuser
or other parties who do not want the victim to participate in the
case as a witness. This will diffuse the anger of the batterer to-
wards the victim and will reduce the likelihood of continued
threats. 3
Because violence in intimate relationships occurs in cycles and
stages, it is important to prosecute a domestic abuse case in a
timely manner, avoiding as many continuances as possible. 4 Expe-
dient prosecution will increase the likelihood of conviction and de-
crease the abuser's opportunity to pressure the victim and/or
engage in violent acts against the victim. It is also beneficial for
prosecutors to keep the time period it takes to complete the case as
short as possible if they wish to increase their chance of getting the
victim to cooperate. The time frame in which the victim is most
likely to be receptive to help and desirous of prosecution is shortly
after an acute battering incident. This is known as the window of
opportunity in the cycle of violence.5 6 The longer the case contin-
ues, the more likely she is to minimize the battering incident and
return to the relationship.
The way the prosecutor treats a victim will also have a large im-
pact on the victim's desire to cooperate. The relationship between
a prosecutor and a victim often parallels that of the batterer and
the victim. 57 If prosecutors are controlling and behave as if they
know what is best for the victim, it is likely to elicit undesirable
responses. The rage that is felt towards the batterer may be di-
rected towards the prosecutor through negative transference, as
the prosecutor is seen as a safe object that cannot physically harm
the victim. 58 This may encourage the prosecutor to engage in a
power struggle with the victim, which will only be frustrating and
unproductive for both parties. Intimidation tactics, such as warn-
ing victims that filing a false report is a crime for which they will be
prosecuted, or using statements such as, "You were either lying
then or you are lying now," to get a victim to admit that she is
recanting, are also not recommended. Such statements presume
53. See Asmus, supra note 23, at 116.
54. See id. at 115.
55. See Simon, supra note 13, at 69
56. See WALKER, supra note 3, at 37
57. See Douglas, supra note 14, at 52.
58. See NANCY MCWILLIAMS, PSYCHOANALYTIC DIAGNOSIS: UNDERSTANDING
PERSONALITY STRUCTURE IN THE CLINICAL PROCESS 32 (1994).
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that the victim has a certain element of self-preservation that does
not exist in a woman who is actively engaged in the intense dynam-
ics of an abusive relationship. A sincere, empathetic, though
straightforward, matter-of-fact attitude is usually the best
approach.
CONCLUSION
Domestic violence cases provide unique challenges to prosecu-
tors because of the intimate relationship that exists between victim
and batterer. These cases can be fraught with evidentiary problems
as a result of a victim's refusal to cooperate with the prosecution.
While theoretical constructs, such as the cycle of violence and
BWS, begin to explain the psychological reasons behind why some
women do not cooperate, prosecutors should be aware that there
are things they can do to increase a victim's desire and ability to
cooperate with the case. An effort should be made to understand a
victim's individual experience both internally and externally. By
doing this, prosecutors can ensure that they are not making as-
sumptions about the case based on stereotyped information, and
are not overlooking circumstances that could be easily amended to
gain a victim's cooperation. Victims should be educated about the
process and should be assured that prosecutors will make every
effort to employ strategies that will minimize the victim's exposure
to harm. Understanding the fundamental dynamics of an abusive
domestic relationships is a beginning, but in order to use this infor-
mation to aid in prosecution and advocate on behalf of the victim,
a concerted effort must be made to overcome the unique obstacles
presented by these relationships.
2000]
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GENDER DIFFERENCE IN PERCEIVING
VIOLENCE AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR THE
VAWA'S CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDY
Renge L. Jarusinsky*
INTRODUCTION
What is violence? A typical dictionary definition of violence de-
fines it as "swift and intense force," "rough or injurious physical
force, action, or treatment," and "an unjust or unwarranted exer-
tion of force or power."1 A legal dictionary defines violence as
"[u]njust or unwarranted exercise of force" and "the exertion of
any physical force so as to injure, damage or abuse."'2 Interest-
ingly, studies show that men and women perceive violence differ-
ently, with women perceiving more acts as violent.' The results of
these studies call into question the accuracy of these definitions
and beg the question: What is violence in the context of violence
against women?
In accordance with the results of the studies described above,
social scientists who study violence against women have expanded
the definition of violence when perpetrated against women to in-
clude not only physical acts, but also "visual, verbal, or sexual acts
that are experienced by a [female] as a threat, invasion, or assault
and that have the effect of hurting her or degrading her ... ." The
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2000; B.A., cum laude,
Political Science, Purchase College, State University of New York, 1995. The author
thanks Professor Katherine Franke for her guidance and suggestions on this Note,
Ellen Gesmer for providing the opportunity to research the Violence Against Women
Act's civil rights remedy, which was the inspiration for writing this Note, and her
family and friends for their support.
1. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1585 (2d ed. 1984).
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1570 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted). The legal
dictionary also notes that, in some contexts, violence can be more than a physical act;
it may also include "false statements ... and veiled threats by words or acts." Id.
3. See infra Part I.A.2.
4. MARY P. Koss ET AL., No SAFE HAVEN: MALE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
AT HOME, AT WORK, AND IN THE COMMUNITY XVi (1994); see also Rebecca Emerson
Dobash & Russell P. Dobash, Cross-Border Encounters, in RETHINKING VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 4 (R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P. Dobash eds., 1998) (defining
violence against women as "verbal abuse, intimidation, physical harassment, homi-
cide, sexual assault, and rape"); Introduction to UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 9-11 (Nancy A. Crowell & Ann W. Burgess eds., 1996). Supporters of
broader definitions argue that such definitions more accurately represent victims' ex-
periences. See id. at 10.
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differences between men's and women's perceptions of violence
contribute to the confusion surrounding violence against women.
For example, is an act that does not include physical force violent
or is an unwanted sexual touching unaccompanied by a slap or a
punch violent?
Courts are often faced with these types of questions when deter-
mining what constitutes violence in cases brought under the Vio-
lence Against Women Act of 1994 ("VAWA"). Under the VAWA,
victims are afforded a civil rights cause of action ("civil rights rem-
edy") 5 that allows a woman to sue the perpetrator in federal court
for money damages and injunctive and declaratory relief.6 The
VAWA's civil rights remedy has two requirements: 1) that the
plaintiff be a victim of a "crime of violence;" and 2) that the "crime
of violence" be motivated by the victim's gender.7
The first requirement, a "crime of violence," is defined in the
VAWA's civil rights remedy as an act that 1) constitutes a felony
under criminal law ("predicate offense"); 8 and 2) comports with 18
U.S.C. § 16 ("section 16").9 Section 16, a definition that was origi-
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). The VAWA is part of the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. See Pub. L. No. 103-322; 108 Stat. 1941 (1994).
The VAWA itself contains several provisions, one of which is the civil rights remedy.
See id. Before and since its passage, the VAWA's civil rights remedy has been at-
tacked on constitutional grounds. Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to decide whether the VAWA's civil rights remedy is constitutional. See
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996),
affd en banc, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c). While the VAWA's civil rights remedy is gender-
neutral, this Note will address male violence against women. Also, the statute explic-
itly states that a VAWA civil rights claim may be brought in either federal or state
court. See id. § 13981(e)(3). The vast majority of VAWA civil rights cases, however,
have been brought in federal court, such as the cases discussed herein. See cases dis-
cussed infra Part I.B. In addition, the legislative history of the VAWA's civil rights
remedy suggests that "legislators contemplated federal courts as the primary forum
for determination of VAWA civil rights claims." Julie Goldscheid and Susan Kraham,
Litigating Violence Against Women Act Civil Rights Claims: Procedural Concerns, in
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 11-1 (David Frazee et al. eds., 1998).
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c). The "motivated by gender" requirement raises a
host of complex issues that will not be addressed in this Note. For analyses of the
"motivated by gender" requirement, see Kuhn v. Kuhn, No. 98-C2398, 1998 WL
673629, at *4-7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 1998); Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531, 540-41
(N.D. I11. 1997); Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 783-85; see also Jennifer Gaffney, Note,
Amending the Violence Against Women Act: Creating a Rebuttable Presumption of
Gender Animus in Rape Cases, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 247 (1997).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d). The statute allows for the predicate offense pleaded
by the plaintiff to be either a federal or state criminal felony, and the statute does not
require that the defendant had criminal proceedings brought against him under these
predicate offenses. See id.
9. See id.
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nally used in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,1" defines a "crime
of violence" as:
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or property
of another, or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature,
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person
or property of another may be used in the course of committing
the offense."
In some VAWA civil rights cases, plaintiffs have alleged predi-
cate offenses that do not contain an element that requires "the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force," pursuant to
section 16(a). 12 In such cases, courts must determine whether the
predicate offense is one that involves a "substantial risk [of] physi-
cal force," pursuant to section 16(b). 3 In the absence of statutory
guidance, courts have developed various and often inconsistent ap-
proaches to determine what constitutes a substantial risk of physi-
cal force to women alleging civil rights violations pursuant to the
VAWA.14
This Note focuses on what acts pose a substantial risk of physical
force to women for purposes of the VAWA's civil rights remedy.
Specifically, this Note addresses the interpretation of section 16(b)
in VAWA civil rights cases. Part I provides a general history and
background of the VAWA's civil rights remedy. First, Part I details
the evolution of the "crime of violence" requirement, and second
presents the congressional intent behind the civil rights remedy.
Part I also provides case illustrations of how federal courts have
interpreted section 16(b) in VAWA civil rights cases. Part II dis-
cusses traditional understandings of violence against women in the
law and presents social science data showing perceptual differences
of violence between men and women to provide a contemporary
understanding of violence against women. Part II then discusses
the different legal approaches utilized by federal courts to interpret
section 16(b), which often echo the difference between the tradi-
tional and contemporary notions of violence against women. Part
III argues that utilizing traditional notions of violence against wo-
men to interpret section 16(b) rids the VAWA's civil rights remedy
10. See discussion infra Part II.B.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 16 (1998) (emphasis added).
12. See cases discussed infra Part I.B.
13. See id.
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981; cases discussed infra Part I.B.
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of any positive effect. Part III proposes that courts employ a
broad, uniform approach to determine what acts pose a substantial
risk of physical force. This Note concludes that utilizing such an
approach would make the VAWA's civil rights remedy the power-
ful tool for which it was created - a tool to benefit both women
and society.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE VAWA's
CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDY
A. Legislative History15
1. The Evolution of the "Crime of Violence" Language
On June 19, 1990, Senator Joseph Biden introduced the first ver-
sion of the VAWA in the Senate.16 Senate Bill 2754 included a civil
rights cause of action under Title III, which provided that "[a]ny
person... who deprives another of the rights, privileges or immu-
nities secured by the Constitution and laws as enumerated in sub-
section (b) ... shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for
the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages.' 1 7 Subsec-
tion (b) enumerated the rights referred to above as freedom from
"crimes of violence motivated by the victim's gender." 8 This sub-
stantive right was defined as freedom from "any crime of violence
... including rape, sexual assault, or abusive contact, motivated by
gender. '"19
On October 4, 1990, Senator Biden introduced a substitute bill
of the VAWA at an executive committee meeting of the Judiciary
Committee (the "Committee"). 2 0 This version included significant
changes from the prior bill,21 increasing coverage from only sex
crimes to all crimes of violence motivated by gender.22 After the
Department of Justice complained about the vagueness of what
15. For a comprehensive review of the legislative history of the VAWA's civil
rights remedy, see Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality
Meet: The Violence Against Women Act's Civil Rights Remedy, 11 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J.
1 (1996).
16. See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 29 (1990); S. 2754, 101st Cong. § 301 (1990) (as
introduced).
17. S. 2754, 101st Cong. § 301(c) (as introduced). The language of the civil rights
cause of action in this version was akin to the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but with-
out "an under color of state law" requirement. See Nourse, supra note 15, at 8.
18. S. 2754, 101st Cong. § 301(b) (as introduced).
19. Id. § 301(d).
20. See id. § 301(d) (substitute bill), reprinted in S. REP. No. 101-545, at 43.
21. See id.
22. Compare S. 2754 § 301(d) (as introduced), with S. 2754 § 301(d) (substitute
bill); see also Nourse, supra note 15, at 12.
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acts of violence would be covered, however, the Committee incor-
porated a reference to section 16, which was the federal criminal
code's primary definition of "crime of violence. ' 23 Later that day,
the substitute bill, which incorporated the federal definition, was
adopted by voice vote in the Committee.24
Against strong opposition, Senator Biden re-introduced the
VAWA as Senate Bill 15 on January 14, 1991.25 In response to con-
cerns about the wide range of acts that would be covered under the
civil rights remedy,26 Senator Biden attempted to clarify the "crime
of violence" requirement in this bill.27 By adding reference to sec-
tion 16, the major issue in the "crime of violence" analysis is
whether the defendant's alleged acts can be associated with a crim-
inal offense.28 Senate Bill 15 also contained language stating that a
plaintiff need not file criminal charges nor show a criminal convic-
tion in order to prove that the defendant's acts amounted to a
"crime of violence" under the VAWA's civil rights remedy.29 The
addition of this language was intended to emphasize that a VAWA
civil proceeding was to be governed by civil law, rather than crimi-
nal law.3°
During the term of the 103rd Congress, the VAWA gained con-
siderable support in the House and the Senate.31 Supporters were
23. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra Part II.B.
24. See Nourse, supra note 15, at 12-13.
25. See id. at 13; S. 15, 102d Cong. § 301 (1991). Shortly thereafter, Congress-
woman Barbara Boxer sponsored a companion bill in the House. See Nourse, supra
note 15, at 13.
26. See Nourse, supra note 15, at 13. Opposition came from both state and federal
judges over the fear that cases brought pursuant to the VAWA's civil rights remedy
would "flood the federal courts." See id. Chief Justice Rehnquist publicly stated that
the VAWA's "definition of a new crime is so open-ended, and the new private right of
action so sweeping, that the legislation could involve the federal courts in a whole
host of domestic relations disputes." 138 CONG. REC. 583 (1992) (statement of Chief
Justice William Rehnquist). The ACLU shared the concerns of the Chief.Justice. See
Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender. Hearing on S. 15 Before the Subcomm. on
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary House of Representa-
tives, 103d Cong. 20 (1993) [hereinafter Crimes of Violence Hearing]. In response,
Sally Goldfarb pointed out the "sexism" behind the floodgates argument, noting that
the introduction of civil rights causes of action in other legislation, such as the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, only met opposition from staunch civil rights opponents,
and not from the federal judiciary. See id. at 12 (statement of Sally Goldfarb, Senior
Staff Attorney, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund ("NOWLDEF")).
27. See Nourse, supra note 15, at 14,
28. See id. at 16.
29. See S. 15 § 301(d). fThis language was added to prevent a mini-criminal trial
within a civil-case. See Nourse, supra note 15, at 15.
30. See Nourse, supra note 15, at 14.
31. See id. at 27.
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concerned, however, that the VAWA would be stalled if brought to
the Senate floor for debate and "would become a vehicle for unre-
lated, and extremely controversial, crime amendments such as the
federal death penalty, habeas corpus reform, or gun control legisla-
tion."3 As a result, Senators Biden and Hatch decided to negoti-
ate a bipartisan compromise bill that would deter "hostile floor
amendments. 33
The Biden/Hatch compromise, embodied in Senate Bill 11, made
several changes to the "crime of violence" requirement. 4 Prior
versions of the civil rights remedy contained a reference only to
section 16(a), which covers acts classified as either misdemeanors
or felonies.35 Senate Bill 11 now contained new language limiting
the VAWA's civil rights remedy only to offenses serious enough to
warrant classification as felonies.36 Also, the predicate offense had
to include a risk of personal injury.37
In addition to these limitations, the drafters added language
broadening the "crime of violence" definition to include "acts that
would constitute a felony ... but for the relationship between the
person who takes such action and the individual against whom such
action is taken. ' 38 The purpose of this language was to provide
coverage to victims of relationship-based crimes because the draft-
ers recognized that many states "downgrade" crimes committed by
and against parties in a relationship, such as domestic violence and
acquaintance rape.39 This new language required that the alleged
act be determined by the seriousness of the offense and not by the
relationship between the victim and the perpetrator.40 The addi-
tion of this language embodied one of the substantive goals of the
VAWA - that state and local applications of the term "felony" not
govern the civil rights remedy. 41
The limits on the "crime of violence" requirement were suffi-
cient to garner majority support for the VAWA in the House and
32. Id.; see also S. 11, 103d Cong. § 301 (1993).
33. Nourse, supra note 15, at 27.
34. See id. at 27-29.
35. See id. at 28; see also supra note 11 and accompanying text.
36. See S. 11 § 301(d)(2)(A); see also Nourse, supra note 15, at 28.
37. See S. 11 § 301(d)(2)(A).
38. Id. § 301(d)(1)(A).
39. See Nourse, supra note 15, at 28-29. Crime "downgrading" occurs when a
crime is committed by a party in a relationship against the other party, and the act is
prosecuted as a misdemeanor even though the same crime committed against a stran-
ger would be classified as a felony. See id.
40. See Nourse, supra note 15, at 28.
41. See id.
WHAT IS VIOLENCE?
Senate.42 On September 13, 1994, President Clinton signed the
VAWA into law.43 Consistent with Senate Bill 11, the VAWA's civil
rights remedy does not reach all injurious actions motivated by
gender. Rather, in its final form, the statute defines "crimes of vio-
lence" as:
act[s] or series of acts that would constitute a felony against the
person or that would constitute a felony against property if the
conduct presents a serious risk of physical injury to another, and
that would come within the meaning of State or Federal offenses
described in section 16 of Title 18, United States Code, whether
or not those acts have actually resulted in criminal charges, pros-
ecution, or conviction .... 44
2. Congressional Intent
In his opening remarks at the first "Women and Violence" hear-
ing before the Committee in October 1990, Senator Biden stated
that "no matter how much we say we have changed as a society,
there is something terribly wrong when, over the last 15 years, vio-
lence against young men in America has dropped by 12 percent,
while violence against young women in America has increased [by]
50 percent. '45 In recognition of society's pervasive "violent sex-
ism," Senator Biden stated that his overarching intention in creat-
ing the VAWA's civil rights remedy was "to change the Nation's
attitude. '46
Along with this ambitious goal, Senator Biden and the drafters
identified at least three additional goals of the VAWA's civil rights
remedy. First, the VAWA's civil rights remedy was intended to rec-
ognize gender-based violence as discrimination and a violation of
an individual's civil rights.47 Congress cited a tradition of fighting
42. See id. at 36.
43. See id.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(2)(A) (emphasis added). The final form also retains the
requirement that the alleged act be determined by the seriousness of the offense and
not by the relationship between the victim and the perpetrator. See id.
§ 13981(d)(2)(B) (stating that a crime of violence "includes an act or series of acts
that would constitute a felony described in subparagraph (A) but for the relationship
between the person who takes such action and the individual against whom such ac-
tion is taken").
45. Women and Violence: Hearing on S. 2754 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
101st Cong. 2 (1990) (statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.) [hereinafter Women
and Violence Hearing 1].
46. Id.
47. See id. at 2-5; see also Symposium, The Violence Against Women Act of 1994:
A Promise Waiting to be Fulfilled, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 427, 430-31 (1996) ("The premise of
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race-based and religion-based violence with civil rights laws and
noted the 1986 U.S. Supreme Court holding that gender-based vio-
lence may constitute discrimination as support for creating the civil
rights remedy.48 Furthermore, Congress recognized the devastat-
ing effects that gender-based violence has on society and the econ-
omy. 49  Congress also noticed that existing civil rights laws
provided protection for gender-based discrimination only in the
workplace.5" Thus, Congress sought to fill the gender gap in cur-
rent civil rights laws and to spearhead a "national commitment" to
fight discriminatory gender-based violence.5 '
Another goal of the VAWA's civil rights remedy was to
supercede discriminatory state criminal and civil laws and to pro-
vide a civil forum for women who might otherwise be barred from
legal redress.52 In the criminal context, for example, Congress
noted that states often "downgrade" 53 rape in marriage, and until
quite recently, many states did not even consider marital rape a
the [VAWA] is that gender-based violence has a systematic impact on women's
equality.").
48. See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 40-42 (referring to the Court's holding in Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)). The VAWA's civil rights remedy "makes
explicit what the Court has already held: that an assault against a woman simply
because she is a woman is no different than an assault against a black person because
that person is black." Id. at 42-43.
49. See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 32-33. Regarding the economic and societal costs
of violence against women, Congress noted that
It is not a simple matter of adding up medical costs, or law enforcement
costs, but of adding up all those expenses plus the costs of lost careers, de-
creased productivity, foregone educational opportunities, and long-term
health problems. Partial estimates show that violent crime against women
costs this country at least 3 billion ... dollars a year .... [Glender-based
crimes and women's fears of those crimes. . restrict the enjoyment of feder-
ally protected rights like the right to employment, the right to public accom-
modations, and the right to travel.... Gender-based crimes violate our most
fundamental notions of equality-that no person's physical security should
be at risk because of an immutable trait, because of race, religion, or gender.
Id. at 33, 43.
50. See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 40-42; see also Andrea Brenneke, Civil Rights for
Battered Women: Axiomatic and Ignored, 11 LAW & INEQ. J. 1, 44-53 (1992). Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides a civil rights remedy to victims of sex-based
discrimination only in the workplace. See id. at 50-52; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). The
VAWA's civil rights remedy aims to attack sex-based violence outside of the work-
place, such as violence that occurs in the home and on the streets. See S. REP. No.
101-545, at 40.
51. S. REP. No. 101-545, at 41.
52. See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 43-48 (1992).
53. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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crime.54 Although marital rape is now a crime in all fifty states,
thirty-three states still only allow prosecutions under limited cir-
cumstances, i.e., where there is evidence of physical injury or under
other restrictions. Furthermore, Congress recognized that many
states also "downgrade" rape and assault between unmarried ac-
quaintances.56 In the civil context, for example, Congress noted
that many states still enforce interspousal immunity doctrines,
which often bar women from suing their abusive husbands in civil
court for money damages.57
A third goal of the VAWA's civil rights remedy was to avoid spe-
cific discriminatory practices at the state criminal level, often
termed the "double victimization" problem, by providing access to
federal court.5 8 "Double victimization" refers to the harm that a
victim sustains first by her attacker and second by the criminal jus-
tice system, a system that often falls short of ensuring justice for
her.59 While many states have passed law reforms to address this
issue, these efforts have failed to eradicate gender bias from affect-
ing criminal proceedings in those states.60 Because federal court is
considered to be less biased than state court, allowing VAWA civil
54. See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 45; see also UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN, supra note 4, at 127 ("For most of Western history, marital rape was not
considered a crime. Its recognition as a crime today is by no means universal and
remains controversial, despite evidence that rape within marriage is often repeated
and extremely brutal.").
55. See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 45 n.50 (citations omitted); Women and Violence
Hearing I, supra note 45, at 64 (statement of NOWLDEF by Helen R. Neuborne and
Sally Goldfarb); RAQUEL KENNEDY BERGEN, WIFE RAPE 4, 150 (1996). In many
states, a husband is exempt from prosecution for marital rape when his wife is legally
unable to consent (i.e., mentally or physically impaired, unconscious or asleep). See
BERGEN, supra, at 150.
56. See Women and Violence, Part 2: Hearing on S. 2754 Before the Senate Judici-
ary Comm., 101st Cong. 2 (1990) (intending to "debunk the myth" that acquaintance
rape is not as violent as stranger rape) [hereinafter Women and Violence Hearing II];
see also BERGEN, supra note 55, at 150-51.
57. See Women and Violence Hearing I, supra note 45, at 64 (1990) (statement of
NOWLDEF by Helen R. Neuborne and Sally Goldfarb).
58. See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 33-41; S. REP. No. 102-197, at 39.
59. See id. at 40-41.
[W]hen the assault is gender-motivated and it takes place in the home or is
sexual in nature, the criminal justice system, in many instances, has not rec-
ognized the crime or has refused to believe its victims .... Despite much
reform, witnesses explained to the committee that vestiges of this legal dis-
crimination remain.
Id.; see also Women and Violence Hearing I, supra note 45, at 29-33 (testimony of
Maria Hanson); ELIZABETH A. STANKO, INTIMATE INTRUSIONS: WOMEN'S EXPERI-
ENCE OF MALE VIOLENCE 83-102 (1985).
60. See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 41; S. REP. No. 102-197, at 45-46. Studies indicate
that gender bias affects not only juries, but also judges, prosecutors and court employ-
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rights plaintiffs to sue in federal court is an important facet of the
civil rights remedy aimed at avoiding the "double victimization"
problem.6 Indeed, Senator Biden described the federal judicial
system as the "best court system in the world, with the most edu-
cated judges ... and with a set of rules and regulations and a de-
gree of sensitivity that is uniform."62
ees. See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 41; S. REP. No. 102-197, at 46-48. NOWLDEF re-
ported that:
Instead of focusing on why men batter and what can be done to stop them,
many judges and court personnel ask battered women what they did to pro-
voke the violence. Several state task forces have cited judges who disbelieve
female petitioners Unless there is visible evidence of severe physical injury,
trivialize domestic violence complaints by their demeaning and sexist com-
ments ...and tell the victim seeking relief in criminal court that this is
merely a domestic problem that belongs in family court. The New York task
force found that in some communities judges shunt victims back and forth
between police and family court until they give up seeking protection.
Women and Violence Hearing I, supra note 45, at 65 (statement of NOWLDEF by
Helen R. Neuborne and Sally Goldfarb). A rape survivor testified that the police
accused her of fabricating her story, even though she had knife wounds and her un-
derwear was missing; they asked her probing questions about her sexual past and
forced her to take a lie detector test. See Women and Violence Hearing H, supra note
56, at 23 (testimony of Christine Shunk).
61. See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 41; see also Women and Violence Hearing I, supra
note 45, at 68 (statement of NOWLDEF by Helen R. Neuborne and Sally Goldfarb).
Congress noted that federal judges are insulated from the political pressures that state
and local judges face and they have more control of the jury selection process because
they can "screen out jurors who harbor irrational prejudices" against women victims.
See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 42. Congress also intended to give female victims of gen-
der-motivated violence control over their own civil actions. See id. During her testi-
mony before the Committee, one rape victim expressed frustration with the criminal
justice system because she did not have "the benefit of an advocate who could have
spoken to [her about] the [criminal justice] system, and spoken to the system on [her]
behalf." Women and Violence Hearing I, supra note 45, at 26 (statement of Nancy
Ziegenmeyer). Also, in a civil trial, the plaintiff may compel the defendant's testi-
mony, whereas in a criminal trial, the defendant is afforded constitutional protections
that shield him from testifying, should he so choose. See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 42.
Lastly, in a civil action, the plaintiff's evidentiary burden is to prove the defendant's
actions by a preponderance of the evidence, which is a lower standard than the crimi-
nal standard of proving a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. Con-
gress also noted that the VAWA's civil rights remedy provides for monetary damages,
as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c). Some may
question whether monetary damages are collectible against most private defendants.
Because violence against women cuts across all socioeconomic levels in the United
States, however, not all defendants lack resources to pay damages. See Crimes of
Violence Hearing, supra note 26, at 8 (statement NOWLDEF by Sally Goldfarb)
("For some victims, even a damages judgment that cannot be collected (or a [declara-
tory judgment] or injuncti[on]) will be seen as an immensely valuable vindication of
their rights.").
62. Women and Violence Hearing I, supra note 45, at 2 (statement of Senator Jo-
seph R. Biden, Jr.).
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As explained above, the VAWA's civil rights remedy was in-
tended to fill "the gender gap in current civil rights laws," and to
avoid discriminatory state laws and practices.63 Equally important
as these intentions is how courts interpret the VAWA's civil rights
remedy in actual cases.64 Part B provides three examples of how
courts have interpreted section 16(b) in VAWA civil rights cases.
B. Current Interpretations of Section 16(b) - Case Illustrations
Without clear enumeration of what constitutes a substantial risk
of physical force pursuant to section 16(b) in VAWA civil rights
cases, federal district courts have employed different modes of
analysis to interpret section 16(b), often with disparate impact.
1. McCann v. Rosquist 65
Melanie McCann, Noele Nelson and Lisa Nielson were employ-
ees of Bryon Rosquist, a chiropractor.66 Without their consent,
Rosquist sexually assaulted67 each of them by fondling them re-
peatedly and rubbing his genitals against their bodies.68 McCann,
Nelson and Nielson filed a joint lawsuit in federal court against
63. David Frazee, An Imperfect Remedy for Imperfect Violence: The Construction
of Civil Rights in the Violence Against Women Act, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 163, 165
(1993).
64. See id.
65. 998 F. Supp. 1246 (D. Utah 1998), rev'd, 185 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir. 1999).
Throughout this Note, the district court's opinion in McCann v. Rosquist will be
referred to as "McCann I", whereas the Tenth Circuit's opinion will be referred to as
"McCann II."
66. See McCann I, 998 F. Supp. at 1247.
67. The term "sexual assault" throughout this Note refers to any nonconsensual
touching of or contact with the breasts, genitals or buttocks of another.
68. See McCann I, 998 F. Supp. at 1248. Each of the three plaintiffs made similar
allegations against Rosquist. Melanie McCann alleged that Rosquist touched her
"breasts, hips, buttocks, thighs, crotch, and pubic bone - sometimes clothed and
sometimes not - on numerous occasions .... ." Brief for Appellant at 2, McCann v.
Rosquist, 185 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir. 1998) (No. 98-4049). Specifically, McCann alleged
that Rosquist
unzip[ped] [McCann's] wet suit at a company water skiing party to expose
[her] breasts, pull[ed] out the elastic waist band on McCann's stretch pants
to look down her pants, rubb[ed] his genitals along McCann's body while
'adjusting' her, ma[de] lewd and suggestive comments, talk[ed] constantly
about sex, fondl[ed] her unclothed pubic area while 'adjusting' her, and
pull[ed] McCann's pants down while 'adjusting' her so that he could fondle
her buttocks.
Id. at 3. Noele Nelson alleged that Rosquist "repeatedly patted and fondled [her]
buttocks, thighs, and shoulders [and] ... once rubbed his penis back and forth along
[her] leg [while] adjusting her." Id. Lisa Nielson alleged that Rosquist "touched [her]
breasts" clothed and unclothed. Id. He also "fondled Nielson's hips, thighs, and but-
tocks, and rub[bed] his hand up Nielson's leg near her crotch." Id.
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Rosquist alleging civil rights violations pursuant to the VAWA's
civil rights remedy.69
The district court found that while Rosquist's acts were "offen-
sive and repulsive," those acts were not "crimes of violence" under
the VAWA's civil rights remedy.70 The court found that the alleged
acts fell within the purview of the predicate offense pleaded by the
plaintiffs.71 Nonetheless, the court determined that the acts were
not of the violent nature required to state a VAWA cause of action
because such acts do not constitute criminal offenses that, by their
nature, involve a substantial risk of physical force as required by
section 16(b).72 Moreover, the court stated that "the time, place,
[and] manner.., alleged are not such that the situation could esca-
late into one where there would be a substantial risk that physical
force would be used. ' 73  Thus, the district court dismissed the
plaintiffs' case. 4
2. Palazzolo v. Ruggiano75
Donna Palazzolo was a regular patient of Dr. Ruggiano, a psy-
chiatrist, between 1992 and 1995.76 During counseling sessions,
Ruggiano allegedly sexually assaulted Palazzolo on three separate
occasions. 77 On one occasion, while Ruggiano was reviewing Pal-
azzolo's file, he "asked her if there was anything in the file indicat-
ing that she did not need a kiss and a hug."' 78 Palazzolo responded
"No," yet Ruggiano proceeded to put his arms around her shoul-
ders and "pressed his genital area against hers. '79 Palazzolo filed
69. See McCann I, 998 F. Supp. at 1247.
70. Id. at 1252.
71. See id. at 1251-52.
72. See id. at 1252.
73. Id. The court further stated that "[aIll of the acts alleged appear to have oc-
curred at work or at social activities under circumstances that would have greatly
discouraged any escalation of contact of the type of violent conduct required within
the meaning of section 16(b) and [the VAWA]." Id.
74. See id. On appeal, however, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's
dismissal, holding that the predicate offense alleged does involve a substantial risk of
physical force pursuant to section 16(b). See McCann II, 185 F.3d 1113, 1121 (10th
Cir. 1998). For discussion of the Tenth Circuit's analysis, see infra Part II.B.1.
75. 993 F. Supp. 45 (D.R.I. 1998).
76. See id. at 46.
77. See id. On the first occasion, Ruggiano placed his arms around Palazzolo's
body while she was being weighed. See id. On the second occasion, Ruggiano
"placed [his] hand on [Palazzolo's] shoulder and pressed his genitals against her but-
tocks." Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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suit in federal court alleging that Ruggiano's acts violated her civil
rights pursuant to the VAWA's civil rights remedy.80
The district court determined that Ruggiano's acts did not
amount to "crimes of violence."' 81 Palazzolo relied on the state law
criminal felony of second degree sexual assault as her predicate
offense.8 2 The court stated that Palazzolo did not allege that Rug-
giano used force or coercion, an element of the predicate offense
she alleged.83 Further, the court found that Ruggiano did not use
force or coercion during any of the three incidents because Palaz-
zolo did not manifest a lack of consent.8 4 The court also found that
the section of the predicate offense alleged by Palazzolo that refers
to engaging in medical treatment of the victim for the purpose of
sexual arousal does not pose a substantial risk of physical harm.85
Thus, according to the district court, Ruggiano's actions did not
pose the substantial risk of physical force required by the civil
rights remedy.86 Accordingly, Palazzolo's case was dismissed. 87
80. See id.
81. See id. at 47-49.
82. See id. at 47. This statute states, in pertinent part, that "[a] person is guilty of a
second degree sexual assault if he or she engages in sexual contact with another per-
son and if... [t]he accused uses force or coercion" or "[t]he accused engages in the
medical treatment or examination of the victim for the purpose of sexual arousal,
gratification or stimulation." R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-37-4 (2) & (3) (1998).
83. See Palazzolo, 993 F. Supp. at 48. Rhode Island law requires that the force or
coercion used by the accused in committing second degree sexual assault must "over-
come the victim" and "must be something more than the sexual contact itself." Id.
(citations omitted). "Force that 'overcomes' the victim" means "physical force or
contact taking place after the lack of consent has been manifested .... Any conduct
making it clear that the victim does not consent to the contact is sufficient." Id. (cita-
tions omitted).
84. Id. Regarding the first two incidents, the court noted that these incidents were
"unexpected and lasted only a few seconds," that "Palazzolo herself does not claim
that she expressed any disapproval or otherwise reacted to the contact," and that
Palazzolo did not "allege that Ruggiano made any further advances." Id. Therefore,
the court reasoned, "there is no evidence that any such force or coercion was em-
ployed." Id. Regarding the third incident, the court based its determination on the
fact that Ruggiano did not know that Palazzolo was not consenting to his advances
until she pushed him away after he embraced her. See id. Also, the court noted that
"Ruggiano made no further advances after that manifestation of resistance." Id.
85. See id. at 49. The court noted:
[T]here would be little reason for a doctor to employ physical force in such a
situation. Patients who see doctors for medical treatment commonly recog-
nize the likelihood that an examination and perhaps some physical contact
will take place and they readily consent. Having obtained such consent, al-
beit 'nder false pretenses, a doctor who conducts the examination for im-
proper reasons would have little need to resort to physical force.
Id.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 47-49.
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3. Smathers v. Webb88
At a party, Debra Smathers witnessed Daniel Webb sexually as-
sault her thirteen-year-old niece." Later, Smathers told the young
girl's mother, who is Smathers' sister, about the incident and en-
couraged her to contact the authorities. 90 Smathers' sister told
Webb about this conversation. 91 As a result, Webb left "five
harassing, intimidating, and threatening phone messages on Ms.
Smathers' answering machine," in an effort to keep Smathers from
reporting him to the authorities for the sexual assault he commit-
ted upon her niece. 92 In one message, Webb stated, "I have noth-
ing else to do but fuck with you for the rest of my life and rest of
yours. Just to give you a hard god damned time, bitch. 93
Smathers pleaded two predicate felonies in her complaint: (1)
malicious harassment; and (2) the crime of civil rights intimida-
tion.94 In its memorandum opinion, the district court examined
Webb's messages and found that the messages did not "threaten
the use of physical force against the plaintiff, nor did any of the
alleged messages present a risk of serious physical injury to the
plaintiff. '95 Accordingly, the court dismissed Smathers' VAWA
88. No. 3:98-CV-124 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 2, 1998).
89. See Complaint at 2, Smathers v. Webb (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 2, 1998) (No. 3:98-
CV-124) [hereinafter Smathers Complaint]. At a social gathering at Webb's resi-
dence, Webb allegedly "intentionally and forcibly placed his hand upon the breast of
Smathers' niece." Id.
90. See Proposed Amici Curiae Brief of NOWLDEF at 5, Smathers v. Webb (6th
Cir. 1998) (No. 98-5806) [hereinafter "NOWLDEF's Smathers Brief"].
91. See Proof Brief for Appellant at 7, Smathers v. Webb, 1999 WL 1046625 (6th
Cir. 1998) (No. 98-5806).
92. Id.
93. Id. Other portions of these messages are as follows:
You're still a god damned queer bitch and you know it and I know it. ...
Now you want to say anything else about me, we gonna get it right on.
Give me a call by eight o'clock, and I mean now or I'm gonna take a check
somewhere you don't want it to go.
[M]y intentions are to harass the fuck out of you from now to hell on. And
you're gonna get your god damned mouth off of me now, and I mean you're
gonna get your god damned mouth off of me, because I won't get mine off
you.
Id. at 7-8.
94. See Smathers Complaint, supra note 89, at 4-5. The crime of civil rights intimi-
dation under Tennessee law is a felony offense when one injures or coerces "another
person with the intent to unlawfully intimidate another from the free exercise or en-
joyment of any right or privilege secured by the constitution or laws of the state of
Tennessee ... [or] of the United States." TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-309 (1999).
95. See Memorandum Opinion at 2, Smathers v. Webb, No. 3:98-CV-124 (E.D.
Tenn. 1998).
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claim.96 In addition, the court treated the predicate offense of ma-
licious harassment as a claim separate from the VAWA claim.97
The court refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and dis-
missed that claim as well.98
These cases each demonstrate that how a court interprets section
16(b) determines whether a plaintiff will survive a motion to dis-
miss at the district court level.9 9 How each court defines and un-
derstands violence against women will shape its respective
interpretation of section 16(b).
II. INTERPRETING SECTION 16(B) OF THE "CRIME OF
VIOLENCE" REQUIREMENT
Traditional understandings of violence against women in the law
often conflict with how women perceive violence. Part A first dis-
cusses how force, or a risk thereof, has been traditionally defined in
the law in the context of violence against women. Part A then
presents social science data that shows perceptual differences be-
tween men and women in determining what constitutes violence
and what acts pose a substantial risk of physical force. Part B iden-
tifies approaches that courts have adopted to determine "crimes of
violence" pursuant to section 16(b) in VAWA civil rights cases and
other contexts where section 16(b) is implicated.
A. Traditional Notions of Violence and Gender Difference in
Perceiving Violence
In VAWA civil rights cases, whether an act poses a substantial
risk of physical force is to be determined objectively by a court as a
matter of law.100 How a court defines violence or risk of force will
shape that court's determination. Part 1 discusses how violence
against women has been defined traditionally in the law. Part 2
addresses the contemporary understanding of violence against wo-
men, showing that there are fundamental perceptual differences in
what acts pose a substantial risk of physical force between men and
women.
96. See id. at 2-3.
97. See id. at 3.
98. See id. ("To the extent that the plaintiff also claims a violation of [malicious
harassment], the court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over this
claim, and this claim will be dismissed, also." (citation omitted)). The Sixth Circuit
affirmed the district court's dismissal of Smathers' case. See Smathers v. Webb, No.
98-5806, 1999 WL 14046625 (6th Cir. Nov. 10, 1999).
99. See supra notes 73, 85 and 95 and accompanying text.
100. See Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp 1375, 1402-03 (N.D. Iowa 1997).
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1. Traditional Notions of Violence Against Women
To understand traditional notions of violence against women, it
is important to understand the historical underpinnings of rape and
domestic violence laws. A review of the history of the law in these
areas explains the evolution of the law regarding violence against
women and the thinking behind current, albeit traditional, policies
and practices.
Rape law, for example, originated from legal codes that con-
strued rape as a property crime of man against man, where the
violated woman is the property.1°1 Moreover, the common law
definition of rape states that a "man commits rape when he en-
gages in intercourse with a woman not his wife; by force or threat
of force; against her will and without her consent.' 10 2 Implicit in
this definition, a victim must physically resist the attacker and the
attacker must use substantial force during the attack for the act to
be considered rape.10 3 Every jurisdiction in the United States has
traditionally made "force" or "threat of force" an element of the
crime of rape.'0 4
Even in the last two decades, courts have commonly drawn a
distinction between the "force" incidental to the act of intercourse
and the "force" required to convict. 105 To convict, courts have typi-
cally focused on force used to overcome the victim, and have not
considered the act of nonconsensual penetration or touching as
force.'06 This distinction was made in State v. Alston,107 in which
the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed a rape conviction. 10 8
101. See Charlene L. Muehlenhard et al., Definitions of Rape and Their Implica-
tions, 48 J. Soc. IssuEs 40 (1992). A famous statement of seventeenth-century Eng-
lish lord chief justice Matthew Hale explains early perceptions of rape: rape is a
charge "easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the
party accused, tho' never so innocent." SUSAN ESTRICti, REAL RAPE 5 (1987). Ac-
cording to Hale's definition, because rape is very difficult to prove, the victim "must
first prove her own lack of guilt." Id.
102. ESTRICH, supra note 101, at 8.
103. See id. at 5.
104. See id. at 59.
105. See id. at 60.
106. See id.
107. 312 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1984) (cited in ESTRICH, supra note 101, at 60).
108. See id. at 471. In Alston, the defendant was the victim's ex-boyfriend when the
alleged rape occurred. See id. The court noted that during their relationship the de-
fendant had been physically abusive and that his girlfriend often had sex with the
defendant just to accommodate him. See id. ("On those occasions, she would stand
still and remain entirely passive while the defendant undressed her and had inter-
course with her."). The relationship ended when the defendant struck his girlfriend,
after which she moved out. See id. at 472-73.
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One month after their relationship ended, the defendant went to
his ex-girlfriend's school, grabbed her arm, stated that she was
coming with him and threatened to physically assault her.10 9 After
she told him she did not want to have sex with him, he pulled her
up, undressed her, pushed her legs apart, and penetrated her.110
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the element of force
had not been established by substantial evidence, although the
court found that the act of sexual intercourse was nonconsen-
sual. 111 This decision shows that a legal definition of rape requires
more than the forceful acts displayed by the defendant, such as
grabbing the victim's arm, threatening to hit her, undressing her,
pushing her legs apart and penetrating her, thereby demonstrating
how the common law definition has affected current rape law.'1 2
Sentencing proceedings can also be affected by how a court
chooses to define "force." When sentencing rapists, judges often
remark about the type of force that was used by the defendant in
particular cases. For example, in 1992 Ernesto Garay was con-
victed of anally raping and sexually abusing a retarded woman.' 13
At the sentencing hearing, the judge stated that "'there was no vio-
lence here. There was an act."" 14 In 1991, a judge "imposed a
suspended sentence on a prominent businessman convicted of
rape, stating that the victim had sustained no physical injuries. 115
Like the origins of rape law, legal understandings of domestic
violence also originate from the concept of women as property of
men.116 Under British common law, the wife legally became the
109. See id. at 472-73. In particular, the defendant told her that he was going to
"fix" her face to show he "was not playing," and stated that he had a "right" to have
intercourse with her again. Id.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 471.
112. See ESTRICH, supra note 101 at 61-63.
113. See Lynn Hecht Schafran, Maiming the Soul: Judges, Sentencing and the Myth
of the Nonviolent Rapist, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 439, 439 (1993). The victim was a
twenty-three-year-old retarded woman with an I.Q. of 51 who behaved as a young
child. See id. Garay raped the young woman in a bathroom of the building where she
lived and where Garay worked as a custodian. See id. at 441. A carpenter discovered
them while Garay was pinning the victim's hands to the wall and anally raping her.
See id. at 441-42.
114. Id. at 440 (quoting the transcript of New York v. Ernesto Garay, No. 669/91
(Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 1992)). The judge agreed with the defense attorney's characteriza-
tion of this rape as non-violent because the medical evidence showed no bruises,
scratches or lesions on the victim's vagina or anus. See id. at 442.
115. Id. (The judge stated, "I think it was obvious it was non-consensual sex, but I
don't believe it was a violent act as most people think of rape.").
116. See Brenneke, supra note 50, at 22.
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property of her husband upon marriage.117 The implication of this
phenomenon was "legal non-intervention in marital relation-
ships.""18 Because wives became property of their husbands upon
marriage, British common law allowed husbands to discipline their
wives, but "only blows with a switch no wider than a man's thumb
were allowed."' 19 This rule came to be known as the "rule of
thumb."' 2 °
The "rule of thumb" and a husband's right to discipline his wife
were also recognized in the United States.' 2' While the "rule of
thumb" is an "increasingly outdated misconception," domestic vio-
lence continues and is often met "with little social or governmental
intervention.' 1 22 Moreover, although advocacy efforts have been
successful in enforcing criminal laws against domestic violence and
have improved law enforcement policies toward domestic violence,
the notion of domestic violence as a "private" matter remains. 23
For example, in 1995, a New York jury acquitted a man who
clubbed his ex-girlfriend with a length of four-inch wire cable and
117. See id.
118. Id. At British common law, the state did have an obligation to protect the civil
rights of its citizens, but this obligation did not reach relations between married
couples. See id. British common law did reach domestic violence, however, but only
when such violence "extended beyond the wife." Id. at 23. For example, when a
pregnant woman was beaten, a crime was committed only if the baby died in her
body, while no crime was committed if the pregnant women was personally injured.
See id.
119. Id. at 22-23. Specifically, husbands were expected to answer for their wives'
misbehavior. See id. Thus, the common law afforded husbands the right to give their
wives "'moderate correction,"' and the right to restrain their wives by "'domestic
chastisement."' Id. (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND, FIRST BOOK 432 (Dawsons of Pall Mall ed., 1966)).
120. See id. at 23. ("This 'rule of thumb' created a distinction between single blows
with large sticks and repeated blows with small sticks irrespective of the damage.").
121. See id. For the first time in the United States, the Mississippi Supreme Court
recognized the "rule of thumb" and its rationale in 1824, and supported a husband's
defense on charges for assault and battery of his wife. See id. at 23-24; Bradley v.
State, 1 Miss. 156 (1824). Later, in 1864, a North Carolina court also followed the
"rule of thumb" and stated that "a husband is responsible for the acts of his wife, and
... the law permits him to use .. .a degree of force as is necessary to control an
unruly temper and make her behave herself." Brenneke, supra note 50, at 24 (quot-
ing State v. Black, 60 N.C. 262 (1864)). While both of these holdings were later over-
turned, the stigma against a "public display of familiar strife remained strong."
Brenneke, supra note 50, at 24. Domestic violence was rarely spoken about in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and legal support was unavailable for vic-
tims of domestic violence because of interspousal immunity doctrines and marital
rape exceptions. See id. at 24-25. See also discussion supra notes 55-59 and accompa-
nying text.
122. See Brenneke, supra note 50, at 25-26.
123. See id. at 26.
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stabbed her in the head with four different knives for ending their
relationship. 124 After the verdict, one juror stated, "Hey - men
and women fight."'1 25
2. Contemporary Understandings of Violence Against Women
and Social Science Data
Social scientists, psychologists and feminists have argued that
traditional notions of violence against women perpetuate myths,
not realities. Scholars have argued that one of the common myths
about male violence against women is that certain acts are not ac-
tually harmful.126 For example, if a woman was sexually assaulted,
but that assault did not result in physical markings such as bruises,
the cultural myth is that the woman was neither culturally nor le-
gally wronged. 27 Similarly, if a wife was battered by her husband
but no bones were broken, the myth is that she was not wronged. 128
Scholars argue that such myths often minimize or cover up the
harmful effects of violence against women, and prevent "the devel-
opment of effective policies and programs designed to prevent such
violence.' '1 29
Moreover, as can be seen from the cases described previously,
such myths "pervade our legal system."13 Indeed, some feminist
legal scholars have recognized that women's perspectives on im-
portant legal issues surrounding sexuality, work, family and vio-
lence against women have been ignored in the law.1 3'
Traditionally, a legal understanding of violence against women in
the law came from the male perspective because legal definitions
of rape and other crimes against women "have been written almost
124. See Stasi, Men & Women Fight, N.Y. POST, May 15, 1995, at 4.
125. Id.
126. See Koss, supra note 4, at 9.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. Id. ("It is through gender-related roles that specific cultural norms related to
gender and violence are patterned, learned, and transmitted from generation to
generation.").
130. See Koss, supra note 4, at 9 (citation omitted); see also supra Part I.B.
131. See Leslie Bender, From Gender Difference to Feminist Solidarity, 15 VT. L.
REV. 1 (1990); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a
Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985). Such scholars
have suggested a new approach to lawmaking that would eradicate the "tradition of
perspectivelessness in legal thinking with a broadened concept of objectivity including
multiple perspectives-the views of women, African-Americans, Native Americans,
Asian-Americans, and others." MONA HARRINGTON, WOMEN LAWYERS: REWRITING
THE RULES 60 (1994).
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exclusively by male legislators. ' 132 Thus, feminist legal scholars
have argued that such "[c]onventional definitions.., tend to be too
narrow" and "serve to advantage men over women. "133
One commentator has argued that women's experiences of sex-
ual and physical violence are often "[c]ast in a mould constructed
within a male-dominated society," and as a result, such experiences
"take on an illusion of normality [and] ordinariness."'1 34 What
some men may see as normal and ordinary behavior, many women
consider potentially violent.135 Social science research confirms
this disparity. 136
A recent study of heterosexual couples examined and compared
male and female accounts of specific incidents of male violence
against women. 137 The researchers found a "pronounced discor-
dance" between what men and women perceive as violent (or po-
132. See Muehlenhard, supra note 101, at 23-24. This psychology professor has ar-
gued that, "In patriarchal social systems, men have controlled oral and written pro-
duction of language. This 'man-made language' reflects and reifies the experiences of
men. To the extent that this language does describe the experiences of women, it does
so from the perspective of men." Id. at 40. Moreover, "a male-defined concept of
violence - [one] premised on a school yard fist fight or a barroom brawl - and lack of
knowledge about rape trauma produce erroneous assessments of rape and erroneous
sentences for rapists." Schafran, supra note 113, at 441.
133. See Muehlenhard, supra note 101, at 40. Professor Muehlenhard continues
that
[i]t is in the patriarchy's best interest to promote images of 'real rape' by
strange men. These images keep women frightened and act as a form of
social control, keeping women off the streets and out of male territory, and
thus limiting women's freedom. They also promote the idea that women
need to attach themselves to one man who will protect them from others
(even though women are more likely to be raped by dates and husbands
than by strangers). They promote the idea that women need to do whatever
it takes to maintain relationships with their male protectors. If women be-
come less wary of stranger rape and more wary of acquaintance rape, this
would decrease the social control of women as well as men's sexual access to
reluctant women.
Id. at 40-41.
134. STANKO, supra note 59, at 9.
135. See id. at 10.
136. Most courts have been unwilling to rely on social science research in support
of holdings. One exception has been in the area of sexual harassment where some
courts have relied on "perceptual difference research," which is the type of research
presented herein, to support a reasonable woman standard. See Barbara A. Gutek &
Maureen O'Connor, The Empirical Basis for the Reasonable Women Standard, 51 J.
Soc. IssuEs 151, 160 (1995); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991).
137. See Russell P. Dobash et al., Separate and Intersecting Realities: A Comparison
of Men's and Women's Accounts of Violence Against Women, 4 VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 382 (1998).
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tentially violent). 138 The findings indicated that three-fourths of
the women reported incidents of serious violence, while less than
half of the men reported such incidents.139 Moreover, thirty per-
cent more women characterized incidents of choking, demanding
sex and threats on their lives as serious violence. n0 One-third of
the women sampled reported being kicked or punched in the stom-
ach when pregnant, while approximately one-tenth of the men
sampled reported engaging in such acts. 41
Studies also show that women often perceive certain non-physi-
cal acts as posing a substantial risk of physical force. In one study,
women described flashing (exposure of the male genitals) as poten-
tially violent. 142 Such behavior, especially when it occurs in a de-
serted place, "may engender fears of injury and death because of
the uncertainty about what may happen next. ' 143 In addition,
"[a]ggressive forms of demeaning and intimidating behaviors-
such as threatening violence, feigning to strike, and aggressive
pointing-when used by someone who is larger, stronger, and
more aggressive" are often experienced as frightening and poten-
tially violent.14 4
Disparities also arise between male and female perceptions of
sexual assaults. 145 Studies show that men interpret certain behav-
iors more sexually than do females. 146 There are also significant
differences between male and female views of sexual touching.1 47
138. Id. There were also striking differences between men's and women's percep-
tions of the effects of violent acts. See DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 4, at 157-58.
Over one-half of the women reported feeling nauseous or vomiting after a violent
incident, whereas only seven percent of men reported inflicting such harm. See id.
Forty percent of women reported being knocked unconscious on at least one occa-
sion, while only 14% of men reported inflicting such an injury. See id. at 158.
139. See Dobash, supra note 137, at 395. For the purposes of this study, "serious
violence" included punching of the face and/or body, kicking and dragging by the
hair. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id. In regards to controlling and coercive behaviors, men reported that
they rarely "attempt[ed] to intimidate and coerce their partners." Id. at 404. Most of
the women in the survey, on the other hand, reported that intimidating and control-
ling behavior was "nearly continuous" and "repetitive," and an "integral aspect of
their relationships." Id.
142. See STANKO, supra note 59, at 11.
143. Id. (citation omitted).
144. Dobash, supra note 137, at 404.
145. See id.
146. See Muehlenhard, sup.ra note 101, at 29-30.
147. See Gutek & O'Connor, supra note 136, at 154.
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Eighty-four percent of women defined sexual touching as sexual
harassment, as opposed to fifty-nine percent of men.148
In the context of rape, studies show that acquaintance rape ac-
counts for eighty percent of all rapes. 14 9 The element of force that
is required in many criminal definitions of rape implies that the
penetration itself is neither forceful nor violent.1 50 While the myth
is that acquaintance rape is a non-violent act, studies show that the
effects of sexual assaults between acquaintances are profound.' 5'
One study showed that seventy percent of rape victims reported no
physical injuries, twenty-four percent reported only minor physical
injuries and just four percent sustained serious physical injuries. 52
However, half of rape victims, whether they suffered physical in-
jury or not, became fearful of death or serious injury during the
rape.' 53
Moreover, many rape survivors suffer from psychological inju-
ries. 15  Approximately one-third of victims developed Rape-Re-
lated Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome, one-third experienced
major depression and one-third contemplated suicide. 55 Rape vic-
tims from that study were thirteen times more likely to have seri-
ous alcohol problems and twenty-six times more likely to have
major drug abuse problems than non-victims "because they turned
to substance abuse to medicate their psychic pain."156 Moreover, a
study of approximately five hundred female college student rape
victims, a vast majority of whom were victims of non-stranger rape,
found no difference between victims of stranger rape and victims of
non-stranger rape regarding psychological trauma symptoms such
as depression and anxiety.1 57 One scholar has argued that because
of the profound psychological injury suffered by all rape victims,
148. See id.
149. See Schafran, supra note 113, at 443.
150. See STANKO, supra note 59, at 44 ("Force, perhaps the most the crucial factor
of raped women's experiences, has many forms but its effect is much the same. Physi-
cal or verbal threats are demands, not invitations.").
151. See Schafran, supra note 113, at 443, 446.
152. See id. at 443-44.
153. See id. This national study, entitled "Rape in America," was performed by the
National Victim Center and the Crime Victims Research and Treatment Center of the
Medical University of South Carolina over a four-year period and its results were
released in April 1992. See id. at 443.
154. See id. at 443, 446 ("The carving up of a rape victim's soul is an invisible crime,
but the victim [of acquaintance rape] is no less maimed than the victim of a physical
assault.").
155. See id. at 444. Thirteen percent of victims actually attempted suicide. See id.
156. Id.
157. See id.
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judges should "recognize that all rapes, by definition, are
violent."' 58
This social science data shows that traditional notions of violence
against women are often at odds with women's experiences. That
is because traditional notions of violence against women are based
on male rather than female perceptions. In the context of the
VAWA's civil rights remedy, how a court determines when an of-
fense poses a substantial risk of physical force will depend on
whether the court has a traditional understanding or a contempo-
rary understanding of violence against women.
B. Approaches to Interpreting Section 16(b)
The "crime of violence" definition of section 16 as incorporated
into the VAWA's civil rights remedy was originally used for federal
criminal sentencing purposes. 59 When Congress created this statu-
tory definition in 1984, its intent was to "expand the 'crime of vio-
lence' concept while creating a universally applicable definition of
the term. ' 160 In 1989, the Sentencing Commission eliminated ref-
erence to section 16 in the guidelines, and redefined the term "in a
more inclusive fashion."' 16' The new definition was intended to
give "federal courts the ability to use a low threshold of force in
determining whether acts constitute crimes of violence.' 162
The language of the new definition is substantially similar to sec-
tion 16(b), 63 although the new definition has no binding effect on
the interpretation of the VAWA's civil rights remedy. 164 However,
courts interpreting section 16(b) in VAWA civil rights cases have
158. Id. at 453.
159. See David Frazee, Crime of Violence Requirement, in VIOLENCE AGAINST WO-
MEN 9-7 (David Frazee et al. eds., 1998) (citing Brenneke, supra note 50, at 60). This
definition has been largely dropped in the criminal sentencing context, and is rarely
used. See id. at 9-7 to 9-8.
160. United States v. Johnson, 704 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (citing
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3486-87).
161. Brenneke, supra note 50, at 60; see also Frazee, supra note 159, at 9-5, 9-8, 9-
10.
162. Frazee, supra note 159, at 9-5.
163. The current sentencing guidelines definition of "crime of violence" is as
follows:
"Crime of violence" includes murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated
assault, forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate exten-
sion of credit, and burglary of a dwelling. Other offenses are included ... if
... the conduct set forth.., in the count of which the defendant was con-
victed ... by its nature, presented a serious potential risk of physical injury
to another.
18 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 app. n.2 (1998).
164. See Brenneke, supra note 50, at 60.
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attempted to follow approaches taken by courts in the sentencing
guidelines context. 16' These perspectives include the "categorical"
approach and the "actual conduct" approach. 166
1. The "Categorical" Approach
Under the "categorical" approach, a court examines the predi-
cate offense only as it is set forth in the criminal code and does not
consider the actual conduct of the defendant.1 67 The purpose of
the categorical approach was "to create certain categories of crimes
that would be evaluated the same regardless of the state of ori-
gin."'168 Two questions emerge in VAWA civil rights disputes with
regard to this approach: 1) whether VAWA courts should apply
determinations of whether an offense poses a substantial risk of
physical force from the sentencing guidelines context; and 2)
whether VAWA courts should apply the categorical approach with-
out relying on precedent from the sentencing guidelines context,
thereby creating a separate set of jurisprudence to define what of-
fenses pose a substantial risk of physical force.
As previously stated, the new definition of "crime of violence"
under the sentencing guidelines does not bind courts deciding
VAWA civil rights cases.169 Some commentators and practitioners
have argued, however, that courts should follow sentencing guide-
lines cases, "especially when the caselaw interprets Sentencing
Commission language which mirrors the language of section 16. "17
For example, in its amicus brief to the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Smathers v. Webb, the NOW Legal Defense and Education
Fund ("NOWLDEF") argued that the predicate offense of mali-
cious harassment pleaded by the plaintiff is a "crime of violence"
because such an act poses a substantial risk of physical force. 71
NOWLDEF's argument was premised on the fact that in the sen-
tencing guidelines context "[c]ourts have consistently held that
165. See, e.g., cases discussed supra Part I.B.
166. See Frazee, supra note 159, at 9-1, 9-15, 9-20.
167. See id. at 9-15. ("In other words, the 'question is not whether the particular
facts constitute a crime of violence, but whether the crime ... as defined by [state or
federal] law is a crime of violence.'" (citations omitted)).
168. McCann v. Rosquist, 998 F. Supp. 1246, 1250 (D. Utah 1998) (citing Taylor v.
United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990)).
169. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
170. Frazee, supra note 159, at 9-10 (noting that Congress chose not to use the new
Sentencing Commission definition, but chose to incorporate section 16, a "mostly un-
used statute"); see NOWLDEF's Smathers Brief, supra note 90, at 8.
171. See NOWLDEF's Smathers Brief, supra note 90, at 8.
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making threats are 'crimes of violence.' 117 2 Similarly, in McCann
II, the appellants argued that because sexual assault has been cate-
gorically deemed a "crime of violence" pursuant to language mir-
roring section 16(b) in the sentencing guidelines context, the
defendant's acts of sexual assault should also be deemed "crimes of
violence.'
' 73
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the appellants'
argument and reversed the district court's dismissal of the case.174
Utilizing the categorical approach, the McCann II court held that
Utah's criminal offense of forcible sexual abuse, the predicate of-
fense alleged by the plaintiffs, by its nature poses a substantial risk
that physical force will be used in carrying out the offense, "even
when unaccompanied by rape, bodily injury, or extreme forms of
coercion.' 1 75 In so holding, the court followed United States v.
Reyes-Castro,76 a sentencing guidelines case, as advanced by ap-
pellants. The Tenth Circuit in Reyes-Castro held that sexual abuse
of a child, the "analogous statutory counterpart" to the predicate
offense alleged by appellants, is a "crime of violence" pursuant to
the part of the new sentencing guidelines definition that mirrors
section 16(b).177 The McCann II court noted that the Reyes-Castro
court focused its holding on the fact that the offense was noncon-
172. Id. In support, NOWLDEF cited cases applying the "categorical" approach in
the federal sentencing context. See id. at 8-9 (citing United States v. Bonner, 85 F.3d
522, 527 (11th Cir. 1996) (concluding that "making a threatening telephone call is a
crime of violence" under the "categorical" approach)); United States v. Left Hand
Bull, 901 F.2d 647, 648 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that mailing a threatening letter to a
person is a "crime of violence" under section 16 even though the defendant did not
carry out the threat).
173. See Brief for Appellant at 12, McCann v. Rosquist, 185 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir.
1998) (No. 98-4049) (citing United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377 (10th Cir.
1993)).
174. See McCann II, 185 F.3d at 1113.
175. Id. at 1121. Utah's criminal offense of forcible sexual abuse provides that:
[a] person commits sexual abuse if... under circumstances not amounting to
rape, object rape, sodomy, or attempted rape or sodomy, the actor touches
the anus, buttocks, or any part of the genitals of another, or touches the
breast of a female, or otherwise takes indecent liberties with another ...
without the consent of the other ....
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-404(1) (1999). The McCann II court noted that it is irrele-
vant that the statute is labeled as "forcible" in making its determination of whether
this offense poses a substantial risk of physical force, and that the analysis requires an
examination of the elements of the statutory definition of the crime. See McCann II,
185 F.3d at 1119 n.5.
176. 13 F.3d 377, 379 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that sexual abuse of a child is a
"crime of violence" pursuant to language in the new sentencing guidelines definition
that mirrors section 16(b)).
177. See McCann II, 185 F.3d at 1119-20.
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sensual, and not that the victim was a child.178 Because the predi-
cate offense before the court requires that the act be without
consent, the McCann II court reasoned that the Reyes-Castro hold-
ing is applicable to the McCann II case, albeit in a different con-
text.17 9 Further, the McCann II court rejected the district court's
"assumption" that section 16 of the VAWA's civil rights remedy "is
restricted to a certain 'type' of physical force."'' 80 The court stated
that
[tihe very act of nonconsensual sexual contact, which by its na-
ture evinces a clear intention to disregard the victim's dignity
and bodily autonomy, both demonstrates and creates a substan-
tial risk of more serious physical intrusion or the application of
force to ensure compliance. 8
Lastly, the McCann II court recognized that a restrictive definition
of "crime of violence" was not intended by Congress when incor-
porating reference to section 16 into the VAWA's civil rights
remedy. 182
178. See id. at 1119. In Reyes-Castro, the Tenth Circuit "addressed the relationship
between lack of consent ... and the risk of physical force" and stated that:
[b]ecause the crime [of rape] involves a non-consensual act upon another
person, there is a substantial risk that physical force may be used in commit-
ting the offense. It does not matter whether physical force is actually used.
"Our scrutiny ends on a finding that the risk of violence is present."
Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d at 379 (citations omitted).
179. See McCann II, 185 F.3d at 1119-20.
180. Id. at 1120 (citing McCann I, 998 F. Supp. 1246, 1252 (D. Utah 1998)). The
McCann II court stated that
Section 16 only refers to "physical force"; it does not qualify that reference
by requiring physical force of a particular nature or severity. In fact, the
imposition of nonconsensual sexual contact, whether brought about by brute
force or, as alleged here, by trick and abuse of authority, might itself be
considered a form of violence, capable of causing mental and emotional in-
jury no less severe than the physical injury caused by a blow.
Id.
181. Id.
182. See id.
In enacting the VAWA, Congress recognized the degree to which our na-
tion's systems of law enforcement and adjudication have been complicit in
perpetuating the epidemic of violence against women, in part by failing to
recognize crimes of gender-motivated violence as serious crimes .... We will
not compound that failing today by restricting, in contravention of the lan-
guage of [section 16], the definition of "violence" to only those forms of
violence most traditionally feared by men - murder and serious bodily in-
jury. To adopt such a restriction would be to exclude much of the "wide-
spread incidence of physical assault against women" from coverage of the
VAWA .... It is simply not permissible for us to create, contrary to clear
legislative intent, a special narrower construction of [section 16] for purposes
only of the [VAWA] .....
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Arguments against application of "crime of violence" determina-
tions in the sentencing guidelines context to VAWA civil rights
cases also rely on the congressional intent behind the passage of
the VAWA's civil rights remedy.183 For example, in Smathers v.
Webb, the defendant argued that the congressional intent behind
the VAWA's civil rights remedy was "to protect the civil rights of
victims of gender-motivated violence," and not to protect such vic-
tims from non-violent behavior. 184 One commentator has sug-
gested that perhaps Congress's choice of reference to section 16,
rather than the new sentencing guidelines definition, indicates that
Congress "believed that the two situations differed such that each
should develop an independent definition of 'crime of
violence.' "185
Even if sentencing guidelines rulings should not apply in the
VAWA context, it has been argued that the categorical approach
should be used to determine what offenses pose a substantial risk
of physical force for purposes of the VAWA.186 The district court
in McCann I concluded that, in accordance with congressional in-
tent, "a policy furthering uniformity can and should be applied" in
the context of the VAWA's civil rights remedy.187 The court stated
further that "in order to effectuate the policy of uniformity," a cat-
egorical inquiry should be used whenever possible.188 Paradoxi-
cally, on appeal, the Tenth Circuit court noted that the district
court did not follow the categorical approach, but instead errone-
ously "based its analysis on the particular circumstances of the al-
leged acts in this case." '189 The McCann II court found that the
Id. at 1122 (citations omitted).
183. See Proof Brief for Appellee at 4, Smathers v. Webb, No. 98-5806, 1999 WL
1046625 (6th Cir. Nov. 10, 1999).
184. Id. at 4 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994)).
185. Frazee, supra note 159, at 9-10. This commentator notes that:
The purposes of the Sentencing Commission is [sic] to ensure uniform and
proportional sentences for convicted criminals. The purpose of the VAWA is
to provide a minimum threshold for a broad, remedial civil rights statute.
Many of the concerns that arise in the context of criminal sentencing and
punishment simply do not arise in the civil rights arena.
Id. at 9-10, 9-11. He also points out that the legislative history of the VAWA "indi-
cates that Congress merely sought a statutory reference in the U.S. Code and actually
gave no thought to daunting problems of interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 16." Id.
186. See McCann I, 998 F. Supp. 1246, 1251 (D. Utah 1998).
187. Id. at 1251.
188. Id.
189. McCann II, 185 F.3d 1113, 1116 (10th Cir. 1999). The Tenth Circuit noted that
the district court relied on Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), a case in the
sentencing guidelines arena. In Taylor, the Court for the first time established the
categorical approach for determining whether acts are "crimes of violence" pursuant
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categorical approach should be used to determine whether acts are
"crimes of violence" pursuant to section 16 in the VAWA civil
rights context and applied that approach in its analysis. 190
2. The "Actual Conduct" Approach
Under the "actual conduct" approach, a court examines the facts
of each case to determine whether the defendant's acts created a
substantial risk of physical harm.19' This approach differs from the
categorical inquiry because the actual conduct approach requires a
court to focus on the defendant's acts rather than on the abstract
nature of the predicate offense alleged. 92
One of the dangers of the categorical approach is that if a court
rules that an offense does not pose a substantial risk of physical
injury by its nature, then subsequent courts may follow that prece-
dent in cases where the defendant's acts may actually pose such a
risk.' 93 To avoid this danger, proponents of a broad interpretation
of section 16(b) in VAWA civil rights cases have argued that when
a categorical inquiry fails to result in a "crime of violence" determi-
nation, courts should perform an actual conduct inquiry. 94
to the new sentencing guidelines definition. See McCann II, 185 F.3d at 1117 (citing
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600). However, the Taylor Court also noted that the categorical
approach "'may permit the sentencing court to go beyond the mere fact of conviction
in a narrow range of cases,'" which is called the Taylor exception. Id. (citing Taylor,
495 U.S. at 602). The McCann II court noted that pursuant to the Taylor version of
the categorical approach, the district court erroneously concluded that "[the defend-
ant's] particular acts, in context, did not involve a substantial risk of physical force."
Id. After a review of the Taylor exception, the McCann II court concluded that the
Taylor exception only applies to a particular clause of the new sentencing guidelines
definition that does not mirror section 16(b), and therefore does not apply to cases
analyzing section 16(b). See id. Thus, according to the McCann II court, the district
court applied the wrong approach and should have applied the categorical approach.
See id. at 1116.
190. See McCann II, 185 F.3d at 1116 ("We conclude that the language of [section
16] and our precedents require that the crime of violence analysis be conducted at the
level of the statutory definition." (citing United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377,
379 (10th Cir. 1993)).
191. See Frazee, supra note 159, at 9-11, 9-23.
192. See id. at 9-20. In other words, while the categorical approach is a decontextu-
alized approach, the actual conduct approach is a contextualized approach.
193. See id. at 9-23. For example, in United States v. Fazio, a sentencing guidelines
case, the defendant was arrested for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. See
id. at 9-21 (citing 914 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1990)). In Fazio, the defendant struggled with
the police over the weapon. See id. Because the struggle "involved force, danger, and
violence, the defendant's actual conduct sufficiently augmented the possession to
bring it within the scope of crimes of violence" under section 16(b). Id.
194. See id. at 9-22, 9-23, 9-24. In an amicus brief to the Sixth Circuit, NOWLDEF
urged the court first to make a categorical inquiry when interpreting section 16(b),
and if that approach does not lead to a clear result, to then utilize the actual conduct
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One such proponent has noted that the factual inquiry of the
actual conduct approach "well suits the capabilities of a district
court" because the court must find facts anyway. 195 In the sentenc-
ing guidelines context, one of the arguments against the use of the
actual conduct approach has been that courts were required to ex-
amine offenses that occurred in the past "to determine whether to
augment a current sentence for prior conduct," posing practical dif-
ficulties such as unavailable witnesses and lack of evidence, among
others.' 96 In VAWA civil rights actions, this problem does not ex-
ist.197 This proponent also has argued that "it would be anomalous
to exclude actually violent felonious conduct from the scope of"
the civil rights remedy "while protecting conduct that involves a
risk that violence may be used." 98 Moreover, he has noted that
Congress, when deciding to make reference to section 16 in the
VAWA's civil rights remedy, chose not to resolve a split of the
courts as to whether the actual conduct approach should be used in
sentencing guidelines cases. 199 Thus, he has argued that because
civil rights actions demand broad, remedial interpretations, "courts
should favor the interpretation that gives the greatest effect" to the
VAWA's civil rights provision.2 0
Thus far, courts have adopted inconsistent standards for deter-
mining how the civil rights remedy's "crime of violence" require-
ment should be interpreted. In McCann I, the district court stated
that it was utilizing the categorical approach, but nevertheless,
looked to the specific facts of the case to determine whether the
approach to determine whether such conduct constitutes a "crime of violence." See
NOWLDEF's Smathers Brief, supra note 90, at 8.
195. See Frazee, supra note 159, at 9-23.
196. Id. When the Federal. Sentencing Guidelines made reference to section 16,
circuit courts split as to whether courts should use the actual conduct approach in the
sentencing guidelines context. See id. at 9-23 to 9-24. Approximately half of the cir-
cuits allowed some form of the actual conduct approach. See id. at 9-21. These cir-
cuits recognized that some criminal statutory language embodies both violent and
non-violent crimes, and have allowed an actual conduct inquiry in those instances.
See id. Because the guidelines later eliminated reference to section 16, the Supreme
Court has never needed to resolve this split. See id.
197. See id. ("In VAWA actions, courts will almost always make factual determina-
tions from evidence before them. The problems of stale information in VAWA ac-
tions are no greater than in any civil trial.").
198. Id. While this commentator admits that the VAWA's civil rights provision was
not intended to cover all acts of violence motivated by gender, but only "crimes of
violence" motivated by gender, he argues that interpretation of the "crime of vio-
lence" requirement "should not exclude those violent felonies whose commission
sparked the moral outrage which lies at the core of the [VAWA's] passage." Id.
199. See id.
200. Id. at 9-23, 9-24.
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defendant's acts posed a substantial risk of physical harm.2 °1 On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit applied the categorical approach. °2 In
Smathers, the district court utilized the actual conduct approach,
relying on the fact that the defendant did not explicitly threaten to
injure the plaintiff physically in his messages.2 °3 On appeal, the
Sixth Circuit also based its decision on Webb's actual conduct. 0°
Finally, in Palazzolo, the district court also utilized the actual con-
duct approach, looking to the specific acts of the defendant in de-
termining whether his acts were "crimes of violence" pursuant to
the VAWA's civil rights remedy.0 5 These courts have taken ap-
proaches that often result in dismissals, thereby denying women a
civil rights remedy and minimizing the significance of gender-moti-
vated violence.
III. A SOLUTION
Reliance on traditional understandings of violence against wo-
men to interpret section 16(b) rids the VAWA's civil rights remedy
of the effect intended by Congress. Thus, in VAWA civil rights
cases, courts should interpret section 16(b) in such a way that takes
into account the broad scope of violent acts that women routinely
sustain in this country. Part A argues that a uniform standard
should be adopted for all courts to apply when interpreting section
16(b). Part B describes what that standard should be. Part C
revisits the cases presented in Part I.B to show how application of
the suggested standard would lead to different results, results that
would be in accordance with women's perceptions of violence.
A. Adoption of a Uniform Standard
Adopting a uniform standard for all courts to apply would be
consistent with the congressional intent in enacting the VAWA's
civil rights remedy. Congress intended to characterize the scope of
violence against women as a problem facing young women
throughout the United States.20 6 Congress also intended to equate
violence against women with violence against other groups by rec-
ognizing gender-based violence as a form of discrimination and as
201. See supra Parts I.B.1. & II.B.1.
202. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
203. See supra Part I.B.3.
204. See Smathers v. Webb, No. 98-5806, 1999 WL 1046625, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Nov.
10, 1999).
205. See supra Part I.B.2.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
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an affront to federally protected rights.2 °7 Uniformity is also re-
quired in light of Congress's intent to supercede discriminatory
state laws and practices.20 8 Indeed, these goals would be furthered
by use of a single standard for all courts because such uniformity
would entitle women from different states to the same protection
under the civil rights remedy.
Perhaps even more important in adopting a uniform standard for
VAWA civil rights cases is the definitional history of section 16.
Because Congress created section 16 to provide a "universally ap-
plicable" definition of "crime of violence," albeit in the sentencing
guidelines context, it is unreasonable and inefficient that courts in
the VAWA context are left to their own devices to interpret section
16(b).2 °9
B. The Need For A Broad Approach
Courts should adopt a broad approach to analyzing what consti-
tutes a "substantial risk of physical injury" pursuant to section
16(b). Based on congressional intent and social science data,
courts are not effectuating the purpose of the VAWA's civil rights
remedy.
There has been disagreement over Congress's intent regarding
the scope of acts that would be covered under the VAWA's civil
rights remedy.210 Proponents of a broad interpretation of what acts
create a substantial risk of physical force under section 16(b) have
argued that Congress intended for such a broad application.211 Op-
ponents of a broad interpretation have argued that Congress in-
tended a more limited application.212
An analysis of the congressional intent behind the legislation
reveals that the former interpretation is more plausible than the
latter. Senator Biden's first version of the VAWA's civil rights rem-
edy covered "any crime of violence . . . including rape, sexual as-
sault, or abusive contact, motivated by gender. ' 213 Senator Biden's
substitute version of the same bill included all crimes of violence
motivated by gender.214 After these definitions of "crime of vio-
207. See supra text accompanying notes 47-51.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 52-62; supra note 41 and accompanying
text.
209. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 180, 184 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 183-184 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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lence" were regarded as controversial and withstood opposition
from Chief Justice Rehnquist and civil rights groups, among others,
only then were limitations imposed on the types of acts that the
civil rights remedy would cover.215 To ease the opposition against
the VAWA's civil rights remedy, supporters in Congress acted
quickly to provide a statutory reference to section 16.216 Further-
more, the Tenth Circuit has agreed with this reading of congres-
sional intent.217 Because the current "crime of violence" definition
in the VAWA's civil rights remedy was borne from political com-
promise, it is hardly fair to say that Congress intended to limit such
causes of action to remedy only brutally violent attacks.
The underlying congressional intent behind section 16 for sen-
tencing guidelines purposes also supports the argument for a broad
approach. Congress's intent when enacting section 16 was to pro-
vide a broad understanding of what constitutes a "crime of vio-
lence. 2 18 In addition, the subsequent definition of "crime of
violence" under the sentencing guidelines, containing language vir-
tually identical to section 16(b), was created to be more inclu-
sive. 21 Likewise, When Congress drafted the VAWA's civil rights
remedy, it sought .to create a uniform statute guaranteeing civil
rights protection to all victims of gender-motivated violence.22 °
Utilizing existing precedent from sentencing guidelines cases
would also allow for a broad interpretation of section 16(b) since
courts in those cases have held more acts to constitute "crimes of
violence" pursuant to language that mirrors section 16(b).221 In
line with a broad approach, courts should apply "crime of vio-
lence" determinations from sentencing guidelines cases to VAWA
civil rights cases.222
To understand what constitutes a substantial risk of physical in-
jury under section 16(b), courts should consider the social science
data presented above.223 The cases cited previously224 demonstrate
a phenomenon documented in social science literature: men and
215. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 185.
217. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 1.61-162 and accompanying text. Compare supra note 11 and
accompanying text with supra note 161.
220. See generally supra Part I.A.2.
221. See supra notes 171-182 and accompanying text.
222. See supra Part II.A.1.
223. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
224. See supra Part I.B.
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women perceive the risk of physical harm differently.225 Two of
these cases in particular, McCann I and Palazzolo, also demon-
strate that some courts determine VAWA civil rights cases from the
traditional perspective of sexual assault as non-violent, rather than
the more realistic understanding of the harm that results from such
acts.226 Because the traditional understanding of what poses a sub-
stantial risk of physical force does not account for how women per-
ceive and experience certain acts, 2 7 courts should consider
nonconsensual sexual assaults as constituting a substantial risk of
physical force irrespective of the particular facts of each case. To
require a higher level of force is to ignore the problem of violence
against women in this country. As it stands, courts are systemati-
cally thwarting the purpose of the VAWA's civil rights remedy, per-
petuating the myth that certain acts taken against women do not
cause harm or create a substantial risk of harm and ignoring the
devastating effects that such violence has on society.228 Therefore,
the social science data provided above should guide courts in inter-
preting section 16(b), by taking into account women's perspectives
and experiences of violence.
With these concerns in mind, courts should seek to provide wo-
men with legal redress for a broad range of acts. To do so, courts
should seek to deem an act a "crime of violence" by utilizing a two-
step approach that includes both the categorical approach and the
actual conduct approach.2 29 Because there is a gender gap in un-
derstanding what poses a substantial risk of physical force, this ap-
proach would allow for a broader range of acts to fall within the
"crime of violence" requirement of section 16(b) thereby allowing
for women's perspectives of violence to be included in the analysis.
Accounting for women's perceptions of violence while utilizing the
two-step process would result in "broad, remedial interpretations"
that civil rights actions, such as the VAWA's civil rights remedy,
demand. 3 °
C. The Cases Revisited
In McCann I, Palazzolo and Smathers, the district courts miscon-
strued the nature of the acts alleged by concluding that such acts
225. See supra Part II.A.2.
226. See discussion supra Parts I.B.1 and I.B.2.
227. See supra notes 133-135 and accompanying text; see also generally Part I1.A.2.
228. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
229. See discussion supra Part II.B.
230. Frazee, supra note 159, at 9-23.
2000]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
did not involve a substantial risk of physical force.23 1 Had the dis-
trict courts applied the two-step approach and precedent from sen-
tencing guidelines cases and utilized a more contemporary
understanding of the reality of violence against women, all of the
plaintiffs would have survived motions to dismiss.
In Palazzolo, the court's reasoning that Ruggiano's acts did not
amount to "crimes of violence" is flawed. The court stated that
patients readily consent to some physical contact that is likely to
occur during an examination between a doctor and a patient.232 In-
deed, the court trivialized Palazzolo's claims by stating that
"[h]aving obtained such consent, albeit under false pretenses, a
doctor who conducts the examination for improper reasons would
have little need to resort to physical force. '233 Furthermore, the
court implied that unwanted sexual contact is not forceful by its
nature, and does not pose a substantial risk of force, when it stated
that "there would be little reason for a doctor to employ physical
force" in this situation.2 3 4 Utilizing the two-step approach with a
contemporary understanding of what constitutes violence against
women, the court should have come to the determination that the
elements of the Rhode Island statute of second degree sexual as-
sault, by their nature, categorically pose a substantial risk of physi-
cal force. Moreover, if the court applied the holding in Reyes-
Castro, which held that a sexual assault without consent constitutes
a "crime of violence," Palazzolo would have survived the motion to
dismiss.
Likewise, the court's reasoning in Smathers is flawed. Under the
categorical approach, Webb's conduct would have been deemed a
"crime of violence" pursuant to section 16(b) because courts in the
sentencing guidelines context have deemed the making of threats
"crimes of violence" pursuant to section 16(b). 235 Even under the
actual conduct approach,. the court should have determined that
the defendant's messages threatened violence,236 particularly when
he said "I have nothing else to do but fuck with you . . ." and
"you're gonna get your goddamned mouth off of me, because I
won't get mine off you." This alone should be sufficient to pass
muster under section 16(b).
231. See supra notes 85, 93, 106 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
233. Id.
234. See id.
235. See discussion supra Part I.B.3; supra notes 1.63-164 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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The Tenth Circuit's decision in McCann II, reversing the district
court's dismissal, should stand as an example for courts when inter-
preting section 16(b). First, the Tenth Circuit demonstrated a con-
temporary understanding of what constitutes violence against
women and what acts pose a substantial risk of physical force when
it stated:
[t]he very act of nonconsensual sexual contact, which by its na-
ture evinces a clear intention to disregard the victim's dignity
and bodily autonomy, both demonstrates and creates a substan-
tial risk of more serious physical intrusion or the application of
force to ensure compliance.237
The Tenth Circuit recognized, in accord with the social science
data, that nonconsensual sexual contact in and of itself poses a sub-
stantial risk of physical force.238 The Tenth Circuit recognized that
a broader understanding of what constitutes violence against wo-
men is necessary to further the congressional intent in enacting the
civil rights remedy.239 Stating that the categorical approach should
be used in VAWA civil rights cases, the Tenth Circuit followed pre-
cedent from the sentencing guidelines context when it applied the
holding that sexual abuse without consent is categorically a "crime
of violence" because such an act poses a substantial risk of physical
force. 240 Thus, all courts should follow the Tenth Circuit's ap-
proach to interpreting section 16(b) in VAWA civil rights cases.
CONCLUSION
The enactment of the VAWA was viewed as "a potential vehicle
of empowerment" for women, and was a long-awaited move to-
ward gender equality in the United States. 241 By enacting the
VAWA, Congress emphatically expressed a strong commitment to
curb and attack the pervasiveness of sex-based violence.242 In
practice, however, the civil rights remedy has fallen short. In the
few VAWA cases brought under the civil rights remedy, the "crime
of violence" requirement has been interpreted in such a narrow
way that it strips the remedy of any effect.
While there is confusion as to how a' "crime of violence" should
be interpreted, courts should adopt a uniform standard and "favor
237. Supra text accompanying note 181.
238. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 182 and accompany text,
240. See supra notes 176-179 and accompanying text.
241. Schneider, supra note 47, at 428.
242. See supra text accompanying note 46.
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the interpretation that gives the greatest effect to a broad, remedial
statute such as the VAWA."243 Courts should do this by utilizing a
definition of violence that does not ignore women's experiences.
Moreover, utilizing a two-step approach and applying precedent
determining cases under section 16(b) would broaden the scope of
violent acts that would pass muster under the statute. By broaden-
ing the types of acts that would constitute crimes of violence in
these ways, courts would finally breathe some life into the VAWA's
civil rights remedy and give it the definitional teeth it requires.
243. Frazee, supra note 159, at 9-24.
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THE FIRST AMENDMENT, THE RIGHT NOT
TO SPEAK AND THE PROBLEM OF
GOVERNMENT ACCESS STATUTES
Anna M. Taruschio*
INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment guarantees that "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ." It
has long protected speech, certain expressive acts and individual
thought and belief. The First Amendment, however, does not only
protect speech in its positive aspect. In West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette,2 and later in Wooley v. Maynard, the
U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the First Amendment also
protects a "concomitant" 4 negative free speech right, the right not
to speak: "The right of freedom of thought and of religion as guar-
anteed by the Constitution against State action includes both the
right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all
.... ,The Court's subsequent articulations of this negative right
framed it as a "freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the
same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect."6
The first articulation of this negative First Amendment right her-
alded a line of "right not to speak" cases that present their own set
of conflicts in First Amendment jurisprudence and implicate sev-
eral of the theoretical bases of freedom of speech.
Courts and commentators have also recognized that the govern-
ment can play an active role in expanding free speech rights and in
enabling the free speech principle that the Constitution estab-
* The author wishes to thank Professor Abner S. Greene for his patience and
guidance with this project, as well as her parents, Giacomo Taruschio and Lisa
Kramer Taruschio, for their support.
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
2. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
3. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
4. Id. at 714.
5. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring).
6. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986) (empha-
sis in original) (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
559 (1985) (quoting Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250,
255 (N.Y. 1968)).
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lishes.7 This active role often takes the form of "access legisla-
tion,"8 such as state-level free speech provisions, which are often
enacted to expand free speech rights further than the federal First
Amendment provision.9 Litigants often invoke the right not to
speak in opposition to these access statutes, which are intended to
encourage and facilitate speech. These access statutes, despite a
stated purpose of expanding some individuals' affirmative rights to
speak freely, often incidentally infringe on negative free speech
rights in the same speech forum. Thus, an access statute or a state-
level First Amendment provision, meant to open speech forums
and encourage debate, can ultimately cause conflict between af-
firmative and negative free speech rights, by sustaining one right at
the price of infringing on the other.
This Note argues that this conflict emerges from the distinct ide-
ological justifications that underlie both the positive right to speak
and the negative right not to speak. It addresses the point of con-
flict between these speech rights, created by access statutes which
seek to further the aims of free speech. To this end, it argues that
each distinct speech right is animated by a different and vital ideo-
logical justification-the "marketplace of ideas," as the positive
First Amendment principle, on the one hand, and the "autonomy/
self-expression" principle, as the negative one, on the other. Ana-
lyzing these two principles in First Amendment jurisprudence, this
Note concludes that by close attention to the effects of government
efforts to widen speech forums and to the conflicting speech princi-
7. See, e.g., OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 17 (1996) (noting that
"fostering full and open debate-making certain that the public hears all that it
should-[can be] a permissible end for the state"); CAss R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY
AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 138 (1995) (noting that "positive government
acts" such as the "provision of diverse opportunities" can be among the aims of gov-
ernment); see also PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 91 (1980) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring) (noting with approval the "healthy trend of affording state
constitutional provisions a more expansive interpretation than [the Supreme] Court
has given to the Federal Constitution" (citing William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitu-
tions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter Brennan, State Constitutions] (discussing incorporation of the Bill of Rights to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment and noting that state courts can play an
active role in protecting these rights)); PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 85 (noting that states
can have an "interest in promoting more expansive rights of free speech and petition
than conferred by the Federal Constitution").
8. For examples and discussion of these kinds of access provisions, see infra Part
II.B.l.b.
9. See, e.g., Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 7, at 491 (observing that
"[s]tate constitutions ... are a font of individual liberties, their protections often ex-
tending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal
law").
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pies informing each case, the Court can achieve consistent and fair
resolution of cases recognizing the right not to speak.
Part I of this Note explores the two main theoretical principles
underlying protection of speech in the United States: the market-
place of ideas and autonomy/self-expression. It ends by illustrating
the uses of these principles in right not to speak case law. Part II
discusses the Supreme Court's right not to speak cases, beginning
with a review of current Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area.
It further investigates and highlights the tension that government
access statutes cause between the two speech principles in each
case. Part III begins by addressing and refuting a major criticism of
cases in the right not to speak area: that in certain circumstances
they do not trigger First Amendment scrutiny at all. This Part goes
on to argue that state and local governments should be permitted
to open speech forums to encourage and facilitate free speech. Fi-
nally, this Note concludes by proposing methods for accomplishing
this goal that avoid the pitfalls and injustices now present in the
Court's system for resolving right not to speak cases.
I. Two FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES: THE MARKETPLACE
OF IDEAS AND AUTONOMY/SELF-EXPRESSION
This Part first defines and contextualizes the two leading free
speech principles underlying free speech jurisprudence in the
United States. Second, it illustrates how these two free speech jus-
tifications emerge throughout right not to speak case law.
Two distinct principles have traditionally supported the primacy
of free speech in liberal democratic society. The first is the belief
that free speech will spark debate and thus serve as a major cata-
lyst for political democratic discourse. This principle, first articu-
lated by John Stuart Mill, and appropriated by American legal
theorists and courts, is the marketplace of ideas. The second, com-
peting principle is the "autonomy/self-expression" principle that
stresses more individualistic values, such as individual choice and
self-determination, and views free speech as critical to human emo-
tional and intellectual fulfillment.
A. The Marketplace of Ideas
Before analyzing the marketplace of ideas in American theory
and jurisprudence, it is useful to begin with some primary concepts
from an earlier text, John Stuart Mill's On Liberty."° Three con-
10. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Alburey Castell ed., Crofts Classics 1947).
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cepts from Mill's work are fundamental to analysis of the right not
to speak. The first is the central concept of liberty of thought and
expression that Mill's work envisions;11 the second is the adver-
sarial nature of this conception of liberty;12 and the third is its em-
phasis on "more speech" and corresponding low tolerance for
silence. 3
For Mill, freedom of thought and discussion was a touchstone of
liberty. 14 The freedom to form, hold and voice one's opinions
played a central role in social evolution toward a great, objective
and discoverable truth.15 Mill also considered this freedom essen-
tial to determining the limits of state interference in individual lib-
erty.16 "[T]o find that limit," Mill wrote, "and maintain it against
encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human
affairs, as protection against political despotism."' 7 According to
this model of liberty, government encroachment on individual free-
dom is a fundamental evil to be resisted.'"
This freedom of thought and expression served several purposes
for Mill. The first was truth-seeking: liberty creates and maintains
an open forum where ideas, both true and false, can be voiced.19
As a result, true ideas will prevail over false ones because, by hear-
ing both a proposition and its refutation, people can test true ideas,
thus tempering and strengthening them.20 Second, liberty of
thought and expression enables individuals to discover and correct
mistakes, thus allowing society to evolve:2' "[w]rong opinion and
practices gradually yield to fact and argument. ' 22 Last, liberty re-
buts a presumption of infallibility in deeply held ideas and beliefs.23
This rebuttal results in healthy abandoning of outdated ideas and
signals acceptance of true ideas where untrue ones earlier pre-
vailed, while also enabling people to hold fast to ideas that were
11. See infra text accompanying notes 14-24.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 25-28.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 46-50.
14. See MILL, supra note 10, at 15-16.
15. See id. at 16.
16. See id. at 5.
17. Id.
18. See id. at 9-10.
19. See id. at 20.
20. See id. at 47.
21. See id. at 20.
22. Id. at 19. This idea would be echoed with characteristic eloquence sixty years
later by Justice Holmes in the observation that "time has upset many fighting faiths
.... .Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
23. See MILL, supra note 10, at 52.
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true from the outset, all through the test of aggressive and public
debate.2 4
Next, Mill's concept of a free speech principle is adversarial.
By definition, this model requires that more than one voice be
heard in the marketplace and even encourages these voices to con-
flict. If truth is to be found through the expression of different
ideas and opinions, it follows that "it has to be made by the rough
process of a struggle between combatants fighting under hostile
banners. '26 This adversarial, almost "Darwinian '2 7 model of truth-
seeking helps to discern not merely that an idea is true, but also
exactly why it is true: on what grounds it defends itself, and where
its weaknesses lie.28 Mill's conception of liberty thus finds little vir-
tue in silence or unheard speech, regardless of whether the silence
is imposed by the state or by the free will of the individual.2 9
Within this paradigm, then, one who refuses to speak has withheld
her opinion and expression from the marketplace; and all humanity
has lost by not having the benefit of these ideas. 30 This paradigm
therefore elevates dissent and places a premium on expression, no
matter how unfounded, despicable or untrue the idea behind it
may be.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 47.
26. Id.
27. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN & JESSE H. CHOPER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 15 (1996).
28. See MILL, supra note 10, at 21 ("Strange it is, that men should admit the valid-
ity of the arguments for free discussion, but object to their being 'pushed to an ex-
treme'; not seeing that unless the reasons are good for an extreme case, they are not
good for any case.").
29. Id. at 16. Mill states that:
[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is rob-
bing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who
dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is
right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if
wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception
and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.
Id.
30. Id. at 48-52. As Mill observes:
[wihen there are persons to be found, who form an exception to the appar-
ent unanimity of the world on any subject, even if the world is in the right, it
is always probable that dissentients have something worth hearing to say for
themselves, and that truth would lose something by their silence .... Not the
violent conflict between parts of the truth, but the quiet suppression of half
of it, is the formidable evil; there is always hope when people are forced to
listen to both sides; it is when they attend only to one that errors harden into
prejudices, and truth itself ceases to have the effect of truth, by being exag-
gerated into falsehood.
Id. at 48, 52.
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1. The Marketplace of Ideas in American Legal Theory
Early American jurists and legal theorists incorporated Mill's
concept of a marketplace of ideas into their framework for a free
society.31 Three aspects of this free speech principle are critical.
First, the marketplace of ideas places itself almost entirely at the
service of the public, rather than private, interest. The marketplace
is primarily a political tool, instrumental to the ultimate goal of
either truth-seeking (in Mill's model) or self-governance (in con-
temporary American theory). 32 Second, it serves the listener in in-
formation-sharing, promoting free discussion and trade of ideas.33
Third, it invariably prizes "more speech" over less or none.34
The American concept of the marketplace of ideas eventually
abandoned Mill's truth-seeking goal in favor of a more political
conception of the marketplace.35 Instead of striving after an ulti-
mate, discoverable truth through the marketplace and its different
voices, the American version of the marketplace of ideas found its
justification in political terms.36
31. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 n.3 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring) ("If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this union or change its
republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which
error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it." (quoting
Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address)); C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY
AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 6-24 (1989) (discussing the early adoption and continuing
validity of Mill's marketplace of ideas to American legal theory and jurisprudence).
32. See infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT 88 (1948). Meiklejohn argues that:
[n]o one can deny that the winning of the truth is important for the purposes
of self-government. But that is not our deepest need. Far more essential, if
men are to be their own rulers, is the demand that whatever truth may be-
come available shall be placed at the disposal of all the citizens of the com-
munity. The First Amendment is not, primarily, a device for the winning of
new truth, though that is very important. It is a device for the sharing of
whatever truth has been won.
Id.
36. See id. Meiklejohn further notes that:
[The First Amendment's] purpose is to give to every voting member of the
body politic the fullest possible participation in the understanding of those
problems with which the citizens of a self-governing society must deal ....
The primary purpose of the First Amendment is, then, that all the citizens
shall, so far as possible, understand the issues which bear upon our common
life. That is why no idea, no opinion, no doubt, no belief, no counter belief,
no relevant information, may be kept from them.
Id. at 88-89.
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This First Amendment principle, therefore, is entirely at the ser-
vice of the public: the highest aim of free speech, and of the princi-
ple that protects it, is to promote democratic self-government
through discussion of political issues and rigorous public debate.
Within this paradigm, "[t]o be afraid of ideas, any idea, is to be
unfit for self-government. ' 37
Many courts and scholars have criticized the marketplace of
ideas as a viable First Amendment principle,38 charging that the
concept serves all categories of protected speech, not merely those
concerning political debate. 39 While the marketplace of ideas the-
ory today recognizes that speech may not be solely for political
purposes,n0 it protects only that speech concerning public issues
and debate.4 ' Accordingly, one commentator has written that,
"[s]peech is valued so importantly in the Constitution... not be-
cause it is a form of self-expression or self-actualization but rather
37. Id. at 27; see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969) (not-
ing that a goal of the First Amendment is to "produc[e] an informed public capable of
conducting its own affairs" (citing J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 32 (R. McCallum ed. 1947))).
38. Shiffrin and Choper cite several scholars who criticize the marketplace of
ideas. See SHIFFRIN & CHOPER, supra note 27, at 15-18. Some of their arguments
include: 1) that people are socialized early on to accept society's political/economic
institutions and therefore that "processes of critical judgment are short-circuited," id.
at 16 (quoting CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 207 (1977)); 2) that
different levels of economic and political influence in the marketplace can lead to
market distortion, see id. (citing LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 786 (2d ed. 1988)); and 3) that the marketplace of ideas under-emphasizes other
important free speech values such as the value of dissent, see id. at 17 (citing STEVEN
H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990)), and the
value of free speech to the individual as opposed to society as a whole, see id. (citing
Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 4-
5 (1984)). Professor Vincent Blasi notes that the concept of truth-seeking is suscepti-
ble of many different meanings for different kinds of people. See Vincent Blasi, Free
Speech and Good Character, 46 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1567, 1568 (1999). For some de-
fenses of the marketplace model, see BAKER, supra note 31, at 6-24, 37-46.
39. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) (noting that
while a fundamental purpose of the First Amendment "was to protect the free discus-
sion of governmental affairs," an abundance of Supreme 'Court cases also find that
expression about "philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, [and] ethical mat-
ters" comprises a "nonexhaustive" list of other kinds of expression receiving "full
First Amendment protection" (citations omitted)).
40. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 35, at 61-62.
41. See id. at 94.
The guarantee given by the First Amendment is not, then, assured to all
speaking. It is assured only to speech which bears, directly or indirectly,
upon issues with which voters have to deal - only, therefore, to the consid-
eration of matters of public interest. Private speech, or private interest in
speech, on the other hand, has no claim whatever to the protection of the
First Amendment.
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because it is essential for collective self-determination. '4 2 Thus,
the marketplace concept of First Amendment liberty prizes public
values promoting self-government, over individualistic ones.
Another important aspect of the marketplace of ideas is its em-
phasis on information-sharing and audience rights.43 This aspect of
the marketplace of ideas comes as a necessary consequence of the
principle's conception and application: because the marketplace
encourages free and open debate in a public forum, it follows that
each member of the audience will have a wider range of ideas and
information from which to choose in making his or her own deci-
sions about the issue at hand.44 This facet of the marketplace of
ideas thus serves the public interest by encouraging multifarious
voices to be heard, thereby creating a more intelligent and in-
formed citizenry.45
Last, the concept of "more speech" is central to the marketplace
of ideas.46 "More speech" means that under the marketplace of
ideas paradigm, more speech, never less, is the remedy for false or
untrue speech. In this way, false or untrue ideas will always be
countered by new and different ones, and will eventually be de-
feated. It follows, therefore, that one who withholds (or is forced
by regulation from withholding) discussion and debate from the
marketplace of ideas, refrains from the civic discourse that the the-
ory encourages.47 This "more speech" tenet of the marketplace of
42. Fiss, supra note 7, at 2 ("[T]his view [the protection of free speech from en-
croachment by the state] is predicated on a theory of the First Amendment and its
guarantee of free speech that emphasizes social, rather than individualistic, values.
The freedom the state may be called upon to foster is a public freedom.").
43. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) ("By
protecting those who wish to enter the marketplace of ideas from government attack,
the First Amendment protects the public's interest in receiving information." (cita-
tions omitted)).
44. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 31, at 67 (noting that the jurisdiction behind the
marketplace of ideas model of free speech is to protect "the interest in the listener's
receipt of information").
45. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 8 ("The constitutional guarantee of
free speech 'serves significant societal interests' wholly apart from the speaker's inter-
est in self-expression. By protecting those who wish to enter the marketplace of ideas
from government attack the First Amendment protects the public's interest in receiv-
ing information." (citations omitted)); see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 390 (1969) ("It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, polit-
ical, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial .... ").
46. See generally, BAKER, supra note 31, at 7-9 (discussing the "more speech" con-
cept within the marketplace of ideas framework).
47. See id. at 7 (noting in discussing the marketplace of ideas that "[r]egulation of
speech would only undermine the discovery and recognition of truth and impede wise,
well-founded decision making").
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ideas is best illustrated by Justice Brandeis' Whitney v. California48
concurrence, when he argued that the state should be permitted to
regulate only speech that poses a "clear and present danger" so
imminent as to inhibit more speech; that is, leaving no further "op-
portunity for full discussion."4 9 Brandeis' "clear and present dan-
ger" test derives directly from the marketplace of ideas because it
allows the government to regulate that speech which poses a threat
to the "more speech" principle. Thus, under the second prong of
Brandeis' test, a danger is "present" if it precludes opportunity for
"more speech" or further discussion.5"
2. The Marketplace of Ideas in American Jurisprudence
The concept of the marketplace of ideas entered American juris-
prudence as a principle of First Amendment liberty in Justice
Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United Staies:51 "[T]he ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas ... the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the com-
petition of the market. '52 This principle, while subject to a great
deal of criticism,53 has consistently been used by the Supreme
Court as a paradigm for positive First Amendment values.54 In a
similar vein, the Supreme Court has also manifested a concern that
the First Amendment be used primarily for public and political
purposes: "Speech concerning public affairs is more than self-ex-
pression,... it is the essence of self-government."55 The Court has
also stated that "there is practically universal agreement that a ma-
jor purpose of [the First Amendment] was to protect the free dis-
48. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
49. Id. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
50. See BAKER, supra note 31, at 7-8 (discussing Brandeis' Whitney concurrence in
the marketplace of ideas context).
51. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
52. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
53. See SHIFFRIN, supra note 27, at 15-18; see also Blasi, supra note 38, at 1568
("Yes, truth is important, but truth seeking is such a different activity for the true
believer, the pragmatist, and the skeptic as to confound any effort to generalize re-
garding the priority to be accorded truth seeking, the role free speech plays in facili-
tating it, and the significance of the many 'market failures' that distort the flow of
ideas and information.").
54. See BAKER, supra note 31, at 7 ("The marketplace of ideas theory consistently
dominates the Supreme Court's discussions of freedom of speech."); see also Whitney,
274 U.S. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Those who won our independence...
believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indis-
pensable to the discovery and spread of political truth .... Believing in the power of
reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law -
the argument of force in its worst form.").
55. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (citations omitted).
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cussion of government affairs. ' 56 Thus the marketplace of ideas
stands as a means, rather than an end,57 toward collective self-gov-
ernment and prizes public values over individualistic ones.
B. Autonomy/Self-Expression
The First Amendment principle that competes most directly with
the marketplace of ideas is the one that elevates human autonomy
and self-expression over other, more public values. Although this
notion of autonomy/self-expression shares many concepts with
general Fourteenth Amendment autonomy,58 most courts locate
this right - as it pertains to individual freedom of thought, con-
science and expression - within the First Amendment.59 Central
to this concept of First Amendment freedom is the idea that the
individual is free to choose her own method of self-expression.6 °
As such, it is a free speech principle that views the individual con-
science and self-fulfillment as an end unto itself, in contrast to the
marketplace principle that views freedom of speech as instrumen-
tal to the ultimate goal of either truth-seeking or democratic self-
government.6' The autonomy principle thus sets up a First Amend-
ment theory that focuses primarily on individual freedom.62 In
56. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 259 (1974) (White, J., con-
curring) (citations omitted).
57. See Fiss, supra note 7, at 2-3; Ingber, supra note 38, at 4-5 (noting that courts
invoke the marketplace of ideas theory because it benefits society and not merely
individual speakers, and thus "relegates free expression to an instrumental value, a
means toward some other goal, rather than a value unto itself").
58. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 97 (1980) (Powell,
J., concurring) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment also protects expression and
belief); Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
451, 480 (1995) (arguing that due process autonomy applies to right not to speak
cases).
59. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S.
557, 573 (1995) (finding it a rule of protection "under the First Amendment, that a
speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message").
60. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 31, at 52 ("[T]he first amendment values of self-
fulfillment and popular participation in change emphasize the speech's source in the
self, and make the choice of the speech by the self the crucial factor in justifying
protection."); see also Blasi, supra note 38, at 1568 (noting that "liberty to express
one's thoughts and to form them by unrestricted reading and listening is an essential
attribute, it is said, of human autonomy-of what it means to be a self-directed person
possessed of human dignity").
61. See Fiss, supra note 7, at 2-3.
62. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970)
[hereinafter EMERSON, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION]. In this sense, Emerson writes
that:
[F]reedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual self-
fulfillment. The proper end of man is the realization of his character and
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contrast to the marketplace of ideas, the autonomy principle con-
siders the freedoms the First Amendment grants as ends unto
themselves, promoting human intellectual fulfillment, rather than
solely as means of promoting social change and growth.63 Most
proponents of this First Amendment principle thus distinguish it
from the marketplace of ideas.64
Other First Amendment scholars define autonomy in terms of
individual choice and emphasize self-determination. 65 In this con-
text, a person is "sovereign in deciding what to believe and in
weighing competing reasons for action. He must apply to these
tasks his own canons of rationality, and must recognize the need to
defend his beliefs and decisions in accordance with these canons. 66
Furthermore, an autonomous person is one who "cannot accept
without independent consideration the judgment of others as to
what he should believe or what he should do."'67 This notion of
individual autonomy is not inconsistent with government regula-
tion, but holds as its central tenet the idea that an autonomous in-
dividual is one who chooses when and how to submit to
government authority.68 Thus, the autonomy principle can be de-
potentialities as a human being. For the achievement of this self-realization
the mind must be free. Hence suppression of belief, opinion, or other ex-
pression is an affront to the dignity of man, a negation of man's essential
nature.
Id.
63. But see Fiss, supra note 7, at 83 (noting that "[tlhe autonomy protected by the
First Amendment and rightly enjoyed by individuals and the press is not an end in
itself, as it might be in some moral code, but is rather a means to further the demo-
cratic values underlying the Bill of Rights").
64. See BAKER, supra note 31, at 24 ("This perspective, however, is quite different
from that of the classic marketplace of ideas theory."); see also Fiss, supra note 7, at 3
(noting that "[a] distinction is thus drawn between a libertarian and a democratic
theory of speech .... The libertarian view-that the First Amendment is a protection
of self-expression-makes its appeal to the individualistic ethos that so dominates our
popular and political culture").
65. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 137-38 (characterizing one aspect of au-
tonomy as simply "right-a recognition of individual dignity-to let people choose
their own path"); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 204, 216 (1972) ("An autonomous person cannot accept without independ-
ent consideration the judgment of others as to what he should believe or what he
should do.").
66. Scanlon, supra note 65, at 215.
67. Id. at 216.
68. Id. ("An autonomous man may, if he believes the appropriate arguments, be-
lieve that the state has a distinctive right to command him .... What is essential to the
person's remaining autonomous is that in any given case his mere recognition that a
certain action is required by law does not settle the question of whether he will do
it.").
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fined in terms of individual choice or self-mastery, allowing indi-
viduals to be "authors of the narratives of their own lives."69
Last, in contrast with the marketplace of ideas principle, the au-
tonomy theory allows and even encourages individuals to remain
silent,70 rather than promoting more speech as in the Millian 71 or
American jurisprudential models.72
The autonomy view, that the First Amendment protects individ-
ual self-expression, therefore, conflicts with the theory of a First
Amendment that protects speech as a means toward achieving self-
government and which prizes individualistic values over collective
ones.
C. The Marketplace of Ideas and Autonomy Principles in Right
Not to Speak Case Law
This section begins discussion of the right not to speak cases and
illustrates how these two First Amendment paradigms, the market-
place of ideas and autonomy/self-expression, function within each
case. The autonomy and marketplace of ideas principles often con-
flict in right not to speak cases. The autonomy principles in these
cases can be defined as those in which a speaker's interest lies
either in silence or in freedom from forced association with an idea
she finds repugnant.73 Marketplace principles, on the other hand,
serve the interests of those speakers who want to be able to speak
freely; thus, the marketplace principle is the one that encourages
more speech, enables democratic self-government, and prizes pub-
lic or collective values over individual self-realization or self-ex-
pression.74 In the discussion that follows, the argument that a case
is decided based on marketplace principles means that the Court
reached a result that would provide for more speech, rather than
69. SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 138.
70. See BAKER, supra note 31, at 24 (noting that "[w]hat is important is not that
everything worth saying be said .. . .[r]ather, the important concern is that society
deny no one the right to speak").
71. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S.
557, 576 (1995) (observing that "when dissemination of a view contrary to one's own
is forced upon a speaker intimately connected with the communication advanced, the
speaker's right to autonomy over the message is compromised").
74. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (noting that
"[i]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail .... It is the right of the public to receive
suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences
which is crucial here").
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upholding the right not to speak, which is identified more with an
autonomy interest.
The first and still central articulation of the autonomy principle
informing the right not to speak is found in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette,75 in which the Supreme Court in-
validated a state law requiring elementary school students to salute
the American Flag. The Court held that the Board of Education's
actions "transcend[ed] constitutional limitations on [its] power and
invade[d] the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose
of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all
official control."76 The Court also invalidated the state's invasion
on each child's "freedom ... to be vocal or silent according to his
conscience or personal inclination."77 The Court concluded that
"[t]o sustain the compulsory flag salute we are required to say that
a Bill of Rights which guards the individual's right to speak his own
mind, left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what
is not in his mind."78 Thus, in Barnette the negative free speech
autonomy/self-expression values of choice, self-mastery and indi-
vidual freedom of conscience, prevailed over affirmative market-
place of ideas principles. In this case, a decision based on
marketplace of ideas principles would have let the Board of Educa-
tion's regulation stand, and perhaps would have urged the children
or families who were offended by the speech to counter it with
more speech of their own.
In Wooley v. Maynard,79 the Court continued to apply autonomy
principles in the right not to speak context. 80 The plaintiffs, who
brought suit challenging a New Hampshire law that required non-
commercial vehicles to bear the state's motto, "Live Free or Die,"
on their license plates,81 invoked their right not to speak under the
First Amendment.82 The Court found that New Hampshire could
75. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
76. Id. at 642 (striking as unconstitutional a West Virginia Board of Education
order requiring children in public schools to say the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag).
77. Id. at 646 (Murphy, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 634.
79. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
80. See id. at 715 (reasoning that the First Amendment invalidates state efforts to
coerce private speech).
81. See id. at 707 (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 263:1 (Supp. 1975)). The Court
also noted that another New Hampshire statute made it a misdemeanor to "know-
ingly [obscure] the figures or letters on any number plate." Id. (citing N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 262:27(c) (Supp. 1975)).
82. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 ("We begin with the proposition that the right of
freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes
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not compel private individuals to carry its motto, "Live Free or
Die," on their family automobile's license plates.83 "The First
Amendment," the Court wrote, "protects the right of individuals to
hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to
foster ... an idea they find morally objectionable. ' '84 This reading
of the First Amendment therefore values an individual, autonomy
principle over a collective, marketplace of ideas theory. A market-
place of ideas reading of the same case would perhaps have en-
couraged the plaintiffs to counter the state's speech with their own.
In the years following Barnette and Wooley, the Supreme Court
confronted the issue of the right not to speak in three cases involv-
ing the news media. In these cases, the Court balanced the right of
the public to the free and unfettered exchange of ideas that the
press promotes on the one hand, and the principles of editorial au-
tonomy on the other.
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,85 the Court applied the
marketplace of ideas as its principal First Amendment justification
in unanimously upholding a right of reply statute requiring radio
stations to supply airtime to political candidates who had been at-
tacked by their opponents on the air.86 The Court noted that "it is
the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather
than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be
by government itself or a private licensee."87 The right of reply in
this case would further the "more speech" interest of the market-
place of ideas since it would enable more voices to be heard by the
public.
Five years later, however, in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo,88 on facts similar to Red Lion's, the Court went in the
other direction. A newspaper challenged a Florida statute requir-
both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all." (citing
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943))).
83. See id. at 717. The plaintiff in this case, a Jehovah's Witness, described his
objection to New Hampshire's "Live Free or Die" motto thus: "Although I obey all
laws of the State not in conflict with my conscience, this slogan is directly at odds with
my deeply held religious convictions .... I believe that life is more precious than
freedom." Id. at 717 n.2.
84. Id. at 715.
85. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
86. See id. at 400-01.
87. Id. at 390 (citations omitted).
88. 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking as unconstitutional a Florida statute requiring
newspapers to afford political candidates a right to reply to editorials that attack the
candidate's personal character).
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ing it to afford political candidates a right to reply to attacks on
their "personal character or official record."89 The Court invali-
dated the mandatory access statute. 90 In so doing, it rejected the
marketplace of ideas argument proffered by the state,91 and instead
accepted the editorial autonomy argument of the newspaper.
92
The Court based its decision on editorial, not individual, auton-
omy, holding that the marketplace of ideas interest held out by the
state in its mandatory right of reply statute could not defeat the
newspaper's editorial autonomy interest in deciding what to print
in its own pages.93 The Court defined the marketplace interest in
terms of the press' interest in unfettered freedom of information in
the service of the public, noting that "[the First Amendment] rests
on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of infor-
mation from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the
welfare of the public, that a free press is a condition of a free
society."94
Last in the line of media cases, in Turner Broadcasting System
Inc. v. FCC,95 a group of cable television operators brought suit
challenging the constitutionality of a federal "must-carry" provi-
sion which required the cable networks to carry some local broad-
cast channels. 96 The Court swung back to a Red Lion-type
rationale when it found the provisions constitutional. 97 It accepted
a marketplace of ideas argument in noting an important govern-
mental interest in "promoting widespread dissemination of infor-
mation from a multiplicity of sources. ' 98 The Court also noted,
however, that "[a]t the heart of the First Amendment lies the prin-
ciple that each person should decide for himself the ideas and be-
liefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence." 99
This opinion again expressed concern that autonomy not be in-
89. Id. at 244.
90. See id. at 257-58.
91. See id. at 257 ("[Tjhere is practically universal agreement that a major purpose
of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs."
(citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966))).
92. See id. at 258 (concluding that "[t]he Florida [right to reply] statute fails to
clear the barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion into the function of
editors").
93. See id.
94. Id. at 252 (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
95. 512 U.S. 622 (1994) ("TBS I"), affd on reh'g, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) ("TBS H").
96. See TBS H, 520 U.S. at 180.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 189.
99. TBS I, 512 U.S. at 641 (citing West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 638, 640-642 (1943)).
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fringed, but this time in the wider context of cable television
media.100
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,10 1 associational free-
dom, another aspect of individual autonomy, prevailed over the
marketplace interest asserted by a union.10 2 In this case, the State
of Michigan had enacted legislation permitting unions to exact
dues from members that were used in part to fund a number of
social and political activities that the plaintiff union members did
not support.10 3 The Court found the legislation unconstitutional,
noting that, "at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that
an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free
society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his con-
science rather than coerced by the state."104 The Court accepted
the "negative association" argument advanced by the union mem-
bers protesting the dues on the grounds that they had been prohib-
ited, "not from actively associating, but rather from refusing to
associate" with the speech the union supported. 0 5
100. See id. at 627.
101. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
102. See id. at 234-35.
103. See id. at 211.
104. Id. at 234-35. Similarly, in mandatory student activities' fees cases, the inter-
ests advanced by universities in support of the fees is often buttressed by marketplace
of ideas values. See, e.g., Carroll v. Blinken, 957 F.2d 991, 999 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding
that a public university could constitutionally assess students an activities fee and not-
ing that a valid interest advanced by the university was the stimulation of campus
debate); see also cases cited infra note 105.
105. Abood, 431 U.S. at 234 ("The fact that appellants are compelled to make,
rather than prohibited from making, contributions for political purposes works no less
an infringement of their constitutional rights."); see also Southworth v. Grebe, 151
F.3d 717 (1998), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3496 (U.S. Mar. 29, 1999) (No. 98-1189)
(finding that a public university's use of a portion of mandatory student activity fees
to fund private organizations that engaged in political and ideological activities,
speech, and advocacy violated free speech rights of students who objected to such
funding); Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1 (1990) (holding that California State Bar's
use of compulsory dues to finance political and ideological activities with which mem-
bers disagreed violated their First Amendment right of free speech when such ex-
penditures were not necessarily or reasonably incurred for purpose of regulating legal
profession or improving quality of legal services). But see Glickman v. Wileman Bros.
& Elliot, 521 U.S. 457 (1997) (upholding Secretary of Agriculture order requiring
California fruit growers to pay dues to fund generic advertising); Lehnert v. Ferris
Faculty Assoc., 500 U.S. 507 (1991) (finding that a union could constitutionally charge
activities to dissenting employees if activities are "germane" to collective bargaining
activity, are justified by government's interest in labor peace and avoiding "free rid-
ers," and do not add significantly to burdening of free speech inherent in allowance of
agency or union shop).
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Autonomy principles also prevailed in Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
v. Public Utilities Commission of California.'0 6 In this case, a pri-
vately owned utility, Pacific Gas, brought suit challenging a Cali-
fornia Public Utilities Commission ("PUC") order that required
Pacific Gas to carry the newsletter of a third party public interest
group in its monthly billing statements.10 7 The Court held the or-
der unconstitutional, and found, based on autonomy principles,'
0 8
that the PUC could not constitutionally dictate the content of Pa-
cific Gas's speech.109 The Supreme Court thus refused to sacrifice
Pacific Gas's autonomy right to PUC's marketplace of ideas argu-
ment that having more speech available to the public always fulfills
the First Amendment mandate.
The Court applied a similar analysis in Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group,1' 0 when it considered the claim
of the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston
("GLIB") to be included as marchers in Boston's St. Patrick's Day
Parade."' The Court unanimously concluded that the speaker's
choice of whether or not to voice views or opinions should remain
with the speaker, and not the government. 1 2 Accordingly, "when
dissemination of a view contrary to one's own is forced upon a
speaker intimately connected with the communication advanced,
the speaker's right to autonomy over the message is compro-
mised."' 3 The parade organizers therefore did not have to allow
GLIB to join in the parade.' 4 Furthermore, the Court reempha-
sized a "fundamental rule of protection under the First Amend-
ment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his
own message."' 1 5 The purpose was to "shield just those choices of
106. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
107. See id. at 4.
108. See id. at 11 (noting that "[j]ust as the State is not free to 'tell a newspaper in
advance what it can print and what it cannot,' the State is not free either to restrict
[Pacific Gas's] speech to certain topics or views or to force [it] to respond to views
that others may hold" (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n,
413 U.S. 376, 400 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting))).
109. See id.
110. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
111. See id. at 559.
112. See id. at 575 ("[W]hatever the reason [to disagree with a certain point of
view], it boils down to the choice of a speaker not to propound a particular point of
view, and that choice is presumed to lie beyond the government's power to control.").
113. Id. at 576.
114. See id. at 580-81.
115. Id. at 573 (stating that "one important manifestation of the principle of free
speech is that one who chooses to speak may also decide what not to say" (quoting
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S 1, 16 (1986))).
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content" that one decides are right or wrong according to individ-
ual conscience.' 16
In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,1 17 however, the Court
took the opposite tack, and based its decision on marketplace prin-
ciples rather than autonomy ones." 8 A California state constitu-
tional provision provided that "[e]very person may freely speak,
write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects." 119 The
Court held that, under this state-level free speech provision, the
plaintiff did not have the right to exclude from its private property
a group of high school students who had set up a table to petition
and pass out pamphlets soliciting opposition to an anti-Zionist
United Nations resolution.12 0 The speakers' positive right to speak
was more compelling in this instance than the shopping center's
right not to speak or to be associated with the speech of the stu-
dents.12 ' The Court distinguished the holding in Wooley by observ-
ing that the message in that case was the government's own (New
Hampshire's "Live Free or Die" motto). 22 In contrast, the
message in PruneYard was that of other private speakers and there
was "no danger of governmental discrimination for or against a
particular message. 1 2 3 Thus, the right of the shopping center not
to speak in PruneYard was outweighed by the marketplace princi-
ple that had motivated the state constitutional provision, namely,
to strengthen affirmative First Amendment values and encourage
more debate.12 4
As these cases illustrate, two First Amendment principles have
achieved preeminence in American legal theory and jurisprudence
in the last century: the marketplace of ideas and autonomy/self-
expression. The contrast between these two paradigms is the
source of the tension behind right not to speak cases. The market-
place of ideas, on the one hand, encourages more individuals to
speak, be heard and engage in the free trade of ideas. The auton-
omy interest, on the other, allows individual speakers to either re-
main silent, or to not be associated with or foster speech they do
116. Id. at 574.
117. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
118. See id. at 87-89 (rejecting the shopping center's contention that it was being
compelled to affirm a belief in any position that the government had prescribed).
119. Id. at 79-80 n.2.
120. See id. at 77.
121. See id. at 88.
122. See id. at 87 (observing that in Wooley the message being prescribed was the
government's own).
123. Id.
124. See id. at 88.
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not support. In these cases, with the exception of Barnette and
Wooley, the right not to speak is usually buttressed by autonomy
concerns, while the positive right to speak is often justified by the
marketplace of ideas principle, urging more speech.
IH. RIGHT NOT TO SPEAK CASES AND THE CONFLICT WITH
GOVERNMENT ACCESS STATUTES
This Part first examines present resolution of right not to speak
cases, and, second, illustrates the conflict between these two speech
principles created by access statutes in each case.
A. Current Method of Resolving Right Not to Speak Cases
The Supreme Court currently resolves right not to speak cases
by determining whether certain factors and risks are present in
each case, weighing these and balancing the burden on one speaker
against the right of the other not to speak.
The Court isolates and weighs several factors in deciding right
not to speak cases. First, it examines whether there is a "ventrilo-
quism" problem, the probability that the speech in question is
likely to be taken as that of the speaker, or the danger that it will
be misattributed to another speaker.125 Related to this point is the
question of whether there is a practical possibility of disclaimer,
that is, whether a speaker who desires that the speech not be mis-
takenly attributed to her can easily disclaim it.126 Also related to
the ventriloquism problem is the issue of whether avenues of dis-
sent are open to the speaker.127 A second factor is whether the
speaker is a natural person or a corporation.1 28 Third, the nature
125. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S.
557, 577 (1995) ("Without deciding on the precise significance of the likelihood of
misattribution, it nonetheless becomes clear that in the context of an expressive
parade ... the parade's overall message is distilled from the individual presentations
along the way, and each unit's expression is perceived by spectators as part of the
whole.").
126. See id. at 576 (considering whether or not "there is [a] customary practice
whereby private sponsors disavow 'any identity of viewpoint' between themselves and
the selected participants").
127. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980) (taking
into consideration that "[owners of the shopping center] can expressly disavow any
connection with the message by simply posting signs in the area where the speakers or
handbillers stand. Such signs, for example, could disclaim any sponsorship of the
message and could explain that the persons are communicating their own messages by
virtue of state law").
128. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 34-36
(1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that "[Pacific Gas] is not an individual or a
newspaper publisher; it is a regulated utility. The insistence on treating identically for
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of the property interest in the speech and the forum in which it
occurs, whether private or public, also affects the Court's deci-
sion.12 9 . Fourth, in cases involving the media in particular, the
Court considers the degree of editorial control traditionally allot-
ted to the speaker. 13°
Two threshold issues should be noted here. The first is that all
cases discussed in this section are ones in which the government
has attempted, through access-broadening statutes or state-level
First Amendment provisions, to expand the marketplace of ideas
by making more speech forums available to the public. The second
is that the speakers in each case are private individuals and not
government actors.
1. The Ventriloquism Problem, the Risk of Misattribution and
the Possibility of Disclaimer
A risk of ventriloquism occurs when there is potential for a
message to be misattributed to another speaker because of mis-
taken association with the speech. Often, the possibility of dis-
claiming the speech can alleviate the risk of ventriloquism.
Accordingly, some right not to speak cases carry a relatively high
risk of ventriloquism and a correspondingly low possibility or feasi-
bility of disclaimer. For example, the ventriloquism problem in
Abood lay in the central claim of the dissenting union members.13 '
They invoked their right of association to avoid "compulsory subsi-
dization of ideological activity"' 32 with which they disagreed. The
union members had no opportunity to disclaim except through
their lawsuit, illustrating their reluctance to foster speech they did
not support.
constitutional purposes entities that are demonstrably different is as great a jurispru-
dential sin as treating differently those entities which are the same").
129. See, e.g., PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87 (noting that "the shopping center by choice
of its owner is not limited to the personal use of appellants. It is instead a business
establishment that is open to the public to come and go as they please").
130. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); Miami Herald
Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969).
131. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977) (noting that "[t]he
fact that the [union members] are compelled to make, rather than prohibited from
making, contributions for political purposes works ... an infringement of their consti-
tutional rights").
132. Id. at 237; see also Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717, 729 (7th Cir. 1998)
(discussing Abood and compelled subsidization and concluding that while hateful
speech may have "a place in our society [the] Constitution does not mandate that
citizens pay for it").
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Ventriloquism problems also arise in false, or mistaken, associa-
tion cases. In Pacific Gas, for example, the Court did not explicitly
consider the ventriloquism problem, but found that the PUC's or-
der133 impermissibly burdened Pacific Gas's right not to speak
under the same kind of right of association argument that prevailed
in Abood.134 Under PUC's orders, the privately-owned utility
would be forced to foster speech it did not support.135 The Court
held this burden on Pacific Gas unconstitutional partly because the
privately-held utility was "required to carry speech with which it
disagreed, and might well feel compelled to reply or limit its own
speech in response.' 1 36 Thus, the Court concluded, the access or-
der impermissibly required Pacific Gas to associate with speech it
did not support.137 The Court further found that this kind of forced
dissemination and association with "potentially hostile views" ran
the risk of forcing Pacific Gas to "speak where it would prefer to
remain silent.' 138
In Hurley, the Court found a high risk of ventriloquism and a
low possibility of disclaimer. 139 Hence, the parade organizers, who
received funding from the City of Boston, had a right to exclude
GLIB's expressive marching.140 Forcing the parade to include
GLIB's message therefore presented an unconstitutional infringe-
ment on its autonomy interest. 14 1 The Court recognized a signifi-
cant ventriloquism problem in Hurley because the parade was
made up of a variety of messages, each contributing to a "common
theme.' 1 42 As such, the Court found that the "likelihood of misat-
tribution" 143 was high because the "overall message is distilled
from the individual presentations along the way, and each unit's
expression is perceived by spectators as part of the whole.'1 14 Sim-
ilarly, the possibility of a disclaimer here was very low because it
133. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
134. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 234.
135. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1986).
136. Id. at 11 n.7.
137. Id. at 12.
138. Id. at 18.
139. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 577
(1995).
140. Id. at 576 (observing that "when dissemination of a view contrary to one's own
is forced upon a speaker . . . [her] right to autonomy over the message is
compromised").
141. See id. at 576.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 577.
144. Id.
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was impractical. In fact, the Court specifically noted that "such dis-
claimers would be quite curious in a moving parade. 145
In contrast, the PruneYard Court found, without explanation,
that the risk of misattribution of the message was low, 146 presuma-
bly because the shopping center was open to the public and there-
fore each member of the public would naturally assume that views
expressed by a table of teenagers distributing leaflets and gathering
signatures were not those of the shopping center. The Court also
noted the high possibility of a disclaimer or disavowal of the
message by the shopping center, so that it would not be mistakenly
imputed to the owner. 147 Thus, it would be reasonably feasible for
a shopping center to put up signs disassociating its views from
those expressed by the public.141
Similarly, in the TBS cases, the Court found that because it was
usual for broadcasters to disclaim any "identity of viewpoint" be-
tween the station and the channels using the facility, there was "lit-
tle risk" that audiences would mistakenly assume that the opinions
expressed by the stations were those of the broadcasters. 4 9 The
Court also noted, however, that cable networks traditionally and
historically served as "conduits" and therefore, there was a low risk
of ventriloquism. 5 °
2. Identity of the Speaker: Corporation or Natural Person
Another important factor the Court considers in resolving right
not to speak cases is the identity of the speaker, whether a corpora-
tion or natural person. As a general proposition, most jurists agree
that corporations have positive free speech rights-that is, as cor-
porate entities, they are entitled to speak with one corporate voice
according to their preferences."' Justices disagree, however, on
the issue of whether corporations should be accorded the same au-
145. Id.
146. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980) ("[T]he views
expressed by members of the public ... will not likely be identified with those of the
owner.").
147. See id. at 87.
148. See id.
149. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994).
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978) (noting that
"[w]e find no support in the First or Fourteenth Amendments, or in the decisions of
this Court, for the proposition that speech that otherwise would be within the protec-
tion of the First Amendment loses protection simply because its source is a corpora-
tion ....").
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tonomy rights as natural people or associations. 52 Justice Powell
notes that, in Pacific Gas, for example, "speech does not lose its
protection because of the corporate identity of the speaker. 115 3
Powell found that for both positive and negative aspects of speech,
corporate speakers are protected by the First Amendment. 154 Jus-
tice Rehnquist's dissent in the same case, however, argued that a
corporate speaker's negative free speech right of autonomy should
not be protected. 155 While acknowledging that the affirmative cor-
porate right to speak is protected by the First Amendment,' 56
Rehnquist argued that protection does not extend to the right not
to speak.1 57 He reasoned that the right not to speak is informed by
autonomy principles; because corporations have no interest in au-
tonomy or self-expression in the way natural people do, they have
no corresponding First Amendment right not to speak.151
Rehnquist contended that this argument was even more persua-
sive in the case of Pacific Gas because the utility company was a
152. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group, 515
U.S. 557, 573-74 (1995); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8
(1986). But see Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 34 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
153. See Pacific Gas, 475 U.S at 16.
154. See id. ("Were the government freely able to compel corporate speakers to
propound political messages with which they disagree, this protection would be
empty, for the government could require speakers to affirm in one breath that which
they deny in the next. It is therefore incorrect to say ... that our decisions do not
limit the government's authority to compel speech by corporations.").
155. See id. at 33-34 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
156. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 765 (holding invalid under the First Amendment a Massa-
chusetts criminal statute prohibiting banks or business corporations from making con-
tributions or expenditures to influence voters). In his Pacific Gas dissent, Justice
Rehnquist noted that Bellotti held that "the First Amendment prohibits the govern-
ment from directly suppressing the affirmative speech of corporations." Pacific Gas,
475 U.S. at 27 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
157. See Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 33 ("In extending positive free speech rights to
corporations [in Bellotti], this court drew a distinction between the First Amendment
rights of corporations and those of natural persons. It recognized that corporate free
speech rights do not arise because corporations, like individuals, have any interest in
self-expression." (citation omitted)).
158. See id. at 33-34 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist observes that:
Extension of the individual freedom of conscience decisions to business cor-
porations strains the rationale of those cases beyond the breaking point. To
ascribe to such artificial entities an "intellect" or "mind" for freedom of con-
science purposes is to confuse metaphor with reality .... The interest in
remaining isolated from the expressive activity of others, and in declining to
communicate at all, is for the most part divorced from this "broad public
forum" purpose of the First Amendment.
Id.; see also Greene, supra note 58, at 482 (arguing that autonomy rights are personal
and thus should not extend to corporate entities).
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regulated monopoly,159 and thus had given up its autonomy interest
to the authority that governed it. He therefore concluded that au-
tonomy rights are "purely personal" extending only to individuals
and perhaps to newspapers. 160
3. Nature of the Property Interest: Private or Public
In resolving right not to speak cases, the Court also examines the
nature of -the property interest at stake in the litigation. In
PruneYard, for example, the nature of the property interest was a
critical factor in the Court's decision-making. 161 In contrast to the
family car in Wooley, the Court found in PruneYard that the shop-
ping center was open to members of the public "to come and go as
they please "162 and had thus acquired a public character in contrast
to the private nature of the Maynard's personal property.163 In his
concurrence, Justice Powell argued that merely because property in
a given situation may be public in character, the property owner
did not surrender his right to decline to foster speech with which he
did not agree. 64 In this sense, Powell found no meaningful distinc-
tion between the property interest advanced by the Maynards in
their family car and that asserted by the shopping center owner. 65
Powell argued that "'[a] system which secures the right to prosely-
tize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee
159. See Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 34 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Any claim [Pacific
Gas] may have had to a sphere of corporate autonomy was largely surrendered to
extensive regulatory authority when it was granted legal monopoly status.").
160. Id. But see Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515
U.S. 557, 574 (1995) (observing that "the rule's [that the speaker has the right to tailor
the speech] benefit [is not] restricted to the press, being enjoyed by business corpora-
tions generally"); Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 8 (noting that "[t]he identity of the speaker
is not decisive in determining whether speech is protected. Corporations and other
associations, like individuals, contribute to the 'discussion, debate, and the dissemina-
tion of information and ideas' that the First Amendment seeks to foster" (citations
omitted)).
161. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80-85 (1980).
162. Id. at 87.
163. See id.; see also Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 25 (Marshall, J., concurring) (finding
that the incursion onto the PruneYard's property interest in that case was "slight"
while the intrusion on Pacific Gas's property interest was greater). But see
PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 90 (Marshall, J., concurring) (arguing that because of the
prominence of shopping mall culture in this country that this case is similar to others
in which shopping malls were regarded as "effectively replacing the State with respect
to such traditional First Amendment forums as streets, sidewalks, and parks"); Bren-
nan, State Constitutions, supra note 7, at 496, n.45.
164. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 97 (Powell, J., concurring).
165. See id. at 97-98 n.1 ("property [does not] lose its private character merely be-
cause the public is generally invited to use it for designated purposes" (citations
omitted)).
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the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts' ..... This
principle on its face protects a person who refuses to allow use of
his property as a marketplace for the ideas of others. ' 166
4. Editorial Autonomy: Media Cases
Three cases in the Supreme Court's right not to speak jurispru-
dence concern the media and the constitutional validity of enforced
"right of access" statutes under federal, state or local laws.167 In
these cases, the Court has looked to factors distinct from those in
other right not to speak cases. These include editorial auton-
omy,1 68 spectrum scarcity 169 and monopoly concerns caused by
spectrum scarcity.170 For example, in Red Lion the editorial auton-
omy argument failed when a radio broadcaster argued that broad-
casters would be "irresistibly forced to self-censorship and their
coverage of controversial public issues will be eliminated or at least
rendered wholly ineffective" under the right of reply statute.17'
Spectrum scarcity was an important factor in that case 72 and led
the Court to find the marketplace aspect more important than the
autonomy right not to speak argument put forth by the radio, be-
cause there was a limited quantity of broadcasting frequencies,
thus limiting speakers' access to these media. 173
In Tornillo, concern for editorial autonomy prevailed over fears
of monopoly in the Court's decision finding an enforced right of
166. See id. (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)).
167. See Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 652 (1994) (upholding as
constitutional, in the cable industry context, "must-carry" provisions which required
cable television channels to carry broadcast television channels); Miami Herald Publ'g
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 241 (1974) (finding unconstitutional a Florida criminal
statute requiring newspapers which attacked political candidates to allow free space
for reply); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1969) (upholding as
constitutional a federal law which required a radio station to provide airtime for re-
sponse to personal attacks).
168. See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 261 (White, J., concurring) ("[Tihe First Amendment
[never] permitted public officials to dictate to the press the contents of its news col-
umns or the slant of its editorials.").
169. Spectrum scarcity is a peculiar physical characteristic of radio that renders it
more regulable because of the limited number of radio frequencies, while there are
potentially unlimited newspaper and cable television outlets. See Red Lion, 395 U.S.
at 398 ("The radio spectrum has become so congested that at times it has been neces-
sary to suspend new applications.").
170. See id. at 389.
171. Id. at 393.
172. See id. at 396-401.
173. See id. at 380 ("Th[e] mandate to the FCC to assure that broadcasters operate
in the public interest is a broad one .... ").
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access provision unconstitutional.174 In this case, the editorial au-
tonomy argument prevailed as it had not in Red Lion.175 Evaluat-
ing a right of reply statute,176 the Court reasoned that if the statute
were upheld, newspaper editors might "conclude that the safe
course is to avoid controversy . . . . Therefore . . . political and
electoral coverage would be blunted or reduced."' 77 Thus, the
Court found that the Florida statute failed to "clear the barriers of
the First Amendment because of its intrusion into the function of
editors.' 1 78 Editorial autonomy is analogous to individual auton-
omy in this context, in the sense that editorial decision-making
must be protected under the First Amendment from government
intrusion lest editorial discretion be chilled.
B. Government Access Statutes and the Conflict in Right Not
to Speak Cases
This section examines the phenomenon of government access
statutes in right not to speak cases. It observes that, with the ex-
ception of Barnette and Wooley, all the cases present instances of
some form of access statute. These access statutes reflect a legisla-
tive deliberation by federal, state or local governments to act af-
firmatively to expand opportunities for free speech and debate. As
such, they fulfill the positive marketplace of ideas mandate to open
more speech forums, either for truth-seeking or for democratic
self-government purposes.
These access statutes, this Note argues, lie at the root of the con-
flict between the two First Amendment principles discussed above:
the marketplace of ideas and the autonomy principles.179 This con-
flict emerges from the tension between the government's twin
goals in these cases: to both respect negative autonomy principles
and also to expand access to speech forums and facilitate robust
debate through affirmative free speech marketplace principles.
Accordingly, in requiring or allowing one entity to give access to a
second one in the way these access provisions require, the statutes
set up an opposition between the positive right to speak in one
speaker, and the negative right not to speak in another. Thus, the
174. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-57 (1974).
175. See id. at 261 (White, J., concurring) ("[T]his law runs afoul of the elementary
First Amendment proposition that government may not force a newspaper to print
copy which, in its journalistic discretion, it chooses to leave on the newsroom floor.").
176. See supra note 167.
177. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257.
178. Id. at 258.
179. See supra Part I.
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conflict between the two speech rights, one informed by positive
marketplace principles, and the other by negative autonomy ones,
is created by the access provisions present in each case.
Before examining this conflict in the law, a critical distinction,
the one between government promotion of speech, on the one
hand, and government participation in speech markets, on the
other, should first be drawn.
1. The Distinction Between Government Promotion
and Participation
The conflict that access statutes create between the autonomy
principle and the marketplace of ideas is not problematic when the
government is an active participant in the speech forum rather than
a mere facilitator or promoter of speech. Whether the government
acts as participant in a speech market or as a mere promoter is the
essence of the distinction between cases like Wooley and Barnette,
on the one hand, and the right not to speak cases that remain, on
the other. The distinction between government "promotion" and
"participation" is therefore critical to this analysis.181 While both
Barnette and Wooley are decided on autonomy/self-expression
principles, and uphold a right not to speak they are not access stat-
ute cases because the government has not opened more forums for
the speech of other private parties. Rather, it has sought to use the
property of private individuals to promulgate its own message.18 1
These cases therefore present examples of government participa-
tion: instances where the government seeks to enter the speech
market by coercing unwilling private citizens to voice its
sentiments.
Government promotion of speech, on the other hand, involves
an effort on the part of state or local governments to create more
opportunities for speech, make more speech forums available to
more speakers and generally fulfill the positive marketplace of
ideas mandate of more speech and robust public debate. Access
provisions facilitate more speech in the marketplace of ideas by,
180. See Thomas I. Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA.
L. REv. 795, 799 (1981) [hereinafter Emerson, Affirmative Side].
181. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) ("New Hampshire's statute
in effect requires that [the plaintiffs] use their private property as a 'mobile billboard'
for the State's ideological message - or suffer a penalty .... "); West Virginia State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.").
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for example, opening more speech forums or by legislating above
the constitutional minimum prescribed by the federal First Amend-
ment provision.18 2 Far from discouraging this type of activist legis-
lation, many Justices have applauded it as a "healthy trend of
affording state constitutional provisions a more expansive interpre-
tation than [the Supreme] Court has given to the Federal Constitu-
tion."' 83 As argued below,18 4 government promotion of speech in
the form of access statutes implicates the conflict in right not to
speak cases after Barnette and Wooley.
(a) Barnette and Wooley: Government Participation in
Speech Markets
In both Barnette and Wooley, only one private speaker's interest
is at stake.' In both cases, it is the government's message that is
imposed on the reluctant speakers. Simply put, the government in
these cases has dictated the required speech, 86 thereby engaging in
speech itself rather than merely promoting it. Accordingly, these
cases involve no positive speech right,'87 only the negative right not
to speak of the private speaker. Thus, these two cases prove useful
to this analysis only insofar as they highlight right not to speak au-
tonomy and illustrate how important this "sphere of intellect and
182. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (bringing suit
under a California constitutional provision protecting speech and petitioning);
Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 241 (bringing suit under a Florida statute requiring newspapers
to afford political candidates a right to reply to editorials attacking the candidate's
personal character); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (bringing suit
under an FCC provision which required radio stations to provide "equal time" for
response to personal attacks); see also Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 7, at
495 ("Of late, however, more and more state courts are construing state constitutional
counterparts of the Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens of their states even more
protection than the federal provisions, even those identically phrased.").
183. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 91 (Marshall, J., concurring); see also id. at 85 (noting
that the State of California had an "interest in promoting more expansive rights of
free speech and petition than conferred by the Federal Constitution"); Brennan, State
Constitutions, supra note 7, at 491 ("The legal revolution which has brought federal
law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of
state law - for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.").
184. See infra Part II.B.l.a.
185. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713 (citing statement of Plaintiff George Maynard: "I re-
fuse to be coerced by the State into advertising a slogan which I find morally, ethi-
cally, religiously and politically abhorrent.").
186. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87 (interpreting Wooley as "a case in which the
government itself prescribed the message [and] required it to be displayed openly on
[Maynard's] personal property").
187. For the purposes of this discussion, this analysis assumes that the government
has no affirmative speech right in this context. A full discussion of whether, and
when, the government does have this right is beyond the scope of this Note.
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spirit"18 is within the Court's First Amendment principle. They
are analytically distinct from the remaining right not to speak cases
and illustrate the difference between government participation in
speech (Barnette and Wooley) and government promotion of
speech markets and forums (those cases that remain).
(b) Government Access Statutes: Government Promotion
of Speech
Each right not to speak case decided after Barnette and Wooley
involves an instance of the federal, state or local government either
requiring or allowing more speech forums to be opened through an
access statute. Furthermore, in each case, the access statute trig-
gers the cause of action.
In PruneYard,189 the access statute took the form of a California
state constitutional provision providing that "[e]very person may
freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of the right."1 90 In Red Lion,191 the
FCC imposed a fairness doctrine on radio broadcasters that re-
quired radio stations to send a "tape, transcript, or summary of the
broadcast to [the opposing party] and [to] offer [him or her] reply
time. 1 92 The Court called the FCC regulations "affirmative obli-
gations, 193 and noted that broadcasters must operate in the public
interest.1 94 In Tornillo, a Florida right of reply statute provided
that "if a candidate for nomination or election is assailed regarding
his personal character or official record by any newspaper, the can-
didate has a right to demand that the newspaper print, free of cost
any reply the candidate may make to the newspaper's
charges." '95 In the TBS cases, the access statute that sparked the
conflict was the FCC's must-carry provision requiring cable televi-
sion operators to carry local broadcast stations on their cable net-
works.1 96 Similarly, in Abood the State of Michigan had enacted
access legislation permitting unions and government employers to
agree to "Agency Shop Clauses," which exacted dues from mem-
188. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
189. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
190. Id. at 79 n.2.
191. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
192. Id. at 372.
193. Id. at 378.
194. See id. at 379-80 ("The [FCC] is specifically directed to consider the demands
of the public interest in the course of granting licenses and renewing them[.]").
195. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 244 (1974).
196. See Thrner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 622 (1994).
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bers and which were in turn used to support a number of different
activities. 197 Likewise, in Pacific Gas the statute granting access
was the California Public Utilities Commission's order that Pacific
Gas & Electric, a private utility, place the newsletter of a third
party public interest group in its own billing envelopes. 198 Last, in
Hurley, GLIB sought access to Boston's St. Patrick's Day Parade
under a Massachusetts public accommodations law.199
These are examples of access statutes, by which the federal, state
or local government goes beyond the First Amendment's negative
prohibition against encroachment on protected free speech rights,
and acts affirmatively in expanding opportunities for speech rights,
opening up more speech forums, and encouraging debate. Gener-
ally these statutes fulfill the positive marketplace of ideas mandate
that debate be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."2" These
state statutes also reinforce the marketplace of ideas notion that
more speech, never less, is a remedy for all free speech ills.2' Fur-
thermore, these acts are taken in the name of affirmative market-
place values because access statutes always increase opportunities
for public speech and debate. 02
While many scholars and courts applaud and encourage these
statutes,2°3 many also have recognized the problematic aspects of
access legislation in the context of a constitution made up of nega-
tive liberties. 2 4 The infringement of negative autonomy rights in
right not to speak cases, this Note argues, is a manifestation of this
problematic aspect of a positive liberty approach to our negative
Constitution. Before an examination of the conflict this approach
causes in right not to speak cases, however, it is instructive to re-
view the fundamental political theory underlying positive and neg-
ative liberty and its application in American legal discourse.
197. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 213 (1977).
198. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 1 (1986).
199. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557,
575 (1995). A public accommodations law like the one in Hurley has an equal protec-
tion aspect to it, when contrasted with a First Amendment provision or a right to
reply statute; however, as the Court put it, "once the expressive character of both the
parade and the marching GLIB contingent is understood, it becomes apparent that
the state courts' application of the statute had the effect of declaring the sponsors'
speech itself to be the public accommodation." Id. at 573.
200. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
201. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 194; see also Fiss, supra note 7, at 18-19 (noting that speech
regulation that tries to "preserve the fullness of debate" should be allowed, since it
seeks to "further the democratic values that underlie the First Amendment itself").
203. See generally Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 7.
204. See infra Part 11.3.
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2. Positive and Negative Liberty
The question of whether government access legislation is permis-
sible under the First Amendment is essentially one of positive and
negative liberty, a theory that recognizes that liberty has two fun-
damental aspects: "freedom to" and "freedom from. 2 0 5 This dual
aspect of liberty is central to the question of government power
and the state's ability to compel individuals:
The first of these political senses of freedom or liberty[,] which I
shall call the 'negative' sense, is involved in the answer to the
question 'What is the area within which the subject-a person or
group of persons-is or should be left to do or be what he is able
to do or be without interference of other persons.' The second,
which I shall call the positive sense, is involved in the answer to
the question 'What, or who, is the source of control or interfer-
ence that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than
that?'
206
American jurists have generally recognized that the Constitution
is a source of negative and not positive liberties.0 7 The Supreme
Court has also recognized that the Constitution envisioned by the
Founders was one of non-interference, founded on principles of
laissez-faire. °8 Some legal scholars, however, have argued that the
First Amendment in particular is a source of positive as well as
negative liberties.2 0° These positive liberty interpretations of the
First Amendment derive from the marketplace of ideas princi-
205. See generally Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, reprinted in FOUR Es-
SAYS ON LIBERTY (1958).
206. Id. at 121-22.
207. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 204
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("No one.., has asked the Court to proclaim that, as
a general matter, the Constitution safeguards positive as well as negative liberties ....
The Court's baseline is the absence of positive rights in the Constitution.").
208. For example, the Court in Barnette has noted that,
[t]hese principles [those embodied in the Bill of Rights] grew in soil which
also produced a philosophy that the individual was the center of society, that
his liberty was attainable through mere absence of governmental restraints,
and that government should be entrusted with few controls and only the
mildest supervision over men's affairs.
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639-40 (1943).
209. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 47 (observing that "the First Amendment
... is not entirely a negative right. It has positive dimensions as well. Those positive
dimensions consist of a command to government to take steps to ensure that the sys-
tem of free expression is not violated by legal rules giving too much authority over
speech to private people."); Emerson, Affirmative Side, supra note 180 (arguing that
"[t]raditionally, the first amendment, like other provisions of the Bill of Rights, has
operated primarily as a negative force in maintaining the system of freedom of ex-
pression. It has served to prevent the government from prohibiting . . . speech or
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ple.21° The First Amendment, in addition to prohibiting govern-
ment from placing impermissible restraints on speech, also can be
interpreted to require or enable the government to affirmatively
create and maintain open speech forums.211 It therefore can be
read to contain not only a negative prohibition against government
interference, but also an affirmative mandate or capacity to estab-
lish "essential preconditions for collective self-government by mak-
ing certain that all sides are presented to the public."' 212 Similarly,
other jurists have concluded that the government's role in promot-
ing this kind of free and open debate consists not merely in a nega-
tive "freedom from" interference, but also in affirmative "positive
government acts designed to furnish the preconditions for auton-
omy. '213 In this sense, the positive "more speech" mandate of the
First Amendment is used as a sword to ensure that more speech is
available in the marketplace of ideas.214 The other side of the coin,
however, shields a speaker, enabling her to withhold her speech
from the marketplace if she so desires. Government access statutes
emerge, therefore, when the government, by either requiring or al-
lowing a private actor to foster speech, seeks to create more speech
forums in the name of the marketplace of ideas. 215
These government access statutes therefore emerge from affirm-
ative "penumbras" in the ordinarily negative prohibition of the
First Amendment. In this context the historical role of the govern-
other forms of communication .... There is growing concern now, however, with the
affirmative side of the first amendment.").
210. See Fiss, supra note 7, at 18 (noting that "[t]he state, moreover, is honoring
those claims [of citizen groups for an opportunity to participate in public debate] not
because of their intrinsic value or to further self-expressive interest but only as a way
of furthering the democratic process. The state is trying to protect the interest of the
audience-the citizenry at large-in hearing a full and open debate on issues of public
importance.").
211. See id.
212. Id.
213. SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 138.
214. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 251 (1974) ("Propo-
nents of enforced access to the press take comfort from language in several of this
Court's decisions which suggests that the First Amendment acts as a sword as well as a
shield, that it imposes obligations on the owners of the press in addition to protecting
the press from government regulation").
215. As an interesting semantic note in this context, it is instructive to observe that
many state-level First Amendment provisions (examples of government access stat-
utes) are positively worded, in contrast to the negative wording of the Federal Consti-
tution's First Amendment prohibition against "abridging the freedom of speech."
U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. See Emerson, Affirmative Side, supra note 180, at 797. See
also, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 77 n.2 (1980) (bringing suit
under a State of Michigan constitutional provision granting each citizen the right to
"freely speak, write, and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects").
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ment as a danger to be guarded against shifts: "the traditional
framework rests upon the old liberal idea that the state is the natu-
ral enemy of freedom, [but] now we are being asked to imagine the
state as the friend of freedom. 2
16
3. Government Access Statutes in the Right Not to
Speak Context
Imagining the state as the "friend" of free speech, however, is
not without attendant problems. As one scholar has noted, posi-
tive governmental intervention in the First Amendment has a "de-
cided tendency" to aggravate "distortions in the system.
217
Foremost among these distortions is the creation of a conflict in
right not to speak cases between positive speech rights, grounded
in the marketplace of ideas, and negative ones, grounded in auton-
omy. As Justice Powell, concurring in PruneYard observed, "state
action that transforms privately owned property into a forum for
the expression of the public's views could raise serious First
Amendment questions. 218
These kinds of "questions" arise because in many instances a pri-
vate speaker who would rather remain silent, or not run the ven-
triloquism risk of being associated with speech she does not
support, is burdened either by speech mistakenly imputed to her
(the ventriloquism problem) or by a pressure to respond. In
PruneYard, for example, the government access statute was a state
First Amendment provision.219 The positive First Amendment
right to speak was asserted in the name of the marketplace of
ideas, which would encourage more speech in this case by allowing
the students to petition and thus benefit the shoppers who heard
the speech.22° The negative autonomy right, on the other hand,
was that of the owner of the shopping center, protesting the use of
his private property for promulgation of someone else's
message.221 His autonomy was threatened not only by the risk of
the students' message being misattributed to him, but also by the
pressure to respond that being compelled to carry the message im-
posed. The state's affirmative legislation, the "essential precondi-
216. Fiss, supra note 7, at 19.
217. Emerson, Affirmative Side, supra note 180, at 797.
218. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 97 (Powell, J., concurring).
219. See id. at 79-80 n.2 ("Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or
her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right." (quoting
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2)).
220. See id. at 90-92 (Marshall, J., concurring).
221. See id. at 85-87.
10332000]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
tion for self-government," therefore created the conflict between
marketplace and autonomy principles that animates the case.222
The same two First Amendment principles were in conflict in
Pacific Gas where PUC's access requirement ordered Pacific Gas
to place TURN's newsletter in its billing envelopes.223 Here the
positive marketplace interest in expanding speech forums per-
tained to PUC, and through it, to TURN.224 PUC had an interest
in creating more speech in the marketplace, and TURN had an
interest in promulgating its own message.225 Pacific Gas, relying on
autonomy principles, brought suit to defend its negative autonomy
right not to be associated with speech it found objectionable. 226
Last, in Hurley, the marketplace of ideas and the autonomy in-
terest conflicted in the context of a positive use of the Massachu-
setts public accommodations law.227 GLIB, which wanted to march
as part of Boston's St. Patrick's Day Parade, asserted the market-
place interest in robust debate.228 On the other side, the Veteran's
Council that organized the parade asserted its autonomy interest in
the right not to speak or be compelled to incorporate a message in
its private parade with which it did not agree.229 The Court de-
cided in favor of the Veteran's Council on autonomy grounds, not-
222. See id. at 98 (Powell, J., concurring). Indeed, as Justice Powell phrased it,
"even when no particular message is mandated by the State, First Amendment inter-
ests are affected by state action that forces a property owner to admit third-party
speakers. In many situations, a right of access is no less intrusive than speech com-
pelled by the State itself." Id.
223. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 5 (1986).
224. See id. at 8 (noting that the Court had previously overturned statutes in which
"the State sought to abridge speech that the First Amendment is designed to protect,
and that such prohibitions limited the range of information and ideas to which the
public is exposed").
225. See id. at 6-8.
226. See id. at 11 (observing that "the State is not free either to restrict [Pacific
Gas's] speech to certain topics or views or to force [it] to respond to views that others
may hold" (citations omitted)).
227. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557,
561 (1995). The law prohibits "any distinction, discrimination or restriction on ac-
count of ... sexual orientation ... relative to the admission of any person to , or
treatment in any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement" MAss. GEN.
LAws ch. 272, § 98 (1992).
228. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 570 (noting that "[GLIB's] participation as a unit in the
parade was ... expressive. GLIB was formed for the very purpose of marching in it
... in order to celebrate its members' identity as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual
descendants of the Irish immigrants, to show that there are such individuals in the
community, and to support the like men and women who sought to march in the New
York parade").
229. See id. at 574 (observing that "[the Parade's] claim to the benefit of this princi-
ple of autonomy to control one's own speech is as sound as the South Boston parade
is expressive").
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ing that "when dissemination of a view contrary to one's own is
forced upon a speaker intimately connected with the communica-
tion advanced, the speaker's right to autonomy over the message is
compromised. 230
This case, however, does not involve a government access statute
like, for example, the state-level First Amendment provision in
PruneYard; rather, the government access in this case was a Massa-
chusetts public accommodations law, enacted after the Civil War to
ensure equal access to public accommodations without regard to
race.231 Interestingly, the Hurley Court found that GLIB's use of
the public accommodations law "had the effect of declaring the
[Veteran Council's] speech itself to be the public accommoda-
tion. ' 232 The Court refused to accept this use of the public accom-
modations law as an access statute for First Amendment
purposes.233 It found instead that this use violated the Parade or-
ganizer's right not to speak, noting that "it boils down to the choice
of a speaker not to propound a particular point of view. 234
Right not to speak cases thus illustrate the conflict between mar-
ketplace principles and autonomy ones occasioned by government
access statutes. In order to strike an appropriate balance of posi-
tive and negative speech interests, the remaining part of this Note
argues, as a threshold matter, that violation of the right not to
speak triggers the First Amendment and that the right therefore
deserves First Amendment protection. This Note concludes by
suggesting methods to avoid some constitutional dangers that gov-
ernment access legislation can create, while still encouraging this
kind of access-widening legislation to promote more speech in the
marketplace of ideas.
III. FUTURE RESOLUTION OF RIGHT NOT TO SPEAK CASES
Because a conflict exists between affirmative and negative free
speech rights in the context of government access statutes, sugges-
tions for resolution must reconcile these interests and not infringe
either the affirmative or negative free speech rights of any one
230. Id. at 576.
231. See id. at 571. The scope of the law was later broadened to prohibit discrimi-
nation on the basis of "race, color, religious creed, national origin, sex, sexual orienta-
tion .. .in the admission of any person to, or treatment in any place of public
accommodation, resort or amusement." Id. at 572 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272,
§ 98).
232. Id. at 573.
233. See id.
234. Id. at 575.
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speaker. This Part proposes three methods to reconcile both inter-
ests, not infringe on negative autonomy interests, and still allow
government access provisions. Before examination of these meth-
ods, however, this section first seeks to dispel an objection and ad-
dress a fundamental premise of right not to speak doctrine,
namely, that compelled speech, by infringing on an autonomy
right, triggers First Amendment protection.
A. Compelled Speech Always Triggers the First Amendment
When the government acts to broaden First Amendment liber-
ties, it must be sensitive to the autonomy rights of those who wish
not to speak or to have their property used to foster speech with
which they do not agree. This Note has argued thus far that this
conflict between positive and negative First Amendment values is
especially apparent in the right not to speak area.235 This argument
rests, however, on the premise that compelling a speaker to
"mouth" words she does not agree with or with which she does not
want to associate always triggers First Amendment protection. The
argument that certain kinds of compelled speech do not trigger
First Amendment. protection, as long as certain conditions sur-
rounding the speech are met, has been made by Abner S.
Greene.236
Professor Greene's argument proceeds as follows: the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment covers both speech and
certain acts that are deemed "expressive. ' 237 For an act to be ex-
pressive in this context, it must communicate to the reasonable ob-
server some aspect of the speaker's "internal mental state, such as
beliefs, attitudes, or convictions. 2 38 Within this framework, the
right not to speak is the right not to reveal one's "internal mental
state, 239 or, put differently, the right not to "share with others
what is 'on [one's] mind."' 240 Greene reasons, however, that not
all acts that involve speech require expression of the speaker's
mind; that is, a speaker could be compelled by law to speak in the
same way that she is compelled to use a left turn signal when turn-
ing.241 Greene concludes that whether or not the speech triggersFirst Amendment protection depends on the perception of the rea-
235. See supra Part II.
236. See generally Greene, supra note 58.
237. Id. at 473.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. (citations omitted).
241. See id.
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sonable observer. If the reasonable observer could ascertain that
the speech was compelled and therefore "dissociated from the
speaker, then the speech affirms nothing, declares nothing, and ex-
presses nothing. ' 24 2 In this case, the First Amendment is not trig-
gered. If, on the other hand, the reasonable observer would not
perceive the speech as compelled, that is, would be unable to ascer-
tain whether or not the speaker had revealed her mind, then First
Amendment scrutiny is triggered.243 Greene also adds a second
prong to his test for whether First Amendment scrutiny is trig-
gered-whether the government has left open channels of
dissent.244
Thus, in cases in which both (1) the speech is reasonably per-
ceived as compelled by the observer, and (2) avenues of dissent are
open to the speaker, Greene argues that the "speech" no longer
deserves First Amendment protection because it is not expres-
245sive. In these cases, Greene suggests, the speaker is "merely fol-
lowing the law, which happened to involve a speech act. '246 These
speech acts do not trigger Free Speech Clause scrutiny since the
Free Speech Clause protects only that speech or act which is ex-
pressive.247 Speech of this order is "externally motivated 248 and
therefore does not impermissibly burden either the speaker's or
the listener's autonomy interest in any way that the First Amend-
ment protects. Greene finds instead that a speaker's right not to
speak or to be compelled to merely "mouth" insincere words, can
be protected by the speaker's autonomy interest outside of the
First Amendment.249
Contrary to Greene's arguments, however, this Note maintains
that the First Amendment always protects an individual's auton-
omy interest. Requiring the utterance of specific speech, even if
reasonably perceived as compelled, offends this autonomy interest
242. Id. at 475.
243. See id. at 473-74.
244. See id. at 476.
245. See id. at 473-78.
246. Id. at 474.
247. See id. at 473 ("For an act to be considered expressive, and thus worthy of
prima facie protection under the Free Speech Clause, that act must involve (or appear
to a reasonable observer to involve) the communication of the speaker's internal
mental state, such as her beliefs, attitudes, or convictions.").
248. Id. (citation omitted).
249. See id. at 480-81 (arguing that an autonomy/personhood argument in this con-
text would be similar to the autonomy arguments recognized by such cases as Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309 (1994), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
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for a number of reasons. First, labeling a verbal or symbolic act as
"action" rather than "speech" has traditionally been a way to allow
regulation of speech since it simply re-defines the "speech" as ac-
tion, and therefore beyond the scope of First Amendment protec-
tion.250 Governmental prohibitions on action are, of course, much
less closely scrutinized than those on speech. 51 In this sense, re-
classification of speech as action is roughly analogous to the argu-
ment that pornography is a non-cognitive form of speech, that it
does not "appeal to deliberative capacities about public matters, or
about matters at all," and is therefore undeserving of the same pro-
tections afforded to speech and other expressive behavior by the
First Amendment. 252 As one commentator viewing speech re-clas-
sification in a different context has noted, however, this method is
not always useful to First Amendment analysis since it "masks all
the hard judgments that the First Amendment requires. '253 These
kinds of "hard judgments" would include, for example, determin-
ing whether compelling speech adequately justifies invasion of a
person's autonomy interest. In addition, as a result of this line of
reasoning, the government would also be tempted to frame more
arguments about compelled speech in terms of legal speech acts
not protected by the First Amendment.
Second, a problem arises from Greene's assumption that, as a
practical matter, a reasonable observer will always be able to judge
whether the speech is compelled. For example, if the speech were
250. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 807-
08 (1993) [hereinafter Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste] (re-defining pornography as
noncognitive speech because, inter alia, "many forms of pornography are not an ap-
peal to the exchange of ideas, political or otherwise; they operate as masturbatory
aids and do not qualify for top-tier First Amendment protection under the prevailing
theories"); Fiss, supra note 7, at 13 (critiquing Professor MacKinnon's argument
against protecting pornography under the First Amendment because "pornography is
not speech at all but rather action, thus denying it the privileged status accorded to
speech as an especially protected liberty" (citing CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY
WORDS 29-41 (1993))).
251. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 7, at 27-28 (noting that "the state acts in... a regula-
tory manner, issuing commands and prohibitions and using the power at its disposal
to enforce those directives .... Most First Amendment scholars have focused on the
regulatory function of the state and in that context have presented the Constitution as
creating a shield around the street-corner speaker, protecting the individual citizen
from the menacing arm of the policeman.").
252. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, supra note 250, at 807-08. But see David
Cole, Playing by Pornography's Rules: The Regulation of Sexual Expression, 143 U.
PA. L. REV. 111, 126-27 (1994) ("[T]he argument that sexual speech is 'noncognitive'
because it is designed to produce a physical effect is predicated on an impoverished
view of sexuality.").
253. Fiss, supra note 7, at 13.
1038
THE RIGHT NOT TO SPEAK
recorded and played back at a later date, the same observer might
not have the same reaction to the speech. Thus, changing the origi-
nal context of the speech vitiates the basic conditions set by
Greene-that a reasonable observer would know the speech was
compelled and that avenues for dissent were left open. Applying
these conditions therefore requires all subsequent observers to
make the same assumption of non-expression that the original ob-
servers did.25 4
Third, compelled speech violates the speaker's autonomy inter-
est because it creates a "pressure to respond," which is an unconsti-
tutional burden on a protected speech interest grounded in the
speaker's autonomy. This pressure to respond occurs regardless of
whether or not the speaker agrees with the speech. Furthermore,
this violation of the speaker's protected First Amendment interest
is complete at the time the pressure is created; it therefore triggers
First Amendment protection regardless of the speaker's response
to the compulsion to speak. In this scenario, "the right to control
one's own speech may be burdened impermissibly even when lis-
teners will not assume that the messages expressed on private
property are those of the owner [of the property]. 255 This pres-
sure to respond argument is grounded in the dual nature of the
protection that the right not to speak affords: first, the right to
disassociate oneself from speech with which one disagrees, and sec-
ond, the right to control over the right to speak or not to speak at
all. 6 Thus, the right not to speak comprises both the autonomy
right to resist compelled speech and also the absolute right to re-
main silent unless and until one chooses to break that silence.
Fourth, the autonomy right in the First Amendment should not
only address the public's perception of an individual's speech.
Rather, it should afford a basic measure of human dignity, which
compulsion to parrot words violates. In this sense, infringement on
the right not to speak, like violation of the right against self-incrim-
254. Greene's argument assumes that observers (even those at a considerable re-
move in time and space) will be able to discern whether the speech was compelled.
As a practical matter, however, it seems highly improbable that all subsequent ob-
servers would be able to recognize the speech as such.
255. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 100 (1980) (Powell, J., con-
curring) (noting that when a state law requires access to otherwise private property
that the property owner may be "virtually compel[led] ...to respond"); see also
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1986) (observing
that Pacific Gas faced a pressure to respond because the access provision forced it
"either to appear to agree with TURN's views or to respond").
256. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 100 (Powell, J., concurring).
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ination in the Fifth Amendment context,2 5 7 takes away the volun-
tary aspects of speech and discounts, "the importance of ... self-
expressive uses of speech, independent of any expected communi-
cation to others, for self-fulfillment or self-realization. '258 Thus,
defining speech that is not self-expressive as outside of the First
Amendment and placing the burden on the shoulders of the rea-
sonable observer blurs the line between speech and action to a de-
gree that jeopardizes many sincere speech interests that lie at the
core of the autonomy principle of the First Amendment.
Further, drawing the line between expressive speech and speech
acts is difficult. This difficulty arises, for example, in ascertaining
when non-expressive compelled speech becomes expressive. Next,
it can be similarly difficult to determine when the will of the indi-
vidual succumbs to government coercion of her speech. Finally, if
whether speech falls within the ambit of First Amendment protec-
tion is gauged by its effect on listeners and reasonable observers,
then these listeners and observers are also affected by the coercive
power of the government to oblige a person to "mouth" words
whose truth she does not believe.
Last, it is instructive to contrast this "captive speaker" problem
with that of the captive audience. A classic captive audience prob-
lem in First Amendment theory occurs when the government com-
pels a listener to attend to government speech with no actual or
constructive means of escape, such as averting one's eyes or stop-
ping one's ears.2 59 This situation creates unconstitutional restraints
on a listener's First Amendment rights.26 °
On a final note, however, Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wooley
suggests that Greene's argument may gain ground in the future:
257. See generally William A. Nelson, The New Inquisition: State Compulsion of
Therapeutic Confessions, 20 VT. L. REV. 951 (1996) (noting, in the context of thera-
peutic confession cases under the Fifth Amendment, that coerced confessions serve a
rehabilitative, and not evidentiary, purpose).
258. BAKER, supra note 31, at 53.
259. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Lehman v.
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
260. Indeed, as one commentator has noted:
[c]ompulsory listening is the counterpart of compulsory expression of a be-
lief. The requirement that any person entertain a belief, opinion or idea, or
be forced to listen to the government's version of events, is an affront to
dignity and an invasion of autonomy .... Moreover, it is hardly an effective
method for discovering the truth. . . .Indeed, compulsion to listen is the
hallmark of a totalitarian society.
Emerson, Affirmative Side, supra note 180, at 833 (footnote omitted).
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The State has not forced [the Maynards] to "say" anything; and
it has not forced them to communicate ideas with nonverbal ac-
tions reasonably likened to "speech,". . . . The State has simply
required that all noncommercial automobiles bear license tags
with the state motto ... . ; they are simply required by the State,
under its police power, to carry a state auto license tag for iden-
tification and registration purposes .. . .What the Court does
not demonstrate is that there is any "speech" or "speaking" in
the context of this case.26'
Since compelled speech always triggers the First Amendment,
the government must maintain respect for the speaker's autonomy
interest even as it seeks to promote discourse in the marketplace.
B. Future Resolution
Because infringement of an individual's autonomy in the form of
a right not to speak violation triggers First Amendment scrutiny,
this section concludes by suggesting methods for resolution of right
not to speak cases that reconcile the interests of both affirmative
and negative speech in the context of government access legisla-
tion. One possible method to reconcile these interests is to allevi-
ate the "pressure to respond" created by an infringement on
individual autonomy. Another is to insure that when equality prin-
ciples, inherent in the First Amendment,262 drive government ac-
cess provisions, their content-neutrality is assured so that one
speaker's viewpoint is not favored over another, as the First
Amendment forbids. A third method is to limit autonomy rights to
individuals, thereby preempting an autonomy argument in any set-
ting where the speaker who claims an autonomy right not to speak
is either a corporation or an association of speakers made up of
different voices.
These arguments accept, as a threshold matter, that government
access provisions benefit society.263 They provide this benefit in a
number of ways-by promoting a more vigorous system of free
speech; enabling more people to hear different and conflicting
voices; increasing diversity and pluralism; and perhaps most impor-
tantly, facilitating more people to participate who, because of so-
cial, political or economic disadvantages, might otherwise have
261. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 720 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
262. See Fiss, supra note 7, at 9-18..
263. But see id. at 79-81 (noting that cases like Red Lion and Pacific Gas present a
"marked hostility toward the state and a refusal to acknowledge the role the state can
play in furthering freedom of speech").
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remained silent.264 In sum, society accepts that the state "may have
to allocate public resources - hand out megaphones - to those
whose voices would not otherwise be heard in the public
square. "265
In this sense, these access provisions help the government fulfill
the dual role the First Amendment has been interpreted to allow,
namely, to both protect speech and to encourage it.266 Thus, ac-
cepting the premise that government access statutes provide signif-
icant value to our system of government, this Part seeks to strike a
balance between affirmative and negative speech interests against
the backdrop of access legislation.
1. The Pressure to Respond
As noted earlier,267 the pressure to respond is a corollary to the
ventriloquism problem because it arises when a likelihood of misat-
tribution exists, regardless of the reasonable possibility of a dis-
claimer. In this sense, it is a constitutional violation that is
complete at the moment the pressure is created.268 Imagine, for
example, that a state passed a law requiring a store, hospital or
shopping center to supply a bulletin board on which all members of
the public could post signs. In this case, it would be reasonable for
one to assume that the private owner of the forum shared the views
expressed on the board.269 The owner of the forum is now faced
with pressure to respond. She has a choice. She can either act, for
example, by posting a sign expressly disavowing the speech, or she
can do nothing, thereby accepting the risk that others will mistake
the speech for her own. Should the owner choose the first option,
she has been forced to speak though she may have preferred to
remain silent; if she opts for the second, she has been forced to
voice someone else's belief.270 In short, the mere fact that she is at
liberty to disavow the offending speech and the views it espouses
264. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 138 (noting that among the "preconditions
for autonomy" is "provision of diverse opportunities" by the government); Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 34 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) ("The right of access here constitutes an effort to facilitate and enlarge public
discussion; it therefore furthers rather than abridges First Amendment values.").
265. Fiss, supra note 7, at 4.
266. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969) (noting that
the First Amendment is aimed at "protecting and furthering communications").
267. See supra Part III.A.
268. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 98 (1980) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
269. See id. at 99.
270. See id.
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comes after the pressure to respond has been created. The avenue
of disavowal is therefore irrelevant to alleviating the pressure to
respond because the pressure has been created at the moment the
owner is faced with the choice.271 This pressure thus constitutes an
impermissible infringement on the individual's autonomy rights in-
dependent of whether the owner agrees with the speech in
question.
The U.S. Supreme Court has commented on this pressure to re-
spond in Pacific Gas where it stated that "[Pacific Gas] is still re-
quired to carry speech with which it disagree[s], and might well feel
compelled to reply or limit its own speech in response to
TURN's. 27 2 "This kind of forced response," the Court noted in a
different context, "is antithetical to the free discussion that the
First Amendment seeks to foster." '73
Thus, the pressure to respond is a significant intrusion on the
right not to speak; it forces someone to speak when they would
rather remain silent or run the risk of agreeing with the offending
speech. Thus, the pressure to respond transforms an intrusion on
the right not to speak into compelled speech to vocalize that with
which one does not agree. Adequate protection of a right not to
speak, therefore, should insure that a pressure to respond is not
created.
Two safety mechanisms would allow both speakers and drafters
of access legislation to alleviate this pressure. The first is an "antic-
ipatory disclaimer," which would ensure that the pressure to re-
spond is never created. The second is to strengthen "opt-out"
provisions. The second mechanism does not completely alleviate
the pressure, but mitigates some of its deleterious effects.
To completely avoid creating a pressure to respond, a govern-
ment access provision must place the burden of disclaimer on the
positive marketplace speaker. Thus, the beneficiary of the provi-
sion would be required to announce that her ideas are unrelated to
the owner or controller of the forum to which the statute has
granted her access. Requiring such an "anticipatory disclaimer"
would have the effect of alleviating the pressure to respond before
it is created. This objective could be accomplished, for example,
271. See id. (citations omitted); see also Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,
654 (1994) ("[B]y affording mandatory access to speakers with which the newspaper
disagreed, the law induced the newspaper to respond to the candidates' replies when
it might have preferred to remain silent." (citations omitted)).
272. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 11 n.7 (1986).
273. Id. at 2.
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simply by requiring speakers who use the property (the positive
marketplace speakers) whether private or semi-private, to voice or
carry a disclaimer, stating that the viewpoints expressed in the
speech are solely their own and should not be attributed to the
property owners.
Against this argument, it can be asserted that when only private
speakers and not government actors are involved, no protected
speech interest is infringed, since the First Amendment applies
only to government actors. As some have suggested,274 however,
the degree to which a private owner is enabled by a government
access statute to take over a historically governmental function,
such as sponsoring a parade, or providing gas and electricity to
consumers, is the same degree to which that private actor should
be held to the same standards as the government. Therefore, the
First Amendment autonomy infringement created by the pressure
to respond would be actionable in the same way as if perpetrated
by a "true" government actor, such as an elected or appointed gov-
ernment official.
The second method of attenuating the harmful effects of the
pressure to respond is to strengthen the safety mechanisms by
which unwilling speakers can "opt-out" by enforcing disclaimers in
every context. These mechanisms do not avoid the problem of the
pressure to respond entirely, but they do mitigate the effect of
speech upon the owner or controller of a forum. This objective will
be easier in some contexts than in others; much of the determina-
tion dovetails with the traditional and historical understanding of
whether the forum is public or private.
For example, a parade often has a public character, though it can
be privately sponsored. 275 Accordingly, the pressure to respond is
created in this situation because the majority of the public might
assume that the marchers all share one point of view, or at least
that they are sponsored by the city hosting the march, and there-
fore that the city itself favors one message over another. To allevi-
ate this pressure, different marching groups could carry disclaimers
on their banners. As the Court observed in Hurley, this method of
disclaimer is impractical, but it does have the effect of alleviating
274. See Emerson, Affirmative Side, supra note 180, at 810.
275. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557,
560-61 (1995). In Hurley, the Parade had been sponsored by the City of Boston from
at least 1876 through 1947, after which it was privately sponsored by the Veteran's
Council but continued through 1992 to use the City's official seal as well as to receive
direct funding from the City. See id.
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the pressure to respond created by the assumption that some pa-
rades are sponsored by the government.276
This pressure is more easily alleviated in contexts involving pri-
vate property, on which the public is allowed for a limited purpose.
In this sense, one important factor is whether the forum is tradi-
tionally a private or public one. If private, then a disclaimer must
be boldly stated so it is seen, heard, or understood by those who
expect otherwise because of tradition or custom.
2. Government Access Statutes Must Insure Content-Neutrality
Government promotion of speech should support pluralism and
diversity, exemplified by the marketplace of ideas paradigm as well
as by government access provisions that enable these pluralistic
values. The government's opening of speech forums using access
statutes relates to what many have called the "equality aspect" of
the First Amendment. 27 7 This equality component within First
Amendment jurisprudence finds its source in Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process considerations.278 These egalitarian considera-
tions thus illustrate the impetus behind government creation of
opportunity for speech because they present efforts to create
equality in the marketplace of ideas by allowing those a voice who
would otherwise be drowned out by the "louder voices" of those
with greater economic, political, or social power.279
As discussed earlier,28 ° the Court has noted an interesting dis-
tinction between government participation in speech markets and
government promotion of speech. Indeed, the Court has at times
stated that attempts at promotion of speech have the virtue of de-
creasing the risk of the government favoring or disfavoring a par-
ticular message because the state has dictated no specific message
276. See id. at 576-77.
277. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 7, at 18 (suggesting that the equality aspect of the
First Amendment is occasioned by concern with access of groups to speech forums:
"the concern is with the claims of those groups [who might be injured by speech regu-
lation] to a full and equal opportunity to participate in public debate .... The state is
trying to protect the interest of the audience-the citizenry at large-in hearing a full
and open debate on issues of public importance."); BAKER, supra note 31, at 42-43
(discussing liberty and equality in the First Amendment).
278. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 7, at 9-26 (discussing the equality component of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments).
279. See Fiss, supra note 7, at 12-13; Emerson, Affirmative Side, supra note 180, at
802-03 (observing that the equality aspect of the First Amendment acts as a "guaran-
tee that some diversity will be achieved is built into the system").
280. See supra Part II.B.1.
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of its own. 281 This situation contrasts with actual government par-
ticipation in speech markets where the government has a vested
interest in the content of the speech.282
But while access statutes do have many of the virtues outlined
above,283 they also can backfire in the sense that they can facilitate
favoring one message over another. Avoidance of this kind of gov-
ernmental discrimination against one speech in favor of another is
a bedrock principle of First Amendment jurisprudence.284 For ex-
ample, in Pacific Gas, the Court found that the access requirement
requiring Pacific Gas to allow TURN to insert a newsletter in its
billing statement constituted an impermissible infringement on
First Amendment values because it discriminated on the basis of
content.285 Here the Court observed that Pacific Gas had "the
right to be free from government restrictions that abridge its own
rights in order to 'enhance the relative voice' of its opponents. 28 6
The Court concluded that access to the billing envelopes was con-
tent-based,287 and therefore forbidden, because access was limited
to only those who opposed Pacific Gas.288
Similarly, in Hurley the Court disagreed with the state court's
use of the public accommodations law. Here, the Court noted that
the public accommodations law had been rendered an access stat-
ute.289 The Court rejected this use of the statute when discussing
the equality aspect of the First Amendment,29 ° which is ironic, be-
cause the public accommodations law itself had its roots in equal
281. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980) (distinguishing
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), on the ground, among others, that "no spe-
cific message is dictated by the State to be displayed on appellants' property. There
consequently is no danger of governmental discrimination for or against a particular
message.").
282. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
283. See supra notes 263-265 and accompanying text.
284. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 12
(1986).
285. See id. at 13-16.
286. Id. at 14 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 & n.55 (1976)).
287. See id. at 13.
288. See id. The Court here used Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974), to illustrate its point, noting that in that case the right of reply was a content-
based penalty. See Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 13.
289. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557,
573 (1995) ("[O]nce the expressive character of both the parade and the marching
GLIB contingent is understood, it becomes apparent that the state courts' application
of the statute had the effect of declaring the [Parade's] speech itself to be the public
accommodation.").
290. See id. at 572-73.
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protection, Reconstruction-type amendments. 291 The Court noted
that the effect of the public accommodation law in this instance was
to discriminate against certain kinds of speech, i.e., content-based
speech discrimination, because "a speaker who takes to the street
corner to express his views.., should be free from interference by
the State based on the content of what he says. ' 292 Indeed, as the
Court concluded, "[t]he very idea that a noncommercial speech re-
striction be used to produce thoughts and statements acceptable to
some groups or, indeed, all people, grates on the First Amendment,
for it amounts to nothing less than a proposal to limit speech in the
service of orthodox expression. 293
Therefore, when government access provisions are used to shape
the orthodoxy of a message, they can run afoul of the First Amend-
ment's mandate to maintain content-neutrality and thus risk favor-
ing one party's message over another's. They can therefore shape
the content of a message in a way that is antithetical to the First
Amendment.294 As the Court in Hurley observed, "[w]hile the law
is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful behavior,
it is not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than pro-
moting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one,
however enlightened either purpose may strike the govern-
ment., 29
5
Access statutes and state free speech provisions, therefore, re-
quire exercise of great discretion lest they appear to favor one
point of view over another, as in Pacific Gas or Hurley. This goal is
accomplished in part by placing government access provisions
under heightened scrutiny, and by awareness, under traditional
First Amendment doctrine, that they are susceptible to this danger.
Care should also be taken, in the right not to speak context, to
protect the autonomy interests of individual speakers. By protect-
ing and strengthening this autonomy interest, government access
provisions can avoid the danger of favoring one speaker's message
over that of another, as the First Amendment forbids.
291. See id. at 571-73.
292. Id. at 579 (citing Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)).
293. Id. ("While the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful
behavior, it is not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an
approved message or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened either pur-
pose may strike the government.").
294. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 13-16
(1986).
295. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 579.
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3. Autonomy Rights Must Pertain to Individuals
Commentators and jurists have argued that autonomy rights
should not extend to corporations.296 Many problems that arise
when government access statutes infringe on autonomy rights can
be resolved if autonomy rights, here in the form of the right not to
speak, are limited to individuals. Under this scheme, autonomy
rights would be inapplicable to corporate speakers, as well as to
those speakers that, while not corporate in nature, are composed of
different viewpoints. Such a speaker might, for example, be a
parade with different ideological or political contingents in it.
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Pacific Gas argues that negative
First Amendment rights should not be available to corporations.297
His reasoning grows from the notion that corporations only have
positive First Amendment rights because of the listeners' interest
in receiving diverse information in the marketplace of ideas.2 98
Therefore, negative speech rights should not extend to corpora-
tions because they have no individual speaker's interest in auton-
omy or self-expression. 99
Autonomy rights, however, could also be limited to only those
individuals who have a speaker's personal autonomy interest in
self-expression and self-fulfillment, and therefore in a right not to
speak. Under this scheme of a negative First Amendment princi-
ple, Hurley was decided incorrectly because it allowed the auton-
omy interest of the Parade organizers to exclude GLIB's message
from the St. Patrick's Day Parade. As the Court reasoned, "a nar-
row, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitu-
tional protection . . . . [A] private speaker does not forfeit
constitutional protection simply by combining multifarious voices,
or by failing to edit themes to isolate an exact message as the exclu-
sive subject matter of the speech. ' 30 0 A "succinct" message cer-
tainly should not be a precondition of constitutional protection for
296. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 26 (1986)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I [do not] believe that negative free speech rights, appli-
cable to individuals and perhaps the print media, should be extended to corporations
generally."); Greene, supra note 58, at 482 (arguing that the autonomy right should
not extend to corporations or corporate speech); BAKER, supra note 31, at 52 (arguing
that if the speech of a corporation did not represent the views of any "relevant peo-
ple" in the corporation that the liberty theory of speech, in opposition to the market-
place one, would not protect the speech).
297. See Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 33-34 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
298. See id; see also supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
299. See Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 33-34 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
300. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557,
569-70 (1995).
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this kind of "associated" speech in its affirmative aspect; a positive
right should be granted to a parade made up of different voices so
that it can freely speak, or march, in public with a message, or
messages, of its choosing.
Granting a parade the autonomy right to exclude other voices
because of a personal right not to speak, however, quickly becomes
a more suspect endeavor because it undermines the fundamental
purpose of an access statute or free speech provision: to enhance
and expand opportunities for speech. In Hurley, by contrast, the
government access legislation resulted in exclusion of the very kind
of diverse speech that these statutes were enacted to promote. Ac-
cordingly, it can be said that government access legislation runs the
danger, whenever corporate or "associated" speech is present, of
allowing the right not to speak to become a tool for exclusion of
speech such associations find disagreeable. Such content-based
regulation of expression is, of course, antithetical to the First
Amendment. A solution, therefore, is to limit the autonomy right
not to speak to individual speakers only.
Accordingly, a stricter definition of an autonomy right should be
personal to individuals. First, only individuals possess a "sphere of
intellect and spirit"'30 1 that autonomy and negative free speech
rights protect. Second, when governments enact access legislation,
they should do so to create either balance or diversity in speech
forums, not to enable private organizations with often greater eco-
nomic or political power in the marketplace to exclude speech they
find offensive: "governmental intervention for affirmative purposes
must be directed toward expanding, not contracting, the range of
fact and opinion available to the community. '30 2 The goal of pre-
serving an autonomy right from official control is to ensure each
citizen's ability to achieve the kind of self-realization and self-ex-
pression that champions of autonomy rights find necessary to
human intellectual and emotional fulfillment. Therefore, both cor-
porations and "speech" that is composed of a multitude of voices,
yet has no unified point of view, should have no right to this kind
of autonomy interest.
Under this analysis, only those autonomy rights that pertain to
individuals, or to groups of individuals where there is an articulable
message or messages that all members of the organization share,
would stand. In this context, the media cases, Red Lion, °3
301. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
302. Emerson, Affirmative Side, supra note 180, at 804.
303. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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Tornillo,30 4 TBS J,305 and TBS 11,306 would stand as decided, since
the media autonomy right has traditionally been seen as equivalent
to a personal one.3 °7 Abood would also stand under this scheme,
because the Court in that case upheld the individual autonomy
right of the union members to not be compelled to subsidize
speech they found objectionable.30 8 PruneYard, however, would be
reversed because in that case the autonomy right not to speak was
that of the shopping center's owner, who is an individual with an
articulable point of view. Pacific Gas would also be reversed, in
accordance with Justice Rehnquist's dissent.30 9 Finally, in Hurley,
the parade organizers would not have an autonomy right since they
do not have a single unified message.310
These three methods, therefore, confront and resolve some
problems that result from the conflict between positive and nega-
tive First Amendment rights in the context of government access
provisions. They therefore seek to shape and limit government ac-
cess provisions and right not to speak autonomy so as to insure that
the interests of all speakers in a speech market are protected.
304. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
305. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
306. 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
307. See, e.g., Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258 ("The choice of material to go into a newspa-
per, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and
treatment of public issues and public officials - whether fair or unfair - constitute the
exercise of editorial control and judgment."). See also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 33 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that "in
[Tornillo] the Court extended negative free speech rights to newspapers").
308. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977) ("[We hold]
that the Constitution requires only that such expenditures [by a union to fund expres-
sion] be financed from charges, dues or assessments paid by employees who do not
object to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced into doing so against their
will by the threat of loss of governmental employment.").
309. See Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("To ascribe to such
artificial entities an 'intellect' or 'mind' for freedom of conscience purposes is to con-
fuse metaphor with reality.").
310. But see Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U. S.
557, 574 (1995). Here the Court noted that:
[The Parade's] claim to the benefit of this principle of autonomy to control
one's own speech is ... sound .... Rather like a composer, the Council
selects the expressive units of the parade from potential participants, and
though the score may not produce a particularized message, each contin-
gent's expression in the Council's eyes comports with what merits celebra-
tion on that day.
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CONCLUSION
The dual principles of promoting the marketplace of ideas and
protecting individual autonomy lie at the core of the First Amend-
ment. When the government assumes an affirmative role by open-
ing opportunities for public speech, it places individuals' negative
liberties, such as the right not to speak, at risk. This conflict cannot
be avoided by analyzing compelled speech outside of the First
Amendment; the autonomy promised by the Bill of Rights and re-
peatedly affirmed by Supreme Court jurisprudence protects the
right not to speak. Scholars, jurists, and practitioners therefore
should pay close attention to the right not to speak when the gov-
ernment pursues affirmative policies of widening access. In so do-
ing, the government may not ignore the negative speech rights of
private citizens.
am
E I
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF CHILD WELFARE
IN NEW YORK CITY: SPARING THE CHILD
OR SPOILING THE FAMILY?
Alison B. Vreeland*
INTRODUCTION
Recently, in New York City, increasing numbers of parents have
been charged with "[e]ndangering the welfare of a child"' and
prosecuted in criminal court for acts of child neglect that were tra-
ditionally handled through child protective services and the family
court. Historically, the police have arrested and prosecuted par-
ents and custodians for child abuse, including sexual abuse. But in
cases of suspected neglect, the Administration for Children's Serv-
ices ("ACS")2 would respond to complaints of child neglect re-
ported to the State Central Registry.3 The police are acting under
a directive by New York City Police Commissioner Howard Safir
to "take action . . . when [they] see children in dangerous situa-
tions."4 Opponents assert that this recent trend in criminal prose-
cutions is an expansion of the "mandatory arrest policy" used in
cases of domestic violence.5
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University, 2000; B.A., Middlebury College, 1995.
Associate Notes and Articles Editor, Fordham Urban Law Journal. This Note is dedi-
cated to my parents for all of their love and support, and their inspiring vision of
family. I would like to thank the attorneys at Lansner & Kubitschek, who first intro-
duced me to this exciting topic. I am forever indebted to Professor Ann Moynihan
for her mentoring and thoughtful advising on this project.
1. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 1998).
2. ACS is the child welfare agency for the City of New York. In the past, ACS
has also been known as the Bureau of Child Welfare and the Child Welfare Agency.
See ACS, Protecting the Children of New York: A Plan of Action for the Administra-
tion for Children's Services (visited Nov. 3, 1999) <http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/htm/acs/
html/frames1.html>.
3. The State Central Registry is the intake center in Albany that receives reports
and complaints from all over the state and refers the cases to local agencies to investi-
gate. All complaints are accepted if the allegations could constitute maltreatment.
See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 422(2)(a) (McKinney 1992).
4. Joanne Wasserman, More Kids Left Alone, State Says, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July
27, 1997, at 4.
5. In 1994, the New York State Legislature amended section 140.10 of the New
York Criminal Procedure Law to address the failure of police to arrest an offending
party in cases of domestic violence unless the victim chooses to press charges. See
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(4)(c) (McKinney 1998). The new mandatory arrest
policy requires police to arrest the offending party, rather than the previous practice
of having them take a walk to cool off. See id.
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There is a growing debate over this criminalization of child wel-
fare. Increasing numbers of arrests for child endangerment indi-
cate that the police are more inclined to automatically arrest
parents suspected of neglect.6 Often the perpetrators arrested are
parents who, because of poverty or poor judgment, have commit-
ted comparatively minor offenses such as leaving children un-
supervised, at home or on the street.7 The debate over the police
policy centers on whether or not arrest and criminal prosecution
are the most appropriate responses to child neglect.
This new policy is, in part, a response to tragic, high-profiled
child abuse cases where a child reported to the child welfare system
died at the hands of her parents.8 In an effort to avoid other un-
necessary deaths, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani has reinstated the long-
abandoned practice of using police power to arrest and prosecute
parents when there is probable cause to believe a parent has en-
dangered the welfare of a child.9 As a result, the criminal court
system is confronting more and more of these cases. 10
The criminalization of child welfare law is having a dramatic ef-
fect on the rights of children within the family. This Note ad-
dresses the debate over whether increased police involvement in,
and criminal prosecution of, acts of child neglect adequately pre-
serves the rights of the child. Part I discusses the criminalization
trend and the fundamental differences between how the family
court and the criminal court handle neglect. Part II presents the
6. In 1990, there were 303 total arrests for the primary charge of "Endangering
the Welfare of a Child." In 1998, there were 1111. See app. infra, tbl.5.
7. See Rachel L. Swarns, In a Policy Shift, More Parents Are Arrested for Child
Neglect, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1997, at Al (discussing instances where mothers who
had left their children unattended were arrested for child endangerment).
8. See Martin G. Karopkin, Child Abuse and Neglect: New Role for Criminal
Court, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 28, 1996, at 1 (discussing how "[a] few highly publicized events
have worked to change" the approach to child neglect that preferred the family court
over the criminal court). One such case was that of Elisa Isquierdo. In November
1995, six-year-old Elisa died at the hands of her crack-addicted mother after months
of abuse and torture. Despite countless reports by the child's teachers, neighbors and
friends, New York City child welfare workers failed to remove the child from her
mother. See Mona Charen, With Kids, the Cautious Seldom Err, DENV. ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 22, 1997, at 67A.
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. See Karopkin, supra note 8. Judge Karopkin asserts that a few highly publi-
cized incidents of child abuse have led to fundamental changes in the way child wel-
fare cases are handled by police and prosecutors. See id. "These changes have
brought a steady stream of criminal cases where the injuries are less severe or where
there is no injury and the charges involve allegations of neglect." Id. Statistics sup-
port Judge Karopkin's observation. Arrests for the criminal charge of "endangering
the welfare of a child" have more than tripled since 1990. See app. infra, tbl.5.
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arguments for and against increased police involvement and crimi-
nal prosecution of neglectful parents. It examines the child's lib-
erty interest in the parent-child relationship, a right that is
implicated when a child is removed from her parents. Part II fur-
ther compares how this constitutional right is affected in family
court neglect proceedings and in criminal court child endanger-
ment prosecutions. Part III argues that the criminalization of child
welfare does not reflect the status that children have achieved as
rights-bearers,11 in that the child has no voice and no right to self-
determination in the parent's prosecution. Part III furthers argues
that this criminalization trend poses a threat to any interest of the
child that is independent of that of the State and that of the parent.
The child's rights are presumed protected by either the parent or
the State, although her true interests often do not fully align with
either, leaving her voiceless in child endangerment prosecutions.
This Note concludes that the criminal justice system, by focusing
on the parent's claims against the State and the State's interest in
child protection, is inadequate in accommodating the constitutional
rights of the child to self-determination. Therefore, child neglect is
best adjudicated in family court under the New York Family Court
Act ("FCA"), which provides the child with legal representation
and thereby protects the child's right to self-determination as well
as her liberty interest in the parent-child relationship.
I. THE CRIMINALIZATION TREND
A. How Neglect Cases Are Handled Through Child Protective
Services and the Family Court
While child abuse and neglect have existed throughout history, 2
it has only been in the last fifty years that public awareness of this
problem has grown,' 3 prompting State intervention on behalf of
11. The term "rights-bearer" refers to individuals who have a set of rights under
natural, common or statutory law. See, e.g., Eric J. Mitnick, Taking Rights Spherically:
Formal and Collective Aspects of Legal Rights, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 409, 426
(1999) (describing how "the provision of rights to individuals necessarily animates the
generation of classes of rights-bearers"); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 48 (1991) (discussing the "image of the
rights-bearer as a self-determining unencumbered individual . . ").
12. See generally Mason P. Thomas, Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect Part I: Historical
Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REV. 293 (1972) (discuss-
ing child maltreatment throughout history).
13. See Douglas J. Besharov, "Doing Something" About Child Abuse: The Need
to Narrow the Grounds for State Intervention, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 539 (1985).
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children. 4 Today every state has established child protective serv-
ices agencies to receive reports of abuse and neglect.15
In New York, the Child Protective Services Act of 197316 regu-
lates the provision of protective services to abused and maltreated
children. 7 In 1998, 57,842 cases of child abuse and neglect were
reported in New York State. 18 These cases come to the state's at-
tention through the New York State Telephone Hotline ("Hot-
line"). These reports are received by the Statewide Central
Registry of Child Abuse and Maltreatment ("State Central Regis-
try"). 19 Anyone can call in a report to the Hotline. The caller must
simply have "reasonable cause" to make a report of suspected
child abuse or maltreatment.2 °
Under New York law, certain individuals are mandated to report
any suspicion of child abuse or neglect. 21 These "mandated report-
ers" include school officials, physicians and police officers.22 Once
a report is received, a state worker at the State Central Registry
makes a preliminary determination of the validity of the allega-
tions.23 If it is determined that the allegations received by the Hot-
line constitute a report of abuse or maltreatment, the state
becomes obligated to report the matter to a local agency.24
The standard for determining the validity of an allegation is
whether the allegation "could reasonably constitute a report of
14. See Jill D. Moore, Charting a Course between Scylla and Charybdis: Child
Abuse Registries and Procedural Due Process, 73 N.C. L. REV. 2063, 2064 (1995).
15. See id. at 2070-78.
16. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 411 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1999).
17. See id.
18. See app. infra, tbl.1.
19. The term "maltreatment" is broader than "neglect" as defined in section 1012
of the FCA because it covers children in foster care and state run institutions. See
N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 412(2).
20. See id. § 414.
21. See id. § 413(1). Section 413(1) of the New York Social Services Law provides
that mandated reporters must:
report or cause a report to be made in accordance with this title when they
have reasonable cause to suspect that a child coming before them in their
professional or official capacity is an abused or maltreated child, or when
they have reasonable cause to suspect that a child is an abused or maltreated
child where the parent, guardian, custodian or other person legally responsi-
ble for such child comes before them in their professional or official capacity
and states from personal knowledge facts, conditions or circumstances
which, if correct, would render the child an abused or maltreated child ....
Id.
22. See id. (containing an exhaustive list of mandated reporters).
23. See id. § 422(2)(a).
24. See Boland v. State, 638 N.Y.S.2d 500, 502-03 (App. Div. 1996).
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child abuse or maltreatment. ' 25 If this standard is met, the case is
then referred to local child protection agencies.26 In New York
City, the borough offices of ACS receive these reports.27 Within
twenty-four hours of receiving a report, ACS must commence an
investigation.28 This investigation includes conducting a home visit
with the family, evaluating the environment of the child named in
the report and any other children living there, assessing the risk to
the children, as well as determining the nature, extent and cause of
any condition enumerated in the report.2 9 The caseworker typi-
cally interviews the child or children, determines their names and
ages and evaluates their condition.30 The case worker must then
"forthwith notify the subjects of the report and other persons
named in the report in writing of the existence of the report and
their respective rights .... "31 Part of the decision-making process
includes deciding whether the facts alleged are sufficient to estab-
lish neglect.32
Under existing guidelines, ACS must make a preliminary report
within seven days.33 ACS must complete its investigation and de-
termine whether the report is "indicated" or "unfounded" within
sixty days.34 An "indicated" report means that some credible evi-
dence of maltreatment exists, whereas an "unfounded" report
means there is no credible evidence to support it.35 On average,
the number of indicated reports is less than half of the number of
total reports.36 When a report of suspected child neglect is indi-
cated by ACS, the Agency assesses what, if any, preventive services
might be put in place for the family.37 Before a petition is filed
against the parent in family court, ACS must have conducted an
25. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 422(2)(a).
26. See id. § 422(2)(b).
27. See id.
28. See id. § 424(6).
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. See id. § 422(2)(b).
33. See id. § 424(3).
34. Id. § 424(7).
35. See id. § 412(11), (12).
36. For example, in 1997, 40% of all mandated reports were indicated. See app.
infra, tbl.3.
37. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(1)(a)(iii) ("[Tihe state's first obligation is to
help the family with services to prevent its break-up or to reunite it if the child has
already left home.").
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investigation, assessed the threat to the child and attempted to pro-
vide the family with assistance.38
If the Agency determines that the child faces imminent risk, a
neglect petition can be filed in family court or the child may be
removed under emergency conditions. 39 Article 10 petitions are
filed in only a fraction of the total cases.40 When a child is removed
under emergency conditions, the child is taken into the protective
custody of the Commissioner of the Administration for Children's
Services, and ACS must file a petition in family court.4" The par-
ents would then be served with a summons and a copy of the peti-
tion containing the allegations against them.42 Under these
circumstances, the parent is entitled to an immediate hearing to be
held within three days at which the court will assess if there is im-
minent risk to the child.43
The court later holds a "fact-finding hearing" to decide whether
the child has been abused or neglected. 4 At this hearing, ACS
may present evidence and witness testimony in support of the alle-
gations in the petition.45 If the court finds that the allegations have
not been proven, the petition is dismissed and the child is returned
home.46 If the court "makes a finding," that is, finds that the alle-
gations are true and that the child has been abused or neglected, a
dispositional hearing is held to determine what is in the best inter-
38. The assessment of conduct employs the standard established by the FCA and
requires the following inquiry: does the parent fail to exercise "a minimum degree of
care" so that the child's physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or
is in imminent danger of being impaired? N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 1012(f)(i) (McKinney
1999).
39. ACS may remove the child from the home prior to filing the petition if the
child is in "imminent danger." Id. § 1024.
40. In 1998, 57,842 abuse and neglect reports came in, but only 11,000 petitions
were filed. See app. infra, tbls.1, 4.
41. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 424(10).
42. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1036.
43. "Imminent risk" is the statutory language and standard by which the family
court judge is to assess the removal of a child. See id. § 1027(b)(i). Under section
1027(a) of the FCA, when a child has been removed without a court order, a hearing
must be held to determine if the child should remain in the custody of ACS pending
the fact-finding trial. If the court finds that removal is necessary to avoid imminent
risk to the child's life or health, the court should continue the removal. See id.
§ 1027(b)(i). The respondent parent can then apply for the return of the child. See id.
§ 1028(a). The court shall grant the application unless it finds the return presents an
imminent risk to the child's life or health. See id. § 1027(b)(i).
44. Id. § 1044.
45. See id. § 1046.
46. See id. § 1051.
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ests of the child.47 If the child has not already been removed from
the home before the fact-finding, once a finding has been made,
the court can remove the child from the home and "remand" her to
the custody of ACS.48 Following a finding, the court will order an
investigation of the child's home and family by ACS.4 9 The court
will hear the results of this investigation at the dispositional hear-
ing and make a determination about the child's disposition based
on the child's best interests.5 0 Possible dispositions may include re-
turning the child to the home on certain conditions or placing the
child in foster care 1 while services are provided to the parents.5 2
This traditional approach to child neglect has recently changed in
New York City.
B. Current Police Policy and the Trend Towards Criminalization
Prior to 1977, New York family courts had exclusive jurisdiction
over acts between family members that would constitute crimes if
they were between strangers.5 3 In 1977, the New York Legislature
amended the Criminal Procedure Law to give the criminal court
concurrent original jurisdiction over these acts. 4 Once a case was
brought in one of these two courts, the complainant had three days
in which to decide whether to transfer the case to the other court.55
47. Id. §§ 1047(a), 1052. Judge Cardozo first enunciated the "best interests of the
child" standard. See Harvey R. Sorkow, Best Interests Of the Child: By Whose Defini-
tion?, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 383, 384 n.75 (1991) (citing LeAnn Larson LaFave, Origins
and Evolution of the "Best Interest of the Child" Standard, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 459,
467 (1989)). While the standard is not clearly defined, it typically requires an exami-
nation of factors relating to a child's safety, happiness and physical, mental and moral
welfare. See id. at 384 (citing Fantony v. Fantony, 122 A.2d 593, 598 (N.J. 1956)).
48. See N.Y. FAM. CT. AC § 1052(a)(3).
49. See id. § 1034 (authorizing the family court judge to order the child protective
agency to conduct a child protective investigation in any proceeding under Article
10).
50. See id. § 623 ("'[A] dispositional hearing' means a hearing to determine what
order of disposition should be made in accordance with the best interest of the
child.").
51. A child may be placed in foster care for a period of up to one year. This
placement can be extended if a petition is filed by the foster care agency, and a hear-
ing is held in which the court decides whether or not continued placement is neces-
sary. See id. § 1055.
52. See id. § 1057; see also COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, ASS'N B.
N.Y.C., INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO THE NEW YORK CITY FAMILY COURT 27-30
(1997).
53. Criminal Court Loses Jurisdiction, As Complainant Chooses Family Court;
People v. Damon McCoy, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 25, 1998, at 25.
54. See id. (discussing the amendment to section 530.11 of the New York Criminal
Procedure Law).
55. See id.
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The case could not be heard by both courts simultaneously.5 6 If the
complainant chose to transfer the case to family court, the district
attorney could not prosecute." However, this policy was not well-
received, and in 1994, the Family Protection and Domestic Vio-
lence Intervention Act was passed.5 1 This Act provided that inci-
dents involving disorderly conduct, harassment (first and second
degree), aggravated harassment in the second degree, menacing
(second and third degree), reckless endangerment, attempted as-
sault and assault (second and third degree) between family mem-
bers could not be prosecuted in both courts simultaneously.59 The
stated purpose of this amendment was "to give greater protection
and choice to the victims of domestic abuse, not less."6° The
amendment did mark a new development in domestic violence law
by enabling the district attorney to pursue a criminal case even
over the direct wishes of- the complainant that the matter be
brought in family court.6'
In 1994, the New York State Legislature amended the Criminal
Procedure Law to address the common police practice of failing to
arrest the offending party in cases of domestic violence.62 The new
policy is referred to as a "mandatory arrest" policy, which requires
the police to arrest an offending party rather than permit him to
"COO1 off."16 3 The new policy is intended to provide endangered wo-
men with a reliable source of assistance.64 The police no longer
may ask the complainant whether she wishes to press charges in
order to execute an arrest.65
56. See id.
57. See People v. Fisher, 580 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Justice Ct. 1991); People v. Falzone,
537 N.Y.S.2d 773 (Crim. Ct. 1989).
58. See 1994 N.Y. Laws ch. 222.
59. See Criminal Court Loses Jurisdiction, supra note 53, at 25.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(4)(a) (McKinney 1999) (mandating police
officers to arrest, not attempt to reconcile the parties or mediate, where an officer has
reasonable cause to believe that a felony has been committed by one family member
against another).
63. Section 140.10(4)(c) of the New York Criminal Procedure Law provides that
where an officer has reasonable cause to believe that a misdemeanor constituting a
family offense has occurred, the officer shall arrest the offender, and "shall not at-
tempt to reconcile the parties or mediate...." N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(4)(c).
64. See JILL M. ZUCCARDY, BROOKLYN B. ASS'N VOLUNTEER LAW. PROJECT,
OVERLAPPING JURISDICTION AND ORDERS OF PROTECTION: CRIMINAL, CIVIL AND
FAMILY COURT (1997).
65. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(4)(c).
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In the last two to three years, the New York Police Department
has played a more active role in child welfare. As a result, more
and more parents are being arrested and charged with the misde-
meanor crime of "endangering the welfare of a child" for acts that
constitute child neglect.66 This Note addresses only the arrest and
criminal prosecution of parents for acts of neglect that do not in-
clude abuse or excessive corporal punishment. The offending be-
havior in many child endangerment cases includes, for example,
leaving a child alone, failing to ensure school attendance or poor
house-keeping. 67 There is a growing sentiment that the police have
actually expanded the "must arrest" policy used in domestic vio-
lence cases to child welfare matters as well.68 Regardless of
whether this sentiment is true, the criminal court system has seen
more cases of child neglect in recent years than it has in the past.69
Statistics show that while arrests for acts constituting criminal child
endangerment have nearly tripled in the last eight years, the
number of petitions filed in family court for neglect have not simi-
larly increased but have instead decreased. 70 This outcome may
indicate that the increased number of arrests are not due to in-
creased neglectful behavior, but rather increased enforcement of
the criminal statute and police arrests.
In People v. Smith,71 a mother of four was arrested in her home
and charged with "endangering the welfare of a child" for leaving
her four children, ages five, seven, twelve and thirteen, home alone
for two hours.72 In the decision, the judge noted that "there are an
increasing number of these so called 'home alone cases' appearing
66. See app. infra, tbl.5. The number of arrests where "endangering the welfare of
a child" was the primary charge has nearly quadrupled since 1990. See id.
67. See infra notes 71-87 and accompanying text.
68. In her testimony before the New York State Assembly on December 16, 1997,
Jill Zuccardy argued against "the New York Police Department policy of using 'must
arrest' as a justification for acting independently of ACS in cases of alleged child
neglect ...." Public Hearing, infra note 134.
69. See Karopkin, supra note 8. In his article, Judge Karopkin discusses how the
Criminal Court generally only saw severe cases involving child or sexual abuse, but
that this practice has changed because a few highly publicized cases of abuse have
brought attention to the issue. See id. Now the Criminal Court sees more cases
where the injuries are less severe, or the allegations are of neglect alone. See id.
70. See app. infra, tbls.4, 5.
71. 678 N.Y.S.2d 872 (Crim. Ct. 1998).
72. See id. at 873. The police found the children home alone when they went to
the house in response to a 911 call placed by an unidentified caller. The defendant
was arrested and held overnight in jail. See id. at 874. At the arraignment, the judge
refused the people's request for an order of protection for the children, and the de-
fendant was released on her own recognizance. See id. The court granted the defend-
ant's motion to dismiss on the grounds that the defendant's action failed to make out
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in Criminal Court which are charged under section one of Penal
Law 260.10, which provides no such guidance."73 This trend is sig-
nificant because it shows that the police may now be making ar-
rests for poor decision-making or lack of resources among parents.
Unlike the defendant in Smith, Laura Vanegas was arrested and
jailed overnight in July of 1997 when the police found her two sons
alone outside of their aunt's apartment in East Harlem.74 The chil-
dren were placed in foster care, but the charge of child endanger-
ment was later dropped.75
In 1997 and 1998, there was much discussion in the press about
increasing numbers of arrests in New York City for acts of ne-
glect.7 6 This attention sparked criticism of the new police policy. 77
The criticism was that the circumstances did not seem egregious
enough to warrant arrest.78 In 1997, Sourette Alwysh, a thirty-
four-year-old mother, was arrested for living with her five-year-old
son in a roach-infested apartment without electricity or running
water.79 Ms. Alwysh, a Haitian immigrant, had been living in a
foreclosed building.80 When the police discovered this fact they
took her away in handcuffs and placed her son in foster care.8' In
1997, Sidelina Zuniga, thirty-nine, was arrested for leaving her two
any cognizable crime under section 260.10(2) of the New York Penal Law. See id. at
875.
73. Id.
74. See Rachel L. Swarns, In a Policy Shift, More Parents Are Arrested for Child
Neglect, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1997, at Al.
75. See id.
76. See id.; Joanne Wasserman, More Kids Left Alone, State Says, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, July 27, 1997, at 4; Bill Egbert & Henri E. Cauvin, Charged Mom Left Six Kids
at Home, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 17, 1998, at 6; John Schultz, Mom Charged in Child
Abandonment, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Nov. 16, 1998, at A20; Timothy D. May, Boy Found in
Park to Live with Dad; Agency Probing Paterson Mom, RECORD, July 15, 1997, at
L01; Graham Rayman, Mom Charged in Child Neglect, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Aug. 17,
1998, at A20; Associated Press, Teen Mother Arrested After Leaving Infants Alone,
BuFF. NEWS, Dec. 22, 1997, at 6A; Henri E. Cauvin, B-lyn Mom Busted in Home-
Alone Case, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 23, 1998, at 16; Cerisse Anderson, Leaving Chil-
dren in Auto May Be Prosecuted as Crime, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 24, 1998, at 1; Associated
Press, 2 Sons Alone; Mom Arrested, N.Y. NEWSDAY, July 2, 1997, at A52; Mirta Ojito,
Mother's Neglect Arrest Called No Surprise, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1997, at B3.
77. See, e.g., Ilze Betins, Letter to the Editor, Child Welfare Doesn't Belong in
Police Hands, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1997, at A30; Brian Harmom & Lama Bakri,
Mom's Arrest Sets Off Debate on Child Neglect, DET. NEWS, May 15, 1997, at Cl;
Katha Pollitt, Killer Moms, Working Nannies; an Increase in Arrests of Mothers
Charged with Child Neglect, Some on Ridiculous Charges, Highlights the Need for
Working Mothers to Stand Up for Their Rights, NATION, Nov. 24, 1997, at 9.
78. See Pollitt, supra note 77.
79. See Swarns, supra note 74.
80. See id.
81. See id.
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sons, ages ten and four, at home for an hour and a half while she
shopped at a grocery store.82 In September of 1997, Lucia Savarin,
forty-one, was arrested for losing sight of her four-year-old son,
who wandered outside into the night while his mother helped a
friend move into a new apartment.83 Ms. Savarin had trusted a
friend to watch her son, but somehow the boy was unattended long
enough to make it outside.84 Samantha Stevens, thirty-three, was
charged with six counts of child endangerment in August of 1998
when she left her six children home alone for five hours.85 The
children ranged in age from five-months to eleven-years-old.86
They were discovered after the three-year-old slipped outside and
was found on the street.8 7
Until recent years, mothers who had committed similar acts of
child neglect would have been referred to ACS, where they would
have received counseling and services, but probably not have been
arrested.88 In fact, "[b]efore the change in policy, police officers
who found children briefly left home alone or living in substandard
housing would call child welfare workers, who would arrange for
counseling, day care, housing subsidies or, in extreme cases, place
the children in foster care. The parents were rarely arrested."89
Typically, after social services had been notified, the family would
have been monitored by social workers. 90
Statistics have indicated that the New York Police Department is
more likely to make an arrest in cases of child neglect than in prior
years.9' By 1998, the number of arrests for child endangerment
had more than tripled since 1990.92 The rise in arrests has been
attributed to Police Commissioner Howard Safir's directive to the
police to "take action ... when [they] see children in dangerous
situations. ' ' 93 While child advocates promote dealing with child ne-
glect through social services, Commissioner Safir has indicated that
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See Rayman, supra note 76.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See Swarns, supra note 74.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. See app. infra, tbl.5.
92. See id.
93. Wasserman, supra note 76 (quoting New York City Police Commissioner How-
ard Safir).
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he would prefer that cops be aggressive.94 "Quite honestly, I
would much rather be accused of overreaction than underreac-
tion," he stated in 1997. 9' This new police initiative has led to a
sixty percent increase in misdemeanor arrests for endangering chil-
dren since 1995.96
The practices used by the police when investigating suspected
child neglect can differ substantially from those of ACS. The police
receive their policy dictates from sources including the Police Stu-
dent's Guide,97 a training manual, and the Police Patrol Guide,98 a
practice manual. Under the Police Student's Guide, when an of-
ficer responds to a domestic incident, the investigation includes de-
termining if there are any children present who may be victims of
neglect, abuse or maltreatment. 99 If the officer "reasonably sus-
pects" a child of being abused, neglected or maltreated, they first
must prepare a Report of Suspected Child Abuse or Maltreat-
ment °° and notify the State Central Registry. 10 1 If the police feel
that there is probable cause to believe the crime of endangering the
welfare of a child has been committed, the parent is arrested and
removed from the home.10 2 The Student Guide defines "probable
cause" as "[a] combination of facts, viewed through the eyes of a
police officer, which would lead a person of reasonable caution to
believe that an offense is being or has been committed."'' 0 3 After
the arresting officer has called the State Central Registry, the nor-
mal procedure is presumably followed and the case is investigated
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. See Swarns, supra note 74.
97. See POLICE DEP'T N.Y.C., POLICE STUDENT'S GUIDE (on file with the author).
98. See id.
99. See POLICE DEP'T N.Y.C., PATROL GUIDE, PROC. No. 110-38: FAMILY OF-
FENSES/DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 2 (1989) (on file with the author).
100. See POLICE DEP'T N.Y.C., PATROL GUIDE, PROC. No. 106-15: EMERGENCY
REMOVALS OR INVESTIGATION AND REPORTING OF ABUSED, NEGLECTED OR MAL-
TREATED CHILDREN 5 (1989) (on file with the author).
101. See supra note 3 (State Central Registry); see also supra note 21 (mandated
reporters).
102. See supra note 100, at 3.
103. POLICE DEP'T N.Y.C., POLICE STUDENT'S GUIDE, INTERIM ORDER No. 10, at
25 (1995) (on file with the author). The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that probable
cause for an arrest exists where the facts and circumstances within the arresting of-
ficers' knowledge and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information are suf-
ficient in themselves to convince a man of reasonable caution that an offense has been
or is being committed. The evidence need not be sufficient to establish guilt, although
the officer's mere suspicion or good faith belief is not enough to constitute probable
cause. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23
(1963).
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within twenty-four hours.104 The Police Student's Guide is silent
regarding what is to be done with the child for those twenty-four
hours.
The Patrol Guide authorizes the emergency removal of children
deemed to be abused, neglected or maltreated.' 1 5 The definitions
of "neglect" and "abuse" are taken from the FCA.10 6 Under this
Patrol Guide procedure, an officer who has reasonable cause to be-
lieve that the child's continued presence within the home presents
an imminent danger to the child's life or health has the authority to
remove the child after requesting the response of a patrol supervi-
sor.107 The child is then taken to the station house or to the hospi-
tal if deemed necessary. 108 The arresting officer then refers the
child to ACS and reports the case to the State Central Registry. 0 9
Under New York Criminal Procedure Law, when a criminal ac-
tion involving a complaint charging any crime or violation between
spouses, former spouses, parent and child, or between members of
the same family or household is pending, the court may issue a
temporary order of protection. 110 The court may issue this order
ex parte upon the filing of an accusatory instrument and for good
cause shown.' The defendant is entitled to an opportunity to be
heard only if recognizance or bail is involved. 2 It is common
practice in criminal prosecutions for the prosecutor to request the
court to issue such an order of protection barring the parent from
contact with the child." 3 There is no provision in the criminal stat-
utes that give the defendant an opportunity to be heard where an
order of protection has been requested." 4 The order of protection
prevents the parent from contacting the child, but the parent still
104. See supra Part I.A.
105. See POLICE DEP'T N.Y.C., PATROL GUIDE PROC. No. 106-15, supra note 100,
at 1.
106. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(e), (f) (McKinney 1999).
107. See POLICE DEP'T N.Y.C., PATROL GUIDE PROC. No. 106-15, supra note 100,
at 2.
108. See id. at 3.
109. See id. at 3, 5.
110. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.12(1) (McKinney 1999).
111. See id. § 530.12(3).
112. See id. § 510.20.
113. See Jane Golden, Is Social Work Losing Child Welfare?, CUSSW CENTENNIAL
CELEBRATION, June 12, 1998.
114. A defendant is only entitled to an opportunity to be heard if recognizance or
bail is involved. Otherwise, the criminal court can issue a temporary order of protec-
tion ex parte. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 510.20, 530.12(3).
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retains legal custody." 5 It is necessary for the arresting officer to
have contacted ACS and initiated child protective custody, or else
the child remains in limbo, without a custodian. The criminal court
system has no legal mechanism to provide for the child while the
parent is detained.1 6 It is necessary for ACS to file a petition in
family court for the child to be placed in foster care.' 17
C. FCA "Neglect" v. Penal Law "Child Endangerment"
The concepts of "abuse," "neglect" and "maltreatment" are by
no means universal. Article 10 of the FCA defines what behavior
by adults constitutes child abuse or neglect.'1 8 However, Article 10
child protective proceedings do not protect children against the be-
havior of all adults. Under the FCA, the child is protected from
the improper behavior of the child's custodian, guardian or any
other person legally responsible for the child's care at the time.119
A "person legally responsible" can include any adult who is living
in the household and has regular contact with the child. 20 This
definition may include a relative or paramour living within the
home.' 2 '
Under section 1012 of the FCA, a child is a neglected child if the
caretaker fails to exercise a minimum degree of care in providing
for specified basic needs of the child, with the result that the child's
physical, mental or emotional condition is impaired or in danger of
115. Under section 530.12 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law, "when a
criminal action is pending involving a complaint charging any crime or violation be-
tween ... parent and child. .. the court... may issue a temporary order of protection
...." Id. § 530.12(1).
116. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 374 (McKinney 1999). While section 1024 of the
FCA provides that:
a peace officer. . ., police officer, or law enforcement official, or an agent of
a duly incorporated society for the prevention of cruelty to children or a
designated employee of a city or county department of social services shall
take all necessary measures to protect a child's life or health including...
taking or keeping a child in protective custody," only an authorized agency
may place a child in foster care.
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1024(a) (McKinney 1999).
117. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Ac-r § 1026.
118. See id. § 1012(e), (f).
119. See id. § 1012(g).
120. See, e.g., In re Yolanda D., 673 N.E.2d 1228 (N.Y. 1.996) (holding that the uncle
of the subject children was a person legally responsible where the subject child visited
him every other week during the time in question and the uncle was regularly present
at the child's own house); In re Heather U., 632 N.Y.S.2d 285 (App. Div. 1995) (hold-
ing that the mother's live-in paramour was a person legally responsible for the subject
child in that he had been living in the home for three years).
121. See In re Heather U., 632 N.Y.S.2d at 285.
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impairment; or if the child is abandoned by the caretaker. While
the statute does not set thorough guidance for the care of a child, it
sets a bare minimum standard to be met by the caretaker. The
child must be provided with adequate food, clothing, shelter, edu-
cation and medical care.123 The statute requires that a causal con-
nection be established between the lack of care and the
impairment of the child.1 24 An important element of the FCA defi-
nition of neglect is that it takes into account the financial ability of
the parent to provide for the child. 125 A failure to provide a child
with basic care can only be found after a determination that the
parent is "financially able to do so or [has been] offered financial
or other reasonable means to do so .. .126
New York Penal Law criminalizes behavior that endangers the
welfare of a child.1 27 A person is guilty of child endangerment
when he knowingly acts in a manner likely to be injurious to the
physical, mental or moral welfare of a child under the age of seven-
teen.2 8 Violation of the statute also occurs when a parent, guard-
ian or other person legally charged with the care or custody of a
child under eighteen fails or refuses to exercise reasonable dili-
gence in the control of such child to prevent him from becoming
an "abused child," a "neglected child," a "juvenile delinquent"
or a "person in need of supervision," under Articles 10, 3 and 7
of the FCA.129  Child endangerment can encompass a broad
range of acts. 130  In fact, under the statute, no actual harm
need result; rather, the course or conduct alleged must be likely
to be injurious. 131 Despite the breadth of conduct the statute
122. N.Y. FAM. CT. Ac'r § 1012(f).
123. See id. § 1012(f)(i)(A).
124. A preponderance of the evidence must show parental failure to exercise a
minimum degree of care, impairment or imminent danger of impairment to the child
and a causal connection between the two. See In re T. Children, 621 N.Y.S.2d 25
(App. Div. 1994).
125. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 1012(f)(i)(A).
126. Id.
127. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10(1) (McKinney 1999).
128. See id. The statute also criminalizes directing or authorizing a child to engage
in an occupation involving a substantial risk of danger to his life or health. See id.
129. See id. § 260.10(2). Article 10 of the FCA governs child protective proceed-
ings; Article 3 governs juvenile delinquency; and Article 7 governs persons in need of
supervision.
130. See Karopkin, supra note 8.
131. See People v. Doe, 512 N.Y.S.2d 636, 638 (Crim. Ct. 1987) (stating that
although "the alleged conduct of the defendant did not involve physical contact with
the child [this] does not lead to the conclusion that such conduct was not 'likely to be
injurious to the ... mental or moral welfare' of the child" (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 260.10(1)).
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covers, challenges claiming unconstitutional vagueness have
failed.132
The penal law refers to the FCA for its definition of neglect.'133
Therefore, acts sufficient to establish neglect would also be suffi-
cient to establish child endangerment. As a result, the difference
lies not in the statutes, but rather in how the offending behavior is
prosecuted under each. The primary difference between how ne-
glect cases are handled in criminal court and how they are handled
in family court is a result of the nature of these two different
courts. 134 The family court is a rehabilitative setting that aims to
identify families in crisis, protect the parties in danger and provide
services to the family. 135 In addressing child abuse and neglect,
courts have struggled to accomplish several goals. In making dis-
positional orders, judges are bound to consider the child's best in-
terest first and foremost. 136 However, the preservation of families
also is a prominent goal in federal and New York State
legislation. 137
The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 re-
quires states receiving federal foster care funds to make "reason-
132. See, e.g., People v. Padmore,. 634 N.Y.S.2d 215, 216 (App. Div. 1995).
133. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10(2) ("[Ajn 'abused child,' a 'neglected child,' a
'juvenile delinquent' or a 'person in need of supervision,' as those terms are defined in
articles ten, three and seven of the FCA.").
134. "Criminal jurisdiction looks at the question what happened. Civil jurisdiction
looks at the question what is likely to happen in the future." Transcript, Examining
and Defining the Role of Law Enforcement in Child Welfare Matters: Public Hearing
on N.Y.S. Assembly Bill 7068 before N.Y.S. Assembly Standing Comm. on Children
and Families, 220th Legis., Dec. 16, 1997 [hereinafter "Public Hearing"] (statement by
Prof. Martin Guggenheim, N.Y.U. School of Law).
135. See People v. Roselle, 643 N.E.2d 72, 74 (N.Y. 1994) (noting that the family
court's duty was to protect the child and if possible work toward the future rehabilita-
tion of the family, whereas in criminal proceedings the state is primarily concerned
with the determination of the guilt of the accused).
136. The standard at a dispositional hearing is the child's best interests. See N.Y.
FAM. CT. Ac-r § 623 (McKinney 1999) ("'dispositional hearing' means a hearing to
determine what order of disposition should be made in accordance with the best inter-
ests of the child"); id. § 1052(b)(1)(A) (obligating judge in dispositional order to con-
sider whether continuation in the child's home would be contrary to the best interests
of the child); In re Anthony "00," 685 N.Y.S.2d 494, 496 (App. Div. 1999) ("It is...
well settled that unless all parties consent to dispense with such, a dispositional hear-
ing is required to determine the appropriate order of disposition to be entered upon
an adjudication of permanent neglect, and at the dispositional hearing the sole crite-
rion is the best interest of the child ...." (citations omitted)).
137. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b[1][a][iii] (McKinney 1998) ("[T]he state's
first obligation is to help the family with services to prevent its break-up or to reunite
it if the child has already left home."); see also Adoption Assistance and Child Wel-
fare Act of 1980, infra note 138 (requiring state agencies to make reasonable efforts to
keep families together).
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able efforts" to prevent a child from entering foster care and to
develop a case plan for each child in foster care that assures the
provision of services designed to facilitate the child's return to her
parents.a38 New York's compliance with this mandate is repre-
sented in the New York Social Services Law.1 39 New York case law
reflects a policy of preserving the parent-child relationship where
ever possible, while still acting in the child's best interest.1
40
In 1997, Congress passed the Adoption and Safe Families Act
("ASFA"). 141 This federal act shifted the priority of the child wel-
fare system from family reunification to child protection.142  The
federal law clarifies that efforts at reunification are not required
where a child's health or safety would be endangered. 143 Under
the Act, if certain aggravating circumstances are present, social
workers no longer have to make a reasonable effort to preserve
families.144 The Act emphasizes expediting the procedure through
which a child is freed for adoption.1 45 Before ASFA, New York
law required officials to undertake "reasonable efforts" to reunify
foster children with their parents. 46 Once ASFA was passed, New
138. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272,
94 Stat. 500 (1980). In the 1970s, the foster care system was criticized because the
predominant approach to dealing with neglect and abuse was to separate the child
from the parent. See Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reap-
praisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887 (1975).
This approach was criticized for failing to consider that the child's emotional health
was at risk when the child was separated from her family. See id. In response to this
type of criticism, Congress passed the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act,
which made a priority of reuniting families whenever possible. See Kathleen A. Bai-
lie, Note, The Other "Neglected" Parties in Child Protective Proceedings: Parents in
Poverty and the Role of the Lawyers Who Represent Them, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
2285, 2289 nn.38-40 and accompanying text (1998).
139. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b[1][a][iii] (requiring the state to provide fam-
ilies with services to prevent its break-up); see also id. § 131[3] ("As far as possible
families shall be kept together, they shall not be separated for reasons of poverty
alone, and they shall be provided services to maintain and strengthen family life.").
140. See In re Dickson, 423 N.E.2d 361, 363 (N.Y. 1981). "Consistent with the con-
stitutional protection of family integrity, Congress and the New York State Legisla-
ture have expressed a clear preference for the preservation of the family unit by
enacting laws to further this goal." Martin A. v. Gross, 524 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (Sup.
Ct. 1987). See also In re Sayeh R., 693 N.E.2d 724, 736 n.7 (N.Y. 1997).
141. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997).
142. See Bailie, supra note 138, at 2286 ("This federal legislation significantly
changed the goals of the child welfare system which, prior to this law, focused mainly
on reuniting families.").
143. See AFSA, supra note 141.
144. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D) (1999).
145. See id. 671(a)(15)(F).
146. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 409-a (McKinney 1999); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 18, § 423.4 (1999).
10692000]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
York, along with other states, was required to pass its own imple-
menting legislation in order to receive federal funding.147 New
York stood to lose $450 million in funding if the legislation was not
enacted. 148 That legislation came in February of 1999, but not
before the New York Assembly missed three deadlines that Con-
gress had set.149 Disagreement among Democrats and Republicans
of the Assembly caused the delays. 5 ° Assembly Democrats feared
that the legislation would go too far in allowing for the termination
of parental rights. 1' The new law allows for the termination of
parental rights if a child has been in foster care for fifteen out of
the last twenty-two months.1 52 The state will also seek to terminate
parental rights if a parent abandons a newborn or assaults or kills a
child. 153
ASFA and New York State's implementing legislation has fed
the debate over what role family preservation should play in child
protection. This question is paramount to the issue of criminaliza-
tion because a shift toward child protection, and away from family
reunification, will embrace the increased role of law enforcement
in child welfare matters.
While this legislation made great strides for those who felt that
efforts at family preservation were hindering foster care children's
access to stable adoptive homes, the statute continues to require
that unless the aggravating circumstances are present, reasonable
efforts must be made to preserve and reunite families.' 54
In the last two decades, judges and social workers have placed a
priority on keeping families together. 55 The goal of family preser-
vation is evidenced by New York Social Services Law, under which
ACS is required to offer and provide services to prevent the break-
147. See Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and Failure
of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REv. 637, 681-83 (1999)
(noting that Congress conditioned federal funding for states on compliance with the
federal legislation).
148. See Shannon McCaffrey, New York Dragging Its Feet on Meeting New Federal;
Child-Welfare Guidelines, BUFF. NEWS, Jan. 19, 1999, at 3A.
149. See Lara Jakes, Funds to Follow Adoption Law Passage, TIMES UNION, Feb.
12, 1999, at B2.
150. See McCaffrey, supra note 148, at 3A.
151. See id.
152. See ASFA, supra note 141, at 2118 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)).
153. See id. at 2116-17. Where the child has been subjected to such aggravated
circumstances, reasonable reunification efforts are not required. See id.
154. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1994).
155. See Lara Jakes, Saving Kids by Splitting Families, TIMES UNION, Aug. 23, 1998,
at Al.
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up of families. 156 Courts are left to strike a delicate balance be-
tween adequately protecting a child and fulfilling the obligation to
preserve families. The legislature has set out means to achieve this
balance by prescribing both preventive and protective services. 57
Since New York enacted the Child Welfare Reform Act in
1976,158 programs that provide "preventive services" have been
available to families in crisis. One of the purposes of the Act was
to provide "increased emphasis on preventive services designed to
maintain family relationships rather than responding to children
and families in trouble only by removing the child from the fam-
ily."'1 59 The services include counseling, therapy, drug and alcohol
abuse treatment, parenting skills training and homemaker ser-
vices.
60
The Department of Social Services' regulations in conjunction
with section 409 of the Social Services Law do not impose a nondis-
cretionary duty on social service officials to provide preventive
services in all cases.' 6 ' However, the statute indicates the prefer-
ence for family preservation whenever possible. 62 A child may not
be placed in foster care before preventive services have been pro-
vided to the family.' 63 However, if the services have been refused,
placement is ordered by the court, the child is at serious risk of
harm by the parent or the parents are unavailable, the child may be
immediately removed. 164
In addition to these statutory provisions that define the family
court as rehabilitative in nature, family court judges have authority
over ACS to ensure that the statutory mandates were followed.
165
The family court must inquire into what reasonable efforts were
made and what preventive services were offered prior to removal
156. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 409-a, 424 (McKinney 1999); N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REOS. tit. 18, § 423.4 (1998).
157. See statutes cited supra note 136.
158. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 409 (McKinney 1992).
159. Governor's Memo, 1979 N.Y. Laws 1814.
160. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 423.2(b)(1)-(18) (1997). New
York State Department of Social Services regulations provide that the provision of
preventive services shall be considered mandatory where children are in foster care,
are at risk of placement in foster care, or are at risk of return to foster care. See id.
§ 430.9.
161. See Grant v. Cuomo, 518 N.Y.S.2d 105, 112 (App. Div. 1987).
162. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 409.
163. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, supra note 138.
164. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 430.10 (1999).
165. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACr §§ 1022(a), 1027(b), 1028(b), 1052(b)(i) (McKinney
1999).
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of the child and at every stage of the proceedings by the agency. 66
The family court has the authority under the FCA to compel ACS
to conduct an investigation and report to the court.167 In family
court, ACS supervises the respondent parent and may impose con-
ditions upon that parent. 16 8 Moreover, ACS is a party to the case
and is required to appear and to comply with family court orders.
In contrast to the family court setting, the criminal court is a pu-
nitive setting, designed to punish individuals for unlawful acts, not
to mend families. 169 In the criminal adjudication, the state is the
prosecutor and the perpetrator is the defendant; the victim has lit-
tle or no involvement in determining the course the prosecution
takes. 7 ° There is no legislated requirement that reasonable efforts
be made to offer preventive services to the offender in the family
before criminal proceedings are initiated. 71 The criminal court has
no jurisdiction over ACS and cannot compel ACS to conduct an
investigation or oversee the family's progress. Often the district
attorney prosecuting the case has had no direct contact with the
child and knows little about the home situation.1 72 The effort that
ACS must make under the FCA and the Social Services Law to
preserve families whenever possible is not considered in criminal
adjudications, and is rather left to the domain of the concurrent, if
any, family court proceeding. 173
II. THE DEBATE OVER CRIMINALIZATION
The growing prevalence of child endangerment arrests has
spawned a debate that questions what is the most appropriate ap-
proach to child neglect. Historically, children enjoyed very little
166. See id.
167. See id. § 1034.
168. See id. § 1039.
169. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05(5) (McKinney 1998) (stating the purpose of the
penal provisions is to provide "an appropriate public response to particular offenses
.... .); see also Criminal Court Loses Jurisdiction, As Complainant Chose Family
Court; People v. Damon McCoy, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 25, 1998, at 25.
170. See Criminal Court Loses Jurisdiction, supra note 169.
171. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05(5) (stating "[a] criminal prosecution is punitive
and is not designed to heal or mend the family").
172. See Karopkin, supra note 8.
173. See People v. Pettiford, 516 N.Y.S.2d 586 (Sup. Ct. 1987). A person can face a
civil proceeding under the FCA and criminal prosecution under New York Penal Law
for the same acts. This rule does not violate the double jeopardy clause because the
family court action is a civil proceeding instituted for the protection of children and
does not bar subsequent criminal prosecution. See id.
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protection from violence within the home. 74 Children were seen
as the property of their parents. 175 Child-rearing was left to the
parents' discretion and unfettered corporal punishment was the
prevailing means of discipline. 176 As child advocates have made
the case for the state's role in child protection,177 the legislature
and the courts have attempted to define what is acceptable treat-
ment of a child.178 Child protectors have advocated that children
have rights and that the state has an obligation to protect those
rights. 179 Both criminal and civil legislation has reflected this senti-
ment. In New York, Article 10 of the FCA has defined what acts
constitute impermissible neglect. 8 ° In addition, section 260.10 of
the New York Penal Law protects the child by criminalizing acts
that endanger the welfare of a child?81
On December 16, 1997, the New York State Assembly Standing
Committee on Children and Families held a public hearing on the
issue of law enforcement involvement in child welfare matters.1 82
The hearing was chaired by Assemblyman Roger L. Green, and
was held partly to discuss Assembly Bill 7068, which had been in-
troduced by Green in 1996.183 The Bill was intended to codify into
law the role of police and other law enforcement officials, in the
form of multi-disciplinary teams, to investigate cases of child
174. See Justin Witkin, A Time for Change: Reevaluating the Constitutional Status
of Minors, 47 FLA. L. REV. 113, 115 (1995) (stating that "[flor many centuries, chil-
dren were seen as chattels; they were mere property which was created and could be
sold or destroyed by their fathers").
175. See id.; see also Barbara B. Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and
Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1043 (1992) (stating
that "[tihe notion of the child as property is at least as old as the Greek and Judeo-
Christian traditions identifying man as a procreative force").
176. See id. at 1046.
177. See Moore, supra note 14, at 2066-67 n.25 (1995). The history of child protec-
tion is thought to have begun with the story of Mary Ellen Wilson in 1974. See id. at
2066 n.25. Mary Ellen was an eight-year-old girl who was chained, starved and beaten
by her adoptive parents. See id. The founder of the Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals advocated on behalf of this child, claiming that, as a member of
the animal kingdom, she should be free from abuse. See id.
178. See supra Part I.C.
179. See Hon. Charles D. Gill, Essay on the Status of the American Child, 2000
A.D.: Chattel or Constitutionally Protected Child-Citizen?, 17 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 543,
545 (1991) (discussing the first children's rights movement called the "child-saving"
movement).
180. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 1012 (McKinney 1999); see also supra Part I.C.
181. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 1999); see also supra Part I.C.
182. See Public Hearing, supra note 134.
183. See id.
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abuse. 184  The hearing was intended to examine the existing
policies. 185
Assembly Bill 7068 was part of a package of bills entitled "Safe
Homes, Safe Children.1' 86 One reason for the hearing was to ex-
amine "the emergence of what appears to be a new policy within
the New York City Police Department, which has resulted in a
number of arrests of parents and custodians for alleged instances of
neglect. ' 187 Assemblyman Green expressed a concern that the new
"must arrest" policy was being expanded to apply to child neglect
cases. 1 88 In light of this possibility, the Assembly decided to ex-
amine the police policy's purpose and discern its impact on investi-
gations conducted by Child Protective Services.' 89 Bill 7068
recommended that "law enforcement personnel should participate
in inter-agency, multi-disciplinary teams and they should be
charged with the responsibility of investigating cases of sexual
abuse and other severe instances of child abuse in accordance with
the state statutes."'190 The speakers who appeared to testify at the
public hearing included legal professionals from child welfare and
criminal practices.19'
A. Arguments for Increased Police Intervention and Criminal
Prosecution of Neglect Cases
Of all of the "great sins against children," neglect is often consid-
ered to be less severe than physical and sexual abuse.' 92 While
more than a half of the children in child protective services agen-
184. Assembly Bill 7068 was amended and enacted as section 422(14) of the New
York Social Services Law to allow disclosure of certain information of the statewide
central register of child abuse and maltreatment for the purpose of prosecuting a
charge of falsely reporting an incident in the second degree under section 240.55 of
the New York Penal Law.
185. See Public Hearing, supra note 134.
186. See id. at 7.
187. Id. at 8.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. Id.
191. Those in attendance included representatives of the Juvenile Rights Division
of the Legal Aide Society, the New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children, New York University Law Professor Martin Guggenheim and New York
City Criminal Court - Kings County Judge Martin Karopkin. The Assembly was dis-
appointed to find that neither New York City Police Commissioner Howard Safir nor
ACS Commissioner Nicholas Scoppetta attended the public hearing. Neither sent a
representative in his place.
192. Deborah Blum, Attention Deficit: Physical and Sexual Child Abuse Grab All
the Headlines. But What You May Not Realize is That Neglect Can Be Worse, 24
MOTHER JONES 58 (1999).
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cies are victims of neglect, it is physical and sexual abuse that draw
the most attention and the most serious reaction from the public. 193
However, a growing number or researchers are finding that neglect
may in fact have a more severe long-term impact on a child than
either physical or sexual abuse. 194
Advocates of active police involvement in, and criminal prosecu-
tion of, child neglect assert that the civil FCA and the criminal Pe-
nal Law are separate and necessary legislation to deal with the
growing problem of child neglect.195 The child protection system
serves the important purpose of rehabilitating families in crisis. 196
The criminal justice system maintains order by restraining perpe-
trators, and deterring and punishing crime.' 97 Ann Reiniger of the
New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children stated
the following in support of proposed New York Assembly Bill
7068:
The role of the police is to enforce the law on behalf of chil-
dren through the arrest of offenders followed by criminal prose-
cution and punishment for the violation of the law. The role of
child protective services is to protect children by assessing risk
as it impacts on the child and providing services with the author-
ity to remove children, if necessary.' 98
This distinction exemplifies the different purposes embodied in
the civil and criminal systems. These different purposes are
thought to justify separate systems dealing with the same problem.
193. See id. (stating that neglect accounts for 52%, abuse 24% and sexual abuse
6%, with the remaining attributable to medical abuse, emotional maltreatment and
unidentified factors).
194. See id. Studies by Bruce Perry, chief of psychiatry at Texas Children's Hospi-
tal in Houston and Susan Rose, professor at the School of Social Welfare at the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin in Milwaukee have indicated that victims of child neglect may
suffer more severe developmental delays than victims of other kinds of abuse. See id.
Penelope Trickett, a child abuse expert at the University of Southern California has
studied the developmental consequences of physical abuse, sexual abuse and neglect
and concluded that neglected children exhibit the most severe delays in learning and
social development. See id. Perry even offers physical proof of the damage done by
neglect. His proof consists of a slide of a child's brain who was a victim of global
neglect. The slide shows the ventricles of the brain, which should be small at the stage
of development captured, to be tripled in size and filled with fluid because the sur-
rounding brain did not grow to its full potential. He attributes this developmental
delay to the neglect. Other studies have indicated similar developmental delays asso-
ciated with neglect. See id.
195. See supra notes 180-181 and accompanying text.
196. See supra Part I.C.
197. See supra note 169.
198. See Public Hearing, supra note 134 (statement of Ann Reiniger).
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Children have the right to be free from harm or risk at the hands
of their parents. Proponents of criminal sanctions for child neglect
argue that because endangerment is a criminal act, the state has an
obligation to protect children from it, and prosecute offenders.1 99
The police can take an offender into custody upon making a deter-
mination of probable cause.2 0 The New York City "must-arrest"
policy in cases of domestic violence has already proven that safety
within the home is a public matter, and has helped ensure that
safety.20
1
Violence in the home no longer enjoys the privacy and protec-
tion that historically sheltered abusers from prosecution. 20 2 This
development reflects society's disapproving sentiment toward vio-
lence in the home, which,, in turn, enforces the value society places
on safe homes.20 3 Children, as victims, are less able to protect
themselves and are more deserving of state intervention.
In home alone cases, the police will contact ACS or bring the
child to the precinct to await the arrival of child protective serv-
ices.20' An arrest warrant is issued for the parent, who, when
found, will be charged with child endangerment. 20 5 The police take
this action, rather than simply calling ACS, because they fear the
child's safety will be jeopardized if ACS engages in a lengthy inves-
tigation. The police act swiftly so as to ensure that if a mistake is
made, they will have erred on the side of caution. Police Commis-
sioner Safir has stated that "even if we make a mistake in an inter-
vention, that's a mistake that doesn't really harm a child. '2 6
Criminal prosecution advocates support a multidisciplinary ap-
proach to child protection.20 7 This approach involves social work-
199. See In re Maria F., 428 N.Y.S.2d 425 (Fam. Ct. 1980) (noting that the state has
an obligation to protect the health, safety and well-being of children).
200. See POLICE DEP'T N.Y.C., PATROL GUIDE, PROC. No. t06-15, supra note 100.
201. See Donald Bertrand, Domestic Violence Up, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 5, 1998,
at 1 (quoting Queens District Attorney Richard Brown that the police department's
mandatory arrest policy has helped increase public awareness about domestic vio-
lence and provide help to victims).
202. See supra Parts I.A-B.
203. See Cathy Young, Domestic Violations, REASON, Feb. 1998, at 24 (discussing
how, in the campaign against domestic abuse, many states have instituted policies of
mandatory arrests in domestic violence cases; and how these policies have increased
arrests and addressed the problem of domestic violence).
204. See supra Part I.B.; see also POLICE DEP'T N.Y.C., PATROL GUIDE, PROC. No.
119-05: CHILDREN OR MINORS REQUIRING SHELTER (1995) (on file with the author).
205. Interview with Carmen Melendez, Spokesperson for the New York City Police
Department Office of Media Relations (Mar. 1999).
206. See Golden, supra note 113, at 5.
207. See Public Hearing, supra note 134 (statement of Ann Reiniger).
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ers, law enforcement and medical personnel working together to
identify and address both neglect and abuse.2 °8 Ann Reiniger ad-
vocated increased collaboration between the New York Police De-
partment and ACS: "Our goal should be to protect children by
combining the punitive and the rehabilitative approaches."2 9 She
did assert, however, that arrests should not be made without first
consulting with Child Protective Services.210
One element of the criminal procedure law that can be helpful in
child protection is a temporary order of protection. Under New
York Criminal Procedure Law, when a criminal action is pending
involving a complaint charging any crime or violation between
spouses, former spouses, parent and child or between members of
the same family or household, the court may issue a temporary or-
der of protection.z1 The court may issue this order ex parte upon
the filing of an accusatory instrument and for good cause shown. 212
It is common practice in criminal prosecutions for the prosecutor
to request the court to issue such an order of protection barring the
parent from contact with the child.213 Nothing in the criminal stat-
utes requires that the defendant be given an opportunity to be
heard where a temporary order of protection has been requested.
As a result, the temporary order may be issued without a hear-
ing.2 14 If convicted of endangering the welfare of a child, the puni-
tive nature of criminal prosecutions allows for the levying of a
punishment that fits the crime. 15
B. Arguments for the Child Protective System and Family
Court as More Appropriate Adjudicator of
Child Neglect
The family court was designed and created to deal with the
unique and complex problems facing families.216 Opponents of the
208. See id.
209. Id.
210. See id.
211. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.12(1) (McKinney 1999).
212. See id. § 530.12(3).
213. See Golden, supra note 113.
214. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.12 (3).
215. Upon entering a guilty verdict for child endangerment, the judge can levy a
sentence of up to one year imprisonment. Under section 260.10 of the New York
Penal Law, "endangering the welfare of a child" is a class A misdemeanor. See N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 1999). Under section 70.15, a sentence of imprison-
ment for up to one year can be levied for a class A misdemeanor. See id. § 70.15.
216. See WALTER GELLHORN ET AL., Ass'N B. N.Y.C., CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN
THE COURTS OF NEW YORK CITY: A REPORT AND STUDY ON THE ADMINISTRATION
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criminalization of child neglect focus on the inability of the crimi-
nal justice system to adequately accommodate the unique needs of
the family.217 They cite the historical development of child protec-
tive services and family court jurisdiction as a sophisticated and
appropriate response to the fragile nature of family offenses.218
The FCA recognizes the need for specialized attention for fami-
lies. Under the Act, the family court has "exclusive original juris-
diction" in abuse and neglect proceedings, except for the
jurisdiction retained by the supreme court.219 Judge Karopkin of
the New York City Kings County Criminal Court points out that
where an arrest is made and a criminal court prosecution pursued,
"the Criminal Court becomes the first court to address issues in-
volving removal of the child from the parent. This practice seems
to ignore the FCA and fails to make use of procedures that are
already in place to protect the interests of the child and the
parent."220
As a unique and fragile institution, the family has been deemed
deserving of specialized attention and services.221 The family court
and ACS have well-developed services and procedures to protect
children and to assess and treat families in crisis. Through the use
of such practices, the child welfare system protects the psychologi-
cal and emotional well-being of a child as well as maintains the
unity of the family.
The family court has jurisdiction over ACS and can compel the
agency to provide services or even to investigate allegations. 2
This power gives the court the benefit of the input of trained child
welfare professionals in determining the needs of the child. 2 3
Child protection workers and family court judges are guided by
statutes that strike a delicate balance between the goals of family
preservation and child protection.224 This balance gives these child
OF LAWS RELATING TO THE FAMILY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK (1954) (documenting
the history of the "urbanized family" in New York City and the development of a
children's court and a family court to deal with the unique and complex problems of
families). In 1933, the Domestic Relations Court Act of the City of New York com-
bined the children's court with the family court, which had previously been a branch
of the magistrates' court. See id. at 27.
217. See supra Part II.A.
218. See id.
219. See N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT §§ 114, 115 (McKinney 1999).
220. See Karopkin, supra note 8.
221. See GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 216.
222. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 1034, 1039 (McKinney 1999).
223. See In re Tashyne L., 384 N.Y.S.2d 472 (App. Div. 1976).
224. New York Social Services Law promotes family preservation by requiring ACS
to provide preventive services to families in need and by requiring caseworkers to
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protection workers the latitude to use their discretion and make
informed decisions on a child by child basis.225 Child protective
workers are obligated under the New York Social Services Law to
preserve families wherever possible.226 However, because the best
interests of the child are paramount in child protection decisions,227
there are due process protections in family court procedure that
prevent the unnecessary separation of parent and child.228 While
there are due process protections in criminal court, they are for
the individual. They are not for the family as a unit.
One important indicator of the "best interests of the child 229
standard in family court adjudications is the appointing of a law
guardian to all children who are the subjects of abuse and neglect
cases.23 ° The FCA provides that, at the first court date, all subject
children be appointed a law guardian who is assigned to represent
the child in the child protective proceedings.2 31 The theory behind
this practice is that the most thorough and effective prosecution of
a neglectful parent in family court does not always allow for the
effective representation of the child's best interests.232 In his
prosecutorial role, the Commissioner of ACS seeks a finding of ne-
glect or abuse against the parent.233 Independent representation
create a family service plan whenever a child is considered for foster care placement.
See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 409-a-e (McKinney 1999). New York Social Services Law
promotes child protection by empowering social services officials to investigate com-
plaints of abuse and neglect and to offer protective services to prevent injury to chil-
dren. See id. §§ 397, 398.
225. New York Social Services Law gives public welfare officers the power to inves-
tigate the family circumstances of each child reported to them in order to determine
what, if any, assistance is needed. See id. § 398(6)(a).
226. Section of 409-a of the New York Social Services Law identifies family preser-
vation as a priority in requiring ACS to provide preventive services when foster care
placement of a child is threatened. See id. § 409-a.
227. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 623.
228. See, e.g., id. § 1027(a) (providing that in any case where there has been an
emergency removal of a child, the court shall hold a hearing as soon as practicable
after the filing of the petition to determine whether the child's interests require pro-
tection pending a final order of disposition).
229. See supra note 47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the best interests
standard.
230. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1033-b.
231. See id.
232. See generally Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. & Sharon S. England, I Know the Child
is My Client, But Who Am 1?, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1917, 1920 (1996).
233. See COMMITrEE ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N, LAW
GUARDIAN REPRESENTATION STANDARDS 111 (1996) [hereinafter "LAw GUARDIAN
STANDARDS"].
Prosecution or presentment of the petition is not the law guardian's function
- the County Attorney or county Department of Social Services counsel ful-
fills that purpose. Equally, defending a client against charges is not the law
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for the child is necessary to give the court a full picture of the fam-
ily and its needs, as well as an informed child perspective. 3 The
law guardian is charged with putting the interest of the child first
and foremost.235
Section 249 of the FCA governs the appointment of law guardi-
ans.2 36 The proceedings in which law guardians are appointed have
been slowly expanded by the legislature and the courts.237 This ex-
pansion is due to recognition that because of the possibility of ad-
versity between the interests of the parent and the child, it would
be difficult for one attorney to represent them both.238 That a law
guardian is appointed by the court to represent the minor, and not
retained by the parent, ensures true independence of represen-
tation. 39
guardian's responsibility - the attorney for the respondent fulfills that pur-
pose and the child is the alleged victim rather than the accused. Thus,
neither the parents, parents' counsel, Department of Social Services and its
counsel, nor the Court can properly represent the child.
Id.
234. See id. at 112.
The law guardian's primary statutory function is to articulate and litigate the
child's position, and to protect the child's legal interests. In addition, the law
guardian should insure that every fact in support of the child's position
which may be relevant to preliminary orders, fact-finding proceedings or dis-
positional remedies, is presented to the Court.
Id.
235. See id. at 111 ("The law guardian's representation must be confined to the
interests of the child - and only the child.").
236. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 249(a) (stating "in a proceeding under articles 7, 3 or
10 or under § 384(b) of the Social Services Law... or when a minor is sought to be
placed in protective custody under § 158, the Family Court shall appoint a law guard-
ian ... "). When the New York Supreme Court has before it a case under the FCA, it
enjoys the power to appoint a law guardian. See Borkowski v. Borkowski, 396
N.Y.S.2d 962 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
237. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 249(a) (commentary by Douglas J. Besharov).
238. "[I]t is generally assumed that parents should not and.., cannot engage coun-
sel to represent their own children in child protective proceedings initiated against
them or in which they are an interested party because the appearance of a possible
conflict of interest and the danger of an actual conflict is too great to tolerate." Id.
239. See LAW GUARDIAN STANDARDS, supra note 233, at 112 ("By requiring the
law guardian to protect the child's 'interests' (rather than promote the 'best interests'
of the child), the Legislature clearly intended law guardians to perform a function
distinct from the judicial assessment of the best interests of the child."). Under sec-
tion 623 of the FCA, when a judge makes a dispositional order, the best interests of
the child are the paramount concern. See id. at 113.
The law guardian's role at trial, or fact-finding hearing, is extensive, and fre-
quently crucial. Recent caselaw imposes a high burden of effective represen-
tation, including the responsibility of proving or disproving child abuse or
neglect when appropriate. The law guardian must be a full participant, in-
troducing evidence and effectively examining and cross-examining witnesses.
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The FCA and Social Services Law also contain provisions for
protecting parents' rights to due process. When child protective
services has removed a child in cases of suspected abuse or neglect
without a court order, a hearing must be held as soon as practicable
after the petition is filed.24 ° The petition must prove imminent risk
to the child's life or health and that protective custody is necessary
to avoid this risk.241 While parents need not be present at this
hearing, their due process rights are protected by the procedure set
forth in section 1028 of the FCA for the return of a child temporar-
ily removed.242 Upon the request of a parent, a section 1028 hear-
ing must be held within three days of the parent's application for
an order returning a child who has been removed.243 At such a
hearing, the court must assess imminent risk to a child's life or
health.244
Because a child is represented by a law guardian at these hear-
ings, the child's due process rights are protected as well.245 In 1987,
section 1028 was amended to authorize the law guardian to make
an application for the return of a child.246 With the law guardian as
the voice of the child in the courtroom, the child can now partici-
pate in this important stage of child protective proceedings.247
Opponents of the trend of criminalizing neglect make a clear dis-
tinction between abuse and neglect. They are concerned that in
many of the cases currently prosecuted for child endangerment, the
alleged offending acts are merely symptoms of poverty.248 They
assert that police practices are outdated examples of state paternal-
ism and that the police are not properly trained to deal with child
240. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 1027.
241. See id. § 1027(b).
242. See In re Z., 339 N.Y.S.2d 3 (App. Div. 1972).
243. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 1028(a).
244. See id.
245. The appointment of the law guardian in family court protects the child's due
process rights by giving her a voice. See, e.g., In re Orlando F., 351 N.E.2d 711 (N.Y.
1976).
246. N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 1028(a).
247. See id. Under section 1028, the application for an order mandating the return
of the child need not be made within any prescribed time limit, so long as it is made
before an adjudication of abuse or neglect. See id. § 1028, at 42 (commentary by
Douglas J. Besharov). Therefore, the timing of requesting a 1028 hearing often in-
volves important strategic considerations. See id. at 45. Before this amendment, the
timing was largely under the discretion of the parents, and the child had no mecha-
nism to bring on request to be returned. See id. The amendment now provides such a
mechanism. See id. § 1028(a).
248. For example, home alone cases often are instances where the parent was at the
store or at work and could not afford childcare. See Swarns, supra note 74.
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neglect, which is often difficult to identify.249 While a collaborative
effort between the police and ACS may assist caseworkers in deal-
ing with massive case loads, critics of criminalization are concerned
that the police are showing little discretion in implementing the
policy on child protection.25 °
In her opinion in People v. Smith,251 Judge Smith expressed con-
cern over the increasing number of "home alone cases" appearing
in criminal court. 52 She pointed out that the statute, section 260.10
of the New York Penal Law, provides no guidelines on this sub-
ject.253 Judge Smith discussed how leaving non-infant children
within the care of responsible twelve- and thirteen-year-old siblings
is a "common and well established tradition,"'254 and further that
"[t]his practice is not based purely on economic factors, but rather,
touches on the very essence of the concept of family and child rear-
ing goals aimed at fostering and encouraging independence, re-
sponsibility, love and support among siblings. 255
In dismissing the charges, Judge Smith stated:
Until such time as the legislature clarifies its intentions with re-
spect to these often troubling "home alone" cases, so that the
public in general, and unwary parents in particular, can be made
aware of the legal ramifications of leaving children home alone;
well established and traditionally accepted community standards
must continue to be carefully applied on a case by case basis.256
Opponents of criminal prosecution argue that there is an identi-
fiable harm in zealous prosecution of child neglect.257 For one, it
restricts the commissioner of ACS's discretion in filing a neglect
249. See Public Hearing, supra note 134 (statement of Professor Martin
Guggenheim).
It is nothing short of astonishing to observe the Mayor of the City of New
York in 1997 enter the fray as a new kid on the block and come up with the
atavistic, long-rejected concept of using the police power to arrest, finger
print, detain, arraign and prosecute parents merely because the police have
probable cause to believe a parent has endangered the welfare of a child.
Id. "[T]he assessment of neglect requires a professional assessment by trained per-
sonnel, social workers, caseworkers, and we need to know what role should law en-
forcement have in making assessments of child abuse and of child neglect." Id.
250. Jill Zuccardy argues against the "misuse of the 'must arrest' statute [and] the
New York Police Department policy of using 'must arrest' as a justification for acting
independently of ACS in cases of alleged child neglect .... " Supra note 68.
251. 678 N.Y.S.2d 872 (Crim. Ct. 1998).
252. Id. at 875.
253. See id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 876.
257. See Public Hearing, supra note 134.
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petition.258 If a parent is arrested for child endangerment, a ne-
glect petition will most likely have to be filed. The fact that the
parent has been accused of acts that endanger the welfare of the
child, and that the parent has been taken into police custody can
provide the impetus for ACS to file regardless of the agency's own
assessment of the allegations. 9 Once a family court proceeding is
initiated, it is difficult to stop.260 Heavy caseloads and backlogged
dockets make the proceedings move slowly, and children can lan-
guish in foster care indefinitely.2 61 This delay is a problem because
under the new federal regulations, the New York codifications of
the Adoption and Safe Families Act, the longer a child remains in
foster care, the more likely parental rights termination proceedings
will be initiated.262
There is also another concern about criminalization that arises
when, despite an arrest and prosecution, no family court petition is
filed by ACS. The concern is that if there is no concurrent family
court case, the orders of protection issued by criminal court will be
the only standing order in the case, and it is an order that does not
take into account the best interests of the child.263 Often judges in
criminal court will issue orders of protection with a clause that
makes them "subject to family court," which relies on the family
court judge to ameliorate the situation.264 Here, the concern is not
that the arrest initiates a family court case, but rather that, without
a concurrent family court case, a full protection order remains in
place, barring the parent from seeing the child. Judge Karopkin
258. See id.
259. According to the ACS Office of Public Information, under ACS policy, the
arrest of a parent does not necessarily lead to ACS intervention or to the filing of a
petition. However, when speaking with a Emergency Children's Services worker, the
author was informed that, in practice, if a parent is arrested for child endangerment,
this creates a presumption of neglect, and the agency will take action.
260. See Megan M. O'Laughlin, A Theory of Relativity: Kinship Foster Care May Be
the Key to Stopping the Pendulum of Terminations vs. Reunification, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1427, 1433 (1998) (stating that, according to statistics, children removed from their
homes and placed in foster care spend an average of three years in the system, and
that one in ten will spend more than seven years in foster care, and attributing these
delays to the complex foster care system).
261. See id.
262. Under the New York Social Services Law, if a child has been in foster care for
fifteen of the last twenty-two months, ACS may be required to file a petition to termi-
nate parental rights. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 392(6)(i) (McKinney 1999).
263. Telephone interview with Martin Karopkin, J. (Apr. 13, 1999).
264. Id.
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found this concern to be so compelling that, as a result, he often
issues limited, rather than full, orders.265
Opponents of criminalization point out that arresting parents for
neglect is one of many contradictions of the New York City child
welfare system.266 While the public may like the image of police
rescuing children in danger, most people do not consider the conse-
quences of this police action.267 Often, the charges are dropped,
and even when they are not, the criminal prosecution does little to
mend the family.268 There is also a concern that parents who face
poverty will be less likely to reach out and ask for assistance and
services if they feel that drawing attention to themselves will leave
them vulnerable to arrest.269 If parents are not willing to access the
available services that provide housing and child care, then chil-
dren will suffer.270
While many criminal acts committed against children, including
physical and sexual abuse, require criminal prosecution and pun-
ishment, neglect is often the product of poor parenting skills, pov-
erty or cultural barriers. 271 These barriers are problems that can be
overcome through social work counseling, court supervision and
access to services.272 In these cases it is often in the child's best
interests to remain with the family - in such a case, family preser-
vation is a viable priority because it is the child's best interest. 3
Since the 1970s, child protective services have rejected separation
of parent and child as the predominant approach to abuse and ne-
glect.274 Reasonable efforts at preserving families replaced the
265. See id.
266. See Ilze Betins, Child Welfare Doesn't Belong in Police Hands, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 1997, at A30 (Ilze Betins is the program director at El Faro Beacon Youth
and Family Service.).
267. See id.
268. See app. infra, tbl.5.
269. See id.
270. See id.
271. See Bailie, supra note 138, at 2294 ("[F]amilies involved in neglect proceedings
are overwhelmingly poor.").
272. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 131(3) (McKinney 1999) ("As far as possible fami-
lies shall be kept together, they shall not be separated for reasons of poverty alone,
and they shall be provided services to maintain and strengthen family life.").
273. See id. The Social Services Law contains a presumption that family preserva-
tion is often in the child's best interest, and therefore remains a primary goal of the
regulations. See id.
274. See Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child. A Reappraisal of the
State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887, 889 (1975) (noting
that the predominant approach to protecting children in the 1970s was to separate the
child from the parent).
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"child rescue philosophy" of the 1970s.275 This pro-family senti-
ment acknowledged that separating a child from her parents can be
damaging to a child's emotional health.276
In child endangerment cases, the police and the criminal court
have the ability to interfere with the parent-child relationship by
determining when acts of neglect constitute criminal activity and by
issuing orders of protection that prevent the parent from contact-
ing the child.277 The debate over criminalization must consider to
what degree this policy jeopardizes the constitutional right to the
parent-child relationship. This debate raises the question of what
rights the child has to remain with her family. That determination
involves weighing the child's liberty interest in family autonomy
and unity with the state's interest in a thorough and expeditious
prosecution of criminally-neglectful parents.
C. The Constitutional Rights Implicated by Criminalizing
Child Welfare
1. The Constitutional Status of the Family
The integrity of the family Unit has found protection in the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Ninth Amend-
ment. 78 While the State has a substantial interest in protecting mi-
nor children, parents and children have a constitutional right to
remain together with limited governmental interference.279 In
275. See Bailie, supra note 138, at nn.43-47 and accompanying text.
276. See id. at 2290. See generally Areen, supra note 138.
277. See infra notes 291-295 and accompanying text.
278. See Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (holding that
"[t]his Court's decisions have by now made plain beyond the need for multiple cita-
tion that a parent's desire for a right to 'the companionship, care, custody, and man-
agement of his or her children' is an important interest that 'undeniably warrants
deference and... protection."' (citations omitted)); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
651 (1972). See also U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
279. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (Powell, J.,
plurality opinion) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (empha-
sizing the "'private realm of family life which the state cannot enter"')); see also Stan-
ley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 645; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(establishing the right of parents to control the upbringing and education of their
children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d
817 (2d Cir. 1977).
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1923, the U.S. Supreme Court first recognized the right of child-
rearing in Meyer v. Nebraska28 0 when it struck down a statute that
made it unlawful to teach foreign languages to grade school chil-
dren.21 A few years later, the Court struck down an Oregon stat-
ute requiring public school attendance that effectively outlawed
private and home schooling in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.28 2
The concept of family autonomy has been incorporated into the
modern right to privacy, which is considered part of the First
Amendment's "penumbra" of associational privacy.28 3 These
"penumbral rights ensured that the specific rights stated in the Bill
of Rights would remain secure. ' '2s4 In Roe v. Wade, Justice Black-
mun stated that the Court has recognized that "a right of personal
privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does
exist in the Constitution. ' 2 5 The origin of the right of privacy
is both in property rights as well as liberty rights.28 6 Historically,
privacy in the constitutional (as opposed to tort) sense was de-
fined not as an individual right, but rather a right belonging to
the institutions of marriage and family.287 Eventually, privacy
developed into an individual right.288 The modern right to pri-
vacy was primarily cultivated by the Court in the 1960s and
1970s.2 9
Historically, the family unit enjoyed a great deal of autonomy
from the State. Family members existed in gender-based roles, and
the family as an institution maintained a great deal of privacy.290
However, increasing public concern for women and children within
280. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
281. See id.
282. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
283. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (holding that several
of the Bill of Rights' guarantees protect privacy interests and create a zone of pri-
vacy). Douglas' majority opinion described Meyer and Pierce as part of the First
Amendment's penumbra. See id. at 482-83.
284. David Fisher, Parental Rights and the Right to Intimate Association, 48 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 399, 426 (1997).
285. 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
286. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLIT-
ICAL DISCOURSE 47-66 (1991).
287. See id.
288. See id. ("Eisenstadt marked the elevation to constitutional status of an individ-
ual's right to be let alone.").
289. See Fisher, supra note 284, at 407. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (declaring the right of a married couple to receive and use contraceptive
devices); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (upholding the right to privacy and
freedom to associate).
290. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION,
AND AMERICAN LAW 267 (1990).
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the home has led to increased state involvement over the years.291
Today, the State has tremendous power to intervene in the family
on behalf of a child.292 While this power represents the State's im-
portant interest in the safety of children, it has been criticized be-
cause zealous advocacy can often result in the witch-hunting of
parents.293 In response to increased State involvement, parents
have actively pursued the right to autonomous decision-making
and freedom from State interference. 294 As a result, modern dis-
course on the family and familial obligations has centered on the
parents' rights versus those of the State, i.e., the right to care for
children, to direct their education, and to have custody. 95 Child
advocates argue that this focus has lost sight of the child's interest
in these very same rights, the elements' that make up the parent-
child relationship. 296
2. The Constitutional Status of the Child
Children have always held a unique status in the context of con-
stitutional rights.297 While they are members of a family and there-
fore have some entitlement to the family autonomy that the
Supreme Court has recognized, they are not adults and therefore
retain a status that is not wholly independent.
As the law has progressed, children have been held to have cer-
tain constitutional rights. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized
the "personhood" of children.298 In Tinker v. Des Moines In-
291. See id. at 271.
292. In New York, section 1024 of the FCA provides-for emergency removal of a
child if the child is in "imminent danger." See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
293. See supra part I.B.
294. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (Powell, J.,
plurality opinion) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (empha-
sizing the "'private realm of family life which the state cannot enter"')); see also
Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1977); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (establishing the right of par-
ents to control the upbringing and education of their children); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
295. See supra note 294.
296. See, e.g., Melinda A. Roberts, Parent and Child in Conflict: Between Liberty
and Responsibility, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 485 (1996). "The
liberal model considers adults to have the right to make choices for themselves be-
cause they are both independent and rational. Lacking these distinctive characteris-
tics, children are not considered, within the liberal model, rights-bearers." Id. at 491.
297. See Justin Witkin, A Time for Change: Reevaluating the Constitutional Status
of Minors, 47 FLA. L. REV. 113 (1995).
298. Protectors of children's rights have promoted a theory of human rights and
human dignity in the struggle to establish constitutional personhood for children. See
Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives
and the Law, 36 ARIz. L. REV. 11, 26 (1994). In A Time for Change: Reevaluating the
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dependent Community School District,299 the Court stated that mi-
nors are included in the constitutional concept of "person" and
that children are possess fundamental rights that the State must
respect. 30 0 In In re Gault,30 1 the Court stated that "neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone. "302
The concept of children having rights within the constitution is
well-grounded. Advocates of children's rights often think the inad-
equacy of those rights is grounded in the failure of society to iden-
tify children as "persons" in the constitutional sense. 3  Despite
the Court's acknowledgment of the personhood of children, a bar-
rier has remained that prevents children from participation equal
to that of their social status, ability and need. Liberalism and the
triumph of individual rights and autonomy have developed the
modern concept of parental rights in such a way as to focus child
welfare disputes on a parent-versus-state model. 304 This model has
Constitutional Status of Minors, Justin Witkin presumes a liberal interpretive theory is
necessary to protect the rights of children. See Witkin, supra note 297, at 131. Witkin
embraces a "human rights theory" to understand the scope of the protections pro-
vided to children by the Constitution. See id. at 132. He advocates that "human dig-
nity mandates that the Constitution provide equal protection for the autonomy and
capacity for autonomy of all children that it provides for adults." Id. at 135. "The
Constitution might be seen as guaranteeing that adults will 'have a voice' in processes
which affect their person and/or property. This guarantee should apply to children as
well." Id. at 135, n.182 (citing Charles R. Tremper, Respect for the Human Dignity of
Minors: What the Constitution Requires, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1293, 1312-14 (1988)).
299. 393 U.S. 503 (1.969) (recognizing children's First Amendment rights and hold-
ing that a school could not prohibit students from wearing black armbands to protest
the Vietnam War).
300. Id. at 511.
301. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
302. Id. at 13.
303. See Fitzgerald, supra note 298, at 26.
The liberal constitutional view of persons as autonomous individuals and the
popular view of children as anything but autonomous individuals clash irrec-
oncilably. As a result, when deciding constitutional issues involving children
the Supreme Court has inadvertently demonstrated the inadequacy of the
liberal model of personhood for children.
Id.
304. Some constitutional theorists have asserted that the liberal movement has de-
fined the individual by the individual's relationship with the State. See id. at 23.
Under traditional liberal theory, government "should provide a framework of rights
that respects persons as free and independent selves, capable of choosing their own
values and ends." MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN
SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 4 (1996). Some authors assert that interpreting
the Constitution by reference to the liberal model leads to a constitutional system that
favors the parents' interests as against the child's. See Roberts, supra note 296, at 491.
Parents have fought for their liberty and privacy rights under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and typically the conflict was between the parents' and the State's perception of
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spawned a debate that alleges that liberalism leaves the child voice-
less in determinations that gravely affect the child's status as a per-
son and as a family member.3°5 This critique of liberalism asserts
that while liberalism has been a successful vehicle for the triumph
of individual rights for parents, it has failed to encompass individ-
ual rights for children.30 6 This dubious victory is because the em-
phasis on individuals' rights and autonomy has focused family law
debates on parents' rights versus the State.3"' The child has legiti-
mate and enforceable rights to liberty and due process, which indi-
cate that she deserves representation when a court makes a
custodial determination.30 8 However, it is presumed that either the
State or her parent has her best interests accurately identified and
adequately represented. 30 9  1
Proponents of children's rights assert that it is no wonder that
children have a level of participation that is unequal to that of their
status, ability and needs.310 They claim that the constitutional im-
balance between the rights of parents and the rights of children is
the result of a liberal theory of constitutional interpretation.3
Under liberal political theory, the prevailing political philosophy of
the time, the government "should provide a framework of rights
that respects persons as free and independent selves, capable of
choosing their own values and ends. ' 312 The State is to remain
neutral on the subject of what is "the good life" in order to respect
the child's best interest. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding
the state's interest in universal education is subject to a balancing test when it in-
fringes on fundamental rights - here the right of parents to handle the religious up-
bringing of their children, after Amish parents refused to send their children to public
school in violation of state law); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (es-
tablishing the right of parents to control the upbringing and education of their chil-
dren); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (upholding parents' rights to
determine their children's education). In this way, the liberal model, which focuses
on the parent as an individual, has focused. the family matter disputes on a parent-
versus-state model. See Sandel, supra note 304.
305. See Fitzgerald, supra note 298.
306. See id.
307. See supra note 286.
308. See supra notes 279-282 and accompanying text.
309. Melinda Roberts asserts that "cases in which children have been taken to have
constitutional rights are cases in which the parents' and child's interests typically coin-
cide." Roberts, supra note 296, at 492 (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954)). David Fisher asserts that part of the reason for this development is the pre-
sumption that parents act in the best interests of their children, a presumption that
has been upheld by the Court even in cases involving abuse and neglect. See Fisher,
supra note 284, at 412.
310. See Fitzgerald, supra note 298, at 23.
311. See id.
312. Sandel, supra note 304, at 4.
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the individual rights of persons.3 a3 The liberal movement has de-
fined the individual by the individual's relationship with the
State.314 Proponents of this interpretation advocate the notion of
the State respecting the autonomous individual's choices and deci-
sion-making.315 The republic's role in enforcing liberty is predomi-
nantly procedural; it is charged with ensuring the dignity and
autonomy of individuals.316 The individual, as an "unencumbered
self, ' 317 is free to make decisions without State intervention. The
State may only interfere with autonomy to the degree that it is nec-
essary in order to preserve the autonomy of others.318
3. The Child's Constitutional Rights within the Family
The constitutionally protected liberty interest in the parent-child
relationship extends to the child as well as the parent. It is "the
right of the family to remain together without the coercive interfer-
ence of the awesome power of the state. ' 31 9 A child has a liberty
interest in remaining with a parent. It has been decided that the
forcible removal of a child from parents constitutes seizure subject
to the Fourth Amendment requirements.32 ° While removing a par-
ent from a child may not restrict the child's liberty interest in her
freedom, it does restrict the child's liberty interest in remaining
with her family. In Quillion v. Walcott321 the Court stated: "We
313. See id. at 92.
314. See Fitzgerald, supra, note 298, at 24.
315. See id. at 23.
316. See id.
317. Sandel criticizes the liberal model because it promotes the notion of the unen-
cumbered self, and ignores the individual's responsibilities as a member of a commu-
nity. He promotes a civic republicanism that focuses more on membership,
participation and contribution, rather than on insulation. He proposes that "[t]he
public philosophy by which we live cannot secure the liberty it promises, because it
cannot inspire the sense of community and civic engagement that liberty requires."
Sandel, supra note 304, at 6.
318. See Fitzgerald, supra note 298, at 24.
319. Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 920 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting Duchesne v.
Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977)). Other circuit courts agree that a "child's
interest in her relationship with a parent is sufficiently weighty by itself to constitute a
cognizable liberty interest." Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir.
1991) (quoting Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1419 (9th Cir. 1987)). "The
integrity of the parent-child relationship is harmed by depriving children of adult care
320. See Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56 (1992); U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV ("The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
321. 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
1090
CRIMINALIZATION OF CHILD WELFARE
have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship be-
tween parent and child is constitutionally protected. 322
However, the constitutional status of the child within the family
is not considered wholly secure by some child advocates.323 There
is concern that especially within the acute situation where the
State's over-protective inclination aims to remove a child from her
parent, the parent's rights are balanced with the State's interest,
and this balance neglects the child's own rights and interest.324 This
view can be critiqued in that it is not a comprehensive approach to
the family's right to privacy and autonomy because it fails to ac-
knowledge the child as a central bearer of those rights.325 It is ar-
gued that when a court sides with a parent or with the State, it is
justified by the assertion that the prevailing party's interest in the
child represents the best interest of the child herself, but that the
child's interest is rarely represented in and of itself.326
The debate over criminalizing child welfare in New York City
has involved various articulations of the core problem, and pro-
positions for the most appropriate solution.
III. CRIMINALIZING CHILD WELFARE DOEs NOT ADEQUATELY
PROTECT THE RIGHTs OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES
A. Identifying the Problem with Criminalization
Child neglect is a severe societal ailment. While it is different
from child abuse, it is no less harmful and may have more long-
term effects.327 The evolution of the child protective system signi-
fies that society will not tolerate child neglect.328 This development
also signifies that the family and the child are unique and that a
unique approach and a specialized system are necessary to deal
with problems. 329 This specialized system is necessary because
traditional criminal justice does not address the problem of pre-
serving families and does not take into account the best interest of
322. Id.
323. See Fitzgerald, supra note 298, at 17, 22-23.
324. See id.
325. See id.
326. See Roberts, supra note 296, at 492 n.16 (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954)) (asserting that "cases in which children have been taken to have
constitutional rights are cases in which the parents' and child's interests typically
coincide.").
327. See supra Part II.A.
328. See supra Part I.A.
329. See supra Part ll.B. for an overview of family court.
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the child. The child protective system and the family court as gov-
erned by the FCA are specifically designed for this consideration.
Opponents of the criminalization trend argue that the police
have no role in child welfare. 330 However, because neglect is a
crime under the child endangerment statute, and because the prob-
lem of neglect affects all of society - as do most crimes - law en-
forcement must play a role. Society cannot demand public
attention to child welfare and then exclude law enforcement. In
addition, while many of the arrests made are truly erring on the
side of caution, many others are justified.331 Even in home alone
cases, there is a broad range of benign circumstances leading up to
this neglect. Some unfortunate parents, on account of a lack of
daycare resources, have merely left children in the care of an older
sibling or alone briefly for a trip to the market. Here, poverty is
often the primary cause of the "neglectful" actions, and poverty
should not indiscriminately be mistook for neglect.3 3 2 Other egre-
gious circumstances have uncovered parents' blatant disregard for
their children's well-being.333 It would be inappropriate to lump
these cases together.
From 1990 to 1998, the number of arrests where the primary
charge was "endangering the welfare of a child" has more than
tripled.334 It is important to identify the significance of this in-
crease. Does it mean that there is more neglect and therefore
more arrests? Answering this question requires a look at the
number of abuse/neglect reports that came into the child protective
system. From 1990 to 1998, the number of these reports has in-
330. See supra Part II.B.
331. The arrests are often justified in that the parents have left the child in a dan-
gerous situation. See, e.g., Associated Press, Teen Mother Arrested After Leaving In-
fants Alone, BUFF. NEWS, Dec. 22, 1997, at 6A (describing how a teenager in Harlem
was arrested for leaving one-year-old and two-year-old alone with food smoldering on
stove while she went out partying all night).
332. New York Social Services Law acknowledges poverty as a factor that may re-
sult in conditions that are symptomatic of, and therefore mistaken to be, neglect. See
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 131[3] (McKinney 1999) ("As far as possible, families shall be
kept together, they shall not be separated for reasons of poverty alone, and they shall
be provided services to maintain and strengthen family life.").
333. For example, in 1997 a Russian couple were arrested for endangering the wel-
fare of a child when they left their four-year-old daughter home alone all night while
they were out partying in an upscale Manhattan club. See Barbara Ross et al., Party
Parents Busted for Leaving Girl, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 5, 1997, at 4.
334. See app. infra, tbl.5. In 1990, the number of arrests was 303, whereas in 1998, it
was 1111.
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creased only slightly.335 In addition, while the number of reports
coming into the State Central Registry has increased slightly, the
number of Article 10 petitions filed has actually gone down
substantially.336
Overall, these numbers seem to indicate that it is not that there
is more neglect, it is that the police are making more arrests. While
it is exactly this "trend" that has concerned some child and family
advocates, the increase in arrests may not be as alarming as is
feared. That is because the number of arrests is still minute com-
pared to the number of reports - founded or unfounded. The 1111
arrests in 1998 represent only 1.9% of the 57,842 reports that year
and 1.01% of the 11,000 petitions filed.337 Therefore, even if the
police are arresting more neglectful parents, they are still only
reaching a fraction of the problem.
The real concern with this "trend" emerges when one looks at
the arrest statistics in and of themselves and asks whether this new
police policy is appropriate and effective. Its appropriateness is a
policy question, but whether it is effective is best determined by
looking at the dispositions of the arrests. Among the arrests for
which disposition information is available, the rate of dismissal is
extremely high.338 Of the cases that are prosecuted, the over-
whelming majority plead out and never go to trial.339 On average,
only two to three people a year (of the reported dispositions) go to
trial and get a verdict.340 It is hard to determine what increasing
arrests accomplish because few offenders serve any time or even
receive probation or fines.341
The real problem with the recent trend of arresting parents and
prosecuting them for acts of neglect is that the criminal justice sys-
tem is not equipped to deal with families in the way in which soci-
ety decided families should be dealt when it created the child
protection system. The criminal justice system can only help vic-
tims and society by keeping perpetrators away from their victims
and possibly away from society. However, this policy conflicts with
335. See app. infra, tbl.1. In 1990, the number of reports was 55,158, whereas in
1998, it was 57,842.
336. See app. infra, tbl.4. In 1990, 21,719 Article 10 petitions were filed. In 1997,
the number was 11,154 (based on this number the projected figures for 1998 are
11,000).
337. See app. infra, tbls.3-5.
338. See app. infra, tbl.5.
339. See id.
340. See id.
341. See id.
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the priority that society has given to the preservation of families.342
The goals of family preservation and the child's best interests dic-
tate that the most effective means of addressing child protection
must involve more than simply punishment and protection.
Families are too complicated to fit into the rigid two-party sys-
tem of criminal justice prosecutions. Where an act of neglect has
taken place, the three parties involved, the parent, the child and
the State, may have different goals. Often the parent's goal is to be
reunited unconditionally with the child. Likewise, the State's goal
may be to keep the child from the parent, thereby ensuring her
safety and reducing state liability. The child, however, has interests
that may intersect with both those of the parent and the State, but
are not completely represented by either. Where the parent has
been neglectful by failing to properly supervise or by being unable
to fully provide for the child due to poverty, such non-violent be-
havior may not justify placing the child in foster care. In New York
City, ACS has the ability to provide multiple services to the family,
short of foster care placement of the child, to help the parent rem-
edy the neglectful behavior. 343 The child may wish to remain with
her parent. However, she would not want this reunion to be un-
conditional, which would relegate her to the powerless position of
Joshua DeShaney. 3" She may want a reunion conditioned on her
parent's compliance with State-offered parenting services, and ef-
fective supervision of that compliance by child protective workers.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, parents have been accorded
various liberty and privacy rights with respect to the custody and
care of their children.345 In the cases that gave rise to these rights,
there was typically a conflict between the parent's and the State's
perception of the child's best interest, and the matter was litigated
342. See supra Part I.C.
343. See supra note 145.
344. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
Joshua DeShaney was a four-year-old boy who was left profoundly retarded after
several beatings by his father. Social Services had become involved with the family
after Joshua's physician notified them of suspected abuse. See id. at 192. He was
temporarily removed, but returned on the condition that his father comply with the
agency's proffered services. See id. Social Services failed to take action, despite the
fact that while Joshua was under their supervision the caseworker noticed unusual
bruises, the father failed to comply with services and Joshua went to the emergency
room twice with injuries. See id. at 192-93. The Court held that the due process
clause conferred no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may
be necessary to secure a life, liberty or property interest, of which the government
itself may not deprive the individual. See id. at 196.
345. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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focusing on those two positions. Little consideration was given to
whether the parents accurately represented the child's actual best
interest, or merely asserted their own interest. 346 The result is that
the focus on the rights of parents, and parents' interest in the child
versus the State's interest in the child, has left the child powerless
as a rights-bearer. Children's rights are generally thought to be
represented insofar as they align with either the interest of the
State or the interest of the parents.347
The conflicting goals of parents, children and the State are not
well accommodated in criminal court. The child has no advocate in
the criminal court proceedings because victims are never indepen-
dently represented in criminal prosecutions, and the prosecutor is
not obligated to abide by the victim's requests. Without represen-
tation, the court lacks input on what is in the child's best interests
when making a ruling.
In child endangerment cases, the criminal court makes determi-
nations that inevitably affect the custodial status of the child. Be-
cause the child's fundamental rights of due process and liberty are
affected, the question becomes to what extent does the child have a
right to remain with her parent.348 If that right is limited, then per-
346. Pierce and Meyer were decided without reference to the interests of the child,
reinforcing the concept of children as property. In Meyer, the Court's decision that
the state could not forbid the teaching of foreign languages in public schools centered
on the Court's assertion that such a law would infringe upon the liberty rights of
parents and teachers. The child's interest in an education that included foreign lan-
guage instruction was not discussed. See Meyer, 262 U.S. 390. In Pierce, the Court
similarly limited its discussion to the liberty interests of parents and teachers. See
Pierce, 268 U.S. 510.
347. This development is often blamed on the presumption that parents act in the
best interest of their children. This presumption also has been embraced by advo-
cates for parents and family preservation. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 284, at 399.
"Even in cases involving parental abuse and neglect, the Court has upheld the pre-
sumption that parents act in their children's best interest. In Santovsky v. Kramer,
this presumption was expressed by requiring a heightened standard of evidence to
terminate parental rights." Id. at 412. As deference to parents' rights expands, courts
tend to reject children's claims if they conflict with those of their parents. See, e.g.,
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989) ("We have never had occasion to
decide whether a child has a liberty interest, symmetrical with that of her parent, in
maintaining her filial relationship. We need not do so here .... "). See also Fitzger-
ald, supra note 298, at 26.
The liberal constitutional view of persons as autonomous individuals and the
popular view of children as anything but autonomous individuals clash irrec-
oncilably. As a result, when deciding constitutional issues involving children
the Supreme Court has inadvertently demonstrated the inadequacy of the
liberal model of personhood for children.
Id.
348. This paper does not advocate raising the child's status to a level equal with
that of adults. In the modern welfare state it is sound policy to acknowledge the
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haps it is acceptable that a child endangerment prosecution disre-
gards family preservation and the child's best interest in pursuit of
retribution and deterrence. The child's best interests may be pe-
ripherally considered when the court or the jury determines if the
State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of en-
dangerment was committed. However, if the child's right to the
parent-child relationship is substantial, then perhaps it dictates that
the only appropriate forum for adjudicating child neglect is one
that is free to consider the child's best interest first and foremost,
as well as strive for family preservation when possible. This consid-
eration is simply not possible within the confines of a criminal pros-
ecution with its own burden of proof and standard for review. If
the child's right to the parent-child relationship is fundamental, it
may demand that the child be represented in any court proceeding
that affects her custodial status. The expansion of the law guard-
ian's role in family court matters exemplifies the importance of
representation for the child.349 However, victims are not indepen-
dently represented in criminal prosecutions.
Ultimately the question is whether the child's right to remain
with her family is so compelling that the forum in which that right
will be best protected is the forum that should be chosen for ne-
glect adjudications. If it is, then clearly neglect belongs in family
court. Such a determination should involve weighing the child's
liberty interest in family autonomy and unity with the state's inter-
est in prosecuting criminally-neglectful parents. The debate
around criminalization then will turn on the constitutional implica-
tions of each policy. The child's liberty interest is protected under
New York Social Services Law, the FCA and federal legislation
that requires that the best interests of the child be the overriding
consideration,3 50 and that family preservation remain a goal where
ever possible.351 In a criminal prosecution, however, such consider-
ations are absent.352 In this way, the criminal prosecution of child
neglect does not adequately represent the status that children have
achieved as rights-bearers. The state can separate a parent and
patriarchal role of the State and family in the lives of children. Instead, this paper
asserts that children have interests independent of the State and their parents and that
protection of these interests requires legal representation and some degree of auton-
omy in decision-making.
349. See supra Part II.B.
350. See supra note 136.
351. See supra notes 155-160.
352. See supra Part I.C.
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child without any attempt to safeguard the parent-child
relationship.
B. Why Criminalization Does Not Adequately Protect the
Rights of Children and Families
The child protection system and the family court should be used
to address the problem of neglect because under the child protec-
tion system, the child's constitutional right to the parent-child rela-
tionship is best considered and protected.
Law enforcement should certainly play a role because child en-
dangerment is a crime. However, social workers should be in-
cluded in criminal investigations of child neglect to make sure that
the child is considered at all stages. Police and caseworkers to-
gether conduct a thorough investigation. Caseworkers often em-
ploy the assistance of police when making home visits or removing
children in order to ensure the safety of everyone involved.353
The problem with criminalization is not that the police are play-
ing a more active role in child welfare. The problem is what hap-
pens after the arrest. The defendant-parent may go through a
criminal prosecution and receive some form of punishment, with-
out receiving any help to change the root of the problem. The ret-
ribution and the punishment that is achieved by a criminal
prosecution may be valuable for society, but it may have little
value to the family itself. The parent ultimately goes back to the
home and the child, still ill-equipped to remedy the neglectful be-
havior that is the root of the problem.
Opponents of criminalization assert that the police are ex-
panding the domestic violence "must arrest" policy to neglect. 354 It
is difficult to determine if this assertion is really the case. The New
York Police Department's position is that they have always re-
sponded to child neglect the way they have in recent years.3 5 5 This
response would indicate that the increased number of arrests is
simply due to a higher rate of neglect. However, the numbers re-
ported by child protection services do not indicate this claim.356
353. See MARC PARENT, TURNING STONES: My DAYS AND NIGHTS WITH CHIL-
DREN AT RISK 146 (1996) (recounting the use of police assistance in removing chil-
dren by the author, a former New York City Emergency Children's Services
caseworker).
354. See supra note 61.
355. See supra note 169.
356. See app. infra, tbl.1 (showing that the number of reports has increased very
little in the last eight years).
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Regardless of the policy behind the arrests, the result is where the
real problem lies.
Family advocates should reject the criminalization of child wel-
fare not because it is a wholly bad option, but because there is a
better option. The child protective system and the FCA promote
family preservation and the child's best interests, and promote so-
ciety's goal for safe and stable families for all children. The crimi-
nal prosecution of child endangerment can achieve separation of
the victim and the offender and punishment of the offender. How-
ever, this outcome is not in the best interests of children and par-
ents because it does not provide for family preservation and
unification.
What, if anything, does criminal prosecution achieve that family
court cannot? In cases of abuse, where the harm to the child is
more immediate, prosecution under the assault statute provides an
immediate remedy. Neglect, however, poses more of a long-term
threat. Whether the neglect is a product of poor parenting skills,
poverty or other ailments, a civil remedy designed to address the
harm that has been done, and prevent harm in the future, may be
more effective in the long-term.
The New York City child protective system may not be perfect,
but it is designed to look out for the best interests of the child and
to preserve families whenever possible.
Essentially, this choice is a policy question: Who is better
equipped to handle the problem of neglect? The answer depends
on what resolution society wants for families in crisis. If family
preservation is to remain a priority, then family court proceedings
are more appropriate. If punishing the crime and preventing fur-
ther offense is more important, then criminal prosecution may be
more appropriate. This Note supports the legislative goals of fam-
ily preservation and child protection as identified in the New York
Social Services Law and the FCA, and for this reason supports the
use of family court proceedings to address child neglect, its causes
and effects.
The child has a recognizable liberty interest in the parent-child
relationship. The exclusion of the child from the criminal prosecu-
tion does not reflect the status that children have achieved as
rights-bearers in that the child has no voice and no right to self-
determination in proceedings that affect custodial status.35 7 Crimi-
nal prosecution creates a chasm in the relationship between the
357. See supra Part II.B.
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parent and child, and there are no provisions that address this
problem. It is not sufficient to presume that the child's interest is
represented by the parent or the State because it is precisely this
presumption that was discarded when the role of the law guardian
was created in the family court system.358
Because the criminal context is centered around a strict two
party system - parent versus the State, the child is left voiceless.
Her rights are presumed protected by either the parent or the
State, although her true interests often do not fully align with
either. The lack of protection for the child's best interest that cur-
rently exists in a criminal prosecution seems to call for a procedural
remedy. One possibility would be for the criminal court judge to
hold an automatic hearing before an order of protection is issued.
Essentially, this goal can be achieved if defense counsel requests
the hearing. However, the standard by which to judge the criminal
charges still will fail to encompass an assessment of what is best for
the child. Thus, the child should be represented by legal counsel in
a child endangerment prosecution and the child's best interests
should be considered before an order of protection is issued. How-
ever, to add the role of a law guardian in child endangerment cases
is implausible because victims generally have no independent rep-
resentation in criminal prosecutions. Such an expansion would set
a precedent of the victim as a party to criminal prosecutions.
While this is not the direction in which the criminal justice system
is likely to move, it would certainly help the criminal prosecution
of child neglect achieve a holistic remedy for families.
Within the constraints of the criminal justice system families are
not treated as a rights-bearing unit. Therefore, the most appropri-
ate forum for neglect adjudication is family court, where the child
is better represented, and the standard is the child's best interests.
CONCLUSION
As child protection comes to the forefront of law-enforcement,
the legislature, judicial scrutiny and the criminal justice system
must reassess the effectiveness of the traditional two-party system
in proceedings that affect the custodial status of non-party children.
Because the child has traditionally been the victim in neglect cases,
the rights of children have been discussed and developed in the
context of asking, what rights does a child have against her parent?
That is, when is corporal punishment excessive, what constitutes
358. See id.
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neglect, to what extent can a parent control the child's education,
medical care and so forth. This discussion, while an important one,
has neglected to encompass the question of what rights does a child
have to be with her parent? Addressing this point requires a bal-
ancing of interests - the State's interest in protecting children, the
parents' interest in raising their children and the child's interest in
both safety and a parent-child relationship.
The trend in child welfare has been to err on the side of protec-
tion, often considered erring on the side of the child. While this
approach may have been appropriate to overcome a long history of
State abstinence from involvement in the family domain, it has
been under-inclusive in protecting the child's fundamental right to
a parent-child relationship. A delicate balance must be struck be-
tween family autonomy and State intervention. This balance is
best achieved in the family court when the child's best interest is
represented and the family is addressed as a whole. Under tradi-
tional criminal procedure, which focuses on the parent-defendant
versus the State, one of these two parties is presumed to represent
the child's best interest. This presumption effectively precludes the
notion that the child may have an interest that is independent of
either the parent or the State. The result has left the child voice-
less, dependent on the judgment of the parent, the State or a court.
This judgment will always be under-informed without input from
the child. This Note concludes that the criminal justice system, by
focusing on the parent's claims against the State and the State's
interest in child protection, is inadequate in accommodating the
constitutional rights of the child to self-determination. Neglect is
more appropriately adjudicated under the FCA, which considers
the best interests of the child first and foremost, and which strives
for family preservation.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1
ABUSE AND NEGLECT REPORTS
FY 1990-1998359
Abuse/Neglect Reports: Total number of all reports recorded by the State Central Register
(SCR), for the Fiscal Year received.
Children: Total of all children in reports
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 360
Abuse/Neglect
Reports 55,158 52,985 52,504 52,458 49,129 47,571 52,994 53,567 57,842
Children 88,334 84,540 83,295 86,651 77,238 75,017 85,432 86,852 89,719
TABLE 2
MANDATEDINON-MANDATED REPORTS
CY 1990-1997361
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Total
Mandated 31,970 33,139 32,699 33,927 31,521 30,202 32,858 39,572
Total Non-
Mandated 19,746 19,210 19,728 17,026 15,348 16,356 19,185 16,559
TABLE 3
PERCENT OF INDICATED ABUSE/NEGLECT CASES BY
REPORTING SOURCE
CY 1990_1997362
Indicated Abuse/Neglect Reports: Percent of reports, determined upon
investigation to have credible evidence of abuse or neglect.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Total Mandated 50.1% 43.5% 34.4% 33.2% 34.8% 36.0% 40.1% 40.0%
Total Non-
Mandated 26.3% 22.5% 16.7% 16.5% 17.6% 18.1% 16.7% 17.4%
359. For the source of this data, see ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN'S SERVS.,
OUTCOME AND PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (June 1998) (deriving data from State
Central Register Monthly Reports).
360. The 1998 figures are projected.
361. For the source of this data, see ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN'S SERVS.,
OUTCOME AND PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (June 1998) (deriving data from State
Central Register Monthly Reports).
362. For the source of this data, see id.
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TABLE 4
ARTICLE 10 PETITIONS FILED ANNUALLY
FY 1990-1998363
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 364
Article 10
Petitions
Filed 21,719 16,200 12,837 10,798 9,646 8,554 9,381 11,154 11,000
TABLE 5
STATE OF NEW YORK - DIVISION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SERVICES
OJSABUREAU OF STATISTICAL SERVICES
ARRESTS FOR ENDANGERING WELFARE OF A CHILD
(PL 260.10)
NEW YORK CITY
36 5
ARREST YEAR 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
TOTAL ARRESTS 303 335 419 424 486 644 872 1052 1111
UNREPORTED DISPOSITIONS 26 30 32 27 51 67 80 204 492
% OF ARRESTS 8.6% 9.0% 7.6% 6.4% 9.9% 10.4% 9.2% 19.4% 44.3%
NOT PROSECUTED 17 14 42 29 51 63 59 66 71
PROSECUTED 260 291 345 368 387 514 733 782 548
CONVICTED 108 120 142 172 192 195 308 272 283
-PLEA 105 117 134 171 192 189 299 271 282
-VERDICT 1 1 5 0 0 4 6 0 1
-UNKNOWN 2 2 3 1 0 2 3 1 0
DISMISSED 148 167 197 187 187 310 420 498 250
ACQUITI'ED 1 0 3 5 4 1 1 3 1
OTHER DISPOSITION 3 4 3 4 4 8 4 9 14
SENTENCES TO:
PRISON 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 2
JAIL 9 11 26 14 21 19 31 28 26
TIME SERVED 17 6 7 7 6 9 9 7 14
JAIL + PROBATION 1 0 3 0 4 3 9 8 8
PROBATION 12 17 12 27 21 16 30 29 13
FINE 11 5 17 7 10 15 20 20 20
COND. DISCHARGE 55 78 73 116 127 126 202 171 189
OTHER 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1
UNKNOWN 2 2 3 1 2 6 4 5 10
363. See id.
364. The 1998 figures are projected.
365. For the source of this date, see COMPUTERIZED CRIMINAL HISTORY (Jan.
1999).
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CONVICTION RATE
(% OF DISPOSED)
INCARCERATION RATE
(% OF CONV)
% OF CONVICTION TO:
FELONIES
MISDEMEANORS
LESSER OFFENSES
39.0% 39.3% 36.7% 43.3% 43.8% 33.8% 38.9% 32.1% 45.7%
25.9% 15.0% 26.1% 12.2% 16.7% 16.4% 16.2% 16.5% 17.7%
0.9% 0.8% 3.5% 1.2% 0.5% 1.0% 0.6% 0.7% 0.7%
32.4% 35.0% 37.3% 38.4% 35.9% 42.6% 33.1% 44.5% 33.9%
66.7% 64.2% 59.2% 60.5% 63.5% 56.4% 66.2% 54.8% 65.4%
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